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Précis 
This study is an analysis of the origins and early evolution of 
the conception of a communist menace in South African politics. 
While anti-communist sentiments in the South African political 
arena does not know any racial or ethnic bounds, it was in the 
context of white and, more specifically, Afrikaner nationalist 
politics that the conception of a communist menace, during the 
latter half of the 1930's, developed a stature and character 
which placed it on a level distinctively different from earlier 
references to this perceived menace. Chapter One discusses some 
of the functions of remarks on communism before 1937. 
Of importance in this analysis is not simply anti-communism as 
a political sentiment or an indication of political preference, 
but rather the origins of a specific kind of anti-communism 
which developed into an organic part of the larger ideology of 
Afrikaner nationalism. In this regard attention is focussed on 
the content, place and role of anti-communism in the main 
political embodiments of Afrikaner nationalism between 1937 and 
May 1945, viz. the Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party, the 
Ossewa-Brandwag, New Order and the Greyshirt-movement. 
Relating to the content, place and role of anti-communism in 
the aforementioned organisations, the evolution thereof was 
affected by a multiplicity of factors which, included, inter 
alia, the following: World War II, a variety of ideological 
elements relating to communism as well as other ideologies, 
differences between Afrikaner nationalist oppositional 
groupings, campaigns against Smuts and the ruling United Party 
and specific campaigns e.g. the colour question. Chapters Two, 
Three and Four discusses some of these elements. 
Chapters Five and Six discusses the three main component parts 
of the campaign against communism, namely the Colour Question, 
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Jewish Immigration and the promotion of Christian-nationalist 
trade unionism as alternative to the perceived communist 
approach. While the campaign against alleged Jewish compassion 
for communism had already reached a climax prior to the 
outbreak of war in 1939, the struggle for the "soul" of the 
Afrikaner working class and the integration of the 'red menace' 
(communism) and the 'black peril' (the colour question) 
progressively grew in stature. Particularly the integration of 
overt anti-communism and the colour question serves to 
illustrative the earlier referred to character of anti-
communism as an organic part of the ideology of Afrikaner 
nationalism. 
In conclusion, some remarks are presented on the functional 
role of anti-communism in Afrikaner nationalist as well as 
South African society between 1937 and 1948. Given the fact 
that this dissertation is a study of conceptions and does not 
aim to evaluate the factual content or even fairness of remarks 
attributed to communism, these comments, by nature, will have 
to be of a tentative nature. 
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Précis 
Hierdie verhandeling is In studie van die oorsprong en vroee 
ontwikkeling van die konsepsie van In kommunistiese bedreiging 
in die Suid-Afrikaanse politiek. 
Ofskoon anti-kommunistiese uitsprake in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
politiek nie gebonde is aan enige ras- of kleurgrens nie, was 
dit tog binne die kader van blanke politiek en, meer spesifiek, 
die ontwikkelende Afrikaner nasionalisme, waar die konsepsie 
van In kommunistiese bedreiging, gedurende die dertigerjare, In 
statuur en karakter van sy eie ontwikkel het. Hierdeur is anti-
kommunisme verhef tot In vlak wat fundamenteel verskillend was 
van vroedre uitsprake. Hoof stuk Een bespreek van die funksies 
van overte anti-kommunisme voor 1937. 
Van belang in hierdie studie is nie net anti-kommunisme as 
politieke sentiment of as aanduiding van politieke voorkeur 
nie, maar veel eerder die oorsprong van In spesifieke soort 
anti-kommunisme wat ontwikkel het tot In organiese deel van die 
groter geheel van Afrikaner nasionalisme. In die verband word 
aandag geskenk aan die inhoud, plek en rol van anti-kommunisme 
in die meer prominente politieke bewegings wat hul vereenselwig 
het met die ideale van Afrikaner nasionalisme, nl. die 
Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party, Ossewa-Brandwag, Nuwe 
Orde en die Gryshemp-beweging. 
Met verwysing na die inhoud, plek en rol van anti-kommunisme in 
bovermelde bewegings, is die ontwikkeling daarvan beinvloed 
deur In verskeidenheid van faktore wat, onder andere, ingesluit 
het die Tweede Wereldoorlog, In verskeidenheid elemente wat 
betrekking gehad het op kommunisme sowel as ander ideologied en 
spesifieke beleidsaspekte by. die kleurvraagstuk. Hoof stukke 
Twee, Drie en Vier bespreek van hierdie faktore. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study was borne out of a fascination with the dynamics of 
the total (communist) onslaught - complex in contemporary South 
African politics. While the conception of a communist onslaught 
against South Africa, which reached a climax under the 
government of P.W. Botha, and measures supposedly aimed at the 
suppression thereof have had many functions over the years, 
sufficient for the immediate aims of this study is to note that 
both in terms of foreign policy and internal politics, overt 
anti-communism, since 1948, have had an all-permeating 
influence. 
This dissertation started out as an analysis of the origins and 
consequences of the Suppression of Communism Act (Act 44/1950). 
Relating to the origins of the aforementioned Act, this study 
inadvertently had to include an investigation into the 
historical roots of the perception of a communist menace in 
South African society. While no attempt have been made to come 
to terms with specifically this issue in scholarly analyses, 
analysts, broadly speaking, explain the evolution of the 
perceived 	 menace in the framework of the post-1945 
era.') During research it was found that the origins of the 
conception of a communist menace was neither to be found in the 
immediate post-World War II era nor did it first come to the 
fore in the years immediately following the National Party's 
May 1948 election victory. In lieu of this, the year 1948, as 
point of departure for an analysis dealing with measures aimed 
at the suppression of a perceived menace, did seem somewhat 
inconsequential and clinical. Hence it was decided to undertake 
a study into the origins and early evolution of the perceived 
communist menace in (white) South African politics. This, then, 
in broad terms, is the issue at hand in this dissertation. 
1. See, for example, W.N. Botes: Die Suid-Afrikaanse  
Beleidsformuleerders se Persepsie van die Kommunistiese 
Bedreiging 	 teen 	 Suid-Afrika. 	 Unpublished 	 M.A.- 
dissertation, RAU, 1985. 
communist 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
vi 
This theme demands immediate and further clarification. As a 
first point it needs to be noted that the origins of the 
conception of communist onslaught are to be found in that all-
fascinating decade of South African politics, namely the 1930s. 
This fact is important as it immediately puts to rest the 
erroneous impression that the conception of a communist 
menace/onslaught, in pure historical terms, is either a post-
1945 or post-1948 phenomenon. The earliest indications of an 
explicit overt anti-communism in South African society can be 
traced back to the period preceding the outbreak of World War I 
in 1914.2)  However, in terms of the creation of an enemy image, 
as will be argued, manifestations of anti-communism, prior to 
1937 largely served to bring into focus elements not normally 
associated with the evolution of a conception. 
This last remark leads to the second and third points: Firstly, 
anti-communism reared its head amongst black oppositional 
groups long before it did so in white circles. Sol T. Plaatje 
reportedly condemned the 'Black Bolshevists of Johannesburg',3)  
while many of the tribal chiefs witin the hierarchy of the 
African National Congress rejected Bolshevism as an anti-royal 
ideology which posed a threat to the indigenous royal 
c1asses.4)  Given the predominance of race in South Africa, 
however, the decision-making process have always been the near-
exclusive domain of the white man. Hence, a study of the 
evolution of the perceived communist menace in South Africa, as 
a result of the peculiarities unique to this society, will have 
to be a study of white perceptions. 
See W.P. Visser: Suid-Afrikaanse koerantberiggewing en -  
kommentaar t.o.v. Arbeiderspartye, Sosialistiese Partye en  
ander radikale groepe en bewegings, 1908-1915. Unpublished 
M.A.-dissertation, US, 1987. 
See B. Willan: Sol Plaatje: A Biography, 1872-1932, p.224. 
One of these chiefs warned: "The Tsar was a great man in 
his country, of royal blood like us chiefs and what is he 
now? ... If the ANC continues to fraternise with them (the 
communists) we chiefs cannot continue to belong to it. See 
F Meli: South Africa belongs to us, p.78. 
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Secondly, in the context of the 1930s and during the 1940s, the 
conception of a communist menace evolved within the framework 
of the struggle between Afrikaner nationalism and British 
Imperialism. While Afrikaner nationalists - irrespective of 
ideological orientation/affiliation 	 repeatedly stressed the 
existence of an alleged communist menace, all such allegations 
were denied by Jan Smuts and the ruling United South African 
National Party. This last development, for the aims of this 
analysis, means that attention will largely be limited to 
Afrikaner nationalist conceptions of communism. 
Relating to Afrikaner nationalist conceptions of communism, it 
needs to be emphasized that no single organisation had a 
monopoly on the ideological construction or evolution of overt 
anti-communism. On the level of politics, all of those 
movements aspiring to provide political leadership to Afrikaner 
nationalists were involved in the debate surrounding anti-
communism. A multitude of other organisations/institutions 
outside of the formal political terrain also contributed to the 
evolution of the perceived menace of communism. While these 
different categories of organisations and the movements in 
themselves fundamentally influenced one another on the theme of 
anti-communism, in the context of this dissertation attention 
will be limited to those attempting to embody the political 
ideals of Afrikaner nationalism. The limited attention afforded 
to the process of cross-pollination between the different 
sectors 	 (cultural-religious-intellectual 	 vs 	 political) 
comprising Afrikaner nationalism in this study is a definite 
drawback. A meritorious examination of this issue, however, 
demands a separate study and different analytical framework. 
This dissertation, then, focusses on the origins and early 
evolution of the conception of a communist menace in Afrikaner 
nationalist politics. The introductory chapter examines the 
place and role of perceived communism in Afrikaner and South 
African society prior to 1937. The second, third and fourth 
chapters analyse the evolution of the perceived communist 
menace in the main political embodiments of Afrikaner 
nationalism in the period between 1937 and May 1945. These 
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organisations are the Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party, the 
Ossewa-Brandwag, the New Order and the Greyshirt-movement. 
Chapters five and six focus on the three main component parts 
"communism" over this period, namely of the campaign against 
the Jewish Question and Immigration, the Colour Question and 
the struggle for the "soul" of the Afrikaner proletariat. The 
concluding chapter, in drawing together the previous five 
chapters, discusses the functional role of overt anti-communism 
in Afrikaner nationalist and South African politics in the 
years between 1937 and 1945. 
The chronological limitation of this study, as will henceforth 
be explained, is a logical division. The year 1937, as 
indicated, marked the advent of the evolution of a perceived 
communist menace in the ranks of Afrikaner nationalist 
political organisations. In May 1945, Nazi Germany, following 
the suicide of Adolf Hitler, surrendered to the Allied Forces. 
Regarding the conception of a communist menace, the period 
between 1937 and May 1945, in spite of many adaptations, does 
reveal a certain continuity. The changed character of 
international politics, following the demise of Germany, 
introduced a new frame of reference to international and 
locally-held conceptions of the modii operandi and vivendi of 
communism. Most important in this regard was the bipolar 
division in the international arena which progressively came to 
the fore from 1945 onwards. South Africa, in siding with the 
West in this battle for international ideological hegemony, as 
elsewhere in the world, were fundamentally affected by it. 
Research for this dissertation was undertaken at various 
institutions throughout the country. These included the J.S. 
Gericke Library at the University of Stellenbosch, the African 
Studies Centre at the University of Cape Town, the Institute 
for Contemporary History at the University of the OFS, the 
Ferdinand Postma Library at the Potchefstroom University for 
Christian Higher Education, the William Cullen Library at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, the provincial archives in 
Cape Town, Bloemfontein and Pretoria and the national archives 
depot in Pretoria. Although a wealth of information was 
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uncovered on the different aspects of the 'red menace'; 
relative to the evolution thereof in Afrikaner nationalist 
political movements, this search, frustratingly, proved less 
rewarding. A single example will illustrate this: The archives 
of the Ossewa-Brandwag (OW) in Potchefstroom, while helpful in 
the sense that it contains some important policy statements on 
the subject of 'communism', are incomplete and reveal very 
little about the different aspects of the OB's campaign against 
this perceived menace. 
The main sources of research material ultimately turned out to 
be newspapers, official press-organs, and, in the case of 
parliamentary-based organisations, parliamentary debates 
(Hansard). Newspapers used were Die Burger and Die Transvaler - 
for the Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party, the New Order (in 
the pre-1940 period) and other 'befriended' organisations. 
Official press organs included Die Waarheid-The Truth (the 
Greyshirt-movement); Die O.B. (the Ossewa-Brandwag); Die 
Kruithorinq (the Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party); and Die  
Anti-Kommunis (the New Order). 
Other sources used, apart from those already identified, are 
indicated in the text. 
This study, while not aspiring to any great heights, will, by 
being the first in the field, hopefully stimulate further 
research into this fascinating topic. On another level, themes 
have been identified which demand further elucidation. In the 
context of this introduction, perhaps three possible future 
fields of research should be highlighted: 
Firstly, the bilateral and multilateral cross-pollination 
between the various volkseie [literally endemic to the 
people] cultural, religious, economic, intellectual, and 
political organisations/institutions in the evolution of 
the conception of a communist onslaught against South 
Africa. 
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Secondly, the integration of the 'red menace' (communism) 
and 'black peril' (the colour question) in South African 
politics. Astonishingly, this issue has been ignored thus 
far in academic writing. 
Finally, the contribution of the perceived communist 
menace in the promotion of Afrikaner nationalist trade 
unionism and, on a broader level, the role of this issue 
in South African labour history. While several studies 
have appeared on the Christian-nationalist onslaught on 
the established (white) labour movement, these studies 
either ignore the role of overt anti-communism as •a 
contributing factor or accept the existence of a communist 
menace as a given reality. Two of the few authors who have 
thus far partially attempted to come to terms with the 
role of perceived communism in South African labour 
history are H.L. du Plessis5)  and M.A. du Toit6). Both 
studies, however, are incomplete and outdated. 
Many people contributed towards this study. While impossible to 
mention them all, I would like to single out the following: 
Firstly, my parents for their invaluable and continuous 
support. Secondly, my dissertation-supervisor, Prof. P.H. Kapp 
and co-examiner, Prof. P.R. Nel. Without their guidance, 
valuable comments and encouragement this study would never have 
been completed. Various other academics also commented on 
different drafts and parts of this study. I this regard I would 
like to extend a special word of thanks to Prof. Rodney 
Davenport of the University of Grahamstown, Dr. Ian Phillips of 
the University of Natal in Pietermaritzburg and Prof. Hermann 
Giliomee of the University of Cape Town. Gratitude is also due 
to Mrs. Doris Conradie for her typing of the manuscript. 
See H.L. du Plessis: Die Vakbondwese in Suid-Afrika met  
spesiale verwysing na die Klerewerkersunie. Unpublished M. 
Comm-dissertation, PUCHE, 1955. 
See M.A. du Toit: Vakbondontwikkeling en -beleid in Suid-
Afrika. D.Comm.-thesis, US, 1971. 
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The Unit for Soviet Studies deserves a special mention. Apart 
from supporting this project financially, Prof. Nel was also of 
great help in locating and acquiring research material. This 
study forms part of a larger HSRC-sponsored project on South 
African conceptions of the Soviet Union and communism. In this 
context, the hope is expressed that this study will provide new 
insights. 
Andre Van Deventer 
Stellenbosch 
March 1991. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
AFRIKANERS AND COMMUNISM - THE EARLY DECADES OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 
This chapter has two objectives: First, it aims at providing an 
analysis of remarks on communism by individual Afrikaners 
during the first two and a half decades of the twentieth 
century. In this regard attention will respectively be focussed 
on a lecture by D.F. Malan on Socialism in 1913, a speech by 
J.B.M. Hertzog on Bolshevism at the Transvaal Congress of the 
National Party in 1919 and J.C. Smuts' remarks on communism at 
the time of the Rand Revolt in 1922. Remarks on communism by 
these individuals will be considered as representative of the 
major conceptions prevalent in Afrikaner-ranks at the time)-) 
The second objective is to trace the course of the debate on 
the subject of communism within the two main (white) political 
parties of the period, viz. J.B.M. Hertzog's National Party and 
the South African Party under the leadership of J.C. Smuts. 
Although Hertzog's and Smuts' remarks on communism in 1919 and 
1922 are also taken into account, in this particular section of 
the chapter attention will be restricted to the period between 
1927 and 1930. The reason for focussing attention on this 
period is the argument that prior to the enactment of Section 
29 of the Native Administration Bill in 1927, remarks on 
communism, within the aforementioned parties, largely served to 
bring into focus elements not normally associated with value-
systems which are indicative of political/ideological 
preference. Chapter One will serve as background to and form 
the basis for the main body of this study. 
1. It needs to be emphasized, however, that, within the 
framework of this analysis, no attention will be afforded 
to remarks on communism by Afrikaners sympathetic to the 
socialist cause. 
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1.1. D.F. MALAN ON SOCIALISM, 1913 
Socialism formed the topic of a lecture delivered to a meeting 
of the Graaff-Reinet Literary Society by D.F. Malan during the 
second half of 1913.2) Malan, at the time, was Minister of 
Religion at the local Dutch Reformed Church.3)  Malan's 
perspective in the presentation of his discourse was largely 
determined by his training as both philosopher and Calvinist 
theologian. Although Malan may have been a supporter of either 
Hertzog or Botha/Smuts, political persuasion, given the non-
contentious nature of Malan's speech at the time, were arguably 
of less importance than motivations of a religious-theological 
nature. If Socialism had indeed been a divisive issue in 
Afrikaner politics at the time, a speech with obvious political 
overtones would have been suicidal for Malan's position as 
minister of the Dutch Reformed Church. 
In his discourse Malan distinguished between two forms of 
Socialism, viz. 'Anarchism' and 'Christian Socialism'. This 
distinction, albeit of a very special nature, must be seen in 
the context of the period. In modern day-terminology this 
distinction seemingly refers to respectively Marxian-Socialism 
and a form of Social Democracy. Although 'Anarchism' (read also 
communism) was adjudged to be "... comparatively insignificant 
[and] ... need not further be discussed 	 114) , it is 
fundamentally important to note that Malan considered both 
'Anarchism' and 'Christian Socialism' to be offshoots of one 
ideology. In his exposition Malan was dealing with this larger 
body of thoughts. 
Complete copies of Malan's lecture, originally published 
in 1913 by the Graaff-Reinet Advertiser, can be found in 
the D.F. Malan-Archives, J.S. Gericke Library, University 
of Stellenbosch and the G.W.U.-Collection, William Cullen 
Library, University of the Witwatersrand. 
See B. Booyens: Die Lewe van D.F. Malan, pp.252-254. 
D.F. Malan: Socialism, p.16. 
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Malan described Socialism as ... a movement which aims at 
nothing less than the reconstruction of society on an entirely 
new basis. This basis must be an equal opportunity for all 
human beings and an equitable share for all in the wealth and 
the culture of this world."5)  This analysis will concern itself 
mainly with Malan's evaluation of his subject. 
In his appraisal of the theoretical principles of Socialism, 
Malan stressed three aspects: 
Social reform: Malan lauded Socialism for its exposure of 
imperfections in society. This had resulted in the 
awakening ... [of a] slumbering sense of social 
responsibility 	 116) within humanity at large. In his 
criticism, however, Malan was intent on indicating the 
limited value of this doctrine. Malan put the question 
whether private ownership did not provide a powerful 
incentive for initiative to remove social impediments 
under the existing order. Malan thus contended that 
Socialism should be credited for the awakening of a 
positive social consciousness, but in as far as the 
removal of observed deficiencies were concerned, he was 
more doubtful of its success. 
Materialism: Malan criticised the 'extreme narrowness' 
of Socialism in believing "... that man can live by bread 
alone."7) According to Malan an analysis of society based 
on the premise of a purely economic substructure 
represented a humiliation and debasement of man: 
Ibid., p.5. 
Ibid.  
Ibid., pp.17-18. 
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"If [Socialism] ... is to be the light of 
the world and illuminate the dark places of 
all ages, it can not be wholly identified 
with any perishable scheme, suitable to a 
particular age, but must look, like the 
sun, from its all comprehensive point of 
view at all the problems of this world from 
above. ,,8) 
iii) Private and public ownership: Malan 	 indicated 	 that 
stability and social order was preferred to the breaking 
up of family life and the consequent dissolution of 
society which may result from the destruction of private 
ownership. 
Malan stressed that the convertibility of Christianity and 
Socialism was untenable. Resemblance was limited to a mutual 
acknowledgement of the potential of religion as a force 
affecting positive social change. Socialist interest in the 
Creator was selective, one-sided and suffered a lack of vision. 
This, according to Malan, had resulted in undisguised 
contempt, even hatred for the Christian Church as it is, 
especially in as far as it emphasises the greater importance of 
the spiritual world and the life to come."9) 
In illustrating this incompatibility, Malan paid attention to 
the scope and method of respectively Christianity and 
Socialism. Malan contended that Socialism had as single 
objective the rearrangement of society. This limited 
perspective stood in sharp contrast to Christianity where 
social reform, as such, was merely one of a number of aims: 
"... He [God] fixed his eyes not on any particular scheme for 
social improvement, but on an end in which all social questions 
will find their solution."1°)  
Ibid., p.17. 
Ibid., pp.9-10. 
Ibid., p.17. 
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Socialism with its aggressive external methods and 
Christianity, with its aim of influencing society from within, 
provided another example of this incompatibility for Malan. 
Malan came to the conclusion that Socialism H... needs 
Christianity as a corrective. We may hope and pray that 
Christianity and Socialism may be so guided in their future 
development that the deep yearning, the wide-spread movements, 
and even the passions and the violence of the age may prove to 
be but the birthpangs of a better social world."11) 
Although Malan's treatise on Socialism may have had a bearing 
on the later campaign by the Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale 
Party (G/HNP) against the perceived menace of communism, the 
drawing of correlations between these events should best be 
avoided. An analysis of Malan's 1913 speech, in the context of 
the G/HNP's latter campaign against perceived communism, albeit 
interesting, does not take into account the irrevocable passage 
of time between these two sets of events. This, then, would 
prove to be unhistorical. Furthermore, such an exercise largely 
negate the actual religious-theological perspective of Malan's 
lecture and faultily place it in the context of a speech 
exclusively motivated by political considerations. 
The importance of Malan's speech is to be found in three other 
areas. Firstly, this speech was one of the earliest attempts by 
any Afrikaner to provide a coherent analysis of some of the 
principles underlying Socialism. Secondly, while Malan, in his 
treatise of 1913, attempted to explain some of the fundamental 
tenets underlying Socialism, he was equally concerned with 
providing an elucidation of his conception of the place, role 
and effect of Socialism vis a vis other ideologies in the 
future socio-political deployment of South Africa. Important, 
however, is to remember that this was done from a religious-
theological perspective. Finally, and of special significance 
for the aims of this study, is to note that Malan's appraisal 
of Socialism (positive and negative) corresponded with remarks 
11. Ibid., p.18. 
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by Christian-Socialists on the European continent who, like 
Malan, accepted elements of Marx' theory of a class based 
society and exploitation of the poor by the rich, and, like 
Malan, could not identify with the political and economic 
consequences of orthodox Marxist theory. In short, MalanIs 
speech was thus representative of a particular conception of 
Socialism to which a number of Afrikaners would ascribe. 
In closing it needs to be emphasized once more that Malan, in 
his treatise, was dealing with a composite body of thoughts 
collectively referred to as Socialism. Socialism, for Malan, 
included both 'Anarchism' and 'Christian Socialism'. In the 
next three sections attention will be focussed on a single 
variant of Socialism, viz. Communism or, as was the case with 
Hertzog in 1919, Bolshevism. 
1.2. J.B.M. HERTZOG ON BOLSHEVISM, 1919 
During November 1919 J.B.M. Hertzog, then leader of the 
National Party (NP), touched on the subject of "Bolshevism" at 
the Transvaal Provincial Congress of the NP. This created a 
minor upheaval amongst Afrikaners and Hertzog was under fire 
from friend and foe alike.12)  
Hertzog described Bolshevism as "... de wil van het yolk om vry 
te zijn, zelf te regeren en niet aan 'n vreemde veroveraar 
onderwerpen te zijn."13) Hertzog acknowledged that this 
ideology contained certain basic deficiencies, but, for him, 
these deficiencies were of secondary concern. In the final 
analysis Bolshevism was essentially virtuous: 
See letter from F.C. Eloff to J.B.M. Hertzog, 26.11.1919. 
(Cited in F.J. Spies et. al.(eds.): Die Hertzogtoesprake, 
IV, pp.146-147.) 
Spies et. al.(eds.): op.cit., p.141. 
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Hertzog warned against an undue fear for Bolshevism. Bolshevism 
was opposed because "... volksvrijheid ..." ,14) which formed an 
integral part of this ideology, would result in the destruction 
of capitalism and imperialism. Bolshevism was part of a 
universal social revolution motivated by "... HET RECHT VAN 
BESTAAN ALS MENS ..."15)(emphasis in the original). The 
ideology of Bolshevism represented so powerful a force that not 
even the great armies of the world were able to check its 
progress. 
Seen in isolation, Hertzog's words may have been cause for some 
concern in certain quarters of South African political life. 
Perspective, however, can only be gained when an analysis of 
this speech is made as part of Hertzog's wider political 
beliefs and placed against the backdrop of South African 
involvement in the Great War of 1914-1918. Finally, Hertzog's 
speech should also be viewed in the context of the early 
Bolshevik emphasis on self-determination for the various 
peoples of the Czarist Russian Empire. 
The establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 
initially held the promise of a politically united 
Afrikanerdom. The majority of Afrikaners believed that their 
national and political aspirations would be realised within the 
ranks of Louis Botha's South African National Party (SAP) .16) 
Less than three years later cohesion had 'erupted into disunity 
and uncertainty with the establishment of the National Party 
(NP) under the leadership of J.B.M. Hertzog. A comprehensive 
discussion of all the variables which contributed to the 
development of this state of flux in Afrikaner politics is not 
a prerequisite for this inquiry. Attention will rather be 
focussed on those factors which had a direct bearing on South 
African participation in World War I. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
D.W. Kruger: The Making of a Nation, p.54. 
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The Union constitution of 1910 did not provide for a South 
Africa sovereign and independent in all respects. South Africa 
was still bound by decisions of the King on matters of war and 
peace. The retention of South Africa's status as an integral 
and permanent part of the British Empire was a non-negotiable 
element in Botha's political credo. Botha's death in August 
1919 and the resultant take-over of the Party chair and 
Government-leadership by Jan Christian Smuts led to an 
increased accentuation of the importance of this imperial tie. 
From 1912 onwards Hertzog embarked on a campaign to assert 
South Africa's right to control her own international destiny. 
In popular terms this principle became known as Hertzog's 
doctrine of "South Africa First". Important is to note that 
Hertzog did not rebel against South Africa's constitutional 
position as part of the British Empire. Rather, he contended 
that if, in a hypothetical situation, South African interests 
were in conflict with those of the Empire, local considerations 
should be given priority. 
When war was declared in London in 1914, South African 
participation was a logical consequence brought about by her 
constitutional position. Hertzog foresaw local involvement to 
be essentially defensive in nature if - and only if - the 
Union's limited sovereignty and territorial integrity were 
violated by external threat. Involvement in German West- and 
East Africa and ultimately on the European continent proved to 
Hertzog that Botha was willing to employ an offensive strategy 
in furthering the Union's war effort. This and the lingering 
memory of the Anglo-Boer War, to mention but two factors, 
convinced Hertzog that the War was fought in the interests of 
the British Empire. As such it was irreconcilable with his 
stated doctrine of giving precedence to national interests. 
Davenport indicates that support for the war effort by Sir 
Thomas Smartt and his Unionist Party, normally associated with 
the Witwatersrand mining magnates by Afrikaners, led to a 
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revival of anti-capitalist sentiments in Afrikaner ranks.17)  By 
nature, the war had now become an act of imperialist aggression 
which would only benefit, at least in South African terms, a 
small number of capitalists. It is interesting to note that in 
portraying the War in these terms, a number of Afrikaners 
aligned themselves with the stance adopted by the International 
Socialist League (ISL), the main forerunner of the Communist 
Party of South Africa (CPSA). 
Partly as a result of ideological and tactical considerations, 
Russian Bolsheviks initially placed particular emphasis on the 
right to self-determination for the different nationalities in 
Czarist Russia.18)  The Russian Provisional Government, in June 
1917, had been urged by the First All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets to issue a declaration recognising the right to self-
determination for all nations in Russia to the point of 
secesssion. The Council of People's Commissars, during 1917, 
adopted as principle in this regard: " THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLES 
OF RUSSIA TO FREE SELF-DETERMINATION UP TO SECESSION AND THE 
FORMATION OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE"18)(italics in the original). 
Finally, in a declaration adopted by the Third All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets in January 1918, it was declared that "... 
all the nations of Russia ... [have] the right of unfettered 
decision whether and on what basis to participate in the 
federal government and in the other federal Soviet 
institutions. t,20) 
Even before the cessation of hostilities in 1918, different 
statesmen had expressed themselves on a possible post-war 
status quo. Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of 
T.R.H. Davenport: South Africa - A Modern History, p.175. 
See E.H. Carr: The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, I, 
pp.265-281 and R. Medvedem: Let History Judge - The  
Origins and Consequences of Stalinism, pp.49-55. 
See M. McCauley (ed.): The Russian Revolution and the  
Soviet State, 1917-1921 - Documents, pp.191-193 
("Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia"). 
Cited in Carr: op.cit., p.269. 
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America, mentioned in vague terms the right of self-
determination for small nations. Remarks, in similar vein, had 
also been made by Lenin's Bolshevik government in relation to 
the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany. 21) A resolution on peace 
adopted by the Congress of Soviets in January 1918, for 
example, called for peace without annexations. Annexation was 
defined as meaning 	 • • • any union of a small or weak 
nationality with a great or powerful state without the 
precisely, clearly, and willingly expressed consent and desire 
of that nationality. 1122) 
Wilson's remarks, in particular, found a spring-board amongst 
supporters of Hertzog according to Kruger.23)  After the war 
Hertzog and other leaders of the NP went to the Paris Peace 
Conference to lobby for the restoration of independence to 
Transvaal and the Orange Free State.24)  
Hertzog's words in 1919 must be interpreted against this 
background. Hertzog's description of "Bolshevism" may just as 
well have been a declaration dealing with a possible 
prospective independent Transvaal and Orange Free State. Being 
in favour of such an arrangement, Hertzog may have equated the 
Party's striving with the October Revolution of 1917. 
As indicated earlier, Hertzog ultimately perceived World War I 
to be an act of imperialist aggression. South African 
participation thus represented a flagrant repudiation of his 
doctrine of "South Africa First". In participating South Africa 
had foresaken her own interests and paid lip-service to the 
wishes of imperialist capitalists. Hertzog found a similar 
situation in the continued criticism levelled at the Soviet 
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, concluded between Soviet 
Russia and Germany in March 1918, terminated Soviet 
participation in World War I. 
See E.H. Carr: The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, I 
pp.268-269. 
Kriiger: op.cit., pp.106-110. 
Ibid. 
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regime. The alleged negation of national interests in favour of 
the interests of another state was a contention which had 
appeared in various nationalist circles the world over. 
In a speech at Smithfield Hertzog presented a clear exposition 
of this belief.25)  Hertzog contended that he was in possession 
of positive and irrefutable evidence which indicated that South 
African capitalists had furnished the imperial Russian regime 
with a loan totalling £6 000 000 to assist them in preparing 
for participation in the War. Rumours of a willingness to sign 
a peace accord with Germany - which would have resulted in 
great losses for the capitalists - moved these same people to 
instigate a revolution in order to remove the czar from office 
and thereby guaranteeing Russian involvement in the conflict. 
"Maar, helaas, de revolutie, sterker dan zij vermoed hadden, 
rukten hun, zoals wij vandaag alien weten, de handen uit, en in 
steden van hun geld verzekerd te krijgen 	 kwam de Regering 
van Rusland te landen in de handen van 't Russiese yolk zelf 
u26) Continued criticism of Bolshevism, therefore, was an 
attempt by capitalists to mobilise public support for their 
venture to destruct the Soviet state. This undertaking, once 
again, was motivated by economic exploitation. 
In analysing Hertzog's 1919 speech, two different explanations 
may be offered: Firstly, Hertzog may have honestly believed 
that the drawing of comparisons between local conditions and 
those in Soviet Russia - at least in as far as it pertained to 
the striving towards self-determination - was indeed a 
plausible endeavour. Communism, in terms of Hertzog's 
perspective the guiding force underlying this striving in 
Soviet Russia, therefore had to be evaluated in a positive 
manner. Communism and the striving towards national autonomy, 
at least in Russia, were thus intimately interlinked. However, 
if the above explanation is accepted, it must immediately be 
Spies et. al. (eds.): op.cit., p.156. 
Ibid., p.155. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
12 
added that Hertzog's knowledge of events in Russia during 1917 
was obviously limited, superficial and even outdated. 
The second explanation views Hertzog's speech as an example of 
his opportunism. It is argued that Hertzog consciously ignored 
the actual historical context of his allegations and, 
selectively, proceeded to glorify elements of the October 1917-
revolution and subsequent developments. In this way Hertzog 
construed a model of Bolshevik Russia which provided the 
striving towards national autonomy with an international rather 
than sectional character. This, in turn, could provide extra 
stature to the NP's own agenda of volksvrijheid and self-
determination. The ideology of communism, in this context, was 
of secondary importance. 
Irrespective of whether a realistic interpretation of Hertzog's 
speech is to be found in any one or a combination of the two 
explanations cited above or whether it was merely, in the words 
of Oberholster, "... In naiewe verdediging van die beginsel van 
self-determinasie vir nasies "27), fundamentally important for 
the aims of this analysis is the role of communism, as an 
ideology, in this regard. 
Communism/Bolshevism, in all three instances, is afforded a 
character of secondary importance. Hertzog's primary concern in 
1919 was the promotion of his treatise on self-determination 
and the right of every nation to be allowed to determine its 
own destiny. Selected events in Soviet Russia - when seen in 
isolation and if interpreted from a Bolshevik-point of view - 
did indeed lend support to Hertzog's thesis on self- 
27. A.G. Oberholster: Die Randse Staking van 1922,p. 66. 
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determination.28)  In utilizing these and other developments to 
illustrate a given point, Hertzog may have associated 
Communism/Bolshevism with the dormant and embryonic Afrikaner 
nationalism. In promoting the NP-ideal of self-determination on 
the perceived example of another country, care had to be taken 
not to demonise the alleged force behind this striving in the 
country quoted. The point bears stressing, however, that the 
promotion of volksvrijheid and full national autonomy was of 
uppermost importance in Hertzog's mind. Bolshevism, in this 
context, was of relative insignificance and served to 
illuminate Hertzog's arguments in favour of full national 
autonomy. 
Against this background, Hertzog's remarks on Bolshevism can 
hardly be afforded a character normally associated with 
political/ideological value-systems. 
1.3. J.C. SMUTS, THE RAND REVOLT OF 1922 AND COMMUNISM 
The Rand Revolt, its causes and consequences have been well 
documented in recent studies.29)  Discussion in this analysis 
will be limited to Smuts' evaluation of the involvement of 
Communists/Bolshevists in the dispute and related developments. 
A single example will serve to illustrate this point: 
World War I, in Bolshevik-phraseology, was also described 
as an "Imperialist War". Lenin, following the October 1917 
Bolshevik take-over, issued a Decree on Peace which called 
for the signing of an immediate and unconditional 
armistice between all combatant-nations. This decree was 
in accordance with an intensive propaganda campaign 
undertaken by Bolsheviks between July and November 1917 
aimed at the immediate withdrawal of Russia from the war. 
(See [Anon]: History of the USSR, II, pp.56-58 et.seq. and 
G. Stephenson: History of Russia. 1812-1945, pp.302-303). 
See N. Herd: 1922: The Revolt on the Rand; B. Hessian: An 
Investigation of the Causes of the Labour Agitation on the  
Witwatersrand. (unpublished M.A. dissertation, UW, 1957); 
A.G. Oberholster: Die Randse Staking van 1922 and F.J. van 
Heerden: Die Randse Staking van 1922 (unpublished M.A. 
dissertation, PUCHE, 1965). 
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Smuts contended that the Witwatersrand strike of 1922, 
initially a purely industrial dispute, had deteriorated into a 
situation reminiscent of the French Revolution. This  
transformation, according to Smuts, was made possible by the 
capture and eventual replacement of the constitutional labour 
movement and labour organisations by "... forces of violence 
and anarchy _1,30) These "forces of violence and anarchy" were 
identified as being a small number of international Communists 
who had "... come from abroad ... [and who were] opposed to all 
the traditions of South Africa."31)  Communists, in their 
striving to establish a Soviet Republic in South Africa, as 
proven by the strike, were ably assisted by certain people. 
Smuts maintained that these people largely consisted of 
recently urbanised Afrikaners.32)  
Certain deductions can be drawn from Smuts' appraisal of the 
role of communists in the strike of 1922: 
Communism was anathema to the existing status quo. Smuts 
contended that this ideology had a foreign origin and 
stood in direct conflict with local traditions. Especially 
repulsive for Smuts was the violent nature of communism, 
which, for him, represented an integral part of this 
ideology. 
Smuts provided an indication of those social groupings 
whom he considered to provide fertile soil for communist 
propaganda. In this regard he stressed the urbanised white 
proletariat in general and more specifically Afrikaner 
workers. 
In dealing with "communists", 	 Smuts displayed a 
willingness to employ even the harshest possible measures. 
On this occasion he made use of brute force. In so doing 
Cape Times, 1.4.1922. 
Ibid.  
Cape Times, 24.4.1922. 
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Smuts laid down a dangerous precedent successive 
administrations could easily follow. 
The CPSA, by its own admission, was indeed involved in the Rand 
Revolt of 1922. Oberholster convincingly proofs that the 
secretary of the CPSA, W.H. (Bill) Andrews, assumed a prominent 
role both in public and behind the scenes during the strike.33)  
While it would be wrong to assume that communists, in the words 
of Walker and Weinbren, "... had as little to do with the 1922 
tragedy in South Africa as the Transvaal Miners' Association 
had to do with the Russian Revolution in 1917 "34), it must 
equally be noted that the leading and dominant role afforded to 
communists by Smuts also represented an oversimplification of a 
much more complex issue. The Communist Party, although having a 
high visibility because of the prevalence of banners and 
slogans attributed to 'communism' during the strike, was, at 
most, merely one of a number of ideologically diverse groupings 
who either participated in the strike or, on a non-
participatory level, supported the demands of the striking 
workers. Thus, while communists were involved in the strike of 
1922, this strike was neither communist-inspired nor communist- 
controlled. 35) 
Similar to Hertzog's speech at the 1919 Transvaal Congress of 
the NP, care must be taken not to overemphasize the 
significance of Smuts' remarks on communism during the 1922 
strike. Irrespective of whether Smuts' evaluation of the 
situation was realistic - in the sense that it may have been 
based on information which made no other deduction possible - 
or whether the portrayal of the Rand Revolt in "total 
onslaught"-terms was a conscious misinterpretation of facts on 
Oberholster: op.cit., p.153. 
I.L. Walker and B. Weinbren: 2 000 Casualties - A History 
of the Trade Unions and the Labour Movement in the Union  
of South Africa, p.128. 
For a more detailed analysis of the role of communists in 
the 1922 strike see Oberholster: op.cit., pp.133-140 and 
Van Heerden: op.cit., pp.81-89. 
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the part of Smuts, imperative for the aims of this analysis is 
to note that Smuts, in explaining the use of force against the 
striking mineworkers36), relied almost exclusively on the 
alleged menace of communism.37)  The conception of a communist 
menace, in this sense, thus served to rationalise the adoption 
of a specific mode of behaviour (violent repression), rather 
than being illustrative of a particular principle or set of 
principles. References to communism by Smuts and other SAP-
functionaries following the suppression of the 1922 strike and 
up to the defeat of the SAP at the 1924-general election tend 
to support this contention. During this period, as will be 
indicated in the next paragraph, remarks on communism either 
served to further rationalise the use of force during the Rand 
Revolt or were employed by the SAP in an attempt to gain 
advantage over its political opponents. The point in focus, 
however, is that Smuts' remarks on communism, once again, 
primarily served to illuminate an aspect of behaviour not 
normally associated with political/ideological preference. 
Apart from blaming communists for the strike, Smuts and other 
members of his administration, at various times, also ascribed 
the Rand Revolt to workers allegedly being misled by opposition 
parties.38)  Most often referred to in this regard were 
Hertzog's National Party and in particular its Transvaal 
leader, Tielman Roos. Smuts described Roos as a "villain" who 
attempted to gain political benefit from the strike.39)  Henry 
Burton, SAP Minister of Finance, in referring to the Rand 
Revolt and rumours of an electoral pact between the NP and 
Labour Party (LP), was reported as having said at a public 
meeting in Robertson early in August 1922: 
See M. Lacey: "Platskiet-politiek: The Role of the Union 
Defence Force, 1910-1924" in J. Cock and L.Nathan: War and 
Society - The Militarisation of South Africa, pp.80-96. 
Cape Times, 22.3.1922. 
A.G. Oberholster: Die Randse Staking van 1922, p.170. 
Cape Times, 22.2.1922. 
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"Die onlangse ongelukkige moeilikheid in Transvaal is 
'n bewys dat die opposisie-partye probeer [om] op 'n 
agterbakse manier te verenig en nie openlik soos die 
ander partye gedoen het nie. Die opposiesie probeer 
die sterkte van verdediging teen Bolsjewisme omver te 
werp, wat soveel skade in Rusland berokken en soveel 
ellende veroorsaak het. Hy is oortuig dat ons yolk 
nie begerig is dat hul lewe lange vryheid omver moet 
gegooi word ten gunste van Bolsjewisme nie. Daarom is 
dit die plig van sy hoorders om daarteen te waak om 
te organiseer en werk om die vryheid wat hul nou 
onder In grondwetlike bestuur geniet te handhaaf. Hul 
moet aan die ou vlag getrou bly en voortgaan soos hul 
begin het."40) 
Following the announcement of an electoral pact between the NP 
and LP in 1924, newspapers supportive of the government and 
SAP-speakers actively attempted to establish a link between the 
NP/LP-pact and communism. In the run-up to the 1924 general 
election Smuts made use of this tactic in an attempt to gain 
political advantage on his opponents. These tactics set the 
scene for a dangerous trend in South African politics other 
parties could easily adopt.41) 
In closing, it needs to be noted that the conflict between 
labour and capital in South Africa provides a third possible 
explanation for Smuts' remarks on communism and communist 
involvement in the Rand Revolt of 1922. The convergence of 
interests between the state and mining capital in the first 
decade after unification have been highlighted by several 
authors.42)  Given the importance of the gold mining industry as 
a source of direct and indirect state revenue, concern over the 
productivity of the mines was shared by the state and mining 
management. More important, however, was the gradual 
convergence of the state's interest in establishing its 
De Burger, 7.8.1922. 
For a discussion of the tactic of 'linkage' in the 
election of 1924, see J.P. Brits: Die Totstandkoming van 
die Pakt-Regering van 1924, pp.83-142. 
See R.H. Davies: Capital, State and White Labour in South 
Africa. 1900-1960, pp.43-145; N. Levy: The Foundations of  
the South African Cheap Labour System, pp.99-161 and D. 
Yudelman: The Emergence of Modern South Africa, pp.52-164. 
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political control with management's interest in getting white 
organised labour to comply with its measures to limit labour 
costs - the crucial factor in the cost accounting of the gold 
mines •43) 
The origins of the Witwatersrand revolt, in this context, can 
be traced back to the decision of the Chamber of Mines to lower 
production costs in the mining industry by introducing cheap 
(black) labour. This brought the interests of capital and 
labour in conflict. Smuts, as agent of the capitalist class, 
had to clamp down on worker militancy to protect and defend the 
interests of "Hoggenheimer" and the (capitalist) state. 
The involvement of members of the CPSA in the strike, in this 
regard, proved doubly useful for Smuts. First, it provided him 
.
with the opportunity to portray the Rand Revolt in "total 
onslaught"-terms; thereby mobilising support for a specific 
mode of behaviour and, in effect, suppressing worker militancy. 
Secondly, this portrayal also assisted in making the use of 
force more palatable for the electorate; thereby drumming up 
support for the interests of Hoggenheimer. This, in turn, 
further institutionalised the privileged and dominant position 
of big capital in the South African state. 
1.4. LEGISLATION DIRECTED AGAINST COMMUNISTS, 1927-1930 
1.4.1 	 Native Administration Bill, 1927 
In 1927 J.B.M. Hertzog, in his capacity as Minister of Native 
Affairs, launched through Parliament a Native Administration 
Bill aimed at the tightening of control and management over 
native affairs. Davenport indicates that this Bill extended 
43. See Yudelman: op.cit., pp.164-166. 
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over Africans44)  in every province except the Cape the 
authoritarian powers enjoyed by the Governor-General in Natal 
under the Natal Native Code of 1891.45) Of special significance 
for this study is the authority extended to the Minister of 
Native Affairs under the controversial Section 29, which 
provided for the "[p]revention of dissemination of certain 
doctrines amongst Natives." 
The importance of this section calls for a verbatim extraction: 
"Prevention of dissemination of certain doctrines 
amongst Natives 
29. (1) Any person who utters any words or does any 
other act or thing whatever with intent to promote 
any feeling of hostility between Natives and 
Europeans shall be guilty of an offence and liable on 
conviction to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
one year or to a fine of one hundred pounds, or both. 
(2) If it appears to a magistrate on information 
made on oath that there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that there is upon any premises within his 
jurisdiction - 
(a) anything as to which there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that it will afford evidence as 
to the commission of any such offence; or 
The terms `blacks' and `Natives', in the context of this 
study, are used interchangeably to denote a single and 
specific element in the South African population mosaic. 
The term `Coloured', where used, refers to people often 
described in other societies as mixed race, mulattos or 
half castes. `Coloured' is spelled with a capital C to 
avoid confusion with `coloured' as meaning black. 
`African' and 'non-white' is used in the general sense of 
all those people not `white'. 
T.R.H. Davenport: South Africa - A Modern History, p.206. 
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(b) anything as to which there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that it is intended to be used 
for the purpose of committing any such offence, he 
may issue his warrant directing a policeman or 
policemen named therein or all policemen to search 
such premises and to seize any such thing if found 
and take it before a magistrate. If any magistrate 
before whom any such case is brought is satisfied 
that it is anything which may reasonably be 
calculated to cause or promote any feeling of 
hostility between Natives and Europeans he may by 
writing authorize the destruction thereof or its 
confiscation to the Crown but no such order shall be 
carried into effect until a period of one month has 
elapsed after the date of such order and the decision 
of the magistrate in that behalf shall be subject to 
review. 
(3) The Governor-General may order that, during 
a period specified in the order, a person convicted 
under sub-section (1) - 
if he is not a Native, and if the offence 
was committed in any area included in the Schedule to 
the Natives Land Act, 1913 (Act No. 27 of 1913), or 
any amendment thereof, shall not enter to be in any 
such area; or 
if he is a Native, and if the offence was 
committed outside any such area, shall not enter or 
be in any place outside any such area. 
(4) Any person acting in contravention of any 
such order shall be guilty of an offence and liable 
on conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred 
pounds or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
one year and to be removed from any place where such 
order prohibits him from being. 
(5) If any person (not being born in any part 
of South Africa which has been included in the Union) 
has been convicted of any offence under sub-section 
(1) of this section, the Minister may, having regard 
to the circumstances connected with the offence, deem 
such person to be an undesirable inhabitant of the 
Union and may, by warrant under his hand, cause him 
to be removed from the Union and pending removal to 
be arrested and detained in custody. H46) 
46. Statutes of the Union of South Africa, 1927, pp.340-342. 
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Before discussing the relation between Section 29 of the Native 
Administration Bill and the issue of communism, some 
introductory remarks need to be presented on the position of 
native affairs in South African politics and the evolution 
thereof during the Hertzog-era. Hertzog's policy on native 
affairs, as will become apparent, had important implications 
for the debate on communism in South Africa. 
Prior to 1924 Union politics were largely dominated by the twin 
questions of South Africa's constitutional position as part of 
the British Empire and the relationship between Afrikaner and 
Englishman in the newly established state. Hertzog's election 
as Prime Minister in that year marked the introduction of an 
increased emphasis on a third element, namely black-white 
relations. These three questions, by 1936, came to dominate the 
South African political arena. 
Davenport asserts that the insistence on white political and 
economic hegemony by successive SAP-administrations determined 
black-white relations under both the Botha- and Smuts-
administrations.47)  While legislation and other measures 
gradually extended the pattern of racial segregation to most 
walks of life, little was done to deal with counter-pressures 
resulting from the rapidly increasing rate of economic 
integration and other social factors. This essentially laissez  
faire-approach, rather than providing for a serious attempt at 
finding and providing solutions for complicated problems, 
inadvertedly led to the suppression of black discontent. A case 
in point is the "Bucket Strike" of 1918 in which black 
municipal sanitary workers, in emulating the example of white 
workers at the Johannesburg power station, came out on strike 
for higher wages.48) Whereas white workers had their demands 
met, the African strikers were arrested for breaking their 
Davenport: op.cit., p.197. 
D.W. Kruger: The Making of a Nation, p.128. See also J. 
Pampallis: National Struggle, Class Struggle - South 
Africa since 1870, p.94 and L. Callinicos: Gold and 
Workers, pp.59-63. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
22 
contracts and sentenced to two months hard labour, doing their 
previous work for no pay under armed guard. 
needless to say, were subjected to the same 
which brought about the original strike by 
Johannesburg Power Station. 
Black and white, 
economic forces 
workers at the 
While both the SAP and NP disapproved of racial miscegenation, 
the SAP'S comparatively non-doctrinaire native policy stood in 
sharp contrast with the ideological politicians who took over 
the reins in 1924. Central to the new administration's colour 
policy was the belief that 'South Africa had to be made safe 
for the white man'.49)  In the realization of this goal, Hertzog 
propagated two principles, viz, racial separation and white 
trusteeship. 
Hertzog's policy of white trusteeship was based on the premise 
that the two racial groups in South Africa represented 
fundamentally different and irreconcilable entities.50)  This 
not only related to skin pigmentation, but more importantly, 
standard of civilization and advancement.51)  Hertzog contended 
that blacks were members of a "child race", standing on the 
threshold of an age-old evolutionary and mechanistic growth 
process whites had already passed through.52)  As such, they 
were in need of protection and guidance by 'right-minded' 
whites. 
For a detailed analysis of Hertzog's native policy see 
H.B. Kruger: Die Politieke Aspekte van Genl. J.B.M.  
Hertzog se Naturellebeleid vanaf Unifikasie tot aan die  
einde van sy Parlementere loopbaan, pp.20-46. 
Hertzog's concept of white trusteeship must not be seen as 
a new principle in South African politics. The term 'white 
trusteeship' represented the formal linguistic embodiment 
of a principle, the development of which could be traced 
back to an era long before unification. 
Kruger: op.cit., p.150. 
Ibid., p.206. 
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The entitlement of Section 29 of the Native Administration Bill 
is misleading in as far as it provides an indication of the 
objective of this particular section of the Bill. The explicit 
reference to "doctrine" would seem to indicate that Hertzog's 
legislation was aimed at persons identified with a certain body 
of thought. Hertzog, however, dismissed this in stating that he 
had no intention of prosecuting persons who preached 
... another ideology different from ours ... I do not want to 
be unfair to any man ... simply because I differ from him and 
think he may be wrong."53)  In presenting the Native 
Administration Bill to Parliament, Hertzog described the aim of 
Section 29 as follows: 
"What I am after of course - I do not care whether it 
is bolshevism or what it is - is to get these people 
who really iniquitiously go about, trying to stir up 
hatred between white and black."54) 
The guiding principle of Section 29 was thus of a general 
nature, providing for the prosecution of all persons who 
promoted "... any feeling of hostility between Natives and 
Europeans ..."55) 
Hertzog's description of the aim of Section 29 renders it 
impossible to establish the political/ideological affiliation, 
if any, of those persons he wanted to prosecute. In all 
probability Section 29 was intentionally defined in such broad 
terms so as to find application under the widest possible range 
of circumstances. 
Judging from the speeches of other members of Parliament on 
both sides of the House, it is clear that members of the CPSA 
were perceived to fall within the scope of Section 29. The 
names of Bill Andrews and Charles G. Glass, both members of the 
Communist Party, appeared with relative prominence in the 
Hansard, 28.4.1927, co1.2913. 
Ibid. 
Clause I, Native Administration Bill. 
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columns of Hansard on this occasion. This related to speeches 
made by Andrews and Glass at a mass meeting of African workers 
in Newtown, Johannesburg towards the end of March 1927.56) 
Andrews, on this occasion, pleaded with his audience for the 
establishment of working class unity across racial lines. This, 
according to Andrews, would empower the working class "... to 
take possession of this country 	 as the Russians have of 
their country  
Sir Drummond Chaplin (SAP) loathed the attitude of Andrews and 
went on to speculate about the presence of agents from so-
called Communist/Bolshevist organisations in South Africa who 
were directed from either London or Moscow.58) H.B. Papenfus 
(SAP) interpreted the words of Andrews as being an invitation 
to bloodshed affecting the welfare of the State.59)  Hertzog 
concurred that the utterances of Andrews and Glass were indeed 
punishable under Section 29.60) 
J.S. Marwick (SAP) referred to the alleged presence of 
Communists in Clements Kadalie's Industrial and Commercial 
Workers' Union (ICU) .61) This occurred in spite of the fact 
that the ICU National Council had already decided in December 
1926 to ban all communists from holding office in the Union.62)  
In all fairness it must be noted that prior to their eviction, 
individual communists did indeed play a notable part in the 
R.K. Cope: Comrade Bill, pp.306-307. 
Ibid., p.306. 
Hansard, 29.4.1927, co1.2957-2958. 
Ibid., 2.5.1927, co1.3017-3018. 
Ibid., co1.3046. 
Ibid., co1.2992-2995. 
See P.L. Wickins: The Industrial and Commercial Workers'  
Union of Africa, pp.106-109. In Parliament Morris • 
Alexander (SAP) and Arthur Barlow (LP), during speeches 
preceding and following that of Marwick, referred to this 
fact. Marwick, however, either ignored or did not believe 
the words of Alexander and/or Barlow. 
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activities of the ICU. Michael Hamel, former executive member 
of the CPSA, notes the "... irreplaceable part ... played by 
the Party and its members in building the ICU."63) The names of 
John Gomas and Bill Andrews, both of whom were Party members 
who figured in the activities of the ICU, were mentioned by 
Marwick in this regard.")  
While general unanimity was reached in Parliament on the 
necessity of having legislation to deal with agitation aimed at 
subverting racial harmony between white and non-white, 
individual members of the SAP called for the extention of this 
principle in order to deal with sedition between all classes, 
groups and races in society as opposed to sedition between 
exclusively black and white under Section 29. Smuts referred to 
this in the following terms: "I agree ... that it is highly 
necessary to have ... a sedition law, a law against people and 
practices subversive to the institutions of this country and 
law and order of this country ... Let us have a general law for 
both black and white. Do not let us give the impression that on 
a matter of cardinal importance like this we see only with one 
eye. What is urgently required is a law to deal with people who 
try to subvert the existing state of affairs by illegal means 
and by poisoning public opinion."65)  In practical terms this 
would have meant the removal of Section 29 from the Native 
Administration Bill and the introduction and redefinement of 
this principle in separate legislation aimed at sedition per 
se. Morris Alexander, in this regard, called for the enactment 
of the Prevention of Disorders Bill that was withdrawn at the 
end of the previous parliamentary session.66) 
Smuts' proposal, however, was not even supported by all members 
of his own party. Alexander, apart from calling for the 
A. La Guma (ed.): Apartheid - A Collection of Writings on 
South African Racism by South Africans, p.210. 
See Hansard, 2.5.1927, co1.2993-2994. 
Ibid., 28.4.1927, co1.2919-2920. 
Ibid., 29.4.1927, co1.2946. 
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enactment of the Prevention of Disorders Bill, also contended 
that the principle contained in Section 29 had already been 
provided for in terms of the Rioutous Assemblies and Criminal 
Law (Amendment) Act (Act 27/1914).67)  Hertzog defended the 
inclusion of this principle in a Bill providing for native 
administration by stating that the serious state of affairs and 
the even more serious implications warranted the current form 
and content of this Bill.")  
The guiding element in this legislation could be traced back to 
the concept of white trusteeship. Hertzog referred to this 
principle in the following terms: "I feel it is absolutely 
necessary, if we are really to protect the natives properly, 
that we should protect them from these influences which are 
being brought to bear with the evil design, not of assisting 
them, but ... of creating mischief."69)  Smuts' personal support 
for the concept contained in Section 29 - in as far as it 
referred to black-white relations - was also based on the 
concept of white trusteeship. In noting the necessity of having 
this form of legislation on the statute book, Smuts agreed that 
the "... vast mass, millions of natives, are to-day where they 
were 20 years ago, or 100 years ago."70)  In terms of the 
Hertzog-perspective, the mentality and understanding of the 
African - who was essentially still in the affective stage of 
mental development - did not provide for an ability to 
distinguish between dangerous and healthy doctrine. The white 
man, as protector of Africans, had the innate responsibility to 
distinguish between good and evil on their behalf. 
Hertzog thus contended that the activities of "agitators", 
amongst whom he may have counted communists, endangered racial 
order and harmony in the state. In as far as Section 29 
provided for the prosecution of individuals, this was to be 
Ibid., co1.2946-2947. 
Ibid., 2.5.1927, co1.3045. 
Ibid., 28.4.1927, co1.2913. 
Ibid., co1.2914. 
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done on the basis of them having endangered black-white racial 
harmony. This applied equally to both communist and non-
communist. Words and deeds thus served as criteria for 
prosecution, not ideological affiliation. To put it 
differently: Communists were considered eligible for 
prosecution not because of their ideological beliefs, but on 
the basis of their perceived actions. 
The enactment of the Native Administration Bill (Act 38/1927) 
in July 1927 proved in no uncertain terms that members of the 
CPSA were eligible for prosecution. Stanley Silwana, John Gomas 
and Bransby Ndobe, all members of the Communist Party, were 
amongst the first people to be prosecuted under Section 29.71) 
Roux also refers to Sam Malkinson and Bill Andrews.72)  
1.4.2. 	 Rioutous Assemblies Amendment Bill, 1930 
The formulation of Section 29 left room for conflicting 
interpretations in a court of law. This was particularly the 
case in so far as the first clause of this section affected 
members of the Communist Party. The relevant clause placed the 
onus on the State in proving that a defendant had intentionally 
fomented feelings of hostility between the two races. Hertzog's 
statement that he did not consider protagonists of another 
ideology liable for persecution further complicated the issue. 
Initially, as indicated, persecution of communists did take 
place under Section 29. The case of Rex vs. Bunting,73)  
however, brought this to an end. 
S.P. Bunting, CPSA candidate for the electoral division of 
Tembuland during the election of 1929, addressed a public 
H.J. and R.E. Simons: Class and Colour in South Africa.  
1850-1950, p.346. 
72. E.R. Roux: Time Longer than Rope, p.203. 
See R.P.B. Davis (general ed.): The South African Law 
Reports [1929] Eastern Districts Local Division, pp.326- 
330. 
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meeting in Umtata early in March 1929. At this meeting Bunting 
was alleged to have said : 
"The natives were driven off the land by the 
Europeans and were compelled to live in locations, 
and important chiefs were also compelled to go to 
locations ... General Hertzog should be thrown into 
the sea; the white man has no right in these 
Territories; the natives are not getting a square 
deal from the white man; in Russia they have an 
institution known as the Duma with the Mobile as well 
which is presided over by the Czar of Russia, and if 
there is any trouble with the people, the Czar sends 
his Mobile out to quell it; you have a similar 
institution in the Territories known as the Bunga and 
a mobile squadron as well."74) 
As a result of these words and on the basis of similar 
'inflammable' pamphlets distributed during the meeting by 
Rebecca Bunting and Gana - Makabeni, S.P. Bunting and his two co-
accused were convicted and sentenced by the magistrate of 
Umtata under Section 29 of the Native Administration Act. An 
appeal for the conviction to be set aside was made to the 
Supreme Court in Grahamstown. The Supreme Court found that the 
preaching of a recognised doctrine, in this case the recognised 
doctrine of Communism, if bona fide, was no offence under this 
clause. S.P. Bunting and his co-accused were found not guilty 
and aquitted on these grounds. 
The acquittal of Bunting resulted in a new offensive against 
communists which eventually found expression in the Rioutous 
Assemblies (Amendment) Bill of 1930. 
During the parliamentary session of 1929 Smuts warned against 
the alleged dangers of communism. The explicit reference to a 
"... real communist movement ..."75) amongst Africans stood in 
sharp contrast to the vague remarks on black and white 
Cited in Ibid., p.335. The applicability of Bunting's 
comments to the USSR, in a purely historical sense, are 
highly questionable. 
Hansard, 8.8.1929, co1.575. 
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agitators less than two years earlier.76) Although agreeing 
with Smuts that Communism had the potential of becoming a 
menace, Oswald Pirow, Nationalist Minister of Justice, asserted 
that this ideology was ... at present merely a nuisance 
1177) 
Smuts motivated his call on the Government for sterner measures 
by pointing to the alleged detrimental effect of this ideology 
on race relations. Smuts' motivation, once again, stemmed from 
his support for the principle of white trusteeship: 
"The natives of this country ought to know that they 
are going to get justice and fair play from the white 
people, but they ought also to know on their side 
that they are expected to give obedience to the law, 
and that any movement of a subversive nature will be 
severely dealt with by the public authorities."78)  
Hertzog concurred with Smuts on the gravity of the situation. 
Hertzog indicated that he did not believe that a remedy would 
be found in a redefinement or further extention of Section 29. 
Hertzog believed that a solution would be forthcoming if the 
Governor-General was allowed even greater authority over 
Africans.79)  This, according to Hertzog, would empower the 
Governor-General to take steps at any time to prevent crimes. 
Following Hertzog's promise that provision would be made to 
deal with the new circumstances brought about by the acquittal 
of Bunting, Pirow, as responsible Minister, presented to 
Parliament in February 1930 the Rioutous Assemblies (Amendment) 
Bil1.80)  This Bill provided, mutatis mutandis, for the 
following: 
See Ibid., 28.4.1927, co1.2919-2920. 
Ibid., 8.8.1929, co1.577. 
Ibid., co1.576. 
Ibid., co1.576-577. 
See Appendix A. 
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Cession of authority to the Minister of Justice to 
prohibit any public gathering which, in his opinion, could 
engender feelings of hostility between whites and any 
other section of the community. 
ii) Authority for the Minister to prevent an individual from 
attending such meeting or being physically present within 
the borders of a designated area for a specified period of 
time. The Minister was obliged to furnish reasons for his 
decision when requested to do so by the individual 
affected. This, however, depended on whether, in his 
opinion, public safety warranted disclosure of such 
information. 
evidence which, in his 
'Documentary evidence' 
to prevent 
documentary 
relations. 
any book, 
newspaper, 
iii) Assignment of powers to the Governor-General 
the publication or other dissemination of any 
opinion, could enflame 
was defined as 	 • • • 
foreign magazine, pamphlet, manifesto, foreign 
handbill or poster, or any article or advertisement, 
cartoon, picture or drawing in any periodical publication 
or newspaper."81) 
iv) Deportation of foreign-born nationals if convicted under 
any of the foregoing provisions. 
Scholtz asserts that the Rioutous Assemblies (Amendment) Act 
can be regarded as South Africa's first anti-Communist 
legislation.82)  This claim, however, is not supported by the 
stipulations of the Act. Similar to the Native Administration 
Act of 1927, the Rioutous Assemblies (Amendment) Act provided 
for the apprehension of any individual, irrespective of party-
political or ideological affiliation, who engendered 'feelings 
of hostility between the different races. 
‘ 
See sub-section ii). 
See G.D. Scholtz' biographical description of Oswald Pirow 
in C.J. Beyers (ed.-in-chief) and J.L. Basson: Dictionary 
of South African Biographm, V, p.595. 
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Oswald Pirow's presentation of the Bill to Parliament, however, 
proved in no uncertain 
2against members of the 
presentation, this Bill 
terms that it was primarily directed 
Communist Party. Judging from Pirow's 
was brought about as a result of the 
Supreme Court's decision in the Bunting-case and, coupled to 
that, the rapidly ascending level of what was believed to be 
communist propaganda.83)  Pirow's presentation does not provide 
a clear indication of whether this 'communist propaganda' had 
developed as a result of the Supreme Court's decision or 
whether it was part of a continuous process which had only 
recently taken on an amplitude which "necessitated legislative 
intervention. Pirow's remarks during the previous parliamentary 
session at which time communist activities were described as 
insignificant, 
However, on t 
statement by 
Communism, 
would seem to support the latter possibility. 
his occasion (1930), he repudiated his earlier 
acknowledging that Smuts' warning against 
"... were in no way exaggerated ..."84) in 1929, 
Pirow's depictment of 'communist activities' took the form of a 
grand exposé of its international and local dimensions to 
illustrate this ideology's perceived aims and the extent to 
which it was promoted amongst the African population. Pirow's 
objective in the presentation of this speech, by his own 
admission, was not to explain a huge involved Bolshevik 
conspiracy against South Africa.85)  The effect his words 
nevertheless had in certain parliamentary circles is aptly 
illustrated by the remarks of Karl Bremer, fellow NP-member, on 
the role of the courts in dealing with this situation: 
Hansard, 24.2.1930, co1.725. According to Pirow the ruling 
of the Supreme Court had rendered Section 29 of the Native 
Administration Act, as a mechanism for the curtailment of 
agitation amongst Africans, practically useless. 
Ibid., co1.729. 
Ibid., co1.737. 
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"If the danger threatening us was entirely a danger 
from within, then the courts of the lands (sic!) and 
their slow process might well be depended upon, but 
when the danger that threatens us is so obviously 
engineered from without our borders, then, I say, it 
becomes absolutely, necessary to take ... 
[alternative] powers. ,,86) 
An evaluation of the factual basis of Pirow's assertions is 
important for the purpose of this analysis, mainly for two 
reasons: Firstly, it will allow for the contextualisation of 
Pirow's allegations and, secondly, serve to determine whether 
Pirow was justified in making the assertions which he did. In 
other words, how realistic was Pirow's conception of a 
communist menace? The difficulties to be encountered in this 
sort of evaluation, however, must be noted from the outset. The 
banning of the South African Communist Party (SAC?) ,87) in 
1950, which was lifted only recently, seriously limit 
opportunities for research into topics perceived to be related 
to national security. Conversely, the secretive nature of the 
Communist Party does not allow for an opportunity to juxtapose 
Pirow's allegations against transcripts from the Party's 
archives. 
In dealing with the international dimension, Pirow focussed on 
the CPSA's affiliation to the Third (Communist) International 
Workers' Organisation.88)  Whereas the Comintern had initially 
shown little interest in South African affairs,89)  recent 
developments, according to Pirow, have proven this to be no 
longer true. Amongst these developments Pirow counted the 
alleged visit to South Africa by a certain Paul Merker, the 
alleged financial assistance to the Party and the establishment 
of the League of African Rights (LAR). These individual 
Ibid., co1.2350-2351. 
The Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) became known as 
the South African Communist Party (SACP) after 1953. 
Hereafter referred to as the Third International, 
Communist International, Comintern or CI. 
Hansard, 24.2.1930, co1.730. 
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episodes were important, especially in as far as it proves that 
Pirow's perception of the changing role of the Comintern and 
subsequently the danger of communism for South Africa were 
based on actual events. 
Pirow perceived the alleged visit by Paul Merker, apparently an 
agent of the Comintern, as symptomatic of this organisation's 
new interest in South African affairs. Apart from conferring 
with the CPSA on the Party's future strategy, Merker, according 
to Pirow, had "... actually corrected the election manifestoes 
of Bunting and Walton (sic!)".90)  No confirmation could be 
found to establish whether such a visit did indeed take place. 
Financial support for the Party, according to Pirow, could 
positively be traced back to 1928. This allegation was based on 
a letter apparently sent to the CPSA by the Executive Committee 
of the Communist International (ECCI).91)  An evaluation of 
Pirow's contention will depend on whether the existence of such 
a letter can be confirmed. Attempts to trace the letter were 
not successful, nor did intensive research provide any solid 
evidence in support of Pirow's assertion. 
Pirow's reference to the so-called 'Merker-mission' and remarks 
on alleged financial support for the CPSA by the CI suggest 
that the CPSA was both controlled and directed by the Third 
International. In other words, the Comintern's interest in 
South Africa amounted to not only a meddling in the ideological 
line taken by the Party, but even more important, a direct and 
active involvement in the day-to-day running of the Party's 
affairs. Bremer's remarks, referred to earlier, serve to 
illustrate this belief within the NP. 
Ibid. S.P. Bunting (Tembuland) and D.G. Wolton (Cape 
Flats), contested the aforementioned seats on a CPSA-
ticket during the election of 1929. 
Hansard, 24.2.1930, co1.729. In this letter a detailed 
financial report for the fiscal year October 1928 to 
September 1929 was requested from the Party. Such a 
statement, according to the letter tabled in Parliament, 
was required so as to determine the Party's subsidy from 
the CI for the first quarter of 1930. 
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In July 1921 a number of organisations amalgamated to form the 
Communist Party of South Africa, which became the South African 
affiliate of the Third International. Affiliation was made 
possible through acceptance of the 21 Conditions of Admission 
as adopted by the Second Comintern Congress in 1920. The future 
relationship between the Party and CI was determined by Clause 
16 of the 21 Conditions: "All the resolutions of the Congresses 
of the Communist International as well as resolutions of the 
Executive Committee, are binding for all parties joining the 
Communist International."92)  Affiliation, therefore, did not 
only amount to an identification with the spirit and goals of 
the Comintern, but, even more important, a willingness to 
comply with all directives and resolutions issued by the Third 
International. 
The importance of the Comintern tie was well grasped by the 
CPSA. The first national conference of the Party, held in 
July/August 1921, noted the "... great strength and inspiration 
• • 
1,93) it was to derive from affiliation to the Third 
International. 
The exact implications of the principle of democratic 
centralism, to which the Party subscribed in terms of Clause 16 
of the 21 Conditions, progressively came to the forefront in 
the course of the 1920's. Two directives dealing with •South 
Africa emanated from the Third International during 1928. The 
first resolution, which was accepted by the Sixth Congress of 
the CI in July 1928, formed part of a general resolution 
entitled "Thesis on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies 
and Semi-Colonies". According to Brian Bunting the entire 
section on South Africa comprised a single paragraph in a 63- 
See [B. Bunting (ed.)]: South African Communists Speak, 
pp.58-62 ("The Twenty-one Points - Conditions of Admission 
to the Communist International"). 
See Ibid., p. 64. 
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page document.94)  The second resolution, under the title "The 
South African Question" and dealing specifically with South 
Africa, while also discussed during the main proceedings of the 
Comintern congress, was adopted as a directive by the ECCI 
after this meeting. 
The essential difference between the two documents relate to 
the proposed aim the CPSA was to emulate. Whereas the general 
resolution merely called for the creation of an 
independent native republic, with simultaneous guarantees for 
the rights of the white minority ...",95) the special 
resolution on South Africa contemplated the formation of "... 
an independent native South African republic as a stage towards 
a workers' and peasants' republic, with full equal rights for 
all races, black, coloured and whiten.%)  The mere political 
rotation envisaged under the general resolution stood in sharp 
contrast to the staged political and social revolution foreseen 
in terms of the specific directive. 
The directive dealing with South Africa was contested by the 
CPSA-delegation to the Sixth Congress on the basis of it being 
a misrepresentation of the South African reality.97)  Local 
communists contended that the eradication of all forms of 
national- and race discrimination and oppression could only be 
realized through class struggle and the achievement of 
Socialism under the leadership of the CPSA.98) In other words, 
B.Bunting: Moses Kotane - South African Revolutionary, p. 
32. According to Bunting even this paragraph was missing 
from the initial draft of the thesis. 
[B. Bunting (ed.)]: South African Communists Speak, pp.90-
91 ("Thesis on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies 
and Semi-Colonies"). 
Ibid., pp. 91-97 ("The South African Question"). 
This delegation consisted of S.P. Bunting, his wife 
Rebecca and Edward Roux. 
B. Bunting: Moses Kotane 	 South African Revolutionary, 
p.35. 
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the CPSA delegates insisted that class, not national issues, 
were uppermost in South Africa. 
The Native Republic-slogan was finally adopted by the CPSA at 
its seventh annual congress in 1929. In as far as acceptance 
related to the position of the CPSA vis a vis the Third 
International, Bunting, as chairman of the Congress, ruled that 
all motions involving the rejection or modification of this 
thesis were out of order under the CI statutes.99)  
Although the Native Republic-thesis and the manner in which it 
was finally adopted by the CPSA have resulted in much 
controversy, two remarks are important for the aims of this 
analysis: Firstly, this slogan constituted the formal 
embodiment of a renewed interest in South African affairs by 
the Comintern. Secondly, while the Native Republic-thesis may 
not have been unilaterally forced unto the CPSA by the CI, 
Clause 16 of the 21 Conditions nonetheless ensured the 
inclusion of this thesis in the Party Programme. Pirow's 
accentuation of a revived interest in local affairs by the 
Third International was thus indeed correct. 
In presenting the Rioutous Assemblies (Amendment) Bill to 
Parliament, Pirow, however, provided little indication of being 
aware of the causal relationship between the Comintern's 
renewed interest in South Africa and the Native Republic-thesis 
of 1928. This thesis, according to Pirow, ". .. did not appeal 
to the masses ... [and] left the average native "stone 
.100) cold"" 	 The relative insignificance attributed to the 
Native Republic thesis by Pirow may well be explained on the 
basis of two possible arguments: Firstly, Pirow's limited 
knowledge of the modus operandi of the CPSA may have resulted 
in him underrating the significance and importance of the 
Native Republic-thesis. Pirow may have adjudged this thesis to 
be nothing more than a (unsuccessful) slogan employed by the 
See [B. Bunting (ed.)]: South African Communists Speak, 
p.99. 
Hansard, 24.2.1930, col. 732. 
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CPSA in an attempt to rally support behind its cause. Secondly, 
Pirow may have consciously underplayed the significance of this 
slogan in an attempt to avoid giving it a greater status or to 
divert attention from it. 
Irrespective of whichever of the above arguments are accepted, 
this, however, is not to say that Pirow did not consider the 
Native Republic-thesis to be part of the CI's renewed interest 
in South Africa. What does seem fair to assume is that Pirow 
did not consider this thesis to be of particular significance 
in his treatise on the strategy and tactics of the CPSA. 
Pirow's main reason for emphasizing the Comintern's new 
interest in South Africa related to the founding of the League 
of African Rights. Whereas the alleged financial support for 
the CPSA and the visit by Merker in themselves did not • • • 
constitute a• menace which would call for very drastic 
the seriousness 
legislation" 101
) of which can hardly be over-emphasized" .102) A 
the founding of the LAR was an event, "... 
Third International by its South African report to the 
formation of the LAR affiliate on the 
evidence for Pirow to contemplate Comintern involvement.ln)  
To Pirow the LAR did not only represent proof of the Third 
International's revived interest in South Africa, but was also 
an example of the CPSA's strategy towards South Africa. Pirow 
interpreted this strategy as containing two basic elements: 
(i) The CPSA's exclusive involvement in African politics. 
Pirow did not provide an indication of whether this 
development was related to the increased CI interest in 
 
Ibid. 
 
Ibid. 
 
It must be emphasized once more that no trace of such a 
report could be 	 found in the 	 course 	 of 	 research. 	 This, 
however, 	 is 	 not 	 to 
fabricated one. 
say that 	 Pirow's 	 argument 	 was 	 a 
provided sufficient 
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South Africa or whether it had been a feature of the 
Party's activities since 1921. 
(ii) The CPSA's aim to create auxiliary organisations which 
could promote its cause in South Africa.104)  The innocent 
features of these organisations, according to Pirow, made 
participation by non-communists possible. Participation 
occurred without any knowledge of communist involvement. 
Referring to the involvement of organisations other than 
the CPSA in a mass demonstration in Johannesburg on 16 
December 1929,105)  Pirow noted that this was "... clear 
proof ... [of] how far the communists [had] succeeded, 
whether these other people know it or not, of embracing 
them in a campaign throughout the whole of the 
country".106) Apart from the LAR, Pirow identified a 
number of other active organisations in South Africa which 
were allegedly related to the CPSA and CI.107)  
Prior to 1929 CPSA and ISL involvement in South African affairs 
were largely determined by the thesis-antithesis of capital and 
labour. On the basis of this approach the CPSA participated in 
both 'black' and 'white' politics. Two examples will serve to 
illustrate this point. 
In 1919 a large number of African mineworkers on the 
Witwatersrand came out on strike. The ISL, 108) in an attempt to 
Hansard, 24.2.1930, co1.736. 
This demonstration was held under the joint auspices of 
the CPSA, LAR and ICU (H.J. and R.E. Simons: Class and  
Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950, p.423). 
Hansard, 24.2.1930, co1.739. 
These 	 organisations 	 were: 	 Educational 	 Workers' 
International; International Red Aid; Universal Negro 
Improvement Society and African Communities League and the 
Ligue de Defence de la Rasse Negre [League for the Defence 
of the Negro Races] (see Ibid., co1.735-736). 
The International Socialist League was the main forerunner 
of the CPSA. 
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mobilise support for the striking workers, issued a leaflet 
aimed at white workers. The leaflet declared, inter alia: 
"White Workers! Do you hear the new Army of Labour 
coming? The native workers are beginning to wake up. 
They are finding that they are slaves to the big 
capitalists. ,,l09) 
Participation in the Rand Revolt by local communists were 
complicated by the obvious racial overtones of this strike. The 
Communist Party's insistence on working class solidarity did 
not allow for any form of racial prejudice. Bunting 
rationalised communist support for the strikers in The 
International, official mouthpiece of the Party: 
"This strike is sometimes called a strike against the 
abolition of the colour bar. But although anti-colour 
feeling run high, the true issue is not racial. 
Essentially it is a strike against the further 
lowering of wages which the capitalists of the whole 
world are trying to enforce; essentially it is not a 
strike of white men as whites; it is a strike of 
workers as workers  
Already prior to the formation of the CPSA certain individuals 
who came to be associated with the Party acknowledged the 
essentially disadvantaged position of Africans. In December 
1915 David Ivon Jones, first secretary of the ISL and leading 
ideologue, wrote in The International: 
Cited in A. Lerumo [Brian Bunting]: Fifty Fighting Years, 
p.36. 
Cited in E. Roux: S.P. Bunting - A Political Bioaraph, 
p.52. 
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"Slaves to a higher oligarchy, the white workers of 
South Africa themselves in turn batten on a lower 
slave class, the native races. Himself kicked by his 
Capitalist masters, the `correct' and accepted 
attitude towards the `nigger' is to kick him, to 
teach him his place, and to stand no impudence. 
Gingerly attempts to show him that in the extension 
of freedom for the native lies the only salvation of 
the white worker invariably aroused storms of 
execration. And thus has the South African labour 
movement grown up, more intolerant towards the native 
slave than any other working class in the world, and 
consequently more parasitical than any other."111)  
The reaction of the first national conference of the ISL to an 
attempt by Bunting to include a Bill of Rights for African 
workers in the League Programme is indicative of the attitude 
of these early international socialists to what came to be 
referred to as the national question. Although there were no 
shortage of support for the belief that the black man was 
entitled to freedom, the majority of delegates agreed that 
"there was no Native problem [in South Africa], only a workers' 
problem" .112) Attempts to deal with the national question were 
thus underplayed in favour of the relative safety of 
ideological dogmatism. 
The establishment of the CPSA found a continuation of this 
tradition of ideological complacency. This was most prevalent 
in the Party's attempt to affiliate to the all-white Labour 
Party and an almost unqualified support for the Nationalist-
Labour Pact in the general election of 1924. Even though 1924 
marked the beginning of an era where both the racial complexion 
and scope of activities of the Party were to change,113)  this 
did not result in any immediate adaptation in so far as the 
national question was concerned. 
111. Cited in B. Bunting: Moses Kotane - South African 
Revolutionary, p.18. 
Roux: op.cit., p.30. 
Lerumo: op.cit., pp.62-63. 
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The absence of any consistent attitude towards the national 
question may well be explained in terms of the socialist 
movement's -origin within the white labour movement. The 
majority of those individuals who broke away from the Labour 
Party to form the ISL were the very same founders and leaders 
of the labour movement of the organised white working 
class.114)  The slogan "Workers of the World Unite" was 
interpreted as referring to white miners, tramwaymen, artisans 
and so on. While white workers were perceived as being the 
main revolutionary force, Africans were simply disregarded.4) 
Occasionally, where the minority Inegrophilist' section of the 
ISL were able to force the issue, the necessity of working 
class unity - irrespective of race, colour or creed - was 
acknowledged. However, both the more progressive and 
reactionary sections of the League refuted the allegation that 
the unique position of the African indicated the existence of a 
separate question. Ivon Jones, in a report to the ECCI in March 
1921, stressed that the ... national and class interests of 
the natives cannot be distinguished the one from the other".4) 
As indicated, the turn to the African masses and the increasing 
lAfricanisation' of the Party failed to bring about a change in 
CPSA-policy on the national question. Whether the dichotomy 
between the racial composition of the Party-membership and the 
The first leadership of the ISL reads like a who's who of 
the Labour Party. The Chairman of the ISL was Bill Andrews 
(former chairman of the LP); the vice-chairmen J.A. Clark 
and A.F. Crisp, both LP members of the Transvaal 
Provincial Council; G. Weinstock, past treasurer of the 
LP, was treasurer, and the secretary, David Ivon Jones, 
had been the Labour Party's secretary. See E. Roux: S.P 
Bunting - A Political Biography, p.25. 
Ibid., p.63. 
Cited in [B. Bunting (ed.)): South African Communists 
Speak, p.54. 
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CPSA leadership117)  - a phenomenon which had developed as a 
byproduct of the shift in Party policy - affected thinking on 
this matter, falls within the realm of speculation.118)  Some of 
the more prominent white members of the CPSA did develop an 
understanding of the principles of Marxist Socialism while part 
of the white labour movement.119)  Consciously or unconsciously, 
the legacy of white labour may have influenced their conception 
of the national question. Rank and file members of the Party 
may have equated the views expounded by these individuals with 
the seniority of their positions in the Party. In this way they 
African members of the Party, from a minority in 1924, 
comprised the overwhelming majority by 1928 - 1 600 out of 
a total of 1 750 members. This transformation did not 
reflect in the Party's leadership. Even though the fifth 
national conference of the Party had elected E.J. Khaile, 
T.W. Thibedi and Gana Makabeni to the Central Committee, 
whites were to retain their hold on the more senior 
positions in the Party hierarchy for years to come. 
Whereas more than 90% of the Party membership for 1928 
consisted of Africans, whites laid claim •to two-thirds of 
the positions on the Central Committee for the period 
December 1928 to December 1929. The delegation appointed 
to the 1928 Comintern Congress consisted exclusively of 
whites, in spite of the numerical preponderance of blacks 
in the Party. 	 (See D.J. Kotze: In Analise van die  
Ideologie van die Suid-Afrikaanse Kommunistiese Party,  
1950-1984, p.208; A. Lerumo: Fifty Fighting Years, p.57). 
A recent article by Robyn Kelley argues in favour of this 
interpretation. According to Kelley African and white 
members of the CPSA perceived the revolutionary tasks of 
the Party in fundamentally different terms. Whereas 
whites, according to Kelley, joined the Party as orthodox 
Marxists, "... Africans joined the [CPSA] as [militant] 
nationalists ..."(italics in the original). Thus, whereas 
white communists rejected nationalist slogans on the basis 
of it being counter-revolutionary and reformist, African 
members of the Party adjudged national liberation to be an 
integral part of the struggle against capitalism. Through 
their dominance of the leadership positions in the CPSA, 
whites - according to Kelley's hypothesis - were able to 
control official thinking on the national question. See 
R.D.G. Kelley: The Third International and the Struggle 
for National Liberation in South Africa (Ufahamu, vol. 
15(1-2), 1986). 
S.P. Bunting and Bill Andrews provide excellent examples. 
Bunting retained his seat on the Central Committee 
uninterrupted from the Party's inception right through to 
1929/30. Andrews was to remain prominent in the Party up 
to his death in 1950. 
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could have been indirectly responsible for their own unique 
brand of `white trusteeship'. The resignation of Charles Glass 
following the victory of the negrophilist section at the 
December 1924 conference of the Party, provides an indication 
of this possibility. Referring to the victory of the 
negrophilists, Glass was reported as having said that Africans 
” ... could not possibly appreciate the noble ideals of 
Communism" .120) 
Acceptance of the Native Republic-slogan in 1929 did not imply 
a cessation of all activities within the white labour movement. 
The importance of promoting working class solidarity between 
white and black was stressed by the Party Programme.121)  In 
later years white members of the CPSA were not only active in 
the white trade union movement, 122) but also in a number of 
other organisations)-23)  
Pirow's contention that the CPSA had been involved in the 
founding of the LAR was correct. Simons and Simons indicate 
that S.P. Bunting took the initiative in organising an all-in 
conference in August 1929 from which this organisation 
evolved.124)  Bunting's action was in accordance with the Party 
Programme which allowed for the devotion of ... special 
Cited in E. Roux: S.P. Bunting - A Political BiographV_, 
p.68. 
Ibid. 
Danie du Plessis, an Afrikaner member of the Party, 
initially played a prominent part in the all-white 
Building Workers' Industrial Union (BWIU). 
Party members Jack Hodgson and Cecil Williams held leading 
positions in the Springbok Legion, a servicemen's 
association, during and after World War II. (A. Lerumo: 
Fifty Fighting Years, p.72.) 
H.J. and R.E. Simons: Class and Colour in South Africa,  
1850-1950, p.417. 
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attention to the national cause of the native people as such 
n125) 
The emphasis on national (African) liberation was in accordance 
with the CPSA's objective of a classless society. The CPSA 
Programme of January 1929 explained the relationship between 
national liberation and class emancipation in the following 
terms: 
... `Labour solidarity' cannot mean ignoring race 
discrimination or subjection. Moreover, modern 
capitalism typically treats colonial races, at any 
rate in Africa, as constituting, en bloc, reservoirs 
of labour. South African imperialism helotises the 
whole of the native people as a race as providing a 
national labour breeding and recruiting ground. 
Again, unity postulates equality. If we are to 
achieve real labour unity we must first remove the 
greatest obstacle to it, viz, the unequal, subjected, 
enslaved status of the native workers and people. 
Hence race emancipation and class emancipation tend 
to coincide. Hence too the conception and realisation 
of native rule merges into that of the Workers' and 
Peasants' Republic, non-imperialist, non-racialist, 
classless and in effect Socialist."-26)  
Pirow was thus once more correct in assessing that the 
Communist Party had "... decided to place in the forefront some 
of the intermediate stages on the march to world 
revolution". 127) The limited objectives of the LAR. also 
coincided with the specific demands made in the Party's 
programme •128) 
[B. Bunting (ed.)]: South African Communists Speak, pp. 
100-106, ("Programme of the Communist Party of South 
Africa adopted at the seventh annual conference of the 
Party on January 1, 1929"). 
Ibid., p.102. 
Hansard, 24.2.1930, co1.732. 
Compare the aims of the LAR and CPSA as found in 
respectively P. Walshe: The Rise of African Nationalism in 
South Africa, p.177 and [B. Bunting (ed.)]: South African 
Communists Speak, pp.100-106. 
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The importance of the LAB, as an organisation allowing for CPSA 
participation, was emphasised by a Comintern directive in 1929. 
The instruction read: "The Party should remain a small and 
select body of trained revolutionaries working through a large 
mass body.11129) For all practical purposes, judging from this 
directive, the League was to become a front organisation, its 
usefulness limited to that of a vehicle propounding CPSA 
interests. Theoretically, from a Party point of view, this was 
indeed possible. The League had established a mass following 
and its leadership contained, apart from CPSA members, a cross 
section of prominent individuals from the two most powerful 
African movements of the day - the ICU and the African National 
Congress (ANC).-30) 
The potential of the LAB as a movement affecting positive 
socio-political change was never realized. Roux indicates that 
a large conference had been planned for 16 December 1929. "In 
the midst of it all a telegram arrived from Moscow ordering the 
dissolution of the League."131)  This order was dutifully 
carried out by the CPSA.132)  The proposed conference never 
materialised. In all fairness it should be mentioned that on 
this day a demonstration was held in Johannesburg under the 
joint auspices of the League, ICU and CPSA.133)  
D.J. Kotze: Communism and South Africa, p.209; E. Roux: 
S.P. Bunting - A Political Biography, p.113. 
The executive of the LAR were made up of the following 
people: J.T. Gumede and N.B. Tantsi (ANC); S.P. Bunting, 
E.R. Roux and A. Nzula (CPSA) and Doyle Modiaghotla (ICU). 
See Roux: op.cit., pp.113-114 and H.J. and R.E. Simons: 
Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950, p.417. 
Roux: op.cit., p.114. See also H.J. and R.E. Simons: 
op.cit., pp.421-422. 
According to the ECCI the League had to be disbanded 
because it was putting up reformist demands, thereby 
turning the masses away from the 'revolutionary' road (see 
Roux: op. cit., pp.114-115; B. Bunting: Moses Kotane -  
South African Revolutionary, pp.52-53). 
H.J. and R.E. Simons: Class and Colour in South Africa.  
1850-1950, p.423. 
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Pirow's assertions relating to the LAR was based on an alleged 
letter and report to the Comintern by respectively Bunting and 
the CPSA.134)  Roux makes mention of a letter sent to the ECCI 
which was drafted by him and endorsed by the Central Executive 
Committee (CEC) of the Party.135) 	 The report presented to 
Parliament may have been a copy of this letter by Roux. If so, 
the overwhelmingly apologetical tone and the emphasis on the 
prospective importance of the LAR for the Party, prevalent from 
Pirow's report, can be explained in terms of Roux's letter. The 
letter by Roux represented a final attempt to ensure the 
continued existence of the LAR. 
Simons and Simons hold that a letter by Bunting, dated 29 
October 1929, was sent to the Colonial Commission of the 
British Communist Party. 136) 	 Bunting also dealt with the 
importance of the LAR in CPSA strategy in this letter. The 
letter quoted from by Pirow may have been the very same letter 
Simons and Simons refer to. The contents of this letter can 
also be explained in terms of the CI directive calling for the 
disbandment of the LAR. 
Roux's reference to the Comintern directive which ordered the 
disbandment of the LAR has been noted. Judging from this, it 
seems clear that the Comintern resolution was received by the 
Party already before the proposed conference of 16 December 
1929. Whether the directive resulted in an immediate suspension 
of Party involvement in the activities of the LAR is not clear. 
Participation by the CPSA in the Johannesburg demonstrations 
provides for conflicting interpretations. Involvement was 
either made possible by the banner of the CPSA or through LAR 
affiliation. The second possibility does not concur with 
Lerumo's emphasis on the Party being a disciplined affiliate of 
the CI.137)  Both Edward Roux and Bunting indicate that the CPSA 
See Hansard, 24.2.1930, co1.732-735. 
E. Roux: S.P. Bunting - A Political Bioaraphv_, p.115. 
H.J. and R.E. Simons: op.cit., p.421. 
See A. Lerumo: Fifty Fighting Years, p.59. 
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did not question the ECCI decision to dissolve the League.138)  
Important to note is that CPSA involvement in the LAR was 
terminated in the course of December 1929. CPSA strategy in 
1930 did not provide for participation in African politics by 
means of auxiliary organisations. A pass burning campaign in 
December 1930 took place under the banner of the Party and not 
that of any other movement or organisation.139)  
While Pirow agreed that it was impossible to ascribe all 
African unrest to "... communist intrigue or bolshevist guile 
1,140) , he stressed that "... all the native unrest taking 
.00 
place must be viewed against the background of the rapidly 
increasing and cunningly adapted communist propaganda ..."141)  
Furthermore, Pirow perceived black discontent to be limited to 
the urbanised minority. Any attempt to merely redress 
grievances "... without taking up a firm attitude towards the 
seditious propaganda would undermine the position of the white 
man" .142), In other words, while Pirow acknowledged the 
existence of discontent amongst the African population, this 
was relatively insignificant compared to the perceived menace 
of communism. 
Pirow's entire analysis of the Communist Party's modus operandi  
in South Africa hinged on the LAR. If the Rioutous Assemblies 
(Amendment) Bill had been presented to Parliament three months 
earlier, the factual content of Pirow's allegations would 
indeed have been relevant and, even more importantly, he would 
have had a strong case in support of the contention that the 
CPSA had "... decided to place in the forefront some of the 
Roux: op.cit., p.114; B. Bunting: Moses Kotane - South 
African Revolutionary, p.53. 
Roux: op.cit., pp.119-120. 
Hansard, 24.2.1930, co1.729. 
Ibid.  
Ibid., co1.740. 
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intermediate stages in the march to world revolution.1t143)  
However, by February 1930, when this Bill was introduced into 
Parliament, the Party's involvement in the League had ended. 
There are two possible explanations for the absence of any 
reference to the termination of the CPSA-LAR connection in 
Pirow's remarks. Pirow may have conveniently and blatantly 
ignored this development. Blatantly, because, as Pirow himself 
acknowledged, his analysis of the modus operandi of the CPSA 
was based on information gained from allegedly confidential 
Party documents. If indeed the South African security 
establishment did find it possible to intercept incoming and 
outgoing Party mail, it is difficult to accept that a Comintern 
directive, given the emphasis placed by Pirow on the CPSA's 
subservience to the CI, would have escaped their attention. 
Furthermore, as indicated by Brian Bunting, 	 the Comintern 
resolution was published in Umsebenzi, official mouthpiece of 
the Party, towards the end of 1929.144)  A report in a public 
journal dealing with an obvious sensitive issue such as the LAR 
surely demanded clarification. Deliberately because if 
communists had indeed withdrawn from the LAR, Pirow's argument 
would have lost its applicability and may have required a re-
evaluation of the role of the CPSA; acknowledging that they 
were a lesser evil than originally perceived. This, in turn, 
could have resulted in a casting of doubt on the perceived need 
for the Riotous Assemblies (Amendment) Bill. 
This argument may have some value in providing an explanation 
for Pirow's exposition of the modus operandi of the CPSA, but 
it fails to take into account two further possibilities: 
The LAR, despite the withdrawal of communists, may have 
continued to exist for some time. Pirow, despite being 
aware of the CI directive, may have equated the continued 
existence of the LAR with CPSA involvement. Conversely, 
Ibid., co1.732. 
Bunting: op.cit., p.52. 
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Pirow may have believed that the LAR had been 
reconstituted in another form and/or under another name 
which provided for continued participation by Communist 
Party members. The CI directive, in this sense, was of no 
particular significance and ultimately served as a 
pretence to hide continued CPSA involvement in African 
politics. 
ii) Legislation is normally prepared well in advance. Those 
individuals responsible for the drafting of the Rioutous 
Assemblies (Amendment) Bill may not have been aware of the 
CI directive or considered it to be of such insignificance 
that it did not warrant a reformulation of the original 
Bill. 
The motivation underlying the introduction of this Bill was 
essentially the same as had been the case with the Native 
Administration Act of 1927. Pirow referred to this principle of 
white trusteeship in the following terms: 
"A speech which is absolutely innocent as far as 
Europeans are concerned, may have disastrous results 
when addressed to the natives, and we must recognize 
that the security of this country and white 
civilization is based on the prestige of the white 
man. "145) 
The alleged actions of white vigilantes at black protest 
meetings146)  provided Pirow with a second reason which 
Hansard, 24.2.1930, co1.737. 
At a protest meeting in the Potchefstroom township 
adressed by Edwin Mofutsanyana and J.B. Marks, both 
members of the CPSA, during 1929, a revolver was seemingly 
fired at Mofutsanyana by a white bystander. The shot 
missed Mofutsanyana and hit Herman Lethebe - 	 another 
member of the CPSA - who died as a result of his wounds. 
Joseph Weeks, secretary of the Potchefstroom School Board 
and brother of the township superintendent, was put on 
trial for murder, but aquitted. Eight other accused were 
convicted on charges- of public violence, but also released 
with a warning by the magistrate. See H.J. and R.E. 
Simons: Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950, p.423 
and Umsebenzi, 20.6.1930; 4.7.1930 and 18.7.1930. 
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necessitated a speedy enactment of the proposed legislation. 
Pirow interpreted these isolated incidents as indicative of a 
possible future reaction by the white population if their 
'authority' were to be provoked. Failure to place this 
legislation on the statute book, according to Pirow, would 
result in the white population defying ... the law in an 
organized and armed manner with disastrous resu1ts."147)  
Patrick Duncan, acting parliamentary leader of the SAP in the 
absence of Smuts, illustrated his party's support for the 
principle of white trusteeship and the necessity of taking 
steps against 'communist propaganda' in the following words: 
"We realize the very serious position into which this 
country may be brought at any moment if this 
propaganda continues. unchecked. We realize we are 
dealing with a population only slowly emerging from 
barbarism, which cannot weigh words as an ordinary 
civilized man can, and with people who are swayed by 
appeals to their sentiments. A powerful organization 
is working from outside for the overthrow of 
civilization in South Africa, and we are prepared to 
co-operate with the Minister to see how far powers 
can be given to him ... to deal with this 
propaganda. ,,148) 
Opposition was limited to a questioning of the dictatorial 
powers allowed for the Minister of Justice and other state 
officials under the proposed Act and the bypassing of the 
courts. 
The motivation underlying the enactment of both Section 29 of 
the Native Administration Bill and the Rioutous Assemblies 
Amendment Bill, as indicated, related to the principle of white 
trusteeship. The NP's conception of communism and more 
specifically its perception of a communist menace must 
therefore be interpreted and analysed against the backdrop of 
this principle. Although Pirow made mention of the alleged 
long-term objective of communism as being a world-revolution, 
Hansard, 23.4.1930, co1.2152. 
Ibid., 24.2.1930, co1.746. 
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this remark, given the belated emphasis on the perceived 
menacing implications of this ideology for race relations, 
seems to be of relative insignificance. 
Communism was adjudged to be a menace because of the 
involvement of protagonists of this ideology with racial 
issues. Important to note, however, is that opposition to 
perceived communism was based on the expected implications for 
harmonious race relations resulting from the activities of 
communists rather than a principle or set of principles 
perceived to be central to or underlying this ideology. While 
the identification of communists with poor race relations ipso  
facto provided for the inclusion of principles allegedly 
adhered to by communists in this 'enemy image', more important 
is to note is that this was the result of a perceived set of 
activities by the proponents of this ideology and not the other 
way round. 
By involving themselves with racial issues, communists were 
challenging the authority of the "right minded" whites as sole 
and accepted interpreters of non-white interests. By disturbing 
the existing status quo in race relations, communists - 
according to both the NP and SAP - were also subverting the 
interests of the white man. The term communist, used in this 
fashion, thus came to be equated to the term communism. By 
opposing and limiting the activities of communists, so the NP 
and SAP may have believed, provision would ipso facto be made 
for the curbing of communist philosophies. If this hypothesis 
is accepted, it needs to be stressed once, again that the 
curbing of communism was to result from the steps taken against 
proponents of this ideology. The emphasis on the CPSA's 
affiliation to the Third International, apart from casting 
suspicion on the objectives of communists in involving 
themselves with racial issues, also may have served to create 
the impression that the Union's internal autonomy and 
territorial integrity was being subverted by an outside 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
organisation/power. 
Relative to the continued evolvement of Afrikaner nationalism 
during the 1930s and 1940, this overt anti-communism of the 
1920s is important and even significant for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, within the context of developing Afrikaner 
nationalism, Hertzog and more specifically Pirow, in connecting 
African discontent to perceived communist machinations, laid 
the ideological basis for the primary tradition of anti-
communism, viz, the belief that non-whites were 'corrupted' by 
foreign ideologies primarily aimed against whites. This belief 
could easily be harnessed by the successors of Afrikaner-
nationalism, the Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party. 
Secondly, overt anti-communism, as *strategy for political 
mobilisation, also dates back to the 1920s. Both Smuts and 
Hertzog, for very different reasons, made use of this strategy. 
Finally, the identification of specifically communism as 
phenomenon threatening the continued survival of South Africa 
as a white man's country, also dates back to the 1920s. 
In closing, it needs to be noted that under Smuts' and 
Hertzog's administrations, communism was portrayed as 
potentially hazardous for the fortunes of specifically the 
state. Both Smuts and Hertzog portrayed communism as 
potentially menacing for the interests of the state. The 
Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party and other Afrikaner 
nationalist oppositional groupings, as will be argued in 
succeeding chapters, while still stressing the perceived 
dangers inherent to this ideology for the state, proceeded to 
lay greater emphasis on the menace of communism for the 
volk.149) 
149. See Chapter Two. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE GESUIWERDE/HERENIGDE NASIONALE PARTY AND COMMUNISM 
This chaptei• aims at analysing the content, place and role of 
anti-communism in the Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party between 
1937 and May 1945 with the formal surrendering of Nazi Germany at 
the end of World War II. Such an attempt, by nature, demands a 
chronological approach. The factors which influenced the stance 
adopted by the Party are identified and described but not 
discussed although some remarks relating to them will of necessity 
be made. The same must be said for an analysis of the three main 
component parts of the campaign against the perceived menace of 
communism, viz. Jewish Immigration, the Colour Question and 
(white) labour organisation. These aspects will be discussed more 
comprehensively in succeeding chapters. 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party [Purified National Party] (GNP) was 
formally and officially established in the course of 1935 
following a major realignment in South African politics. Under the 
leadership of D.F. Malan, the GNP represented the main opposition 
force to the ruling United South African National Party (UP).1) 
Following the defeat of his neutrality motion in September 1939, 
J.B.M. Hertzog and his supporters disassociated themselves from 
the UP. The resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism, as one of a 
number of factors, brought Hertzog and Malan together in an 
attempt to forge Afrikaner political unity. An agreement, 
providing for parliamentary cooperation, was concluded between 
Malan's GNP and Hertzog's newly established Volksparty [literally 
People's Party] in January 1940.2) The contemplated aim of 
volkseenheid [literally volksunity] was seemingly realized with 
Hereafter referred to as the United Party. 
J. Cope: South Africa, p.15. 
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the founding of the Herenigde Nasionale Party of Volksparty 
[Reunited National Party or People's Party] (HNP)3) later in the 
same year. However, as a result of personal animosities and 
irreconcilable differences in principle, this fragile unity was 
soon after shattered. Hertzog retired from active politics. Some 
of his former supporters reconstituted themselves in the Afrikaner 
Party (AP) under N.C. Havenga.4)  A second group, under Oswald 
Pirow, broke away in September 1940 to form the New Order-
movement. Malan retained the leadership of the HNP. 
2.2. ANTI-COMMUNISM: DEFINEMENT, REDEFINEMENT AND CONSOLIDATION, 
1937 - JUNE 1941 
Prior to the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, the GNP's 
conception of communism had developed through two distinct phases. 
Both in terms of content and applicability as well as in the 
mechanisms identified for opposing this ideology, significant 
adjustments had occurred. 
2.2.1. 	 Communism - The Intra-Racial Perspective 
Initial GNP interest in communism was closely related to the 
continued proletarianisation of the traditionally agrarian 
Afrikaner society. The Afrikaner nationalist assault of the 1930s 
on the organised labour movement fomented Party interest in 
'communism'. Specifically this development marked the first 
occasion where the GNP, as a political party, was to involve 
itself with the subject of communism. 
It would however be wrong to assume that the term communism 
represented a new concept for the broad leadership element of the 
Party. D.F. Malan had been a member of Hertzog's cabinet with the 
enactment of the Riotous Assemblies (Amendment) Act in 1930. This 
The Herenigde Nasionale Party, in 1953, following an 
amalgamation with the Afrikaner Party, became known under its 
current name, the Nasionale Party. Throughout this analysis, 
the historically-correct name of the Party will be used. 
J.H. le Roux (ed.): Generaal J.B.M. Hertzoq, II, pp.736-737. 
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Act, as indicated in the previous chapter, was ostensibly directed 
against members of the Communist Party. With the exception of two 
names, all of the rebel MP's who broke with Hertzog's party in 
1934 to form the GNP,5) supported the enactment of this Act. By 
1937, more than 85% of these individuals were still active as GNP 
parliamentarians. 
The Nasionale Raad van Trustees [National Board of Trustees] (NRT) 
was founded in October 1936 with the expressed aim of integrating 
Afrikaner workers into the yolk on a Christian-national basis.6) 
The most viable method for the realization of this goal was 
considered to be the formation and organisation of 'right-minded' 
trade unions. The mining sector in general and specifically 
underground miners were identified as important points of 
departure. An Afrikanerbond van Mynwerkers [literally Afrikaner 
League of Mineworkers] (ABM) was established to oppose the then 
existing South African Mineworkers' Union (SAMWU). 
The motivation underlying Afrikaner nationalist interest in 
(white) labour organisation will be discussed more comprehensively 
at a later stage. In this chapter attention will be focussed on 
comments from within the Party on this subject in as far as it 
related to the perceived menace of communism and, subsequently, 
the activities of the NRT. 
De Kock indicates that the formation of the NRT was welcomed by 
the GNP in 1936.7) Following attempts to link the establishment 
and activities of the NRT to the GNP, the Party aligned itself 
openly with the NRT and ABM. While denying any knowledge of or 
involvement in the founding and/or functioning of the NRT, Party 
members stressed the necessity of supporting the principle of 
Afrikaner nationalist labour organisation. C.R. Swart (GNP MP for 
For the names of those individuals who left Hertzog's party 
to form the GNP see Parliamentary Register, 1910-1961, p.66. 
INCH [Institute for Contemporary History]. PV 632: J.D. 
Vorster. File 1/2/29/7/1: "Konstitusie Van die NRT". 
L. de Kock: Die Stryd van die Afrikaner in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Mynwerkersunie, 1936-1948, pp.55-56. 
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Winburg) described the NRT as "... an Afrikaner organisation which 
concerns itself exclusively in (sic!) the cultural and economic 
interests of the Afrikaner without identifying itself with any 
political party ..."8) Malan rationalised GNP support for the ABM 
by stressing that the Party's actions were not motivated by 
political considerations: 
"We act in this matter not as a political party, but as 
Afrikaners, and as Afrikaners we have the fullest right 
to call on all Afrikaners to stand together for 
Afrikaner interests."9)  
Members of the GNP, against this background, addressed themselves 
to the issue of communism. 
Initially, GNP statements on communism were more the exception 
than the rule. In welcoming Afrikaner trade unionism, Die Burger  
commented on the leadership of the existing labour movement in 
stating that, from the outside, these elements seemed to be 
propounding communism within their respective organisations.10)  
Important to note is that this editorial acknowledged that Die 
Burger was concerning itself with speculation and, as such, was 
hesitant to convey a definite impression on both issues. Swart 
also referred to communism in defending the ABM in Parliament. The 
SAMWU, according to Swart, was controlled by a strong 
'communistic' element, while the ABM represented an attempt 
to "... save the workers from that communistic flood ...1111) With 
the exception of Swart and J.H.H. de Waal, none of the other 
prominent leaders of the GNP addressed themselves to this subject. 
Such was the case both in Parliament and on public platforms. 
Hansard, 8.4.1937, co1.4483-4484. 
See Malan's speech before an audience in Stellenbosch as 
reported in Die Burger of 12.4.1937. 
Die Burger, 8.1.1937: "Afrikaanse Vakverenigings" 
[editorial]. 
Hansard, 8.4.1937, co1.4474. 
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GNP sympathy for the ABM turned into open support following a 
decision by the Chamber of Mines (CM) to introduce the "closed 
shop"-principle in the mining industry. 12) This development also 
gave rise to an increase in remarks on communism. A significant 
percentage of the subsequent propaganda correspondingly related to 
the alleged presence and influence of respectively communists and 
communism in the SAMWU. 
Apart from focussing on the SAMWU, the GNP also concerned itself 
with other 'communist' movements and individuals involved in white 
labour organisation. This ranged from a general remark by the 
Orange Free State leader of the Party,13) to a specific 
identification of 'communistic' persons and organisations. 
Prominent amongst the latter were E.S. (Solly) Sachs and his 
Garment Workers' Union (GWU) and A.A. Moore and the South African 
Trades and Labour Council (SATLC). C.R. Swart described Moore and 
Sachs as "... the leading spirits of the communistic movement, and 
their objective is to make declared communists of the Afrikaans 
population. "14) 
Sachs and the GWU were isolated for preferential treatment. In 
describing Sachs as a communist, excessive use were made of 
In terms of the "closed shop"-agreement between the Chamber 
of Mines and SAMWU, the SAMWU was to become the sole 
recognised labour movement for underground mineworkers. The 
SAMWU thus achieved a monopoly in organising and representing 
this category-of miner. Even more important was the authority 
granted to the SAMWU in co-determining, through the granting 
of union-membership, which individuals could be employed by 
mine management. The ABM, under this agreement, for all 
practical purposes, ceased to exist. The provisional 
agreement, announced on 8.4.1937, was to come into operation 
on 1.6.1937. See Die Burger, 9.4.1937. 
N.J. van der Merwe stated in Parliament on 23.4.1937: "The 
trade unions in South Africa have of late adopted a course 
and a direction which undoubtedly has a communist tendency." 
(Hansard, 23.4.1937, co1.5350) Van der Merwe did not qualify 
this statement by identifying those organisations he was 
referring to. His statement may thus be interpreted as 
applicable to all trade unions in (white) South Africa. Even 
the all-Afrikaans Spoorbond, impossible as it may seem, 
qualified in terms of Van der Merwe's definition. 
Hansard, 23.4.1937, co1.5350. 
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Pirow's action against Sachs in 1932-33 under the Rioutous 
Assemblies (Amendment) Act)-5) The majority of GNP members were 
seemingly either unaware of or consciously ignored the fact that 
Sachs had been expelled from the CPSA in September 1931 following 
its own series of purges.16) Where indeed this was acknowledged, 
individual Party members attempted to underplay any significance 
it may have had. N.J. van der Merwe, in this regard, alleged that 
... a pretence ... [was] apparently made of kicking [Communist 
Party members] out in some way or other. I have already heard some 
years ago that this is one of the methods of the communist party 
in South Africa which works in the dark to suddenly kick people 
out ..."17) 
For the GNP the person of Solly Sachs was also indicative of 
Jewish 	 involvement 	 with 	 communism. 	 The 	 expression 
"Communistic/Bolshevistic Jew" appeared with an almost monotonous 
regularity in this regard. Referring to the SAMWU, Swart agreed 
that the majority of the executive consisted of Afrikaners, but 
added that, despite this, "... the fact remains that they are all 
Pirow, as Minister of Justice, issued orders in November 1933 
declaring members and former-members of the CPSA persona non  
arata on the Witwatersrand for a period of twelve months. 
Sachs was one of those individuals affected. Following a 
contravention of his banning order, Pirow instituted legal 
proceedings against Sachs to have him deported. After Fusion, 
Smuts, as Pirow's successor, overturned these orders. (See 
H.J. and R.E. Simons: Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-
1950, pp.460-461) 
Ibid., p.447 and B. Bunting: Moses Kotane - South African  
Revolutionary, p.55. Important is to note that the suspension 
of Sachs from the CPSA did not, ipso facto, imply the 
termination of his support for philosophies and dogmas 
considered to be atypical of Marxism. What can well be stated 
is that as a result of him falling out of favour with the 
Stalinist leadership of the CPSA, Sachs was expelled from the 
Communist Party. 
Hansard, 23.4.1937, co1.5367. As indicated, the withdrawal of 
Sachs from the CPSA did not imply an immediate and 
irrevocable termination of support for Marxist philosophies. 
Van der Merwe, however, interpreted the termination of Sachs' 
membership of the CPSA as being of little material 
significance. 
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dupes of a small number of Bolshevistic Jews Malan 1118) 
connected the presence of 'communistic Jews' in the labour 
movement to the larger question of Jewish immigration.19)  
Unanimity was reached on the ultimate goal communists in the 
labour movement were striving to attain. Karl Bremer described 
this perceived aim as follows: "The leaders of most of the trade 
unions are striving after a communistic state which they want to 
establish here."20)  Important is to note that under this 
description communism was perceived to be ultimately a threat to 
the South African state. Relative to labour organisation, this 
implied that communists, by virtue of their alleged authoritarian 
positions within the labour movement, would prove able to mobilise 
their respective labour unions in support of this goal. Afrikaner 
workers and ultimately all white workers affiliated to trade 
unions were thus to be actively involved in the process of 
lbolshevisation'. 
This exposition serve as background to the motivation presented by 
the GNP for opposing communism. While Bremer noted in a general 
remark that communism implied ... [the] destruction of most of 
the things which we in South Africa stand and are striving 
for"21), C.W.M. du Toit explicitly referred to the negative 
implications of this ideology for the Christian dogma.22) 
According to Swart, once an Afrikaner had become involved with 
communism, he was ... lost to his nation, [becoming] an 
internationalist who repudiates his own people."23)  Swart thus 
contended that communism endangered national-, i.e. volksidentity. 
Hansard, 8.4.1937, co1.4485. 
See Die Burger, 12.4.1937. 
Hansard, 29.4.1937, co1.5726. 
Ibid.  
Ibid., co1.5725-5726. 
Ibid., 8.4.1937, co1.4048. 
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Conspicuous is the fact that occasions where concern was voiced 
over specifically communism (as an ideology) were largely 
isolated. Judging from Hansard and Die Burger, it seems as if the 
GNP was more concerned with exposing the presence and influence of 
'communists' and 'communism' in the white labour movement than 
with combating this perceived menace. Furthermore, as illustrated 
in the previous paragraph, the concern voiced on these occasions 
were diverse in nature. Communiality was only provided by the 
joint opposition to the concept of communism. No attempt was made 
to present a coherent view of this ideology - even if 
predominantly negative. Karl Bremer was the only GNP member who 
indicated that the above possibility did indeed exist.24) 
According to Bremer, however, such an analysis, for the immediate, 
was uncalled for. Bremer's remark is indicative of the overall 
approach by the Party. 
To the GNP's essentially haphazard approach towards the 
theoretical suppositions underlying Marxist dogma must immediately 
be added two further dimensions: Firstly, communism, from 1935 
onwards and particularly after 1937, were, for a variety of 
reasons, summarily and forthwith rejected by many circles in 
Western countries.25)  This rejection was never clearly 
substantiated. The relative absence of remarks on the principles 
underlying Marxist Socialism, within the framework of the GNP, was 
thus in accordance with accepted international practice. 
Secondly, the GNP's references to communism have to be analysed in 
the context of its interest in Afrikaner nationalist labour 
organisation. Similar to Hertzog's campaign of 1929/30 against 
Bremer noted that there was "... a good deal in communism 
which may be good and may be Christian, possibly more than in 
the existing order ..." See Ibid., 29.4.1937, col. 5726-5727. 
These reasons, inter alia, included the following: The 
decision by the Third International, at its 1935 Moscow 
Congress, to foment a world-revolution; the successive purges 
undertaken under the leadership of Joseph Stalin; and the 
initial rejection, by Western powers, of an alliance with the 
USSR against Germany. For a detailed examination of the 
Comintern decision of 1935 and the different purges 
undertaken by Stalin, see, for example, I. Deutscher (ed.): 
The Great Purges. 
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communism, which, in effect, largely served as a springboard for 
the promotion of the NP's native policies, the GNP, in commenting 
on the alleged communist menace, was primarily concerned with the 
promotion of Afrikaner trade unionism. The relative absence of a 
detailed and in-depth evaluation of the theoretical suppositions 
underlying communism is understandable and to be expected when 
viewed against this background. Bremer's remark on the inopportune 
occasion for an evaluation of communism must be interpreted in 
this context. 
In analysing the role of anti-communism in the GNP's attempt to 
promote the cause of Afrikaner nationalist labour organisation, 
two explanations may well be applicable: Firstly, references to 
communism were without any ideological merit and primarily served 
to promote the cause of Afrikaner nationalist labour organisation. 
The second explanation, on the other hand, does attribute a 
normative value to remarks on the alleged menace of communism. The 
validity of these contentions will henceforth be evaluated. 
The first explanation, in terms of which references to communism 
are adjudged to be part of a tactical initiative, does not offer a 
comprehensive interpretation. If all references to a perceived 
communist menace had to be analysed in terms of the immediate 
value it may have had as a propaganda tool, it would be expected 
for such remarks to disappear over time. This did not happen. 
Although remarks on communism by GNP members served an obvious 
tactical goal, this, however, still does not imply that all such 
pronouncements were, by definition, propagandistic. Elements which 
are indicative of ideological value-judgment may well have been 
embedded in these remarks. In other words, the normative element 
in criticism of perceived communism cannot simply be discarded in 
favour of an exclusivist tactical explanation. Against the 
background of a comparison between the connotations attached to 
this ideology by respectively Pirow and the GNP (communism as an 
inter-racial phenomenon vs communism as an intra-racial 
phenomenon), the question may well be asked whether, if indeed 
this was merely a propaganda strategy, it would have achieved any 
success. Furthermore, such an explanation negate the influence of 
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a variety of cultural, economic and religious organisations who 
identified themselves, like the GNP, with Afrikaner nationalism. 
In all probability the conception of a communist menace did figure 
in the GNP's support for Afrikaner trade unionism. Judging from 
the emphasis placed on the perceived goal that communists in the 
labour movement were allegedly striving to attain, it seems as if 
the GNP perceived the formation of 'right-minded' trade unions as 
a realistic and viable alternative for a potentially explosive 
situation. By supporting the NRT and its affiliates, the GNP - or 
so members of the Party may have believed - was indirectly 
involved in the curbing of communism. 
What exactly was meant by communism, however, is not clear. Given 
the remark by Swart on possible volksalienation and the emphasis 
on labour organisation, it may have been that the predominant 
characteristic of communism was adjudged to be international 
intra-ethnic proletarian solidarity. References to atheism, within 
this context, seems to be of secondary importance. 
A comparison between Pirow's remarks on communism in 1930 and 
those of the GNP during the early months of 1937, reveal that on 
these two occasions this ideology was perceived in fundamentally 
different terms. Whereas Pirow stressed the supposedly detrimental 
effect of this ideology on race relations, the GNP, by 1937, 
accentuated the presence and influence of alleged communists and 
communism in the white labour movement. GNP propaganda initially 
made little mention of `communist involvement' in either non-white 
trade unions or with the African community. 26) This indicate that 
whereas the NP in 1930 perceived communism to be a menace limited 
26. In a speech at Stellenbosch, Malan stated that " [d]aarby 
stel die Joodse Kommunis hom teen rassediskriminasie van 
enige aard, wat in Suid-Afrika beteken dat die kleurlyn 
uitgewis en alle rasse een moet wees." (Die Burger, 
12.4.1937) Malan, however, made this remark in passing and 
mainly linked it to the perceived influence of this ideology 
on the Afrikaner worker. No indication was provided whether 
he thought it to have had an effect on the African or whether 
this principle was or had been propagated amongst the non-
white population. 
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to inter-racial affairs, by 1937 the GNP stressed the essentially 
intra-racial nature of this phenomenon. 
2.2.2. 	 Anti-Communism - The Inter- and Intra-Racial Perspective 
Following unsuccessful attempts to move the Hertzog-administration 
into opposing the proposed agreement between the CM and SAMWU, GNP 
statements on communism became more widespread. Even though there 
may exist a causal link between the "closed shop"-agreement and 
the increase in pronouncements on communism, care must be taken 
not to overemphasize the importance of this development. Such an 
attempt ignore the implications of other developments in the wider 
socio-political arena. 
In terms of continuity, renewed emphasis were placed on the 
alleged involvement of Jews with communism and the role of 
perceived communists in the white labour movement. Allegations of 
Jewish support for communism gained fresh momentum following E.H. 
(Eric) Louw's return to South Africa27) and his decision to join 
the GNP. It needs to be noted, however, that the campaign against 
communism and its linking with Jewish immigration was closely 
related to the upsurge of anti-Semitic feeling in South Africa. 
In dealing with communism in the white labour movement, the GNP, 
as before, remained supportive of the NRT. Apart from regularly 
publishing reports on its public meetings, Die Burger also called 
upon the yolk to support the NRT in its endeavour to promote 
Afrikaner nationalist trade unionism.28) The resumption of the 
NRT's campaign against the SAMWU, marked by the founding of the 
Hervormingsorganisasie binne die Mynwerkersunie [literally 
Reformist Organisation inside the Mine Workers' Union] in February 
Eric Louw was South African diplomatic representative in 
Washington, Rome and Paris consecutively from 1925 onwards. 
See biographical sketch of Louw in M. Roberts and A.E.G. 
Trollip: The South African Opposition 1939-1945, p. 212. 
Die Burger, 21.6.1937: "Die Kommunistiese Veldtog" 
[editorial]. 
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1938, was well documented in Die Burger and Die Transvaler.29)  The 
same goes for the campaign against Sachs and the GWU. 
The emphasis on communism in the white labour movement was another 
element already present in the GNP's conception of communism. 
Relative to the white population, this implied that the influence 
of communism was perceived to be limited to a particular social 
class. The revitalised interest of the GNP, however, allowed for 
an extension of this conception to include those sections of the 
`white' community hithertho excluded.30) Die Transvaler proceeded 
to `expose' the strategy allegedly employed by the Communist Party 
in gaining disciples from social classes other than the white 
proletariat.31)  
An interesting element in this regard is the fact that the 
emphasis on the perceived menace of communism outside of the 
labour movement was initiated by Party newspapers. In other words, 
campaigns by Die Burger and Die Transvaler initiated the 
broadening of the Party's conception of communism - or at least in 
as far as it related to the white population. Prior to the 
outbreak of World War II, references to this aspect were generally 
limited to the columns of Party newspapers. 
The single most important element in the GNP's redefined 
conception of communism related to the position of non-whites. The 
origin of Party statements in this regard, as before, could also 
be traced back to developments associated with the labour 
movement. Reacting to a racially-mixed social function organised 
An excellent example of this is provided by De Kock's 
analysis of the struggle for supremacy in the SAMWU. A 
significant percentage of her research is based on reportage 
emanating from Die Burger and Die Transvaler.  See L.de Kock: 
Die Stryd van die Afrikaner in die Suid-Afrikaanse  
Mynwerkersunie, 1936-1948. 
See for example editorials in both Die Burger and Die 
Transvaler: Die Burger, 29.9.1938,: "Propaganda teen 
Neutraliteit"; Die Transvaler, 28.4.1939: "Uitgebreide 
Veldtog om Kommunisme te Propageer" and Die Transvaler, 
15.8.1939: "Die Kommunistiese Gevaar". 
Die Transvaler, 28.4.1939 and 2.5.1939. 
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by the Cape Federation of Trades, D.F. Malan stated that this 
could partially be ascribed to 'communist' inf1uence.32)  
Addressing the 1937 Cape Provincial Congress of the GNP at 
Uitenhage, Malan stated that the Third International had declared 
that the South African worker would only be able to attain his 
fullest rights via the black man.33) Taking its cue from Malan, 
Die Burger declared that it was an important objective of the 
Communist Party to organise black workers.34)  
Judging from statements by GNP members, it seems as if initially 
there existed some uncertainty in applying the term communism to 
people of colour. This applied equally to both groups, i.e. 
Coloureds and blacks, as well as social classes within a given 
group. Malan, in his speeches, had indicated that he perceived 
communism to be particularly prevalent amongst the African working 
class. Malan's description was not limited by ethnic definition, 
i.e. between blacks and Coloureds, nor did it encompass all social 
classes of the non-white population. 
Louw, on his return to South Africa, stated that "... die Unie se 
naturellebevolking verskaf vrugbare grond vir 	 [kommunistiese] 
propaganda ..."35) Louw's description does not allow for the 
inclusion of the Coloured population. In so far as it provided for 
the black population, Louw may have perceived workers to represent 
merely a sub-section of a larger entity without any apparent or 
particular significance. 
The Uitenhage conference marked the first occasion where a 
provincial congress of the GNP adopted a resolution on communism. 
In as far as this resolution referred to communism and the non-
white population, it provided, albeit in vague terms, for both 
See Malan's statement to the press as reported in Die Burger, 
7.5.1937. 
Die Burger, 19.8.1937. 
Die Burger, 23.9.1937: "Kommunistiese Bedrywigheid" 
[editorial]. 
Die Burger, 2.8.1937. 
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what may conveniently be referred to as the Malan- and Louw-
perspectives.36)  Following the Uitenhage Congress, however, Louw's 
approach on intra-racial group applicability progressively came to 
be adopted by the Party. Disturbances in the townships of 
Vereeniging towards the end of September 1937, which resulted in 
the death of two white policemen, solidified this approach. At a 
protest meeting organised by the GNP, N.J. van der Merwe alleged 
that the disturbances in Vereeniging were born out of 
"... agitasie en kwaadstigting deur sekere kommuniste 	 ”37) 
Malan, in this regard, stated that the black man, because of his 
traditionalist life-style, proved to be highly susceptible to 
communist propaganda.38)  
Conversely, but less conspicuous, Malan's emphasis on inter-ethnic 
group applicability also came to be adopted by the GNP. Discussing 
a predominantly Coloured protest march on the Houses of Parliament 
in May 1939, GNP parliamentarians were adament that this march had 
taken place under the leadership of Icommunists'.39)  By partaking, 
Coloureds - according to the GNP - had proven their susceptability 
to communism. Later in the same year Louw stated that blacks and 
Coloureds were prime objectives in the Communist Party's overall 
strategy. 
A speech by D.F. Malan in August 1937 represented the only 
occasion throughout the course of the period under discussion 
where a GNP speaker was ostensibly concerned with providing an 
analysis of the theoretical suppositions underlying communism. 
Malan, in a speech before an audience in Stellenbosch, 
acknowledged that communism was an improvement on the then 
existing status quo in South Africa.") Malan, however, failed to 
expand on this observation or identify those positive elements of 
See Die Burger's (19.8.1937) report on the Congress. 
Die Burger, 28.9.1937. 
Ibid., 11.10.1937 and 12.10.1937. 
See Die Transvaler's (27.3.1939) report on the debate in 
Parliament. 
Die Burger, 28.8.1937. 
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communism he was referring to. He was primarily concerned with 
highlighting the perceived shortcomings and negative attributes of 
this ideology. In this regard emphasis was placed on four aspects: 
Anti-Nationalism: Malan contended that communism did not 
recognise any national boundaries.41)  Malan, once again, did 
not expand on this observation. Furthermore, he failed to 
provide an indication of what exactly he was referring to. 
Against the backdrop of his earlier statements on the 
continuing Spanish Civil War, it may well have been possible 
that Malan was addressing himself to alleged communist 
involvement and/or propaganda which transgressed national 
boundaries. Conversely, he may have been voicing an opinion 
on the concept of proletarian internationalism. This last 
remark must be seen in the context of Malan's statement of 
possible inter-racial labour solidarity at the Uitenhage 
conference less than a week before. A third possibility 
allows for a synthesis of both sets of arguments. 
Materialism: Malan stated that the materialistic character of 
this ideology had to be explained in terms of the abnormal 
emphasis placed on economic forces. 
Atheism: The rejection of religion, according to Malan, was 
the natural result of communism's materialism. 
Equality: Malan noted that communism accepted the principle 
of political, social and economic equality. The striving 
towards equality, according to Malan, had to result in 
"... strakke uniformiteit ..."42)  Although Malan did not 
explicitly mention racial equality, there can be little doubt 
that this was indeed what he had in mind. 
Ibid.  
Ibid.  
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In motivating their opposition to communism, GNP members and Party 
newspapers referred to a number of aspects which it perceived as 
characteristic of this ideology and, as such, reprehensible. 
Most prominent amongst the GNP's criticism of communism was the 
refusal of this ideology to heed the colour bar. Malan formulated 
his concern in explicit racial terms by stating that if communism 
found applicability in South Africa, this had to result in the 
obliteration of all differences between "... blanke, Ikaffer' en 
kleurling ...“43) Die Burger commented that communism's refusal to 
take cognisance of the colour bar had rendered it impossible to 
provide a positive appraisal of any other aspect of this ideology 
even if such an aspect was indeed meritorious.44)  The 
onbeperkte verbroedering ..." between different races figured 
prominently in Die Burger's reportage of the May Day meeting on 
the Cape Parade in 1938.45) 
The interconnectedness of atheism and communism provided another 
major concern for the GNP. P.W. Botha, then organiser of the Cape 
GNP, stated that this ideology was intent on undermining the very 
foundations of Afrikanerdom.48)  The GNP's opposition to communism, 
according to C.W.M. du Toit, was self-evident from the Party's 
"... Christelike fondament[e]_1,47) Die Transvaler, in referring 
to the interest shown by Afrikaans Protestant Churches in the 
alleged communist menace, stated that this ideology's atheism 
necessitated intervention by the Church.48)  
A third major element in GNP protestations over communism related 
to this ideology's perceived internationalist character. What 
Die Burger, 30.10.1937. 
Die Burger, 20.8.1938: "Drie Stelsels" [editorial]. 
Ibid., 2.5.1938., 
Ibid., 20.8.1938. 
Die Transvaler, 19.1.1939. 
Die Transvaler, 15.8.1939: "Die Kommunistiese Gevaar" 
[editorial]. 
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exactly was meant by internationalism, however, is not clear. 
Furthermore, the interpretation attached to the concept of 
internationalism was severely qualified. With the exception of a 
single editorial in Die Burger,49)  the Party failed to address 
itself to the ultimate question of the relationship between 
nationalism and internationalism. In spite of a comment by Die 
Transvaler that "[e]en van die fundamentele karaktertrekke van 
kommunisme 	 [is] die onvoorwaardelike verwerping van die 
kleurslagboom in In poging om alle bevolkingsgroepe te verenig in 
die internasionale strewe na materiele gewin",50) the GNP, in 
dealing with internationalism, was primarily concerned with the 
possible implications of this construct for the working class. 
Even then, this was limited by racial definition to the white 
working class and ultimately the Afrikaner proletariat. 
Die Burger declared that the aim of communism was class struggle 
instead of national unity. Class consciousness, it was stated, 
would result in the alienation of workers from the volk.51)  This 
particular statement can be traced back to the belief that the 
yolk was an organic entity where all members - irrespective of 
economic status or social standing - were bound by ties of 
tradition, blood and culture. Working class solidarity, in terms 
of this perspective, was sectional and, as such, a direct 
challenge to Afrikaner volksunity. A broadening of this 
description gradually evolved so as to accomodate all white 
Die Burger, 14.5.1938: "Nasionalisme en Internasionalisme" 
[editorial]. While this editorial emphasized the 
irreconcilability of nationalism and internationalism, this 
was presented in such a manner so as if to say that the 
construct of internationalism was a theoretical possibility 
which ultimately belonged to the past. According to Die 
Transvaler: "Eerbied vir eie nasionaliteit het die 
wereldleuse van ons tyd geword." Interesting to note is that 
Die Transvaler did expect a new status quo to come into being 
which was also referred to as internationalism. This 
'internationalism', however, was constructed in economic 
rather than political terms and resembled more a form of 
economic holism than internationalist socio-political 
integration and uniformity. 
Die Transvaler, 13.5.1938. 
Die Burger, 21.5.1937 and 21.6.1937. 
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workers irrespective of ethnic affiliation on a national level. In 
motivating its opposition to communism's 'denationalisation', Die 
Burger noted that by becoming a worker, "... hou In man nie op om 
burger te wees nie en word sy belange in die lewe en in die 
volkslewe nie tot sy diensvoorwaardes beperk nie."52) 
The resolution adopted at the Cape Provincial Conference of the 
Party in 1937 provides an important point of departure in 
examining the place and role of anti-communism in the GNP. As the 
largest and most influential of the four provincial congresses, 
the resolution adopted at Uitenhage may be considered as 
representative of the general approach by the Party. 
The importance of this resolution allows for a verbatim 
extraction: 
"Die kongres vestig die aandag van die Regering op die 
steeds toenemende kommunistiese gevaar in Suid-Afrika en 
eis dat dit bestry moet word deur 
Strenger immigrasiewette, 
Strafbaarmaking van ongewenste propaganda deur 
deportasie en andersins, 
Strenger toepassing van die Wet op Oproerige 
Byeenkomste, en 
Gesonder nywerheidswetgewing."53)  
The mechanisms identified for the curtailment of the alleged 
communist menace, as indicated, consisted of a series of 
administrative and legislative measures. Important to note is that 
the proposed measures allowed for far more than merely opposition 
to communism. Judging from these measures, it seems as if the GNP 
perceived the eradication of communism to be co-dependent on and 
ultimately interlinked with a remodelling of existing legislation. 
The propagation of its own principles, so the Party may have 
believed, allowed for the limitations of existing legislation to 
be redressed. This corresponded with an acknowledgement by D.F. 
Die Burger, 2.11.1937: "Vyande van die Vakbonde" [editorial]. 
Die Burger, 20.8.1937. 
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Malan during August 1937 that one ideology "... kan alleen . 
geneutraliseer of teengegaan word deur In ander stroming."54)  
Remarks on communism subsequently came to be intertwined with 
other elements of the Party Programme. In this regard generally 
three aspects were involved, viz. Immigration, Neutrality and the 
Colour Question. The linking of protestations over communism to 
one or more of these elements had important implications for the 
utilisation of anti-communism by the GNP. The Party may have 
believed that the propagation of the one was an important and 
fundamental prerequisite for the successful realization of the 
other. This, then, would be in accordance with the seemingly 
integrated approach decided on by the Uitenhage Congress. 
Conversely, however, the remarks on communism may have primarily 
served as an added emphasis for a campaign aimed at promoting the 
related principle(s) or some other objective. From the outset it 
must be noted that the distinction between anti-communism as 
respectively a principle and strategy, attempted here, represents 
an oversimplification of a much more complex issue. 
The Uitenhage Congress, as indicated, identified the passing of 
stricter immigration laws as an important and necessary mechanism 
for the curtailment of communism. Eric Louw, on his return from 
Europe, declared that "[o]ngewenste vreemdelinge en hulle wat 
deelneem aan kommunistiese propaganda moet onmiddellik gedeporteer 
word ..."55) Louw's emphasis on `undesirable aliens' corresponded 
with Article Eleven of the GNP's Programme of Principles as 
Ibid., 28.8.1937. 
Ibid., 2.8.1937. 
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adopted in 1936.56)  Die Burger supported Louw's contention that 
the enactment of stricter immigration laws was imperative to avoid 
a further increase in the number of 'communist agitators' already 
present and active in South Africa.57)  At Uitenhage Louw repeated 
his warning in introducing discussions on the topic of 
communism.58)  
Criticism of his remarks on communism by Morris Kentridge,59)  and 
the dormant tide of anti-Semitism within South Africa provided 
Louw with the opportunity to link his warnings on communism and 
immigration to the Jewish Question. Louw contended that Kentridge, 
himself a Jew, was acting as spokesman of the Jewish community 
and, as such, his criticism was 	 betekenisvol —"CO By 
association, Kentridge - according to Louw - had thus illustrated 
Jewish support for communism. Although Louw's reaction coincided 
with the Uitenhage Congress and even though a resolution on the 
Jewish Question was adopted by the conference, this particular 
resolution did not make any mention of communism. 
The GNP's election manifesto for the May 1938 election explicitly 
referred to immigration and the Jewish Question. Once again, as 
before, no mention was made of communism.61)  Malan, however, in 
"11. Die Party verwelkom die versterking van die blanke 
bevolking deur die immigrasie van gewenste persone. Hy 
verklaar hom egter teen enige immigrasie op staatskoste. 
Verder dring hy daarop aan dat van staatswed sodanige 
maatreels geneem word dat geen onwenslike persone die land 
binnekom nie en dat immigrasie soveel moontlik beperk word 
tot elemente wat deur die Suid-Afrikaanse volk geassimileer 
kan word en wat nie deur hul aanwesigheid of die stof like 
lewenstandaard Of die sedelike peil van die blanke bevolking 
sal verlaag nie." Cited in J.H. le Roux and P.W. Coetzer: Die 
Nasionale Party, III, pp. 637-638. 
Die Burger, 4.8.1937: "Kommunisme" [editorial]. 
Die Burger, 19.8.1937. 
See Kentridge's criticism of Louw's statement as reported in 
Die Burger of 3.8.1937. 
Die Burger, 19.8.1937. 
See the GNP's election manifesto as published in Die Burger 
of 3.8.1937. 
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one of his first campaign speeches, connected the continued 
immigration of Jews to the Party's emphasis on the perceived 
menace of communism.62)  Given the preponderance of remarks on the 
alleged involvement of Jewish communists in the labour movement 
and the actuality of the Jewish Question, this development was to 
be expected. The ensueing campaign reached a climax with the 
introduction into Parliament of a Aliens (Amendment) and 
Immigration Bill under the name of Eric Louw in February 1939. 
Although introduced as a private member's motion, this Bill had 
the full support of the GNP.63)  
In as far as Louw's proposed Act related to communism and the 
Jewish population, the following sections are relevant: 
"4.(3) The ... [Immigrations Selection Board] may 
authorize the issue of a permit to enter the Union for 
the purpose of permanent residence therein, to an alien 
who has applied therefor ... and who is, in its opinion, 
a desirable immigrant. The granting or withdrawing of 
such authority shall be entirely at the discretion of 
the board: Provided that the board shall not authorize 
the issue of such a permit unless the applicant 
therefor - 
is likely to become readily assimilated 
within a reasonable period after his entry 
into the Union: Provided that no applicant who 
is of Jewish parentage shall be deemed to be 
readily assimiable; and 
is not likely to be harmful to the welfare 
of the Union and is not known to be or to have 
been a member or supporter of any communist 
organization, or to have espoused or professed 
the principles of communism ... 
8.(4) If the holder of a permit issued in accordance 
with the provisions of section four ... 
Die Burger, 19.8.1937. 
G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, 
p.126 and P.F. van der Schyff: Eric H. Louw in die Suid 
Afrikaanse Politiek tot 1948, p.450. 
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(b) has been proved to the satisfaction of the 
Minister to be or to have engaged in 
communistic activities, or in activities 
likely to disturb harmonious relations between 
the European and non-European sections of the 
population of the Union, 
the Minister may at any time direct that a notice in 
writing be addressed to that holder, whereby that permit 
is cancelled and whereby he is ordered to leave the 
Union within a period stated in the notice, and upon the 
expiration of that period that permit shall become null 
and void."64) 
Judging from the proposed legislation, it would seem fair to 
assume that Jews and communists were adjudged to be two separate 
categories of undesirable immigrants. Analogies, therefore, were 
to be more the exception than the rule. Louw, in the presentation 
of his Bill to Parliament, however, indicated in no uncertain 
terms that he was referring to a single, coherent grouping of 
prospective undesirable immigrants, viz. Jews. Louw described the 
acceptance of the unsuitability of the Jewish 'race' for 
immigration purposes as the outstanding feature and leading 
principle of the Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration Bi1l.65)  
In dealing with communism, Louw argued that Jewish involvement 
with this ideology was a historical legacy. Although it was 
acknowledged that all Jews, by definition, were not communists, 
Louw stated that "... Jode die mense [was] wat die begrip van 
kommunisme bedink het en dit is deur Jode dat kommunisme beheer 
word en vandag nog bestuur word."66) According to Louw this was a 
natural phenomenon given communism's internationalism and the 
Jewish community's alleged international outlook. 
In so far as the emphasis on communism related to the GNP's 
campaign against immigration, indications are that the alleged 
communist menace were utilised as both a principle and strategy. 
64. See Statutes of the Union of South Africa. 1937 and Union 
Gazette ExtraordinarN/, no. 2596, 6.1.1939. 
Hansard, 24.2.1939, co1.838. 
Ibid., co1.843. 
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Malan's attempt in 1938 •to link continued Jewish immigration to 
communism may be interpreted as referring to the then upcoming 
general election as well as the question of Jewish immigration. 
Seen in the context of the election, it may be argued that Malan's 
immediate objective was to maximise potential voter support for 
the Party. Both communism and Jewish immigration, given their 
actuality, were ideally suited for such a campaign. Anti-
communism, in conjunction with the stressing of the perceived 
negative implications of Jewish immigration, thus served as a 
vehicle for the mobilisation of popular support. 
In the presentation of his Bill to Parliament, Louw - as 
indicated - acknowledged that the words communist and Jew did not 
represent interchangeable terms.67)  Louw was primarily concerned 
with ending the perceived influx of undesirable immigrants. The 
emphasis on communism and communists was an integral part of this 
campaign. Judging from his speech in Parliament, it seems as if 
Louw believed that by limiting Jewish immigration, provision would 
ipso facto be made for the barring of a significant percentage of 
communists from entering South Africa. In this manner the twofold 
aim of terminating Jewish immigration and eradicating communism 
could simultaneously be realised. 
Conversely, however, t he opportunity also existed for the 
utilisation of the allege d communist menace with the exclusive aim 
of promoting the GNP's campaign against Jewish immigration and 
ultimately the enactment of the Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration 
Bill. This must be seen against the backdrop of what Cuthbertson 
typifies as the If SOO growing Anti-Semitism which had found 
sanctuary within the Purified Nationalist Party of Dr. 
D.F. Malan ..."68) 
The emphasis on communism, in dealing with Neutrality and the 
Colour Question, were utilised in much the same fashion as was the 
case with the GNP's campaign against Jewish immigration. Given the 
67. Ibid. 
68. G.C. Cuthbertson: Jewish Immigration as an Issue in South 
African Politics, 1937-39 (Historia, vol.26(2), 1981). 
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stressing of the rejection of the colour bar as a distinguishing 
feature of communism, it was to be expected for elements 
considered to be atypical of this ideology to play a prominent 
role in the Party's dealings with the subject of race relations. 
Through the propagation of its policy of rigid racial separation 
which, from 1948 onwards, became known as apartheid, the GNP may 
have believed that it was providing a viable alternative to 
perceived communism. Conversely, the emphasis on the perceived 
menace of communism provided an added incentive for and a useful 
tool in promoting the GNP's insistence on racial segregation. 
The GNP's emphasis on the need for neutrality increasingly became 
a topical issue in South African politics partly as a result of 
the rapidly deteriorating international situation. Although, prior 
to the outbreak of World War II, the issue of neutrality pertained 
more to the Union's constitutional position vis a vis Britain than 
actual participation in an international conflict, rumours of war 
and tension in world politics contributed to the actualisation of 
the neutrality-issue.69)  Furthermore, given the absence of a 
definite and clearly-defined policy in this regard within the 
ruling United Party, the issue of neutrality also held short-term 
benefits for the GNP in the party political struggle for the 
allegiance of white voters. 
Neutrality, in time, also came to be connected to the perceived 
menace of communism. The stressing of communism's alleged 
international connotations potentially allowed for the linking of 
the 'communist menace' and the issue of neutrality. Prior to the 
outbreak of World War II this conception was already present in 
certain quarters of the GNP. Die Transvaler epitomised the 
relationship between Joseph Stalin (and by implication the Soviet 
69. Important, however, is to note that while the question of 
neutrality did attain a new momentum in the years immediately 
preceding the outbreak of World War II and although the 
stressing of this issue held immediate and short term 
benefits for the G/HNP, this issue, in a manner of speaking, 
did not appear out of the proverbial blue on the Party 
programme. Neutrality, or rather the emphasis on national 
autonomy, had been an integrated element in Afrikaner 
nationalist ideology even before the outbreak of World War I. 
See Chapter One. 
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Union), the Third International and South African communists in 
the following terms: "Stalin het gespreek, die Komintern gaan 
handel en in Suid-Afrika sal sy (Stalin) se woorde ook weerklank 
he."7°)  
At first glance, the GNP's initial conception of the relationship 
between communism in general and the Soviet Union was ill-defined. 
The expected forthcoming international conflict, according to 
Malan, was in all probability going to take place between 
"... kommunisme en ... fascism (sic!) - dit wil se tussen 
Duitsland en Italie aan die een kant en Engeland, Frankryk en 
Rusland aan die ander kant."71) 
In defence of Malan's comment must be added that between 1937 and 
1939 a possible agreement, providing for cooperation between the 
Soviet Union, Britain and France, was high on the international 
agenda and no less than 30 schemes were proposed in this regard. 
Malan's intention, in referring to a possible international 
conflict between the USSR, Britain and France on the one hand and 
Germany and Italy on the other, may well have been to gain 
political advantage on the UP by once again bringing into focus 
the question of neutrality and in particular whether South Africa 
was going to partake in a future conflict on the side of Britain. 
Following negotiations between British and Soviet diplomats and 
rumours of an imminent pact between London and Moscow,72)  the 
emphasis on alleged Soviet involvement with communism 
internationally and the subsequent necessity of not becoming 
involved in the conflicts of Europe came to be presented in a more 
coherent manner. Die Transvaler declared that it was generally 
accepted that with the advent of friendship between the Soviet 
Union and any other state, this was perceived by the USSR as an 
Die Transvaler, 17.2.1938: "Die Bedreiging van Kommunisme" 
[editorial]. 
Die Burger, 6.10.1937. 
For an analysis of British diplomatic overtures aimed at the 
establishment of a Anglo-Soviet Pact, see A. Werth: Russia at 
War, 1941-1945, pp.27-39. 
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opportunity for the spreading of communistic doctrines within the 
host country.73)  Louw contended that friendship between the USSR 
and another country was only the first step towards communism's 
ultimate goal of a world-revo1ution.74)  Diplomatic contact between 
London and Moscow, by definition, thus represented the groundwork 
for the spreading of communist propaganda in Britain. South 
Africa, by reason of the imperial tie and the perceived lackey-
status of Hertzog and Smuts, were ipso facto also to be affected. 
The Union, according to the GNP, was particularly vulnerable given 
the alleged susceptability of the African population to communism. 
Malan stressed that if "... die leer van Rusland eers In houvas op 
Suid-Afrika gekry het, sal Suid-Afrika ophou as om witmansland te 
bestaan."75)  The Party thus contended, albeit in rather simplistic 
fashion, that by not becoming involved in the squabbles of Europe 
and more specifically in an alliance with the Soviet Union through 
Britain, provision would automatically be made for a restriction 
of opportunities for communism to gain a foothold in South Africa. 
Simultaneously, however, the focus on the Soviet Union as 
allegedly collaborating with local communists in spreading this 
ideology, served to promote the GNP's insistence on neutrality. 
The absence of a clearly defined or definite attitude towards 
involvement in potential international conflicts as well as on the 
topic of national autonomy within the ruling UP76) accentuated the 
advantages to be reaped from propagating a policy of neutrality 
and non-participation. 
Finally, it needs to be remembered that while the issue of 
neutrality did attain a new momentum in the period prior to the 
outbreak of World War II, Neutrality was first and foremost a 
Die Transvaler, 8.4.1939: "Kommunisme" [editorial]. 
Ibid., 8.7.1939. 
Ibid., 27.6.1939. 
Smuts and Hertzog differed fundamentally in their 
understanding of the meaning attached to national autonomy. 
See P.W. Coetzer and J.H. le Roux (eds.): Die Nasionale 
Party, IV, pp.230-259. 
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constitutional issue relating to the relationship between South 
Africa and Britain.77)  Neutrality, in so far as it served to 
reflect on the perceived disadvantages of some kind of entente 
with the USSR, was of secondary importance and indeed subordinated 
to the question relating to national autonomy. This distinction 
between the primary and secondary dimensions of neutrality must be 
seen in its proper perspective. 
Following the defeat of Hertzog's neutrality motion in September 
1939, references to communism figured less prominently in G/HNP 
statements. This subdued emphasis remained in place for a 
significant portion of the early war years. The alleged menace of 
communism only regained its former prominence following the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and the subsequent siding of 
Stalin with the Allied Forces. 
In as far as the subject of communism did appear in Party 
statements during the above period, this generally related to 
South African involvement in World War II. The emphasis, as 
before, was on the Soviet Union and the suspected role of this 
country in fomenting the spreading of communistic doctrine. More 
striking than the content, however, was the infrequency of these 
remarks. 
In spite of the lack of ,consistency, it does seem as if the 
Party's conception of the distinguishing features of communism 
essentially remained unchanged during this period. As before, the 
emphasis on class struggle, racial equality and atheism figured 
with varying degrees of intensity at different times in G/HNP 
statements. 
Generally speaking, the early war years - in so far as it related 
to the subject of communism - can be described as a period of 
consolidation. Rather than explaining the unexpected German-Soviet 
77. See exposition in Chapter One. 
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non-agression pact78) in the context of its treatise on communism, 
the Party preferred to focus on elements already referred to 
earlier. In this way preconceived ideas were consolidated and 
strenghtened while simultaneously allowing for the inclusion of 
Nazi Germany as part of the campaign against communism. 
2.3. ANTI-COMMUNISM AND THE WAR YEARS: CONVERGENCY AND DIVERGENCY 
Anglo-Soviet military cooperation, which had come about as a 
result of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, triggered a new 
wave of protestations over communism from the HNP. Malan stressed 
that specifically this development necessitated a hundredfold 
times over the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South 
Africa from the war.79)  Die Burger stated that "[nog nooit was 
die gevaar van die kommunisme so aktueel, so onmiddellik dreigend, 
vir die wereld, en ook vir Suid-Afrika, as juis nou [nie] ..."8°) 
In explaining its position, the Party focussed on the perceived 
long-term and short-term implications of the 'alliance' with the 
Soviet Union. 
Relative to the first aspect, members of the HNP contended that if 
the joint forces of the Anglo-Soviet alliance did succeed in 
overrunning Germany, the victory would ultimately be that of the 
Soviet Union. An impoverished and exhausted Britain, according to 
the HNP, would prove unable to check ... die kommunistiese 
vloedgolf wat Europa sal oorstroom."81)  That this was indeed what 
the Soviet Union had in mind, the Party deduced from the alleged 
declared aim of communism to stir up revolution internationally. 
Malan summarised the implications of continued South African 
involvement in the war in the following words: "... [B]olsjewisme 
The non-agression treaty between the Soviet Union and Nazi 
Germany was known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. 
Die Burger, 25.6.1941. 
Die Transvaler, 7.7.1941: "Pro-Kommuniste" [editorial]. 
Die Burger, 25.6.1941: "Nou Eers Daaruit" [editorial]. 
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sal nie net Duitsland oorstroom nie, mar ook Europa .. en 
Engeland ... en dan die V1oedgolf."82)  
Interesting to note is that in time it came to be accepted that a 
transposition of this argument to include Germany and exclude the 
Soviet Union was indeed possible. Subsequently, on a number of 
occasions, it was acknowledged that a German victory would result 
in the Inazification' of Europe.83)  Continued German war successes 
on the battlefronts of Europe in the course of 1941 and 1942 made 
the possibility of a German war-victory even more relevant. Little 
evidence, however, was forthcoming on how the HNP expected such a 
state of affairs to affect South Africa. Specifically *Malan, 
however, did call on Hitler to provide an indication of his 
objectives with South Africa.84)  
Relative to the possible eventuality of a German victory and a 
British defeat, a high degree of opportunism was present in HNP 
commentary. Malan argued that in the event of a German victory, 
Hitler could well decide to support the republicanist striving of 
Afrikaner nationalists - as embodied by the HNP. German support 
for the HNP could thus ensure the establishment of a Christian-
National Republic in South Africa.85)  Of fundamental importance, 
however, is to note that the Party referred to this in the context 
of its campaign against the British imperial connection. Potential 
support from Germany did not point to ideological concurrence or 
support for the German war effort, but represented a form of 
idealistic opportunism in the striving towards republicanism. 
The focus on the short-term implications of the Anglo-Soviet 
alliance primarily related to how this development was perceived 
to affect South Africa internally. Prior to the formal 
announcement of the British-Soviet agreement in mid-July 1941, 
Die Burger, 25.6.1941. 
See Ibid., 11.2.1942: "Ondergang" [editorial]. 
See Malan's speech at a public meeting in Epping as reported 
by Die Burger, 27.2.1941. 
See D.W. Kruger: The Making of a Nation, pp.211-212. 
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Party newspapers warned the Smuts-administration against 
underplaying or ignoring the already existing `communist menace' 
in favour of the promotion of Anglo-Soviet military 
cooperation.")  Important to note is that the Party organs were 
speculating on a hypothetical possibility and not stating a 
conviction. On the same day as the agreement was announced in Die 
Burger,87)  Malan, however, contended that "[h]y (Smuts) sal dit 
nie waag om aktief teen die kommunisme in die land op te tree nie, 
want Suid-Afrika kyk saam met Engeland na Rusland as In 
redder."88)  Die Burger went as far as stating that Smuts' refusal 
to act against this ideology served as auid pro quo for Soviet aid 
to the British Empire.89) Although it was acknowledged that the 
UP, in principle, abhorred communism, the absence of preventative 
action against this ideology was perceived as further proof of its 
status as lackey of `British-Jewish imperialism'. 
Anglo-Soviet military cooperation, South African participation in 
World War II and Smuts' perceived willingness to negate local 
interests in favour of those of the Empire represented the basic 
framework for the HNP's continued campaign against communism. 
Relative to the remaining war years on the European continent, 
this campaign can roughly be divided into two phases, viz, the 
period prior to the general election of July 1943 and the period 
between this election and the final submission of Germany early in 
May 1945. Although not a watertight division, the campaign against 
communism during the aforementioned periods contain 
characteristics which allows for a distinction to . be made. These 
two phases, which will respectively be referred to as the periods 
of convergency and divergency, are to be discussed separately. 
See Die Transvaler, 25.6.1941 and Die Burger, 27.6.1941. 
Die Burger, 16.7.1941. 
Die Transvaler, 16.7.1941. 
Die Burger, 11.11.1941: "Die Teenstelling" [editorial]. 
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2.3.1. 	 Anti-Communism - The Period of Convergency 
For the duration of the first period, the basic features of the 
background against which this campaign took place, remained 
essentially unaltered. As before, the uncalled for involvement of 
the Union in World War II remained the basic point of departure. 
In this sense the participation of the Soviet Union in the war on 
the Allied side did not mark the beginning of a new era, but 
merely further complicated an already unwanted situation. Although 
the HNP contended that the involvement of Soviet Russia created a 
new and serious situation for the spreading of communism, it 
should be noted that the withdrawal of South Africa from the 
continuing conflict remained the most obvious and requisite 
antidote against Icommunism'.90)  
Throughout the period of convergency, the HNP's campaign against 
communism was characterised by more of a reactive than active 
approach. If remarks on communism did not relate to some aspect 
connected to participation in the war, it was the result of 
developments within the South African socio-political arena. A 
decision by the Smuts administration in March 1942 to arm non-
white members of the Union Defence Force under certain conditions 
was followed by a HNP campaign to illustrate alleged non-white 
susceptability to communism and how the spreading of communism was 
going to be promoted by such a step.91) Although the HNP took the 
initiative in 1943 in introducing into Parliament a motion calling 
on the Government to act against communism,92)  this motion can 
directly be traced back to the tactical defeat suffered at the 
hands of Oswald Pirow and his New Order-movement during the 
See Malan's statement to the press following speculation on 
Anglo-Soviet military cooperation (Die Burger, 25.6.1941) and 
editorials in Die Transvaler and Die Burger over the next two 
days. 
See the statement issued by the provincial leaders of the HNP 
on 18.3.1942. Published in Die Burger and Die Transvaler on 
19.3.1942. 
Hansard, 26.1.1942, co1.458. 
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previous parliamentary session.93)  The motion introduced into 
Parliament by Louw during January 1943, apart from focussing 
attention on the perceived communist menace, may well be 
interpreted as a face-saving exercise and an attempt to regain the 
initiative for the HNP as the most viable organisation for 
opposing communism. In spite of the reactive approach, indications 
are that this campaign was developing a momentum of its own, 
progressively constituting broader entities than before. 
Louw's motion of January 1943 and its predecessor, introduced into 
Parliament eleven months earlier as an amendment to Pirow's 
motion, are significant for a number of reasons. Ostensibly this 
represented the first occasion where a campaign against 
specifically communism was launched by the HNP. More important, 
however, was that in doing so, the perceived distinguishing 
features of the Marxist ideology came to be presented in a more 
detailed and structured manner than had previously been the case. 
A similar observation can be made with regard to the HNP's 
conception of the applicability of alleged communist propaganda to 
the South African racial and social mosaic. Finally, a more 
detailed presentation of the mechanisms/strategy favoured by the 
HNP to curb/combat perceived communism were provided. These 
issues, in reverse order, will henceforth be focussed upon. 
Relative to the curtailment of communism, the most obvious step in 
combatting this ideology pertained to the Union's continued 
involvement in World War II. The HNP argued that the ultimate goal 
of communism, and by implication that of the Soviet Union, was the 
spreading of a world-revolution. By participating in the war, 
South Africa was indirectly promoting a process which could 
eventually lead to its own destruction. The Union's participation 
in the Anglo-Soviet alliance served to accentuate such a 
possibility. By withdrawing from the conflict, South Africa - 
according to the HNP's perspective - would not fall prey to 
communist imperialism. Relative to the presence of communists 
inside the Union, this implied that the alleged umbilical chord 
93. See Ibid., 12.2.1943, co1.1766-1786. 
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between local communists and those of the Soviet Union was to be 
severed.94)  
Concurrently, however, the emphasis on the alleged implications 
for South Africa of Anglo-Soviet cooperation and, after December 
1941, also that of American-Soviet cooperation,95)  served to 
promote the HNP's declared policy of neutrality and non-
participation in World War II and the Union's right of secession 
from Britain. The stressing of withdrawal from the war as antidote 
against communism is reminiscent of the HNP's campaign against 
communism prior to the outbreak of World War II. 
Apart from this all-embracive approach (withdrawal from World War 
II as a requisite antidote against communism), the HNP also 
propagated the adoption of specific measures which were perceived 
to provide for the eradication of communism. Whether these 
specific measures were intended as complimentary to the campaign 
on the macro-level, is debateable. Conspicuous, however, is that 
the propagation of these specific measures were largely limited to 
the parliamentary sessions of 1942 and 1943. Quantitatively, this 
would seem to indicate that the 'total strategy' was considered to 
be a more viable mechanism for opposing communism. Although there 
may be some element of truth in this statement, it needs to be 
noted that the total strategy allowed for the propagation of much 
more than merely anti-communism. 
As indicated previously, two motions on the subject of communism 
were introduced into Parliament during the course of 1942 and 1943 
Allegations of an intimate relationship between South African 
communists and Moscow progressively came to the forefront 
following the announcement in January 1942 that permission 
had been granted to the Soviet Union to establish a legation 
in South Africa. Reacting to this announcement, Die Burger, 
for example, declared that a "... [t]akkantoor van die 
Moskouse organisasie ter bevordering van die Bolsjewistiese 
wereld-revolusie sal tans in die Unie geopen word." See Die  
Burger, 26.1.1942. 
The Japanese attack on the American naval station of Pearl 
Harbour on 7.12.1941 paved the way for American participation 
in World War II. See P. Johnson: A History of the Modern  
World, pp.388-391. 
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by the HNP. Although similarly constructed, these motions differed 
significantly in terms of composition, applicability and scope. 
The first motion, originally an amendment to Pirow's resolution of 
February 1942, reads as follows: 
"Dat die Regering versoek word om dadelik die nodige 
stappe te doen - 
om alle kommunistiese organisasies 
onwettig te verklaar en kommunistiese 
propaganda te verbied; 
om geen immigrante, ditsy vir vaste of 
tydelike verblyf, die Unie binne te laat nie 
van wie dit bekend is dat hulle kommuniste is 
of die kommunistiese leer voorstaan; 
om alle vreemdelinge, wat bekend is as 
kommuniste of wat meedoen aan kommunistiese 
propaganda, te deporteer; 
om In verbod op die druk, publikasie of 
verspreiding te plaas van boeke, nuusblaaie, 
tydskrifte, pamflette of ander leesstof, asook 
op die vertoon van rolprente wat bedoel is of 
bereken is om die kommunistiese •saak te 
bevorder of om kommunistiese propaganda aan te 
moedig en om die invoer van sodanige leesstof 
en rolprente te verbied; 
om paspoorte aan Unie-burgers te weier 
wat afgevaardig word na kommunistiese 
kongresse oor see of wat na Rusland gestuur 
word om kommunistiese propaganda te bestudeer; 
en 
(5) om die pas aangeknoopte konsulere 
betrekkinge met die Sowjet-regering af te 
breek."96) 
The motion introduced into Parliament in January 1943 by Eric Louw 
proposed: 
96. Hansard, 13.2.1942, co1.2047-2048. 
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"Dat die Raad sy ernstige verontrusting uitspreek oor 
die toenemende groei van kommunistiese propaganda en 
bedrywighede in die Unie, en oor die reeds sigbare 
uitwerking daarvan, soos getuig die onlangse onluste,97)  
asook die uittartende houding van nie-blankes teenoor 
blankes; dat die Raad daarom oortuig is dat die 
aanvaarding van kommunistiese leerstellings deur die 
nie-blanke bevolking In noodlottige uitwerking sal he op 
die verhouding tussen die blanke en nie-blanke rasse, en 
eindelik die voortbestaan van die blanke bevolking in 
Suid-Afrika sal bedreig; dat die Raad derhalwe die 
Regering versoek om die noodsaaklikheid te oorweeg om 
onmiddellike stappe te doen - 
om die Kommunistiese Party en alle 
organisasies wat kommunistiese leerstellings 
propageer of aanmoedig, as onwettig te 
verklaar; 
om die propagering of aanmoediging van 
kommunistiese leerstellings; ditsy deur 
toesprake, verspreiding van leesstof, vertoon 
van rolprente, of deur enige ander middel, te 
verbied; en 
om vreemdelinge wat die kommunistiese 
leer verkondig of propageer, te deporteer, en 
om geen immigrante in die Unie toe te laat van 
wie dit bekend is dat hulle kommunistiese 
leerstellings propageer of voorstaan nie; 
dat die Raad verder die mening uitspreek dat die 
bewapening van nie-blanke soldate, en die 
teenwoordigheid van die U.S.S.R. se diplomatieke 
verteenwoordigers in die Unie, bydraende faktore tot die 
groei van kommunisme is, en derhalwe die Unie-regering 
versoek om die bewapening van nie-blanke soldate te 
staak, en om bestaande konsulere verhoudings met die 
U.S.S.R. te verbreek."98)  
In comparing the above resolutions, the far more detailed approach 
of the latter is conspicuous. This not only relate to the 
formulation of the actual motion, but also to its 
contextualisation and relevancy for South Africa. Whereas the 
first motion may have been applicable to any one of a number of 
A reference to the Pretoria riots of December 1942. 
Hansard, 26.1.1943, co1.458. 
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diverse countries, the second left no uncertainty about its origin 
or efficacy. An excellent example of this is provided by the 
absence of any reference to race in the first motion and the 
abundance of such references in the second. Subsequently, whereas 
the first motion was in a sense merely a collection of proposed 
measures against communism with near-universal applicability, the 
second motion intimately tied in with the existing state of 
affairs in South Africa. 
Relative to the measures proposed to combat communism, elements of 
both continuity and change are perceptible between these different 
motions. Superficially, most conspicuous is the absence of any 
reference to the withholding of passports from persons "... wat 
afgevaardig word na kommunistiese kongresse oor see of wat na 
Rusland gestuur word om kommunistiese propaganda te bestudeer ..." 
in the second resolution. An explanation for the absence of this 
article in the second motion may well be found in the broader 
implications of placing restrictions on the individual's freedom 
of choice. At the same time, however, the changed formulation of 
sub-section (1) of the 1942-motion, which appeared as sub-section 
(a) in Louw's second motion, brought a potentially even more 
contentious issue to the forefront. 
Whereas the 1942-resolution called for the banning of "... alle 
kommunistiese organisasies ...", the 1943-motion demanded that 
It 
• • 
die Kommunistiese Party en alle organisasies wat 
kommunistiese leerstellings propageer of aanmoedig ..." (italics 
mine) be declared illegal. Although it may be reasoned that the 
HNP, under the first motion, had in mind more than one 
organisation,99)  it must be noted that this resolution 
specifically referred to "... kommunistiese organisasies ...". The 
scope of the 1943-resolution, on the other hand, differed 
substansially from that of the earlier motion. No longer had an 
99. The reference to "kommunistiese organisasies" corresponded 
with remarks relating to organisations/movements other than 
the CPSA. Reacting to a fund-raising campaign organised by 
the Friends of the Soviet Union, Die Transvaler (7.11.1941) 
described the FSU as "... omtrent die bedrywigste liggaam vir 
die verspreiding van kommunistiese leerstellings in die 
Unie ..." 
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organisation to be declared "... kommunisties ..." to 'qualify' 
for banishment, but potentially all movements perceived to be 
cooperating directly or indirectly with the cause of communism 
were to be declared illegal. 
The implications of applying this definition to South Africa were 
far reaching. Organisations, hithertho acknowledged not to be 
'communistic' were potential victims of this clause. One 
possibility was the ruling United Party. As indicated previously, 
the HNP contended that the Smuts-administration did not dare to 
venture any preventative steps against communism. This 
unwillingness, according to the HNP, were borne out of fear for 
the possible negative impact such measures could have on Anglo-
Soviet cooperation. Although not supportive of communism, the UP, 
in this way, allegedly aided the growth and spreading of the 
Marxist dogma. In terms of sub-section (a) of the 1943-motion, the 
UP, on this basis, may well have qualified for banishment. 
By referring to the arming of non-white soldiers as a contributory 
factor in the spreading of communism, the HNP, consciously or 
unconsciously, linked these specific measures to the campaign on 
the macro-level against 'communistic doctrines'. Subsequently, in 
protesting against communism, this could either be done in 
focussing on the perceived implications of continued South African 
involvement in World War II or propagating those specific 
measures - or variations of it - contained in the 1942- and 1943-
resolutions. 
Following the introduction of the 1942-motion in Parliament, the 
first of these alternatives progressively came to be adopted by 
the HNP. In the run-up to the general election of July 1943, the 
topic of communism were regularly touched upon at Party 
gatherings. In dealing with the eradication of communism, HNP 
speakers repeatedly referred to the necessity of disengagement 
from the war. Malan, at a pre-election meeting in Vredendal, for 
example, stated that it was far more acceptable for Britain and 
the USA to be defeated in the war than to have the opposite, 
"... omdat Rusland die oorlog vir hulle sal wen en daarna die leer 
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van kommunisme op die wereld gaan afdwing.H 0) J.G. Strijdom, 10 
Transvaal co-leader of the HNP, dealed more explicitly with the 
implications of an Allied victory for South Africa: "In Russiese 
oorwinning sal beteken 	 dat Suid-Afrika Iverkaffer' sal 
word. "1°1) 
Relative to the perceived susceptability of certain races and 
ethnic groups to communism, HNP-speakers and Party newspapers, as 
before, stressed the susceptability of blacks to this ideology. 
This belief gained fresh momentum following the announcement on 
the limited arming of non-white members of the Union Defence 
Force. This announcement resulted in a series of protest meetings. 
At one such meeting Strijdom stated that by arming non-whites, 
Smuts was providing communism with "... In stoot soos nog nooit 
tevore ..."1°2)  Die Burger speculated that Smuts' decision to arm 
non-European soldiers may well have been the result of pressure by 
communists 103) 
Although more subdued, references to communism within the white 
community did not altogether disappear from HNP statements. As 
before, reference was made to the alleged presence of communists 
in the white labour movement.104)  Louw also made mention of the 
perceived affinity of Jews for communism.105)  Compared to the 
preponderance of remarks on the alleged susceptability of non-
whites to communism, however, these contentions were of secondary 
importance. 
Die Transvaler, 1.5.1943. 
Ibid., 31.5.1943. 
See Die Burger and Die Transvaler, 28.3.1943. 
Die Burger, 23.3.1942. 
See Strijdom's remarks on the GWU and SAMWU in Parliament 
(Hansard, 13.2.1943, co1.2069) and B.J. Schoeman's exposition 
of the HNP's labour policy at a public meeting in 
Johannesburg (Die Transvaler, 19.10.1942). 
Hansard, 12.2.1943, co1.1478-1479. 
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In so far as protestations over communism did relate to the white 
community, two aspects are nevertheless of significance: Firstly, 
it came to be accepted that poor socio-economic circumstances and 
general discontent promoted the cause of communism. Possibly as a 
result of this acceptance, warnings were subsequently issued by 
the HNP on the implications of the alleged discontent in the South 
African armed forces, resulting from poor renumeration and the 
arming of non-white soldiers, for the spreading of communism.106)  
The Party also referred to the opportunities for communistic 
propaganda to succeed within the context of the rapidly expanding 
poor white community. 107) These warnings contrasted sharply with a 
statement by Eric Louw in August 1937 that communism's growth had 
to be explained in terms of intensive propaganda rather than poor 
social circumstances.108)  
The second significant development pertained to the HNP's 
contention that there was in existence a grouping, encompassing 
not only the HNP, who had a natural aversion towards communism. 
This grouping was described as "Afrikanerdom" which, according to 
Die Transvaler, proved to be "... eenvoudig onvatbaar vir die leer 
van die kommunisme."1°9)  The Afrikaner's philosophy of life, 
according to this editorial, were irreconcilable with the 
principles of communism. Less than six weeks later the same 
newspaper stated that "... kommunisme sal nie In houvas kry op 
daardie Afrikaners wat Christelik-nasionale beginsels bely 
nie.”110) On another place in this editorial, Die Transvaler 
In introducing his 1943 motion on communism into Parliament, 
Louw warned that communists were intent on exploiting the 
'discontent' amongst soldiers returning from the North. See 
Hansard, 12.2.1943, co1.1494. 
Ibid., 12.3.1943,co1.3333. See also Die Burger, 19.8.1942: 
"Selfbedrog" [editorial]. 
Die Burger, 2.8.1937. 
Die Transvaler, 1.8.1941: "Pas die Wet Toe" [editorial]. 
Die Transvaler, 10.9.1941: "Imperialiste word ook Kommuniste" 
[editorial]. 
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described this entity as the "Nasionaalvoelende Afrikanerdom"  
(nationally conscious Afrikanerdom). 
World War II, generally speaking, made a significant impression on 
the HNP's conception of the characteristic features of communism. 
Although the origin of many of those elements described as 
atypical of communism could chronologically be traced back to 
earlier periods, the continuing war situation perceptibly moulded 
these elements into a new, complex and integrated whole. 
Developments associated with South African participation in the 
war were subsequently utilised to not only illustrate other 
elements of HNP-policy, but also to emphasize the alleged 
communist menace. 
The first perceived feature of communism to be stressed by the HNP 
can best be decribed by the term "internationalism". Although this 
primarily related to communism's alleged objective of promoting a 
world-revolution, it simultaneously encompassed references to the 
perceived unity in purpose between communists internationally and 
the alleged dictatorial role of Moscow in this regard. 
In introducing his 1943-motion in Parliament, Louw quoted 
extensively from a diverse range of publications to illustrate 
communism's ultimate goal of In kommunistiese wereld-
revolusie, wereld-kommunisme en wereld-diktatorskap. H111) In the 
international arena, according to the HNP, the organisation 
primarily responsible for the promotion of the concept of a world-
revolution was the Third International. Die Transvaler alleged 
that the promotion of the world-revolution was the central task of 
the Comintern.112)  Furthermore, the CI was perceived as having no 
identity separate and independent from that of the Soviet Union. 
Louw, in addressing himself to this matter, declared that the 
Hansard, 12.2.1943, co1.1473. 
Die 	 Transvaler, 	 4.6.1942: 	 "Die 	 Russiese 	 Konsulaat" 
[editorial]. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
93 
Comintern was under the authority of the Soviet regime of which 
the master was "... Josef Stalin, die diktator van Rusland."113)  
This, according to Louw, indicated that all communist propaganda 
outside of the Soviet Union was directed and controlled by the 
ECCI, the Kremlin and, ultimately, Sta1in.114) In propagating 
communism, 'communistic' organisations were thus ultimately 
promoting the interests of the Soviet Union as defined by Stalin. 
World War II and the resultant abnormalities in international 
relations, according to the HNP, did not alter the existing state 
of affairs. Louw contended that the communists perceived the 
continuing war as a conflict waged in favour of capitalistic 
objectives and that World War II ultimately facilitated the 
communistic world-dictatorship. 115) Allegations that the Anglo-
Soviet treaty of 1941 had effectively and officially terminated 
the imperialistic objectives of the Soviet Union and communism in 
general were refuted by Louw. Louw stressed that allegations of 
this sort were based on 	 onwetendheid 	 Of [was] die gevolg 
van politieke oneerlikheid en politieke skynheiligheid."116)  
Relative to South Africa, this implied that by participating in 
the war, the Union had become the ally of both Soviet Russia and 
communism.117)  By involving South Africa in the World War II Smuts 
was thus promoting the cause of the international communist 
revolution. 
Following the announcement in January 1941 that a Soviet 
diplomatic mission was to be established in South Africa, the HNP 
progressively came to emphasize the alleged involvement of local 
communists and Soviet diplomats in the spreading of the dogma of a 
world-revolution. The Soviet mission was subsequently described as 
Hansard, 12.2.1943, co1.1471. 
Ibid., co1.1468. 
Ibid., co1.1475. 
Ibid., 5.3.1943, co1.2946. 
See Strijdom's speech at a public meeting in Brits as 
reported in Die Transvaler of 5.1.1942 and Die Burger of 
6.1.1942. 
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both a source and incubator of communism.118)  In illustrating this 
contention, the HNP employed two integrated yet separable 
strategies. Both strategies stressed the predominant role of 
Moscow, the Kremlin and ultimately Stalin in fomenting the 
spreading of communism. However, whereas the first strategy 
primarily focussed on the institutional framework and 
authoritarian hierarchy which allegedly' ensured and enforced the 
propagation of a world-revolution, the second strategy accentuated 
the perceived unity in purpose between communists internationally. 
The CPSA's affiliation to the Third International and the 
perceived nature of the relationship between the Communist Party 
and CI initially provided for the utilisation of both 
strategies.119)  
Following the disbandment of the Comintern in May 1943, however, 
greater emphasis came to be placed on the second strategy. 
Attempts were nevertheless made to underplay the significance of 
the disbandment of the CI. Louw, in a letter to Die Transvaler, 
stated that the decision to disband the Comintern was 	 niks 
meer as In taktiese set nie ...", aimed at the appeasement of 
Britain and the United States)-20) For the sake of perspective it 
should be noted that this was indeed the case. 
Closely connected to this first aspect was the contention that the 
planned for revolution implied, by definition, a violent overthrow 
of the existing status quo. Malan summarised this belief in the 
following words: " Kommunisme is agressief in sy hele wese en 
optrede; die metode wat hy volg is die metode van revolusie."121)  
The element of violence in this ideology, judging from Louw's 
exposition in Parliament during 1943, was an integral part of a 
well-rehearsed campaign. With the exception of a few isolated 
remarks by Malan, however, not much attention was paid to the 
Hansard, 11.3.1942, co1.3546 and 12.2.1943, co1.1490. 
An excellent example of this dual utilisation is provided by 
an editorial in Die Burger, 3.6.1942: "Die Russiese Inval". 
Die Transvaler, 4.6.1945. 
Hansard, 5.3.1943, co1.2910. 
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implications of the perceived violent nature of communism for 
specifically South Africa. Malan largely connected this aspect to 
the CPSA's campaign for the arming of non-white soldiers. The aim 
underlying this campaign, according to Malan, was to prepare the 
non-white soldiers of the revolution 	 om witmense 	 te 
skiet."122)  
The ultimate goal of the communist world-revolution, according to 
the HNP, was the establishment of a 'dictatorship of the 
proletariat'. Communism's refusal to heed the colour-bar served as 
a basic point of departure in the application of this construct to 
South Africa. It is important to note that the concept of 
proleratiat was not limited by racial definition. P.J. Hugo, MP 
for Paarl, referred to the non-racial proletariat in the following 
terms: "Daarom doen die Kommuniste alles in hul vermod om ons 
[blankes] te verneder tot 'n klas waaraan ook kaffers en 
kleurlinge kan behoort 	 1,123) In spite of the theoretical 
equality between the white and non-white working classes under the 
communist system, the HNP stressed that the African proletariat 
would eventually dominate under a communist system in South 
Africa. -24 ) This deduction, as a matter of course, allowed for the 
propagation of the belief that communist propaganda, by 
definition, endangered the continued existence of the European 
civilization in South Africa. Malan accordingly stated that 
internally communists "... voorsien 	 In swart proletariaat - 
dit beteken die einde van Blanke Suid-Afrika."125)  
See Malan's speech at Springbok (Die Burger, 3.5.1943 and Die 
Transvaler, 4.5.1943). 
Hansard, 13.2.1942, co1.2053-2054. 
No set indication was provided of whether the possibility of 
a 'Black Republic' in South Africa under a communistic system 
was going to be the result of the numerical preponderancy of 
Africans or ideological considerations. Both possibilities 
were included in HNP-argumentations. See Malan's speech to an 
audience in Zeerust (Die Burger, 28.5.1943) and Louw's 
parliamentary treatise of 1942 (Hansard, 13.2.1943, co1.2040-
2042). 
Die Transvaler, 21.6.1943. 
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The striving towards racial equality was adjudged the most 
disturbing feature of communism. Even more directly than the 
emphasis on the perceived implications of a proletarian 
dictatorhip for South Africa, this aspect allowed for the 
continuous propagation of the belief that communism would result 
in the destruction of white South Africa. With this in mind Malan 
may have stated in rather dramatical fashion that the HNP would 
struggle to the proverbial end to preserve the white race in South 
Africa)-26)  The contentious nature of this assertion was well 
utilised within certain quarters of the Party. In a detailed 
exposition, R.A.T. van der Merwe, attempted to illustrate how 
communism, with its policy of racial equality, had originated from 
British Imperialism.127)  Strijdom went even further in stating 
that both communism and British imperialism propagated equality 
between all peoples)-28)  Smuts and his administration, allegedly 
proponents of British imperialism, were ipso facto included under 
this description. 
In terms of frequency referred to, protestations over the 
atheistic nature of communism ran a close second to remarks on 
this ideology's policy of racial equality. Developments associated 
with South African participation in World War II were once again 
utilised to illustrate and accentuate communism's aversion towards 
religion. Malan greeted the announcement on Anglo-Soviet military 
cooperation with a reference to communism's atheism)-29) A 
statement by Jan Smuts in 1939 that World War II was a Holy 
Crusade for the freedom of small nations was interpreted as 
contradictory to his then present behaviour of 
omhelsing ... van die godlose Sowjet ..."1") 
Hansard, 5.3.1943, co1.2879. 
Ibid., 12.3.1943, co1.3337-3338. 
See Strijdom's speeches in Cape Town and Nylstroom as 
reported in Die Transvaler of 27.2.1943 and 3.5.1943. 
Die Burger, 25.6.1941. 
Die Burger, 14.7.1941: "n Verwyt Ontleed" [editorial]. 
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Although less prominent than other aspects, individual HNP members 
also referred to communism's perceived objective of eradicating 
private ownership from society. Louw described this striving as 
one of the fundamental tenets underlying Marxist dogma.131)  Malan 
stated that the abolishment of private ownership implied that all 
people were to be degraded to labourers and squatters of the 
State.132)  
2.3.2. 	 Anti-Communism - The Period of Divergency 
The UP's landslide victory in the general election of July 1943 
initiated the beginning of a new phase in the HNP's campaign 
against communism. 
Heard has indicated that the central issue in the election of July 
1943 was the question of continued South African participation in 
World War II.133) Whereas the UP propagated a pro-involvement 
slogan, the HNP, as before, adjudged participation to be contrary 
to South Africa's best interests. The immediate and unconditional 
withdrawal from the war remained the most immediate objective of 
the Party. This was to be followed by seccession from the British 
Empire which would serve to guarantee full South African autonomy 
under any given situation. Although the outcome of the election 
131. Eric Louw identified three cardinal principles underlying the 
socio-economic suppositions of communism: 
Communal possession of land; 
Communal possession of the means of production and 
distribution; and 
Abolishment of private ownership. See Hansard, 12.2.1943, 
co1.1473. 
It must be noted that in spite of Louw's distinction and with 
the exception of a few isolated references to the third 
principle, none of these elements were described as 
characteristic of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism by other 
HNP members. 
132. Die Transvaler, 1.5.1943 and Die Burger, 3.5.1943. 
133. K.A. Heard: General Elections in South Africa, 1943-1970, 
pp.15-16. 
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did not end the HNP's striving towards a republic or the 
propagation of neutrality and non-participation in World War II, 
it did result in a de jure acknowledgement of the then status quo 
of South African participation in World War II and the 
continuation thereof. 
This acceptance had important implications for both the campaign 
against communism and the future propagation of Party principles. 
D.F. Malan, in his opening address to the Cape Provincial Congress 
of the HNP in November 1943, provided an indication of the 
directional change in Party policy: 
"Ons vergader hier op In allerbelangrikste tydstip. Dis 
In tydstip waarop die oorlog nader is aan sy einde as 
aan sy begin. Daarom spreek dit vanself dat sakende 
rakende die oorlog meer en meer op die agtergrond raak 
en na-oorlogse sake des te meer aandag [sal] 
geniet."134)  
Following this Congress the outcome of the war and the expected 
impact thereof on South Africa did come to receive more attention 
than before. This new approach was formalised in 1944 with the 
adoption of a new socio-economic policy by the various provincial 
congresses of the HNP. 
Speculation on the outcome of World War II and the post-war 
balance of forces co-determined the broader context of the HNP's 
continued campaign against communism. Initially, however, these 
remarks were infrequent and regularly overshadowed by other 
developments. A speech by Jan Smuts in late-November 1943 not only 
provided new momentum to HNP speculation, but also steered this 
speculation into a more definite direction. 
Smuts, in a speech before British parliamentarians in London on 25 
November 1943, declared inter alia: 
134. Die Burger, 10.11.1943. 
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"Great Britain, the United States and Russia now form 
the trinity at the head of the United Nations fighting 
for the cause of humanity. And as it is in war, so will 
it have to be in peace. We shall have to see to it that 
in the new international organization135)  the leadership 
remains in the hands of this great trinity of powers. 
These three powers must retain the leadership in war and 
in peace, and be responsible in the first instance for 
the maintenance of security and for the preservation of 
world peace. 
Russia is the new colossus of Europe - the new colossus 
that bestrides this continent. When we consider all that 
has happened to Russia within the last twenty-five 
years, and we see Russia's inexplicable and phenomenal 
rise, we can only call it one of the great phenomena of 
history. It is the sort of thing to which there in no 
parallel in history, but it has come about ... What the 
after effects of that will be nobody can say. We can but 
recognise that this is a new fact to reckon with, and we 
must reckon with it coldly and objectively. With the 
others down and out, and herself mistress of the 
Continent ... Russia will be in a position that no 
nation has ever enjoyed in the history of Europe."136)  
Smuts' explosive' speech, as indicated, initiated a new interest 
in the post-war era. In the HNP this was aptly illustrated by the 
introduction of a motion into Parliament in January 1944 based for 
a large part on those thoughts uttered by Smuts less than three 
months before.137)  Prior to the formal surrender of Germany in May 
1945, generally five aspects were stressed by HNP speakers and - 
newspapers in this regard: 
An Allied victory in World War II would ultimately result in 
a triumph for the Soviet Union; 
The Soviet Union will be the dominant power in post-war 
Europe and the world; 
A reference to the proposed United Nations Organisation 
(UNO). 
Cited in J. van der Poel (ed.): Selections from the Smuts 
Papers, VI, pp.456-468. 
See Hansard, 25.1.1944, co1.78-79. 
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(iii)With the rise to ascendancy of the Soviet Union, Great 
Britain will be demoted to the rank of third-rate power; 
The destruction of Germany and other central-European nations 
implied the destruction of historically-accepted bastions 
against communism;138)  
Tension and conflict - actual or potential - between the 
Anglo-Saxon nations and the Soviet Union will be the order of 
the day. This, according to the HNP, could well prepare the 
way for World War III. 
Needless to say, not all of these aspects figured simultaneously 
at any given point in time in Party statements. The rapidly 
changing war fortunes of the Allied nations between July 1943 and 
May 1945, to mention but one example, allowed for the minimum of 
consistency and continuity. Intimately connected to all of these 
aspects, however, was the adoption of a "I told you so"-approach 
by the Party. The HNP, in this regard, emphasized the correctness 
of its decision in September 1939 not to become involved in the 
perceived squabbles of Europe. 
No detailed analysis of the implications of the expected post-war 
status quo for specifically South Africa was presented by the HNP. 
Relative to the perceived menace of communism, the Party primarily 
connected these expectations to the often referred to contention 
that Smuts and the UP were ultimately mere extensions of British 
imperialism. The belief that South Africa, together with Britain, 
were creating the conditions for the establishment of Soviet 
hegemony on the European continent was regularly stressed by the 
HNP in this regard. Relating this to the HNP's "bastion-theory", 
A.J. Stals declared that Smuts had surrendered Europe and the Far 
East to communism.139) Strijdom alleged that South Africa was 
sponsoring communism in Europe to the tune of 450 million 
For the aims of this analysis, this contention will be 
referred to as the "bastion-theory". 
Die Burger and Die Transvaler, 6.12.1943. 
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pounds.140)  Smuts' refusal to act against communism internally and 
his unwillingness to detach South Africa from World War II, 
according to the HNP, had to be explained in terms of his 
perceived status as handyman of the British Empire. In equating 
Smuts with Alfred Milner, Die Burger declared that the former was 
and would be used as a pawn in the struggle for supremacy between 
Russia and the Anglo-Saxon powers.141) This, together with the 
shift in the balance of world-power, had to have significant 
implications for South Africa. Not only was the Union going to be 
affected by the post-war dominance of the Soviet Union, but also, 
and even more importantly, South Africa - due to the perceived 
puppet status of Smuts - was to become an active participant in 
World War III. Malan, in this regard, declared that Smuts was 
ready to declare war against anyone, It 
	 selfs teen [die planeet] 
Jupiter. ,,142) 
During the parliamentary session of 1945, Malan stated that the 
awakening of Suid-Afrika 	 uit sy imperialistiese 
doodslaap" was a prerequisite for the eradication of 
communism.143)  Although no explicit reference was made to 
seccession, there can be little doubt that Malan was indeed 
referring to this. 
The connection between anti-communism and the adoption of a 
redefined version of Hertzog's original policy of "South Africa 
First" did not represent a new element in HNP thinking on the 
subject of communism. Already prior to the outbreak of World War 
II in September 1939, GNP members stressed the benefits to be 
gained from a policy whereby precedence would be given to local 
interests. The period of divergency differed from earlier periods 
in terms of the relative importance attached to specifically 
republicanism and/or seccession as a measure to combat communism - 
See Strijdom's speech at Wakkerstroom as reported in Die 
Transvaler on 1.6.1943. 
Die Burger, 26.3.1945: "Die Handlanger" [editorial]. 
Die Burger, 30.9.1944. 
Hansard, 14.2.1945, co1.1398. 
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albeit indirectly. Prior to the election of July 1943 and with 
regard to the war years, it was accepted within the Party that 
full national autonomy was ultimately the only guarantee for non-
participation in future wars. As a matter of course this would 
also alleviate the menace of communism for South Africa. The 
immediate objective, however, remained the unconditional 
withdrawal of South Africa from the war. In other words, compared 
to the emphasis on withdrawal from World War II, seccession was of 
secondary importance. Following Smuts' explosive' speech and the 
HNP's resultant interest in post-war developments, a reversal of 
this argument occurred. Progressively the question of 
disassociation from the war came to be underplayed in favour of a 
more direct pro-seccessionist approach. 
The emphasis on the imperial connection not only related to the 
perceived international menace of communism, but also served to 
illustrate the alleged danger of this ideology internally. Similar 
to what may be described as the campaign on the international 
level, Smuts' alleged willingness to give precedence to the 
interests of the Empire served a basic point of departure in this 
regard.144)  However, whereas the HNP predominantly focussed on the 
anticipated post-war status quo to illustrate the perceived menace 
of communism internationally, both the reality of World War II and 
expected post-war developments served to accentuate the Party's 
remarks on the presence of communist propanda within South Africa. 
In focussing on the continuing war, the HNP, as before, contended 
that the promotion of Anglo-Soviet friendship ruled out the 
possibility of preventative steps against communism internally by 
Smuts. Relative to the expected post-war status quo, it was 
alleged that Britain followed a policy of appeasement towards the 
Soviet Union in an attempt to avoid future conflict with 
Moscow.145)  Smuts, in accordance with his status as "lackey" of 
See Malan's speech in Parliament on 21.2.1945 (Hansard, 
21.2.1945, co1.2017-2018) and editorials in Die Burger, 
6.7.1944: "Vriende van Stalin" and 24.1.1945: "Suid Afrika en 
Pole". 
Die Burger, 7.9.1944: "Rusland: die Vyand" [editorial]. 
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British Imperialism, slavishly adopted this approach decided on by 
Whitehal1.146)  Reacting to warnings by Smuts on indiscrimate 
verbal attacks on the Soviet Union,147)  Die Burger stated that 
"... sy (Smuts se) kruiperigheid voor die Russiese kolossus ..." 
had already affected South Africa's internal policies.148)  
Apart from the focus on seccession from the Empire, Malan 
identified two further measures which he deemed integral to any 
attempt to eradicate communism from South Africa, viz, the 
implementation 	 of 
bestaansbeveiliging" and the finding of a solution for the Colour 
Question.149)  The HNP's Programme of Principles, as may be 
expected, allegedly provided for both aspects. The HNP's socio-
economic policy, adopted in the course of 1944, provided the basic 
framework for the implementation of the proposed `scheme of social 
security' .150) Relative to the colour question, Malan stressed 
that this could only be solved on the basis of apartheid.151)  The 
HNP's conceptualisation of the interrelatedness of the `red 
menace' and `black peril', however, had not yet reached the same 
level of practical enunciation as was the case with its socio- 
economic policy. 
Needless to say, the measures proposed by Malan provided for much 
more than merely opposition to communism. If it is accepted that 
the implementation of apartheid and the HNP's socio-economic 
policy would have resulted in the complete eradication of 
communism from South Africa, it must be noted that these proposed 
measures implied a simultaneous and thorough reshuffling of the 
See Strijdom's speech at Volksrust (Die Transvaler, 
8.5.1944). 
Hansard, 14.2.1945, co1.1397-1398. 
Die Burger, 22.2.1945: "Die Kruiper" [editorial]. 
Hansard, 14.2.1945, co1.1397-1398. 
A detailed exposition of the HNP's socio-economic policy was 
published in Die Kruithorinq, propaganda organ of the Party, 
in August 1944. 
See Hansard, 14.2.1945, co1.1398. 
In deurtastende skema van 
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Union's social and economic substructure and the reorganisation of 
race relations. In attempting to find an explanation for the 
propagation of specifically these measures, one is forced to fall 
back on the earlier referred to argument of anti-communism being 
utilised within the Party as both a principle and strategy. 
The HNP's socio-economic policy is also significant in as far as 
it represented the first conscious attempt by the Party to 
characterise its own ideology of Christian-nationalism vis a vis 
communism and capitalism. In the introduction to its "Economic 
Plan for South Africa", the HNP referred to this aspect in the 
following terms: 
... die HNP [is] nog kapitalisties nOg kommunisties 
Hy is Nasionaal. Onder die kapitalistiese stelsel 
domineer die winsmotief, en word die swakkere ekonomiese 
eenhede en seksies, en veral die werkers, uitgebuit. 
Rykdom en armoede, met onverskilligheid aan die een en 
bitterheid en wanhoop aan die ander kant, staar mekaar 
dan in die gesig. Onder die kommunistiese stelsel weer, 
met sy leuse van "die diktatorskap van die 
proletariaat", het slegs een ekonomiese seksie, nl. die 
werkersklas, reg van bestaan. Alle ander word vernietig. 
Die HNP handhaaf die verskillende ekonomiese seksies in 
hul reg en hul funksies soos die aparte lede van 
dieselfde liggaam. Hy erken die reg van privaat besit en 
privaat inisiatief. Naar daarby beskerm hy ook deur In 
stelsel van doeltreffende staatsbeheer elke seksie teen 
die uitbuiting van elke ander" -52 ) (emphasis in the 
original). 
As indicated in the above paragraph, this "Economic Plan for South 
Africa" represented the first conscious and coherent attempt by 
the HNP to position its own ideology against that of capitalism 
and communism. Relative to specifically communism, it may be 
argued that many of these principles emphasized as indicative of 
Christian-nationalism were indeed irreconcilable with the 
suppositions underlying Socialism. Prior to the publication of the 
HNP's socio-economic blueprint for a future South Africa, however, 
no coherent attempt was made to relate these principles to the 
ideology of communism. On occasion where one or more elements of 
152. Die Kruithoring, 2.8.1944. 
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the Party Programme were propagated in conjunction. with the 
emphasis on the perceived menace of communism, this was generally 
connected to a set of predetermined and preconceived premises and 
arguments. Excellent examples of this is provided by the HNP's 
conception of communism and the propagation of neutrality and non-
participation in the perceived wars of Britain, stringent 
immigration measures and rigid racial separation. These subjects 
will be returned to in succeeding chapters. 
In focussing on manifestations of communism within South Africa, 
the HNP accentuated two aspects: 
(i) The prevalence of communism and communist propaganda 
amongst non-whites: In explaining this, the HNP, as before, 
stressed the perceived susceptability of Africans to alleged 
communist propaganda. Subsequently it was accepted that - in 
the words of Malan - "... 'n groot deel van die nie-blanke 
bevolking onder die leiding van en die heerskappy gekom het 
van kommunistiese agitators van die ergste graad."153)  A wide 
variety of developments in the South African socio-political 
and economic arena were referred to as indicative of the 
extent to which elements of this ideology were being 
propagated amongst the African population. Die Burger and Die  
Transvaler, in this regard, repeatedly referred to labour 
unrest, the upsurge in the crime rate and developments in 
non-white politics as allegedly illustrative of the influence 
and effect of communism.154)  Die Burger, in commenting on the 
support for CPSA-candidates in the Cape Peninsular 
constituencies during the 1943-elections, declared that 
Coloured voters, in these constituencies, had voted en bloc 
for the Communist Party.155)  
Hansard, 14.2.1945, co1.1384. 
See 	 Die 	 Burger, 	 23.6.1944: 	 "Naturelle 	 en 	 Misdade" 
[editorial]; Die Transvaler, 7.11.1944: "Die Regering se Eie 
Skuld" [editoria]]; Die Transvaler, 7.11.1944: "Amokmakery Sc 
_ 	
Lc,r1.f21 ] rir:j Di Tranrwaler, 24.1.1045: "Kommilnis+- c,  
----------- --- 
17.77.1euii 	 T-7Ae,E,;e1:" 
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(ii) Indications of communism within the white community: In 
addressing itself to alleged manifestations of communism 
amongst whites, the HNP adopted a seemingly contradictory 
approach. On the one hand the perceived invulnerability of 
the white population to communist propaganda was repeatedly 
stressed. Die Burger, for example, declared that unless "... 
In selfmoord-neiging die blanke bevolking van hierdie land 
oorkom ", communism would fail to make an impact on (white) 
South Africa.156) This observation is reminiscent of earlier 
remarks on the existence of a natural counter-weight to 
communism. Conversely, however, the HNP continued to stress 
the prevalence of propaganda connected to this ideology 
within the white labour movement. A strike in a Germiston 
clothing factory during November 1944 by members of the GWU 
and the resultant expulsion of two Union members by the GWU-
executive157)  once again brought this aspect to the 
forefront. Allegations regarding the spreading of communism 
amongst 'defenceless Afrikaner daughters' and the dictatorial 
action by the 'Sachs-clique' in expelling its own members 
figured prominently in HNP statements.158)  Argueably, the HNP 
would not have continued to stress the perceived dangers 
inherent to the propagation of perceived communism in the 
labour movement had it not adjudged a section of the white 
community to be potentially susceptable to this propaganda. 
The reference to 'defenceless Afrikaner daughters' is 
illustrative of this. 
In addressing itself to the perceived characteristics of this 
ideology, many of those aspects which had come to receive 
attention prior to the general election of July 1943 were once 
again returned to by the Party. Communism's atheism, its perceived 
revolutionary and atheistic nature, the twin principles of 
'proletarian internationalism' and 'dictatorship of the 
Die Burger, 10.12.1943: "Nie Veel Invloed" [editorial]. 
For Sachs' account of the strike and the expulsions see 
E.S. Sachs: Garment Workers in Action, pp. 119-123. 
See Hansard, 17.3.1944, co1.3479-3787 et.seq.; 13.5 1944, 
co1.7455-7463 and 19.3.1945, co1.1493-1499. 
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proletariat' and this ideology's negation of private ownership 
and -initiative were regularly focussed upon by members of the 
HNP. In terms of intensity and frequency referred to, communism's 
perceived goal of a world-revolution came to receive the largest 
share of attention during this period. In many ways this was to be 
expected given the preponderancy of remarks on Soviet hegemony on 
the European continent as an expected post-war development. 
Relative to the perceived leading role of the Soviet Union in 
fomenting this world-revolution, significant adjustments had 
occurred within the HNP over this period. Prior to the 1943-
election, the HNP stressed the alleged role played by the Third 
International and, within South Africa, Soviet diplomats in 
fomenting the idea of a world-revolution. The dissolution of the 
Comintern in May 1943, as indicated, resulted in less emphasis 
being placed on the perceived directorial role of the Soviet Union 
in this regard. Solidarity between communists internationally now 
came to be accentuated. Following the election, however, the HNP 
once more returned to the alleged domineering role of the USSR in 
the fermentation of this world-revolution. Louw, as before, 
contended that the dissolution of the Comintern "... was 'n 
bluf."159)  Louw's conviction, however, was not shared by other 
members of the HNP. The majority of Party members focussed on the 
policies of the Soviet Union in illustrating the perceived 
connection between Moscow and the goal of a world-revolution. In 
this regard the alleged dichotomy between the USSR's internal and 
external policies were stressed. 
Within the Soviet Union, according to the HNP, internationalist 
slogans were underplayed in favour of patriotism and 
nationalism.160)  This development, however, had not filtered 
through to the sphere of international relations. The Soviet 
Union, in this regard, continued with its aggressive imperialistic 
Die Kruithorinq, 26.4.1944. See also Louw's remarks on the 
Third International in Parliament (Hansard, 24.5.1944, 
co1.8733 and 19.3.1945, co1.3794). 
See Malan's speech in Parliament in January 1944 (Hansard, 
25.1.1944, co1.81-83). 
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policy of spreading - directly or indirectly - a communistic 
world-revolution.161)  Developments in particularly Eastern Europe 
were repeatedly referred to as exemplary of direct Soviet 
involvement in attempts to establish communistic dictatorships. 
Within South Africa the USSR was allegedly promoting the cause of 
a communistic revolution through its consular personnel, the CPSA 
and pro-Soviet friendship organisations. Die Burger subsequently 
reacted to the announcement that a South African-Soviet Friendship 
Congress was to held in Johannesburg during July 1944 with a 
reference to "... valse front-organisasies ..."162) 
In closing, it must be noted that following Smuts' November 1942-
speech in London, the HNP's campaign against the perceived menace 
of communism progressively came to take on more of a active than 
reactive character. The Party was no longer merely reacting to 
developments it peceived to be connected to communism, but rather 
propagated principles which allowed for the inclusion of anti-
communism. To put it differently: The HNP's campaign against 
communism, after November 1942, was no longer predetermined by 
external stimuli over which it had little or no control, but 
rather principles which was not only the creation of the Party, 
but also controlled and manipulated by the HNP. The HNP's socio-
economic policy, in this regard, was of fundamental importance in 
as far as it determined the basic parameters of both the campaign 
against communism and, conversely, an alternative policy. 
A series of editorials in Die Burger provide an excellent 
exposition of the HNP's contention regarding the apparent 
discontinuities in Soviet policy. See 21.12.1943: 
Uitgediende Leuse" and 22.12.1943: "`n Nuwe Lied". 
Die Burger, 11.7.1944: "Valse Front" [editorial]. 
11%n 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
109 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE OSSEWA-BRANDWAG AND COMMUNISM 
Chapters three and four are a continuation of the previous 
chapter in as far as it aims at providing an analysis of overt 
anti-communism in movements who, like the G/HNP, were opposed 
to the ruling UP and, like the G/HNP, identified with Afrikaner 
nationalism. However, whereas the G/HNP largely came to be 
identified with mainstream Afrikaner nationalism, these 
organisations - rightly or wrongly - were associated with 
different variants of National-Socialism. Although it is not a 
distinctive objective of this analysis to typecast those 
organisations involved in the debate surrounding anti-
communism, the Ossewa-Brandwag, New Order and Greyshirt-
movement, in opposing communism, did so on a more direct, overt 
and integrated level vis a vis their own respective ideological 
agendas than was the case with the G/HNP. A discussion of anti-
communism in the Ossewa-Brandwag, New Order and Greyshirt-
movement therefore necessitates a broader evaluation of the 
ideology espoused and principles propagated by these 
organisations. 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The Ossewa-Brandwag [literally Ox-wagon Sentinel] (OB) was born 
out of the emotional fervour which swamped the centenary 
celebrations of the 1838 Great Trek. Formally constituted in 
February 1939, the OB initially presented itself as a socio-
cultural front for Afrikaner nationalists)-) The promotion of 
Afrikaner-volkseenheid, amongst other things, were included as 
an objective shared with other organisations. J.C.C. Laas, in 
1. See M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip: The South African 
Opposition 1939-1945, pp.73-74; G.D. Scholtz: Die 
Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner, 
VIII, pp.148-149; A.J.H. van der Walt: 'n Volk op Trek, 
pp.5-15. 
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October 1940, was ousted from the Commandant-Generalship, the 
highest position of authority within the OB and replaced by the 
then Administrator of the OFS, J.F.J. (Hans) van Rensburg. 
The initial relationship between the OB and G/HNP can best be 
described as cordial and, at times, even heartily. The OB, with\ 
its emphasis on the 	 socio-cultural 	 organisation and \ 
mobilisation of the yolk, was perceived as holding no threat 
for the political activities of the Party. Indeed, the overlap 
in membership of and support for these organisations indicate 
that in many instances the OB and G/HNP were perceived as 
parallel movements, representing, albeit at different levels, , 
the same body of people. 
The Cradock-agreement, concluded in October 1940 between Malan 
and the OB-leadership, constituted an attempt to formalize and 
cement this tentative relationship by demarcating the spheres 
of influence and activity of respectively the OB and HNP.2) 
Under this agreement, according to the announcement made by 
Malan at the HNP's Cradock Congress, the activities of the 
Party were to be limited to the It 	 party-politieke\ 
terrein ..." and those of the OB to die nie-politieke 
terrein ..."3) Fourie has indicated that the actual formulation 
of the Cradock-agreement did not provide for the demarcation as 
insisted on by the HNP.4) 
Tension between the OB and the HNP progressively came to the 
forefront following the appointment of Van Rensburg as 
Commandant-General in January 1941. Less than a year later the 
once cordial relationship between the OB and HNP had 
Roberts and Trollip: Op.cit., p.76. 
Cited in L.M. Fourie: Die Ossewa-Brandwag en 
Afrikanereenheid, 1939-1942, pp.93-94. 
Ibid., p.94. 
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degenerated into open political warfare.5) Sufficient for the 
immediate aims of this analysis is to note that by January 1942 
another centrifugal force, this time in the form of the OB, was 
beginning to make its presence felt in South Africa's intra-
ethnic politics. 
Although the OB can be described as initially being a populous 
movement, it failed to maintain this stature.6) By the end of 
1944, this organisation had lost its position as a serious 
contender for the vanguard position in Afrikaner nationalist 
politics. 
3.2. ANTI-COMMUNISM IN THE OSSEWA-BRANDWAG 
The OB's campaign against communism can chronologically be 
divided into two broad phases, viz, the period before the 
formal establishment of the OB Arbeidslaer [Labour Front] in 
November 1943 and the period following this event. Prior to the 
formation of the Arbeidslaer, the OB's campaign against 
communism was characterised by the inclusion of the widest 
possible range of events/developments in both the national- and 
international arena which could directly or indirectly be 
related to the perceived menace of communism. Following the 
establishment of the Arbeidslaer, the campaign against 
communism came to be characterised by a continuation of this 
erstwhile process of horizontal diversification on the one 
hand, and, on the other, vertical stratification. 
The perceived menace of communism, in this last instance, was 
made applicable to a particular social class, viz, the recently 
For a description and analysis of the development of this 
schism between the OB and HNP prior to the general 
election of July 1943, see M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip: 
The South African Opposition 1939-1945, pp.73-148; F.J. 
van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, pp.273-318. 
D.F. Malan, in Parliament on 4.2.1941, estimated the 
numerical strength of the OB to be between 300 000 and 400 
000 members. See Hansard, 4.2.1941, co1.2196. 
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urbanised (predominantly white) proletariat. The rearrangement 
of the OB's campaign against communism corresponded with a 
general acceptance of the potential importance of the white 
working class as a factor in South African politics. Relative 
to the OB, a greater emphasis subsequently came to be placed on 
a more dogmatic approach towards communism. 
From the outset it needs to be stressed that the formation of 
the Arbeidslaer did not mark the advent of the ideological 
construction of the OB's anti-communism. Between March and 
November 1943 there were indeed numerous occasions where the 
campaign against this `menace' came to take on more of a 
ideological character than ever before. The establishment of 
the Arbeidslaer, however, marked the beginning of a concerted 
effort to link the eradication of communism more directly to 
both the national and social objectives of the OB credo. 
Rather than attempting to provide a purely chronological 
analysis of the OB's campaign against communism, this 
discussion will take the form of a functional enquiry 
underlined by a chronological framework. Although the two 
campaigns - particularly after November 1943 - came to be 
intimately intertwined, the adoption of this approach will 
eliminate undue repetition and provide for a more coherent 
analysis of the issue of overt anti-communism. 
It needs to be stressed that both these analyses will suffer 
from definite and obvious deficiencies. This can largely be 
ascribed to the adoption of a policy by HNP-associated 
newspapers in the course of 1941/42 whereby the existence of 
organisations such as the OB and New Order were simply ignored. 
Correspondingly, the absolute minimum and then only negative 
reportage on these organisations emanated from the HNP press. 
Particularly the OB attempted to counter this through the 
publication, from 1941 onwards, of its own newspaper called Die 
O.B. Although the official history of the OB contends that Die 
O.B. immediately had "... In leserskring 	 groter as enige 
( 
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Afrikaanse dagblad ",7)  the weekly editions of this newspaper, 
as a vehicle for the presentation, promotion and dissemination 
of OB points of view, had obvious limitations both in terms of 
time and space. As such it failed to provide a realistic and 
competitive alternative for the mass-circulated organs of the 
HNP. Neither Die O.B. nor the OB's archives in Potchefstroom 
provide the same amount or depth of 'insight' as came to be 
expected from Die Burger and Die Transvaler relative to the 
topic of anti-communism in the HNP and other befriended 
organisations and institutions. 
The main spokesperson within the OB on perceived communism 
prior to March 1943 was J.F.J. van Rensburg. The inclusion of 
P.J. Meyer in the OB-executive (the Grootraad), initially as 
Chief of Information and after November 1943 also that of 
acting leader of the Arbeidslaer,8)  resulted - as indicated - 
in a diversification of the OB's campaign against communism. 
Van Rensburg and Meyer acted not only as interpreters of OB-
policy towards communism, but also, and even more importantly, 
played a significant role in the formulation thereof. The 
structuring of the OB along the lines of the traditional 
commando system and the prominence of the leadership-principle 
within this hierarchial structure provided par excellence for 
autocratic decision making. 
P. de Klerk, in a recent study on the ideological orientation 
of the OB, acknowledges that the, leadership-principle 
potentially allowed for imposition of policy from atop. In 
practice, however, according to the De Klerk, the OB Grootraad 
[literally Grand Council] was the main decision-making and 
policy-determining body within the OB.9) In other words, 
collective decision making rather than autocratic and 
A.J.H. van der Walt: 'n Volk op Trek, p.123. 
See Footnote 39. 
P. de Klerk: Afrikanerdenkers en die Beginsels van die 
Ossewabrandwag. Journal for Contemporary Historv (vol. 14 
(1), 1989), p.45. 
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unilateral policy-imposition from atop was the normal practice 
in the OB. In support of this contention, De Klerk argues that 
important policy documents were either issued by or under 
authority of the Grootraad. 
An evaluation of the policy-formulating function of 
respectively the Grootraad and individual personalities such as 
Van Rensburg and Meyer, in the context of the campaign against 
the perceived menace of communism, shows that elements of both 
autocratic and collective decision-making may well have been 
present in this process. The strongest argument in support of 
collective policy-formulation by the Grootraad is indeed the 
fact that the basic principles underlying Van Rensburg's and 
Meyer's remarks on communism could in some way be traced back 
to important policy documents "... [wat] goedgekeur en/of 
uitgereik [is] deur die Grootraad." )) This was particularly 
so with regard to the Ossewa-Brandwag's social campaign against 
the perceived menace of communism. A policy document issued by 
the Grootraad in November 1943 determined the basic parameters 
of this campaign. -) 
However, many of those ideas which came to be regarded as 
synonomous with OB-policy on communism, had already been 
expounded by Meyer prior to November 1943. Statements made by 
Meyer in his capacity as acting leader of the Arbeidslaer could 
also be traced back to the period preceding November 1943. The 
earlier referred to policy document issued by the Grootraad in 
November 1943 which, as indicated, determined the basic 
parameters of the OB's social campaign against communism, in 
this context, may well have been formulated and drawn up by 
Meyer. 
Another example is provided by Van Rensburg's speech on 
communism at Crosby early in March 1943. Van Rensburg's speech 
came to be regarded as the sine qua non in any exposition of 
Ibid., pp.46-47. 
Ibid., p.46. 
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OB-policy on communism.12) No evidence could be found to 
indicate that this speech was sanctioned by the OB-executive 
prior to its presentation. The Grootraad only adopted a 
resolution on communism after Van Rensburg's Crosby-speech. 
This resolution - as will be indicated - both corresponded and 
differed significantly from Van Rensburg's Crosby-speech. 
3.3. THE OB AND THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST COMMUNISM 
The first public reference to the perceived menace of communism 
by the OB took the form of a unitary circular issued by Van 
Rensburg early in July 1942.13) Rather than providing an 
exposition of the OB's conception of communism, this circular 
was more of a warning against passivity and indifference and a 
call to all Afrikaners to oppose this ideology 
"... onverbiddelik en konsekwent ..."14) 	 Remarks on the 
perceived characteristics of communism and the implications of 
this for (white) South Africa appeared only in passing. Even 
then, compared to the emphasis placed on the necessity of 
coherent opposition to communism, these remarks were of 
secondary importance. Indeed, seen in isolation and compared to 
remarks on communism by HNP members over the same period, the 
ideas expressed by Van Rensburg on this occasion may just as 
well have emanated from the HNP. The importance of this 
circular therefore does not lie so much in its contents, but 
rather in the seemingly conciliatory approach and time of 
release. 
Against the background of Pirow's and Louw's parliamentary 
motions on communism earlier in the same year, this circular 
The first major policy document issued by the OB in the 
post-war period was published under authority of the 
Grootraad in May 1946. In explaining the OB's policy 
towards communism, Van Rensburg's speech of 5.3.1943 was 
extensively quoted from. See lets oor die Ossewa-Brandwaq, 
pp.65-78. 
See Die 0.B., 8.7.1942. 
Ibid.  
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may well have been released with the primary objective of 
promoting the concept of a "... nasionale en anti-kommunistiese 
front ..."15) If indeed so, this represented the first 
tentative attempt by any-cultural/political movement to promote 
the idea of a broadly based coalition of forces to jointly 
oppose the perceived menace of communism. 
Van Rensburg's initiative must also be seen against the 
backdrop of the OB adopting an own political programme less 
than three months before.16) This programme placed the OB on an 
ideological and political level independent from that of any 
movement connected to or associated with Afrikaner nationalism. 
The emphasis on the perceived menace of communism provided Van 
Rensburg with the opportunity to move closer to the ideological 
terrain unobtrusively. This, in turn, relayed the impression 
that the evolution of the Ossewa-Brandwag fom a purely cultural 
movement to an organisation with explicit political aims 
constituted a shift in emphasis rather than a dramatic change 
in paradigm. Furthermore, and almost needless to say, this 
initiative validated the fact that Van Rensburg perceived the 
future Tole of the OB in explicit political terms. 
Interesting is to note that Van Rensburg had already indirectly 
promoted the concept of coherent opposition to communism during 
his tenure as Administrator of the OFS. In a speech to the 
Fourth Annual Congress of the Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentebond 
[literally Afrikaans National Student League] (ANS) at 
Potchefstroom in October 1937, Van Rensburg described communism 
as "... ['n] non-partypolitieke en inderdaad non-kontensieuse 
vo1kskwessie."17)  Although it may well be argued that the 
primary motivation underlying Van Rensburg's comment on 
coherent opposition to communism was a plea in favour of the 
belief that communism should not become a divisive issue in 
15. Ibid.  
This declaration of policy was published in the form of a 
pamphlet. See Die Ossewa-Brandwag : Vanwaar en Waarheen. 
[N. Diederichs and P. Meyer (eds.)]: Hedendaagse 
Staatkundige Strominge, p.28. 
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Afrikaner politics, it nevertheless, ipso facto, also provided 
for coherent opposition to communism. Communism, according to 
Van Rensburg, were not aimed at any particular political party, 
but against the state as such. Information regarding the modus  
operandi of communism - the topic of Van Rensburg's speech on 
this occasion - therefore had to be supplied to "... almal wat 
deel van die Volk, die draers van die Staat, uitmaak."18)  
Conversely, failing success in this endeavour or even if the OB 
had never contemplated such a strategy, the attempted 
association with conventional elements of Afrikaner nationalism 
may well have been intended as a stalling tactic. This provided 
the OB with the opportunity to formulate a more definite policy 
towards 'communism'. 
Following the publication of this circular, the issue of 
communism appeared even less prominently in OB circles. Indeed, 
prior to February 1943 no statement on this subject was 
forthcoming from either Van Rensburg or the OB-executive. 
Remarks on communism were limited to isolated references in Die 
O.B. Even then - in the majority of cases - the perceived 
menace of communism were primarily utilised to illustrate a 
related contention. The emphasis, in this regard, was generally 
placed on Smuts' alleged subservience to British imperialism. 
Die 0.B., in September 1942, identified four interest groups 
which had allegedly supported the pro-war stance of Smuts in 
September 1939.19) According to this editorial, Smuts' 
perceived willingness to give precedence to the interests of 
the British Empire, •as illustrated by the first three war-
years, were incompatible with the original motivation presented 
by these groupings for supporting the Union's participation in 
World War II. In the case of three interest groups the subject 
of communism - and by implication the Soviet Union 	 were  
utilised to illustrate the aforementioned contention: 
Ibid., p.29. 
Die 0.B., 9.9.1942: "Na Drie Jaar" [editorial]. 
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1. 
	
	
The involvement of Jews and Bolshevists were incompatible 
with the sentiments uttered by those who had rationalised 
their pro-war stance on the basis of Christianity; 
The participation of II ... `n Russiese diktator ..."2()) did 
not concur with the pro-democratic slogans of the pre-war 
period; and 
The laissez faire and even tutelary approach of the Smuts-
government towards communism21) were irreconcilable with 
the emphasis on personal freedom as factor which 
necessitated support for the war effort. 
Less than two months later Die O.B. referred to evidence which, 
so it was alleged, conclusively indicated that the Smuts-
government was in effect a continuation of British rule. The 
connection with communism was described in the following terms: 
"As ons verder let hoe Engeland en die ander Britse 
Dominiums geleidelik aan die kommunistiese agitasie 
met betrekking tot beperkings op hul bedrywighede 
toegegee het, en ons sien hoe die kommuniste in ons 
land agiteer vir die bewapening van naturelle, kan 
ons tot geen ander slotsom kom nie as dat die oomblik 
aangebreek het dat die swarte hordes van Afrika in 
belang van Engeland se oorlog ingespan gaan word - 
altans so sal die Britse mentaliteit dit graag 
aanvaar."22)  
On the solitary occasion where Die O.B. did refer to communism 
other than wholly connecting it to Smuts and/or British 
imperialism, this related to the perceived negative effect of 
this ideology on race relations. However, even then it was 
stated that communists were only partially responsible for this 
20. Ibid.  
A second article which dealt in totality with the alleged 
protectionism afforded to communism by the Smuts-
government was published in Die O.B. on 27.1.1943. The 
CPSA, in this article, was described as the "... blou-oog 
seun ... of Smuts and his administration. 
Die 0.B., 4.11.1942: "Die Groot Gevaar" [editorial]. 
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toestand van fermentasie ..." in race relations, the other 
culprit being the Smuts-government.23)  
The lull in remarks on communism over this period is possibly 
once again to be explained in terms of the two arguments 
referred to earlier. On the one hand the relative disinterest 
in communism may have only served as cover-up for an intensive 
behind the scenes-planning process aimed at the formulation of 
a definite policy towards this ideology. Conversely, this may 
have been a continuation of the attempt to promote 'united 
front'-tactics in opposing 'communism'. The perceived negative 
impact of this ideology on race relations and Smuts' alleged 
liberal approach towards communism were generally agreed on by 
the majority of forces identifying with Afrikaner nationalism. 
Accordingly, agreement on this issue could have served as a 
point of departure in establishing a common front against 
perceived communism. Alternatively, the covert alignment with 
other forces by way of references to aspects on which consensus 
existed, provided the OB with a further opportunity to 
formulate a separate policy towards communism. 
An extensive speaking-tour by Van Rensburg in the course of 
February 1943 marked the beginning of a new phase in the OB's 
campaign against communism. Van Rensburg's meetings, of which 
the primary objective 	 om die Afrikanervolk te waarsku 
1124),  
attention in the OB press. An analysis of the OB's conception 
of communism, based on Van Rensburg's speeches, therefore 
proves impossible. However, during the second week of this 
campaign a press statement on "... die Regering se beleid ten 
opsigte van 
daarteenoor 
Die O.B.  
die kommunisme en die Ossewabrandwag se standpunt 
"25) was issued by Van Rensburg. According to 
this statement was unanimously adopted as 
   
"... duidelike gids ..." by many of those meetings addressed by 
Die 0.B., 27.1.1943. 
Ibid., 24.2.1943. 
Ibid., 10.2.1943. 
was 
teen die gevare van die kommunisme received little 
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Van Rensburg.26)  It will thus be accepted that Van Rensburg's 
statement to the press was a synopsis of the most important 
points touched upon by him during his extensive speaking-tour. 
Van Rensburg's statement to the press, in so far as it was 
intended as analysis of Smuts' alleged policy towards 
communism, consisted of a series of allegations and 
accusations. Most prominent in this regard was the contention 
that Smuts' unprincipled' stand towards communism had to be 
explained in terms of his war declaration against the Axis 
powers and him (Smuts) yielding under pressure by communists. 
The perception of the implications of a Soviet victory in 
Eastern Europe not only dominated Van Rensburg's exposition of 
the OB's 'standpoint' towards communism, but, for all intents 
and purposes, was the only element in it. Little attention, and 
then only in passing, was paid to communism as an ideology. 
The battle in Eastern Europe - according to Van Rensburg - 
involved a life-or-death struggle between Bolshevism and those 
forces opposed to "... die anti-nasionale Komintern ... 27) Van 
Rensburg, although failing to identify the 'anti-Comintern' 
forces, aligned the OB with them. The implications of a defeat 
for this grouping was indicated in the following terms: 
"In Bolsjewistiese oorwinning sou oor die hele 
aardbol heen die einde beteken van beide nasionalisme 
en die Christendom ... En almal weet dat die 
bolsjewisering vat' Europa die Iverkaffering' van 
Afrika beteken."28) 
In as far as remarks on communism as an ideology did appear in 
this statement, reference was made to the perceived anti-
national and atheistic character of this ideology. 
Ibid.  
Ibid.  
Die 0.B., 10.2.1943. 
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In a sense Van Rensburg's press release was more of the 
proverbial `storm in the tea-cup' than a document of 
fundamental importance. Remarks relating to Smuts' alleged 
policy towards communists/communism had already appeared in 
earlier editions of Die O.B. Allegations concerning the 
implications of a Soviet victory in the war, judging from the 
available material, was indeed a new element in OB-thinking on 
communism. However, by connecting it to OB support for the 
'anti-Comintern' (read also Axis) powers, Van Rensburg 
`undermined' the significance of this element. As a result this 
particular statement may just as well be interpreted as a 
covert declaration of support for the Axis alliance. 
3.3.1. 	 Crosby, 6 March 1943 
Van Rensburg presented his first major speech relating to the 
perceived menace of communism during a public meeting at Crosby 
(Johannesburg) early in March 1943.29) Van Rensburg's speech 
was not only the first detailed policy declaration on this 
topic by an OB functionary, but also provided the. basic 
theoretical framework for the OB's continued campaign against 
`communism'. Many of those ideas expressed by Van Rensburg at 
Crosby came to be refined even further over the ensuing period. 
Van Rensburg stressed two contentions: Firstly, the necessity 
of distinguishing between national- and international forms of 
Socialism and, secondly, the eventuality/inevitability of one 
of these forms of Socialism becoming the accepted status quo in 
all countries of the world. In explaining this last allegation, 
Van Rensburg made use of an interdependent almost dialectical 
approach whereby man's striving towards political- and material 
emancipation were connected to and equated with the historical 
evolution of systems of government and the perceived excesses 
of capitalism. 
29. Two complete copies of Van Rensburg's Crosby-speech exist: 
This speech was published in full by Die O.B. on 
17.3.1943. Another copy, this time in Van Rensburg's own 
handwriting, can be found in the OB-archives in 
Potchefstroom (See OB-archives, KG 11/7/49). 
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In the historical development of systems of government, 
Feudalism - according to Van Rensburg - had to make way for a 
system of "... burgerlike demokrasie ..."3°) The implied severe 
restriction of civil liberties under Feudalism (thesis) stood 
in sharp contrast with the unlimited freedoms of democracy 
(antithesis). Indicative of the latter part of this statement 
was the interchangeable usage of the terms `liberalism' and 
`democracy'. The unqualified libertarianism underlying 
democracy, however, had resulted in this system's 
"..• vinnig[e] 	 en 	 onvermydelik[e] 	 ontaard[ing] 	 in 
kapitalisme."31)  `Liberal democracy', with its emphasis on 
unfettered freedoms (thesis), had thus degenerated into a 
`capitalist democracy' (antithesis) where ... die geldadel 
(i.e. kapitalisme) in die plek gekom het van die geboorteadel 
(i.e. feudalisme) 1132) 00e 	 According to Van Rensburg the 
excesses and deficiencies of both these systems were to be 
reconciled in a new world order (synthesis). Socialism 
therefore had to predominate in the post-capitalist phase of 
world history: 
"Die keuse in die toekoms gaan nie wees tussen 
sosialisme of kapitalisme nie. Die keuse is net 
tussen nasionale vorms van sosia4.isme of die anti-
nasionale vorm, die kommunisme."33)  
Van Rensburg identified the OB with the `national forms of 
Socialism'. This alignment figured prominently in Van 
Rensburg's conception of the position of communism in the 
international ideological arena as well as the expected 
implications of this ideology for South Africa. World War II, 
in both instances, served as a basic point of departure. 
Die 0.B., 17.3.1943. 
Van Rensburg described the relationship between democracy 
and capitalism in the following terms: "Demokrasie is soos 
die weelderige Savoy-hotel in Londen. Dit is vir almal oop 
en vry - mits jy kan betaal." (See Ibid.) 
Die 0.B., 17.3.1943. 
Ibid.  
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Van Rensburg described World War II as "... In bloedige 
wereldstryd 	 [tussen] die nasionale gedagte en die anti- 
nasionale gedagte ..."34) Important to note is Van Rensburg's 
conception of the composition of these two opposing sides: The 
'national' faction, according to Van Rensburg, consisted of 
"... die Duitse minter met sy bondgenote en met sy 
vrywilligers uit besette en neutrale lande."35) This 
conglomerate of forces, needless to say, corresponded with the 
composition of the Axis alliance. Given the reality of World 
War II and the reference to the Axis alliance, it was to be 
expected for the 'anti-national' forces to consist of the 
Allied nations. Van Rensburg, however, did not refer to the 
Allied nations; thereby, in effect, underplaying the existence 
of such a grouping.36)  This may have been deliberately done in 
favour of an added emphasis on the alleged role of the Soviet 
Union as the promotor-in-chief of communism. World War II was 
thus portrayed as predominantly a bipolar ideological struggle 
between 	 the 	 forces 	 of 	 nationalism 	 and 	 anti- 
nationalism/internationalism. 
34. Ibid.  
Ibid.  
Although Van Rensburg, as indicated, did not dispute the 
existence of the Allied alliance, he attempted to 
underplay the significance of British and American 
involvement in the Alliance. In this regard two strategies 
were employed: On the one hand the Third International, 
and by implication the Soviet Union, was described as 
...die "senior partner" in hierdie oorlog." Although not 
explicitly stated, the implications for the positions of 
the USA and Britain relative to that of the Soviet Union 
is self-evident from this statement. Conversely, the sheer 
physical distance between Britain and the United States on 
the one hand and the battlefronts of Eastern Europe on the 
other - according to Van Rensburg - ruled out the 
possibility of significant involvement in the war by them. 
In support of this contention Van Rensburg referred to his 
earlier thesis on the world-wide evolution towards 
Socialism. The "... sogenaamd[e] demokratiese empires, 
Engeland en Amerika ... " 	 in this context, 	 were 
"... verbygaande verskynsels ..."(See 	 Die 	 0.B., 
17.3.1943). 
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The continuing struggle in Europe was perceived as affecting 
South Africa directly and indirectly. Van Rensburg, in this 
regard, stressed the outcome of the battle for Eastern Europe 
and the implications for South Africa of her involvement in the 
Allied alliance. Relative to the first aspect, Van Rensburg 
subscribed to the "bastion-theory" in stating that the German 
Wehrmacht stood between South Africa and Soviet/communistic 
imperialism. The collapse of the Nazi Wehrmacht therefore had 
to pave the way for an all-out communist onslaught on South 
Africa. 
Van Rensburg's remarks on the Union's pro-Allied war stance 
must be seen against the backdrop of his earlier referred to 
contention that the Soviet Union was the dominant force in the 
Allied alliance. Because of the Union's involvement in the 
entente with the Soviet Union, the 'vanguard' of communism, 
according to Van Rensburg, had already reached the shores of 
South Africa.37)  Van Rensburg failed to indicate the actual 
composition of this 'vanguard'. Given the emphasis on the 
alleged unity-in-purpose of communists internationally, it is 
possible that Van Rensburg may not have considered a 
distinction between communists in the different national states 
to be of any particular significance. Communists all over the 
world were literally brothers-in-arms with only one loyalty and 
aim, nabely the promotion of the interests of the Soviet state. 
Within South Africa, according to Van Rensburg, the Smuts-
government were yielding under pressure of this communist 
Ivanguard'.38)  The selective application of War Emergency 
Measures and the recognition afforded to the CPSA as a bona  
fide political party were allegedly illustrative of this. 
Van Rensburg referred to this aspect in the following 
terms: "As u lees of hoor van die geweldige gebeurtenisse 
in Oos-Europa, moenie dink: "Ag wat, die Rooi leer is 
8 000 myl van my vaderland af!" Nee, onthou dat sy voorste 
patrollies alreeds hier is. U kan hulle hoor en hulle sien 
in elke stad van die Unie, veral in elke lokasie en elke 
kafferstat." (Die 0.B., 17.3.1943). 
Die 0.B., 17.3.1943. 
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Van Rensburg, in focussing on communism as an ideology, 
emphasized two aspects which he perceived as fundamental to 
this ideology, viz, internationalism and atheism. 
Van Rensburg's conception of internationalism, however, did not 
only relate to proletarian internationalism, but also included 
remarks on the alleged existence of a central 'nerve' centre 
which controlled, coordinated and directed this ideology 
internationally. Important to note is that Van Rensburg 
adjudged communism's striving towards racial equality to be an 
integral and inseparable part of the broader characteristic of 
proletarian internationalism. This contrasted sharply with the 
HNP approach where communism's negation of the colour bar was 
adjudged to be a distinctive characteristic; separate and 
independent from remarks on internationalist proletarian 
solidarity. 
Communism, according to Van Rensburg, ".., beoog om die wereld 
te verower in belang van een klas, die werkersklas."39)  The 
objective underlying this initial goal was the establishment of 
a dictatorship of the proletariat. Van Rensburg referred to the 
national - and racial-composition of the proletariat in the 
following terms: 
"En alle arbeiders is een. Duitser, Zoeloe, Rus, 
Indier, Afrikaner, Engelsman, IHotnot'40)  - almal 
een. In Afrikaner-arbeider op die Spoorweg staan 
nader aan die kleurling-arbeider op die Spoorweg as 
aan sy eie vader, of sy eie moeder wat In stukkie 
grond besit. Rasse is sommer onnodige grense, net die 
klas tel - so leer die kommunisme."41)  
Van Rensburg adjudged communism's 'colour-blindness' to be 
particulary menacing for the prolonged survival of (white) 
South Africa. The dictatorship of the proletariat implied not 
only the dominance of society by the working class, but also 
39'. Ibid.  
40. Afrikaans slang-term for people of racially-mixed 
origins - so-called Coloureds. 
41. 	 Die 0.B., 17.3.1943. 
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the removal of all other classes from society. Given the 
alleged stratification of classes along racial lines in South 
Africa, this may have implied that whites were going to be 
removed from society in a repetition of the classical 
bourgeois-proletariat struggle. The advent of communism in 
South Africa therefore had to result in the total and 
inescapable destruction of Afrikaners as a socio-cultural 
entity. 
The second constituent element of internationalism related to 
the alleged pyramidal structure inherent to this ideology: 
"Agter die kommunisme staan nie argumente en debatte 
nie. Agter hom staan magspolitiek. Agter die 
kommunisme staan die Komintern met die Rooi Leer. Die 
Komintern, die wereldwye federasie van kommunistiese 
partye en die Rooi leer wat hamer, met mokerhoue 
hamer, aan die poorte van Europa en die wereld."42) 
Relative to the CPSA and CI, this implied the existence of a 
intimate relationship which could ultimately be traced back to 
Stalin, as commander-in-chief of the Red Army. The activities 
of communists in South Africa were thus linked to the inner-
most chambers of the Kremlin. The exact function of the Red 
Army within this relationship was not dwelled upon by Van 
Rensburg. Against the background of World War II, the intention 
may well have been to attribute to the Red Army a function 
complimentary to that of the Third International. In this 
manner the perceived link and unity in purpose between 
communists internationally could once again be stressed. 
While there was no factual evidence in support of Van 
Rensburg's contention that the CPSA, the Comintern and the Red 
Army were all intimately involved in a perceived onslaught 
against specifically South Africa, it should be noted that the 
Red Army was of central importance in the USSR's overall 
strategy to enforce its hegemony over Central and Eastern 
Europe in the period immediately before and after the end of 
World War II. Thus, while Van Rensburg's argument could not be 
42. Ibid. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
127 
applied to South Africa, in the context of the period it was 
not far fetched. 
Atheism was described as the second major characteristic of 
communism. In stressing this perceived feature, Van Rensburg 
referred to the well-known Marxist slogan of religion being 
opium for the masses. However, so as to relate this slogan more 
directly to the South African context, it was adapted to the 
following form: "Godsdiens is opium vir die volk"43) (italics 
mine). 
The significance of Van Rensburg's speech becomes even more 
apparent when seen against the backdrop of Louw's parliamentary 
motion on communism less than three weeks before. Louw's 
motion, if accepted, would have resulted in the adoption of a 
series of administrative- and legislative measures to provide 
for the eradication of perceived communism from society. 
Important is to note, however, that these proposed measures 
were to be both adopted and implemented within the framework of 
the then existing constitutional structure. 
Van Rensburg, on the other hand, was neither concerned with the 
adoption of measures to combat communism, nor did he feel 
himself bound by the limitations of the Westminster-type 
democracy of white South Africa. Van Rensburg's exposition did 
not make provision for democracy (read also capitalist 
democracy) as being the final phase of international 
ideological development. At most this was an intermediate stage 
in the final evolution towards Socialism. Communism could only 
be opposed effectively during this final phase. 
In other words, whereas Louw and the HNP propagated the 
adoption of a series of measures which supposedly provided for 
the eradication of specifically communism, Van Rensburg 
stressed the necessity of a single ideology which would allow 
for . the neutralization of communism as well as other 
ideologies. 
43. Ibid. 
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The topic of communism, following Van Rensburg's maiden policy-
speech, gained even more prominence in the OB-hierarchy. This 
is most vividly illustrated by the adoption of a motion on 
communism by the Grootraad less than a week after Van 
Rensburg's Crosby-speech. This motion, which' was released to 
the press, reads as follow: 
"Die O.B. neem met besorgdheid kennis van die 
groeiende en onbeteulde Kommunistiese gevaar in ons 
land, wat dreig om die blanke bevolking hier te 
vernietig. 
Die O.B. is sterk onder die indruk van die feit dat 
die regering aan die een kant kommunistiese 
propaganda oogluikend toelaat, indien nie begunstig, 
selfs onder nie-blankes, terwyl aan die ander kant 
die burgerlike blanke bevolking, selfs op die 
platteland, *deur ontwapening weerloos gemaak is. Die 
O.B. eis derhalwe beveiliging van die blanke 
bevolking deur die onderdrukking van alle 
Kommunistiese organisasies, of anders die reg van die 
blanke burger om homself te herbewapen."44) 
The influence of Van Rensburg's speech shows clearly from this 
resolution, particularly with regard to the damning criticism 
of the Smuts-government for allegedly allowing and even 
promoting communism. Important to note, however, is the 
relative absence of controversial ideological elements - which 
formed the basis of Van Rensburg's speech at Crosby - from this 
resolution. The insistence on repression as a mechanism to 
curtail communism corresponded in principle with those measures 
propagated by Louw and the HNP. White rearmament as an 
alternative for repression was indeed controversial. This was 
even more so given the implied utilisation of force as a 
mechanism to quell communism. The controversy in this instance, 
however, relate more to the proposed mechanism as such rather 
than the ideological rationalisation underlying it. 
Furthermore, care should be taken not to overemphasize the 
significance of rearmament per se in this resolution. Against 
the background of Smuts' decision to disarm certain categories 
44. INCH. P.V. 158: J.D. Jerling. File 13: "Notule van In 
Vergadering van die Grootraad gehou te Bloemfontein, 11-
12/3/1943." This resolution was unanimously adopted on the 
first day of the meeting. 
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of the white civilian population, the OB may have attempted to 
capitalise on the unpopularity of this decision; thereby 
bolstering its own membership figures. The inclusion of 
rearmament in a public statement provided an ideal opportunity 
for this. 
3.3.2. 	 Crosby and its Aftermath 
Prior to the formal surrender of Nazi Germany in 1945 and 
relative to the OB's national campaign against communism, the 
perceived dangers inherent to this ideology were regularly 
touched upon by Van Rensburg and Die O.B. Many of those remarks 
on communism made after March 1943, as indicated previously, 
could in some way be traced back to Van Rensburg's Crosby-
speech. This period will be discussed by way of four aspects 
referred to by Van Rensburg in his Crosby speech. Of particular 
importance is the manner in which these elements came to be 
refined after March 1943. 
a) 	 The Eventuality of a Socialist World-Order 
As before, the irreversible eventuality of a world wide 
rotation towards Socialism was accentuated. Van Rensburg, 
during May 1943, once again stressed the "... onverbiddelike 
noodwendigheid ..." 	 of a socialist world-order. In a 
pamphlet aimed at the English-speaking population, this 
'phenomenon' was explained in the following terms: 
"We, the generation of to-day, are living in the 
birth-pangs of a Social World-Revolution. He would be 
a rash prophet who tried to delineate the post-war 
face of the world. But one thing can be said with 
certainty, namely that the Old-World, the pre-war 
world of liberal Capitalism is gone - for ever and a 
day. And in its stead there looms the new-socialist 
order for all to see."46) 
OB-Archives, KG 11/7/49. A summary of Van Rensburg's 
speech was published in Die O.B. of 12.5.1943 - nearly a 
fortnight after its initial presentation. 
Some Facts about the Ossewa-Brandwaq, p. 29. Important to 
note is that this pamphlet was published in June 1944. 
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Die O.B. repeatedly referred to this expected international 
rotation.47)  Protagonists of conventional party politics were 
vehemently criticised in an editorial during June 1944 for 
promoting the cause of a 'tottering' system such a democracy. 
This, according to Die 0.B., only promoted communism.48)  
Concurrently, however, elements which came forth from the OB's 
social campaign against communism were added to this 'national' 
campaign. The inclusion of these elements were inconspicuous 
and created the impression of it being a further refinement of 
the OB contention relating to the eventuality of a socialist 
world-order. 
The eventuality of a socialist-dominated world, as indicated, 
was generally agreed on within the OB. Within the context of 
this final phase of international ideological deployment, so it 
was alledged, two forms of Socialism would predominate, viz. 
'national' and 'anti-national'. Following Van Rensburg's speech 
at Crosby, the concept of a 'counter-revolution' came to be 
propagated as a measure to rid society of the 'anti-national' 
form of Socialism (read also communism). Van Rensburg, in 
January 1945, defined this concept: 
"Deur kontra-revolusie bedoel ek In algehele 
maatskaplike omwenteling en die herinrigting van die 
volk se hele lewe volgens die sosialistiese 
diensmotief. Ek bedoel nie dat alle stabiliserende 
ankers losgeruk moet word nie. Ek wil nie die bande 
van kerk, famine en besittings vernieitg [sic!] nie, 
ook nie die internasionalisme, ateisme en 
materialisme van die kommunis aanvaar nie. Ek wil In 
volkstaat he, daargestel deur In eengesinde en 
gedissiplineerde yolk, met mag om alle onheile van 
die yolk af te wend en met genoeg sosialisme ()Irk die 
yolk in sy bestaan te beveilig en te beskerm."49)  
This description of the proposed counter-revolution, seen in 
isolation, concurred with the general structuring of Van 
See for example Die 0.B., 21.6.1944 and 10.1.1945. 
Die 0.B., 28.6.1944: "Word Noodwendig Bondgenote" 
[editorial]. 
Die 0.B., 10.1.1945. 
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Rensburg's Crosby speech. Within the context of Socialism 
allegedly constituting the final phase of international 
ideological deployment and -development, this description, 
thus, consisted of, firstly, an identification of those 
qualities of communism (internationalism, atheism and 
materialism) adjudged to be perilous and, secondly, a 
compilation of the broad objectives of the OB's anti-
internationalist form of Socialism. 
In practice, however, the elimination of communism 
progressively came to be linked to the eradication of 
liberalism, capitalism and democracy. The setting of 
preconditions (the elimination of liberalism, capitalism and 
democracy) for the eradication of communism did not concur with 
Van Rensburg's original treatise on the perceived inexorable 
eventuality of Socialism.50)  In terms of the argument forwarded 
by Van Rensburg in his Crosby-speech, capitalism or a 
capitalist democracy would already have had disappeared prior 
to the commencement of the "final struggle" (read also counter-
revolution) against communism. Arguably the finest exposition 
of OB-thinking on the perceived linkage between capitalism and 
communism was provided by a pamphlet published in June 1944: 
"No, let us regard Communism not as a new thriller 
but as a fungus springing from the evils of 
capitalism. A review of the facts teaches that 
Capital accumulates Capital and that this 
accumulation can only be done by taking away from the 
weaker competitors who then fall under the subjection 
of the stronger. This is an age-old truth and long 
before Marx it was said that from him that hath not 
shall be taken even that which he hath. Briefly, 
capitalism breeds its antithesis, the poverty-
stricken proletariat. And out of the proletariat 
arises the Communist vanguard. 
50. Van Rensburg's exposition of the dialectical evolvement of 
Socialism will, for the aims of this analysis, be 
considered both valid and representative of OB-thinking on 
this issue. 
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Recognising this we seek the fault not with the 
proletariat who is acting in self-preservation, but 
rather do we seek it in the hopeless subordination of 
labour to capital, of the "have nots" to the "haves". 
Only if we can break the stranglehold of soulless 
capitalism can we face Communism with a clear 
conscience and with a determination to stamp out 
ruthlessly this threat to the preservation of white 
South Africa. To leave the money-power intact and to 
fight the man or woman who, in communist 
organisations, has sought refuge from capitalist 
exploitation, is to confuse cause and effect - to put 
the cart before the horse. 
Therefore we regard the smashing of capitalism by a 
nationally orientated Socialism as a vitally 
necessary stage in the final line-up against the most 
deadly threat the white man has ever faced in our 
country - Communism. Communism and a Black Soviet 
Republic"51)  (italics mine). 
Rather than acknowledging the ideological adaptation of Van 
(J Rensburg's original treatise on communism, this was presented 
as a refinement of earlier OB points of view. The terms 
'revolution' and 'counter-revolution' proved particularly 
helpful in this regard. On several occasions during the course 
of the war-years, the expected evolutionary movement towards 
Socialism was described as the "Revolution of the Twentieth 
Century".52) Relative to anti-communism, this concept, 
following the introduction of anti-capitalism as an integral 
part of the campaign against communism, was applied divergently 
- through the utilisation of the terms 'revolution' and 
'counter-revolution' - to provide for both communism and 
0 capitalism. Die 0.B., in discussing the concept "Revolution of 
the Twentieth Century", provided a fair indication of the 
A!,  
Some Facts about the Ossewa-Brandwaq, pp. 31-32. 
See F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in 
die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.124. 
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manner in which this divergent approach was employed: 
"Nie alleen wil die O.B. as sosialistiese beweging 
die kapitalisme vernietig nie, maar ook as 
volksbeweging wil hy die kommunisme teengaan. Die 
rewolusie van die twintigste eeu gaan teen die 
kapitalisme - as sulks is die O.B. In deel van 
hierdie rewolusie en is hy rewolusioner. Maar die 
rewolusie van die twintigste eeu het ook In ander 
aspek - een wat spesifiek teen die kommunistiese 
rewolusie gaan. Hierin deel die O.B. ook, daarom is 
hy ook kontra-rewolusioner. Die taak van die O.B. is 
nie alleen om die kapitalisme te beveg nie, maar ook 
om te verhoed dat kommunisme sy plek sal inneem. 
Daarom moet die O.B. In kontra-rewolusie uitvoer."53)  
b) World War II and Communism 
Van Rensburg and other OB-functionaries, in relating their 
warnings on communism to the continuing war, continued to 
stress, on the one hand, the expected outcome of the battle for 
Europe and, on the other, the implications of a Europe 
dominated by the USSR for specifically South Africa. Compared 
to Van Rensburg's Crosby-speech, however, significant 
adjustments had occurred on both counts. Most distinctive was 
the gradual evolvement away from indications of tacit support 
for the Axis war effort. In time this came to be replaced by an 
increased emphasis on the "bastion-theory" and the implications 
of a Soviet dominated Europe. The centrality of Germany's 
position in both instances, however, was never questioned. 
Nonetheless, no longer was the emphasis placed on the defeat of 
the German Wehrmacht, but rather on the possibility of a 
destruction of Germany Der se. 
Relative to communism and the outcome of World War II, the 
"bastion-theory" and the implications of a Europe dominated by 
the Soviet Union, when utilised, normally appeared in tandem. 
Smuts' explosive' speech of November 1943, needless to say, 
provided the ideal opportunity for the inclusion of remarks 
relating to the expectation of a Soviet dominated post-war 
Europe. Van Rensburg, in reacting to this speech, welcomed 
53. Die 0.B., 23.2.1944. See also editorial "Die Kontra-
Revolusie" in the same edition. 
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Smuts' frankness, but also criticised his perceived defeatism 
for wanting to divide the post-war world into "... een 
ateisties-kommunistiese 	 en 	 • • • 	 twee 	 kapitalistiese 
Empires ..."54) The destruction of Germany, 	 ... die sterkste 
en ... enigste Europese bolwerk teen Kommunisme ...",55) would 
only hasten the eventuality of Soviet domination. According to 
Van Rensburg the fall of Germany would result in the 
establishment of "... a Soviet-controlled confederation 
stretching from the furtherst harbour in East Asia, 
Vladivostok, deep into Central Europe and, ere-long, to the 
Channel Ports of France and Flanders.1t56)  
South Africa, described by Van Rensburg as an outpost of 
Europe, was ipso facto also going to be affected by the 
destruction of Germany as a historical bastion against 
communism. 
South African involvement in the Allied alliance and the 
implications of this for the spreading of communism figured far 
less prominently in OB circles than had been the case with Van 
Rensburg's Crosby-speech. This applied both in terms of the 
perceived position of the Soviet Union within the Allied 
alliance as well as the direct implications of this for South 
Africa. Although Smuts' alleged liberal approach towards 
communism were still ascribed to his original decision to 
involve South Africa in the war, the Allied alliance and the 
Union's connection with it did not appear as a separate, 
identifiable element within the framework of this hermeneutic 
model. 
On the solitary occasion where Die O.B. did indeed connect the 
spreading of communism to the Allied alliance, the content and 
structuring of this allegation differed significantly from Van 
Die 0.B., 15.12.1943. 
Ibid., 18.10.1944. 
See Van Rensburg's speech in the Johannesburg City Hall on 
30.4.1945. Published in pamphlet form under the title "The 
Communist Colossus in Europe and South Africa". 
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Rensburg's speech at Crosby.57) Whereas, on both occasions, it 
had been alleged that the Soviet Union was abusing its 
membership of the Allied alliance to promote communism, the 
motivation which allegedly made this possible differed in both 
instances. While Van Rensburg, in November 1943, ascribed this 
to the perceived absolute dominance of the alliance by the 
USSR, Die 0.B., a year later, contended that Allied dependency 
on Soviet military support had resulted in an unwritten 
agreement in terms of which the Soviet Union was allowed a free 
hand in the propagation of communism in the allied states. This 
'freedom' was grudgingly agreed to. 
Within South Africa, according to Die 0.B., the Smuts- 
government was 	 ernstig bekommerd oor die kragdadige 
toename in ... [kommunistiese propaganda] ..."58) This differed 
significantly from the Grootraad-press statement of March 1943 
which afforded the Smuts-administration a more active role in 
the spreading of communism. 
C) , The UP-administration and Communism 
Prior to May 1945, the OB, in relating the subject of communism 
to the UP-administration, adopted a dualistic approach. On the 
one hand the Smuts-administration, as before, was accused of 
favouritism towards the CPSA and of consciously promoting the 
cause of communism. Alternatively, as indicated in the previous 
paragraph, it was acknowledged that Smuts and his government 
were indeed concerned about the spreading of 'communism' in 
South Africa. However, even then the UP-administration was 
severely criticised for failing to 'adopt the required measures 
to tarnish the spreading of this ideology. In many ways these 
approaches represented different strategies, the utilisation of 
which depended on the broader context of the specific reference 
to communism. 
See Die 0.B., 31.5.1944: "Stalin is reeds Diktator van 
Suid-Afrika" [editorial]. 
Ibid. 
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The first of these strategies were generally employed on 
occasion where the broader objective was to promote the cause 
of specifically the OB as a counter-force to communism. 
C.F. (Colin) Steyn, Minister of Justice, was the individual 
most often referred to by the OB as allegedly the leading 
protaganist of the communist cause within Government-circles. 
As before, examples of the alleged selective application of War 
Emergency Measures were repeatedly pointed to as indicative of 
Steyn's prejudice in favour of communism.59)  Although care was 
taken not to describe or accuse Steyn of being a communist 
himself, the question of whether this was never implied remains 
a matter for speculation. A good example of this is provided by 
Van Rensburg's remarks on Steyn's involvement with the FSU: 
"But as I explained, ... [Colin Steyn] is not merely 
Minister of Justice. He is also official patron of 
the communistic "Friends of the Soviet Union". In 
this latter capacity his hostility towards the OB is 
to be understood. Because the OB is par excellence 
the counter of Afrikanerdom to communism."60)  
The second strategy was selectively employed on occasion where 
the concept of coherent opposition to communism was referred to 
by the OB. Although the idea of a broad coalition of forces to 
oppose the perceived menace of communism figured with varying 
degrees of prominence in OB-circles during the course of the 
period under discussion, the possibility of members of the 
ruling party being included in this alliance was referred to 
only once. This was done by by way of an editorial in Die O.B.  
during July 1944.61) 
Van Rensburg repeatedly referred to particularly two 
examples: The dropping of charges against M.M. (Moses) 
Kotane, general secretary of the CPSA and the release of 
Y.M. (Yusuf) Dadoo, member of the CPSA's executive, from 
internment. See Van Rensburg's speeches at the Florida 
Lake in Johannesburg during May 1943 (reported in Die O.B.  
of 12.5.1943) and Crosby less than a year later. (OB-
archives, KG 11/7/53). At Florida Kotane was described as 
... die gunsteling van die Minister van Justisie". 
"The Communist Colossus in Europe and South Africa" 
[pamphlet]. 
Die 0.B., 19.7.1944: "Red Suid-Afrika". 
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Of significance is the criticism levelled at the Smuts-
government for failing to take concrete steps to combat the 
perceived menace of communism. Die 0.B., in this regard, 
forwarded two explanations which, according to it, might well 
explain the absence of preventative measures to combat the 
perceived menace of communism. On the one hand it was alleged 
that the expected post-war dominance of the Soviet Union may 
have forced Smuts into a position where he was forced to take 
the lead in the lbolshevisation' of the Union. This, according 
to Die 0.B., would not be done out of sympathy with the 
communistic cause but constituted a desperate attempt to ensure 
his and the UP's prolonged survival as the ruling elite in 
South Africa. Alternatively, in a continuation of his holistic 
striving, Smuts' aim may well have been to replace England with 
"... die groter en meer kragtige Russiese kolossus"62)  as 
'interpreter' of South African interests. In the realization of 
this objective - according to Die O.B. - care had to be taken 
not to offend the Soviet Union by instituting repressive 
measures against communism. 
d) Communism as Ideology 
Atheism and internationalism, as before, were repeatedly 
referred to by Van Rensburg as characteristic of communism. 
Relative to the proletarian aspect of internationalism, Van 
Rensburg continued to emphasize the racial stratification of 
classes in South Africa. An important addition in this regard 
related to the alleged involvement of Jewry with communism. 
Although indications are that the connection between Jews and 
communism were already made prior to November 194363), the 
formation of the Arbeidslaer resulted in a more coherent 
application of this contention. In time Jewry came to be 
Ibid. 
Van Rensburg, in a speech at Pretoria-West during November 
1943, described communism as "... hierdie Joodse 
aborsie ..." (OB-archives, KG 11/7/49). 
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connected to both capitalism and communism: 
"En wie is nou hierdie leiers van die kommunisme? 
Ons weet uit eie ervaring dat die Jood oor die 
algemeen nie deurgaan as 'n hande-arbeider nie. Hulle 
word getel onder die kapitaliste. Dat Jode die 
regeerders van Rusland is, is juis 'n bewys dat ons 
hier met die mees absolute vorm van kapitalisme te 
doen het."64) 
Given the perceived reality of race as a determinant of class 
in South Africa, the dictatorship of the proletariat in the 
Union would have to be - in the words of Van Rensburg - • • • In 
naturelle proletariaat met In Joodse algemene staf."65) 
Important, however, is to note that alleged Jewish affinity for 
communism held little prominence as a separate and unique 
contention in OB circles. Quantitatively speaking, on occasion 
where Jewry was connected to existing dogmas, this related more 
to the perceived Jewish nature and -origins of capitalism than 
alleged Jewish support for communism. The deduction to be drawn 
from this is that within the framework of the OB's campaign 
against specifically the alleged communist menace, Jewish 
communism and support for communism by Jews had little 
significance other than being an element of propaganda. 
The alleged highly centralized system of control inherent to 
communism was also stressed by the OB. An interesting 
development in this regard related to the contention by Van 
Rensburg that the CPSA campaign for the arming of non-white 
soldiers could directly be traced back to a directive issued by 
the Third International. This directive, according to Van 
Rensburg, was as follows: 
"Die triomf van die proletariaat veronderstel die 
bewapening van die proletariaat en die ontwapening 
van die burgerlike element."66) 
64. Die 0.B., 19.7.1944: "Kolossale Bedrog" [editorial]. 
65. See Van Rensburg's speech at Grosby on May Day 1944 (OB-
archives, KG 11/7/53). 
66. Ibid.  
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Van Rensburg's argument relating to the inderdependence of race 
and class shows clearly from this quotation. 
The seemingly violent and revolutionary nature of communism was 
described as another distinctive characteristic of this 
ideology. Van Rensburg, in quoting from Stalin's Problems of  
Leninism, summarised this characteristic in the following 
terms: "... it is evident that the Communists are aiming at a 
revolution by violence and that it is their duty to further 
this violent revolution. And ... this revolution is to be the 
prelude to a long period of many years of the Dictatorship of 
the Proletariat. "67) 
Within South Africa, given the racial stratification of 
classes, the dictatorship of the proletariat implied the 
establishment of "[a] Jim Fish republic with Amalaita-gangs as 
shock-troops."68)  This particular feature and its relevancy for 
South Africa was subsequently also utilised to promote the 
cause of specifically the OB as an extra-parliamentary 
resistance movement against communism. 
Intimately connected to all of these aspects were remarks on 
the most effective manner to oppose communism. In practice this 
boiled down to the question of whether the OB per se or a 
broadly constituted coalition of forces provided the best 
alternative for opposing communism. In attempting to find a 
satisfactory answer to this question, the OB adopted a 
dualistic approach whereby both possibilities were selectively 
stressed. 
Less than three weeks after his maiden policy-speech on 
communism, Van Rensburg again referred to this topic at a 
See "The Communist Colossus in Europe and South Africa" 
[pamphlet]. 
Ibid.  
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public meeting in Cape Town. Relative to the opposing of 
communism, it was declared that "[d]ie Ossewabrandwag as buite-
parlementere volksbeweging is dan ook die enigste mag wat die 
kommunisme in Suid-Afrika kan beveg."69) Simultaneously, 
however, Van Rensburg connected the perceived menace of 
communism to the called-for establishment of a volksfront 
[literally people's front] before the coming general election 
of July 1943. Although Van Rensburg did not elaborate on the 
composition and function of the proposed volksfront, the 
reference to this concept, against the backdrop of remarks on 
communism, indicate that Van Rensburg perceived the eradication 
of communism to be an important motivation for the creation of 
such a front. Less than a year later Die O.B. went even further 
by stating that the campaign against communism could only be 
successfully executed "... as die hele yolk opstaan en hulle 
soos een man aangord tot die stryd."70) In other words, 
whereas, in 1943, the OB identified the alleged menace of 
communism to be an important motivation for the creation of a 
united front, by 1944 it was alleged that a unified 
Afrikanerdom was a prerequisite for effectively opposing 
communism. 
Following Van Rensburg's Cape Town speech, a continuation of 
this dualistic approach evolved. In so far as the proposal for 
was touched upon at two occasions during the course of this 
period. In July 1944 Die O.B. delivered a highly emotional plea 
for the establishment of 111 
	
`n gemeenskaplike front teen 
coherent opposition to 	 was concerned, this subject communism 
hierdie buitelandse bedreiging 
front were to consist of "... 
... [van kommunisme]."71)  This 
alle Christelike en nasionale 
groepe ... [in Suid-Afrika]."72)  Relative to the participation 
of political movements, Die 0.B., stressed that all political 
parties, including the UP, had to be represented in this front. 
Die 0.B., 31.3.1943. 
Die 0.B., 19.7.1944: "Die Kontra-Revolusie" [editorial]. 
Die 0.B., 19.7.1944: "Red Suid-Afrika" [editorial]. 
Ibid.  
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Party political divisions and other divisive factors were of 
secondary importance compared to the necessity of joint action 
against this perceived common danger. 
Van Rensburg, in accordance with a Grootraad-resolution, in 
February 1945, launched another attempt to promote the concept 
of united front-tactics in opposing communism. This campaign 
took the form of a concrete and formal proposal whereby the 
leaders of each of the HNP, Afrikanerparty, NO and Greyshirt- 
movement were invited to 	 eventuele samesprekings met die 
doel on teen gemeenskaplike gevare In gesamentlike ... front te 
stig 	 "73) Communism was identified as one of an unspecified 
number of dangers demanding coherent attention. Van Rensburg 
added two preconditions for OB participation: Firstly, all of 
the movements participating in the front should be allowed to 
retain their own separate identities and, secondly, the 
proposed front would have to be so broadly constituted as to 
allow for the inclusion of "... alle elemente wat mik om los te 
kom van onnasionale en kapitalistiese magte wat tans regerings 
maak of breek."74) 
Care must be taken not to overemphasize the importance of the 
1945-initiative. Roberts and Trollip indicate that this venture 
should also be seen against the background of the OB 
experiencing a serious loss of support.75)  The ultimate 
objective underlying this ... half-hearted gesture"75)  may 
thus well have been to ensure the continued survival of the OB 
as a factor in Afrikaner nationalist politics. Anti-communism, 
within the context of this aim, may well have served as a 
slogan for the potential rallying of support. Van Rensburg's 
OB-archives. KG 11/5/28: Letter Van Rensburg-Pirow, 
26.2.1945. 
Ibid. 
M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip: The South African 
Opposition, 1939-1945, pp.168-169. 
Ibid.  
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and the Grootraad's `peace-plan', for the sake of completeness, 
was rejected by all approached. 
Simultaneously, and even after the 1945-initiative, the OB 
continued to emphasize the more exclusivist approach. In 
motivating this strategy, two aspects were regularly referred 
to: 
The interdependence of race and class in South Africa 
demanded extra-parliamentory action to combat communism. 
The OB, with its declared aversion of conventional party 
politics and its "commando spirit" were ideally suited for 
such a venture. 
Both organisationally and ideologically the OB represented 
the most viable counter-force to communism. Ideologically 
because the socio-political programme of the OB was the 
natural counter-balance to communism. Organisationally 
because the eradication of communism demanded coordinated 
and effective reaction. The OB, organised along the lines 
of the traditional commando system, provided par_ 
excellence for this. 
Van Rensburg summarised these `positive attributes' of the OB 
in rather dramatic fashion: 
” ... die dag sal kom, en spoedig ook, waar die 
Afrikanerdom die Here sal dank dat Hy ... betyds In 
Volksbeweging laat ontstaan het wat die Volk 
saamgesnoer het vir buiteparlementere afweeraksie; 
wat vinnig en beslis kan optree, dwarsdeur die land, 
nie net elke vyf jaar nie dog elke dag en elke nag 
van elke jaar. `n Organisasie wat nie in 
kiesafdelings en kongresse gedeel is nie, dog in 
weerbare kommandos onder offisiere wat oor die drie 
jaar lank al teen In oormag moes veg. In Organisasie 
wat ideologies en organisatories in ons volk die 
sterkste teenvoeter is teen Kommunisme, naamlik die 
Ossewa-Brandwag.."77)  
77. See Die 0.B., 10.2.1943. 
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3.4. 	 THE OB AND THE SOCIAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST COMMUNISM 
The social campaign against communism 	 as indicated 
previously - was facilitated by the elevated importance 
attached to the white working class as a factor in South 
African politics. This 'awareness' was not only limited to the 
OB, but included a broad spectrum of movements, institutions 
and organisations ranging from the three Afrikaans Protestant 
Churches to the Afrikaner-Broederbond [literally Afrikaner 
League of Brothers] (AB). The increased emphasis on the white 
working class within the OB was part of a larger process aimed 
at widening the range of appeal of the OB by making special 
efforts to gain converts from particular sections of the South 
African population.78)  Although the motivation underlying this 
step falls outside the scope of this study, it must be noted 
that the fortunes of the OB were intimately tied up with the 
course of the Axis war effort. By November 1943 the Axis 
alliance had clearly lost the initiative in the continuing war 
and were rapidly retreating before the Allied onslaught.79)  
The formation of the Arbeidslaer marked the advent of the OB's 
social campaign against communism. Although indications are 
that the concept of the Arbeidslaer may have been promoted 
within the OB prior to November 1943, it was only in the course 
of that month that the establishment of this front was formally 
agreed to by the Grootraad.80)  Relative to the sanctioning of 
the concept of the Arbeidslaer, this would be in accordance 
Apart from the white working class, special attention was 
also paid to members of the Union Defence Force and 
English-speaking whites. This, according to Roberts and 
Trollip, was done by de-emphasizing the 'revolutionary' 
aspects of the OB's creed in favour of "... a constructive 
social programme which should be both Nationalist and 
Socialist, but which would be less obviously than before 
National-Socialist." (Roberts and Trollip: op.cit., 
pp.157-158). 
G.D. Scholtz: Die Onwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van 
die Afrikaner, VIII, pp.240-241. 
See Van Rensburg's annual report to the Grootraad in 
September 1944 (OB-archives, KG 11/8/56). 
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with De Klerk's argument on the Grootraad being the main 
decision-making forum within the OB. Indeed, on this occasion, 
the function of the Grootraad was not only limited to a 
sanctioning of the Arbeidslaer-concept, but a major policy 
document issued by it in the same month determined the basic 
parameters of the policy to be expounded by the Arbeidslaer. 
Conversely, as indicated previously, the "Ten Point Policy 
Declaration", may well have been the work of Meyer. Important 
for the aims of this analysis, however, is to note that this 
document causally affected the OB's social campaign against 
communism. 
This document, which will conveniently be referred to as the 
"Ten Point Policy Declaration", also addressed itself to 
specifically communism: 
"10. Neither Capitalism nor Communism. Capitalism, 
with its international control, particularly as 
regards the mines, industries, trade and the money 
market must be done away with. The prices, profits 
and losses of production are to be controlled; 
speculation with the land, housing, food and clothing 
of the people is to be prevented. Godless and 
raceless Communism is to be overcome by a Christian 
and national Socialism"81)  (italics in the original)., 
It needs to be stressed that Section Ten must be read in 
conjunction with the remainder of the Ten Point Policy 
Declaration. Relative to the subject of anti-communism, this 
document provided a diagnosis of the 'ailment' ("[g]odless and 
raceless Communism") in the final point while the remainder of 
the document provided an explication of the proposed remedy ("a 
Christian and national Socialism"). 
Most prominent in the Arbeidslaer was P.J. (Piet) Meyer.82)  Van 
Rensburg officially launched the Arbeidslaer at a public 
Some facts about the Ossewa-Brandwaq, p.100. 
This statement is validated by a transcription of an 
interview with a former member of the Arbeidslaer, G.H. 
Beetge. See "Onderhoud Gevoer met mnr G.H. Beetge van 
Pieter Neethling-gebou, Pretoria" (Interview no.90, 03- 
archives, Potchefstroom). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
145 
meeting in Pretoria-West during November 1943. Prior to May 
1945 Van Rensburg regularly referred to the perceived role of 
the Arbeidslaer in the counter-revolution against communism. 
Meyer, as acting leader of the Arbeidslaer, was not only 
responsible for the functional- and organisational deployment 
of the front, but also - and even more importantly - the 
explication of Arbeidslaer-policies. 
Meyer progressively came to assume the role of leading 
theoretician in the ideological construction of the 013',s anti-
communism. Prior to his inclusion in the Grootraad,83)  Meyer 
had already written extensively on the expected ideological 
restructuring of the twentieth century world. Relative to anti-
communism, Meyer, in his writings, paid special attention to 
the perceived connection between capitalism and communism and 
the position of the working class vis a vis this connection and 
the expected new socialist world-order. Meyer's inclusion in 
the Grootraad and his appointment as acting leader of the 
Arbeidslaer provided him with a further opportunity to expand, 
refine and ultimately propagate his ideas to a wider audience. 
In so far as the Ten Point Policy Declaration may have been 
intended as a framework for the functional and ideological 
development and -deployment of 	 the Arbeidslaer, 	 Meyer's 
philosophies were atonable with the principles identified by 
this document. Indeed, if it is considered •that Meyer had 
already expounded the majority of those ideas which came to be 
regarded as synonomous with OB-social policy prior to the 
formation of the Arbeidslaer, it may well have been that Meyer 
was the architect-in-chief of the Grootraad Ten Point Policy 
Declaration. For the aims of this analysis it will be accepted 
83. Meyer, like so many other G/HNP-supporters, had been a 
member of the Ossewa-Brandwag since its inception in 1939. 
In the period preceding the hostilities between the OB and 
HNP, Meyer was a member of the Transvaal executive of the 
OB. As a result of the schism between the OB and HNP, 
Meyer, according to Hans van Rensburg, was forced to 
withdraw form the public activities of the OB. Meyer, in 
his private capacity, however, "... het ... sy pligte as 
Brandwag steeds getrou nagekom." (Die 0.B., 10.2.1943) 
The possibility of Meyer being influenced in his writings 
by OB-policy can therefore not be excluded. 
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that Meyer did indeed play a leading role in the ideological 
construction of the OB's anti-communism. 
3.4.1. 	 The Ideological Construction of the OB's Anti- 
Communism 
Central to the ideological construction of the OB's anti-
communism was the concept of an 'organic volksunity'. 
Afrikaners, in terms of this concept, formed a single coherent 
entity, the unity of which was fundamentally more important 
than the constituent elements making up this entity.84) 
Explicitly defined in ethnic terms (initially even ethno-
linguistically), the concept of an organic volksunity had to 
reflect the inner unity in purpose of the yolk. The proposed 
Christian-National Authoritarian State, in its constitutional-, 
political- and economic structuring, had to embody this living 
organic volksentity. Van Heerden refers most effectively to 
this belief in stating that ... die staat ... [is die] draer 
van die volk se persoonlikheid."85)  Socially, the organising 
and mobilisation of the yolk on the basis of this organic 
entity represented a microcosm of and substructure for the 
establishment of the proposed republic. Van Rensburg, in his 
Crosby-speech, provided an indication of the social objectives 
of the OB and the connection thereof with the proposed 
For a more detailed exposition of this statement see the 
family policy of the OB as published in brochure form 
under the title "Gesonde Huisgesinne Bou 'n Lewenskraatige  
Volk!" See also P.J. Meyer: Die Vooraand van ons  
Vrywording, pp.18-20. 
F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die  
Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.134. 
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"A man's, or a woman's, class or vocation is an 
incidental ... [and] can change overnight, but his 
blood, his race, is something given him by God, 
something which he can not escape as long as he 
lives. It is his Self. The Authoritarian National 
State sees in each member of the national community 
the bearer of the blood ... One and all, irrespective 
of the class of their parents, they are the future of 
Afrikanerdom, the nation of tomorrow. 
Every generation, and also every individual is merely 
a link in the chain of generations. And the whole 
chain, not a particular link, is Afrikanerdom. The 
past generations are as much a part of our national 
make-up and the future- and present generation is 
merely a link, a means to an end, not an end in 
itself. 
But a chain is never stronger than the weakest link. 
And for this reason it is our desire and our interest 
to see to it that all links are equally cared for and 
equally healthy, irrespective of the class or 
vocation in which that link is placed. For the sake 
of the whole chain. 
The National Authoritarian State desires to weld them 
all into one totality, not to divide them into 
groups, parties or classes. A non-party state, 
because divisions are a luxury for fair-weather days 
and not for the period of storm and stress which is 
now sweeping the earth."86) 
The organic unity of Afrikanerdom as an entity-in-totality 
served as yardstick in the evaluation of other ideologies. 
Particularly important for the aims of this analysis is the 
ideologies of Liberalism, Capitalism and Communism and the 
alleged existnce of a causal relationship between them. 
Liberalism, which Meyer described as the "... grootste en mees 
kragtigste vyand ..."87) of the yolk, allegedly contributed 
fundamentally to the dissension and disunity within 
Afrikanerdom. Compared to the Volkscentrism of the OB's 
Christian-national ideology, liberalism - according to Meyer - 
attached a pivotal importance to the interest of the individual 
Cited in Some Facts about the Ossewa-Brandwaq, pp.39-40. 
P.J. Meyer: Die Vooraand van ons Vrvwordinq, p.7. 
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per se. Under this ideology, yolk, according to Meyer, was 
defined as ... die som van selfonderhoudende individue wat, 
afgesien van ras, taal of kultuur, saamgegroepeer word in 'n 
eenheidsstaat met die doel om die eiebelang van elk te 
beskerm."88)  In the South African context, this yolk would thus 
comprise 	 Engelse, Jode, Afrikaners, kleurlinge en 
naturelle 	 889) Each subject-member of this 'liberal' state 
had a wide range of rights and freedoms, but only one 
obligation, namely the promotion of his own particular 
interests. 
In South Africa, according to the OB, liberalism had manifested 
itself in the British imperial domination of South Africa 
which, in turn, was carried by the system of parliamentary 
democracy. Meyer explained the perceived connection between 
liberalism and democracy in stating that in the course of the 
nineteenth century a synthesis had occurred between liberalism 
as a philosophy of life and democracy as a method for politico-
constitutional ordination. Democracy, as a result of this 
synthesis, had acquired a strong liberal character with the 
consequent compartementalisation of the powers of state in 
legislative, executive and judicial branches. These limited 
powers of state guaranteed individual rights and freedoms to 
the detriment of the yolk. The primary task of the liberal-
democratic state was thus to protect and serve the rights of 
the individual through the adoption of legislative measures and 
their application by the other branches of state.") 
Political parties, the primary actors in the system of 
parliamentary democracy, were made up of "... groep[e] van ... 
enkelinge, met min of meer ooreenstemmende belange ..."91) who, 
Ibid.  
P.J. Meyer: Afrikanereenheid (Wapenskou, vol. 2(2), 1941), 
p.20. 
P.J. Meyer: Demokrasie of Volkstaat? (Wapenskou, vol. 3 
(4), 1942), pp.5-15. 
P.J. Meyer: Afrikanereenheid (Wapenskou, vol. 2(2), 1941), 
p.20. 
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in organising themselves into a political party, were promoting 
their own sectional interests. This, once again, was 
detrimental to the collective interests of the yolk. Meyer, in 
1944, subsequently declared that the system of parliamentary 
democracy was merely another example of the British divide-and-
rule strategy to ensure the perpetual subjugation of 
Afrikanerdom.92)  On a number of occasions it was noted that a 
significant portion of Afrikaners who, for all intents and 
purposes, should have been part of the OB's organically defined 
volksbeweging [literally movement of the people], had been 
converted to the `liberalistic cause'. Liberalism in general 
and more specifically the system of parliamentary democracy 
were thus factors which divided Afrikanerdom nationally or 
horizontally. 
Concurrently, capitalism also came to be connected to 
liberalism and the system of parliamentary democracy. 
Capitalism, according to Meyer, was a manifestation of British 
imperialism (read also liberalism) in its economic form.93) The 
unqualified and unfettered freedoms of liberalism on the 
politico-constitutional level had thus been duplicated in the 
economic sphere. The application of the capitalist system had 
resulted in the socio-economic partition of the organic yolk 
into two opposing sides, namely those who possessed capital or 
wealth (referred to as employers/bosses) and those who were 
dependent on the aforementioned group to earn a living 
(proletariat/workers). In practice this had led to a situation 
where, as a result of exploitation, the relationship between 
the working class and capitalist minority had deteriorated into 
militant class struggle. Subsequently, according to Die 0.B., 
the 	 term `worker' has been degenerated into 	 • • • 	 In 
kapitalistiese woord wat iemand van In minderwaardige sosiale 
stand moet aandui."94) Liberalism in general and more 
P.J. Meyer: Die Stryd van die Afrikanerwerker, p.15. 
Ibid., p.10. 
Die 0.B., 26.1.1944. 
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specifically capitalism were thus factors which divided 
Afrikanerdom socially or vertically. 
Apart from contributing to the social dismemberment of the 
organic volksunity, capitalism allegedly also played a part in 
promoting the horizontal alienation of members of the yolk. 
Although Meyer typified capitalism as the economic equivalent 
of political liberalism, it was also stated that within the 
capitalist system of bosses and workers, both classes of people 
had developed into political classes which played a significant 
role in the political ordering of the whole.95) Relative to the 
form and extent of this alleged influencing, different opinions 
were susceptible within the OB. Apart from noting a "... enge 
eenheid ..."95) between capitalism and democracy, Meyer did 
not elaborate on this contention. A.J.H. van der Walt (member 
of the OB-Grootraad), in a speech at Stellenbosch in October 
1942, stated that the organised aeldmaq [literally money-
power], through its control of the printed media, was able to 
influence the electorate in supporting their interests.97)  In 
this manner the aeldmaq was able to influence the decision-
making process. 
Die 0.B., however, went further than anyone else in this 
regard. In all democracies, according to the OB-organ, 
capitalists controlled and directed the government of the 
day.98) In ensuring its behind-the-scene dominance, the geldmaq 
employed classical divide-and-rule tactics in partitioning the 
yolk into political parties. World War II, against this 
background, was described as a war to ensure the continued 
domination of the world by "[d]ie internasionale geldmag 
P.J. Meyer: Arbeidsordening in die Volksbeweging en 
Volkstaat, p.3. 
See P.J. Meyer: Die Stryd van die Afrikanerwerker, p.10. 
See F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in 
die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.142. 
Die 0.B., 23.2.1944. 
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"99) Irrespective of whichever stance reflected the majority 
opinion in the OB, the connection between democracy and 
capitalism had the added advantage of, when linking the 
eradication of communism to that of capitalism, the term 
capitalism not only referred to an economic system whereby the 
forces and means of production were controlled by private 
initiative, but also included the system of parliamentary 
democracy. 
Communism, in terms of origin and growth, was causally 
connected to capitalism-liberalism. The division of people into 
classes and the resultant class-struggle were - as indicated 
earlier - respectively an 'invention' and product of the 
liberal systems of capitalism and democracy. Communism, 
according to the OB, depended on the continued existence of 
this schismatic division and the class struggle for the 
promotion of its principles. Communism was therefore a creation 
of liberalism and, as such, the latter • • • het die weg van 
rewolusionere ondermyning en verbrokkeling van die 
Afrikanereenheid vir die kommunisme voorberei."1")  Meyer even 
proceeded to state that "[i]n ons land is die kapitalisme en 
kommunisme as bondgenote teen die Afrikanereenheid gerig. Ons 
erken hulle as ons gemeenskaplike vyande."1°1) Subsequently, 
and as a result, the eradication of communism came to be linked 
to that of capitalism.102)  Indeed, in many ways, the 
destruction of capitalism came to be perceived as a 
prerequisite for the annihilation of communism from society. 
Ibid., 5.1.1944. 
P.J. Meyer: Afrikanereenheid (Wapenskou, vol. 2(2), 1941), 
p.21. 
Ibid., p.22. 
This contention was repeatedly referred to by Meyer and 
other OB functionaries. See for example Meyer's speeches, 
in his capacity as member of the OB-executive, at Pretoria 
(21.4.1943) and Cape Town (8.5.1943) as reported in Die 
O.B. of 5.5.1943 and 26.5.1943. 
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Apart from being causally connected to capitalism, communism - 
according to the OB - was both a refinement of and logical 
conclusion to liberalism-capitalism. On the one hand, in so far 
as it contributed to the alienation of specifically the 
Afrikaner-proletariat from the organic volksunity, communism 
was a continuation of liberalism. However, whereas the 
individual as such served as point of departure in liberalism, 
communism linked up with ... die abstrakte som van alle 
enkelinge."1°3)  Communism was thus 'collective liberalism'. In 
this regard Meyer stated that "[d]ie verskil [tussen kommunisme 
en kapitalisme/liberalisme] ... [is] 'n verskil van omhulsel en 
nie van wese nie. Daarom die hartlike en noue samewerking van 
Britse liberalisme en Russiese kommunisme 104) ten spyte van 
uiterlike omhulselverskille wat albei graag wil handhaaf."1°5)  
Furthermore, although liberalism propagated equality between 
black and white, in practice, it did not implement this 
conviction. Communism, on the other hand, both preached and 
practiced racial equality. Communism was thus "... konsekwente 
liberalisme."1")  
Closely connected to this last aspect was the contention that 
whereas liberalism, in its economic casing, envisaged a 
'private capitalism', State socialism (read also communism) 
would, "... in sy mees konsekwente vorm tot Staatskapitalisme 
[lei] .1,107) Workers, in the communist state, would thus become 
the wage slaves of the state as opposed to being wage slaves of 
a group of individuals under the capitalist order. 
P.J. Meyer: Afrikanereenheid (Wapenskou, vol. 2(2), 1941), 
p.22. 
A reference to the Anglo-Soviet war alliance. 
P.J. Meyer: Afrikanereenheid (Wapenskou, vol. 2(2), 1941), 
p.22. 
Ibid.  
P.J. Meyer: Die Stryd van die Afrikanerwerker, pp.92-93. 
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The Ossewa-Brandwag, compared to the private capitalism of 
liberalism and state socialism/capitalism of communism, 
envisaged and propagated Afrikaner Volkssocialism. 
3.4.2. 	 Volkssocialism and the Arbeidslaer: The Ideological 
and Organisational Counter-Balance to Communism 
Van Rensburg, in his 1944-annual report to the Grootraad, 
described the modus operandi of the Arbeidslaer in the 
following terms: 
"Die doel van hierdie front is om die stedelike 
blanke werker - die deurslaggewende magsfaktor van 
die toekoms - en die plattelandse volksgenoot deur 
middel van die [Ossewa-Brandwag] 	 hegter aanmekaar 
te snoer om sodoende volksverdelende invloede 
(Kommunisme ens.) teen te werk en tergelykertyd die 
slaankrag van die O.B. te verhoog. Die metode is, 
benewens ideologiese bearbeiding van werkers, om die 
werker se vertroue en toegeneentheid te wen deur 
0.B.-steun aan horn te bied sonder om horn te vra om sy 
vakunies o4' ander organisasies te verlaat of te 
verswak"108) (italics in the original). 
Van Rensburg's description of the purpose and method of the 
Arbeidslaer will, for the aims of this analysis, serve as point 
of departure in discussing the OB's Volkssocialism and its 
implications for the topic of anti-communism. As indicated 
earlier, the OB perceived the eradication of communism to 
ultimately co-depend on the simultaneous destruction of 
capitalism. Relative to the social campaign against communism, 
attention will therefore also have to be focussed on those 
elements of anti-communism which encompassed the twin `menace' 
of capitalism and communism. 
Of pivotal importance in the ideological construction of the 
OB's anti-communism, as indicated, was the concept of an 
organic volksunity. Although Meyer traced the striving towards 
volksunity back to the nineteenth century Great Trek, "... `n 
108. "Ossewa-Brandwag. Verslag van Kommandant-Generaal aan 
groot Raad. September 1944" (OB-archives, KG 11/8/56). 
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nasionale en sosiale volksbeweging _11,109)  this striving, 
particularly in the early part of the twentieth century, was an 
exclusivist national struggle against imperialism which did not 
take account of or encompass the social struggle against 
capitalism. The OB, as an all-inclusive volksmovement, not only 
had to reflect the changed social composition of Afrikanerdom, 
as brought about by capitalism (read also industrialisation and 
urbanisation), but the newly created urban (white) proletariat, 
together with the more traditional rural elements of Afrikaner-
society, had to be submerged in a single organic entity. 
Announcing the establishment of the Arbeidslaer, Die O.B.  
referred to this essentially symbiotic relationship in the 
following terms: 
"Die werkers is 'n groep mense wat in werklikheid in 
die volkslewe bestaan en die kern van die yolk vorm 
... Die Afrikanervolk, sonder die Afrikanerwerker, is 
niks en sal ook nooit iets wees nie ... Maar dit is 
net so waar dat Afrikanerwerker sonder die 
Afrikanervolk niks is nie en ook nooit iets sal wees 
nie.n110) 
In terms of broad objectives, this implied - in the words of 
Van Rensburg - ... In nasionalisme wat sosiaal is en ...['n] 
sosialisme wat nasionaal is."111)  
Organic volksunity, as concept, was divided into two further 
natural entities, namely that of the family and work-circle. 
Meyer explained this division: 
"Within the organic life of the volk may be 
distinguished two core associations [kernverbande], 
namely the family, which is linked to a house, and 
the work-circle [arbeidskring] which is linked to a 
work-place. Every member of the yolk is a member of a 
particular family and ... work-circle ... 
P.J. Meyer: Demokrasie of Volkstaat? (Wapenskou, vol. 3 
(4), p.30. 
Die 0.B., 22.9.1943. 
See Van Rensburg's speech at Pretoria-West on 13.11.1943 
(OD-archives, KG 11/7/49). 
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The volk as family-unity is an organic unity of 
blood, language, culture, genesis, tradition and 
destiny, a unity of inner spiritual community, the 
bearer of its own political regulation of authority 
and organisation. 
The volk as work-unity is a creative and productive 
unity of work-force (spiritual, psychic and 
physical), which is the bearer of the welfare and 
spiritual material regulation of the interests of the 
volkslife as a whole."112)  
The sphere of the family was thus the organic root of 
nationalism, while the work-entity formed the basis of the OB's 
Volkssocialism. Both spheres were complimentary, mutually 
interdependent and directly subordinate to the larger organic 
volksunity: 
"Insoverre die Volksbeweging (read also OB) die 
volksgemeenskap as In familie-eenheid (of nasionale 
eenheid) verteenwoordig, is dit die draer van die 
volkbeleid 	 soos dit neerslag vind in die 
karakter, tradisie en bestemming van die volk. 
Insoverre die Volksbeweging die volksgemeenskap as 
arbeidseenheid (of sosiale eenheid) verteenwoordig, 
is dit die draer van die voorspoed van die yolk ... 
Beide hierdie sfere, nietemin, vorm In onverbreekbare 
eenheid onder die leierskap van die ... [Ossewa-
Brandwag] .11113) 
Of special importance for the aims of this analysis is the 
organisation of the yolk in terms of the work-circle principle. 
The OB's blueprint for the social restructuring of the yolk was 
based on three fundamental principles: 
a) 	 Afrikanerdom, in its national and social context, was 
essentially a labouring community. The Ten Point Policy 
Cited in T.D. Moodie: The Rise of Afrikanerdom. Power,  
Apartheid and the Afrikaner Civil Religion, pp.230 - 231. 
Die 0.B., 7.7.1943. 
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Declaration made special mention of this: 
"Unemployment is a reflection on the State 
and not on the Unemployed. The essence of 
our social policy is ... ensuring healthy 
families and good employment. Unemployment 
can not be tolerated and the worker is 
taken into the national life to insure him 
against the vicissitudes of the labour 
market. Only the working Afrikaner is 
regarded as a full Afrikaner and the real 
strengthening of every yolk basically 
consists of the strength of its workers, 
its farmers and its soldiers, in other 
words those elements furthering production 
and those defending it." -14) 
The yolk as a work-unity, was an organic entity. This 
organic principle had to be reflected in the composition, 
structuring and internal make-up of the yolk. Van Rensburg 
identified the guiding principle in this regard: 
"The sort of Socialism which answers with 
an emphatic 'yes' to the age-old question 
"Am I then my brother's keeper?" Where the 
Afrikaner, man or woman, labours for his or 
her daily bread, in the mines, on the 
roads, in the factories, in the stores and 
on the farms - there the Ossewa-Brandwag 
seeks him and seeks her and calls: 'My 
brother, my sister' .11115) 
Labour was a service to the volk (volksdiens) with 
mutual benefits and obligations for both the individual 
and family on the one hand and the yolk on the other: 
Cited in Some facts about the Ossewa-Brandwaq, p.100. 
Cited in Ibid., p.82. 
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"Arbeidsdiens is wesenlik volksdiens. Deur 
volksdiens te verrig dra ons by tot die 
groei 	 en 	 ontwikkeling 	 van 	 die 
volksgemeenskap. 	 Hoe 	 hoer 	 die 
ontwikkelingspeil wat die volkslewe bereik, 
hoe meer is die geleenthede vir 
selfverwesenliking wat aan elke volkslid 
gebied word"116)  (italics in the original). 
The Arbeidslaer, as the organisational manifestation of 
Volkssocialism, was primarily responsible for the promotion of 
the OB's social policies. The Arbeidslaer, in turn, 
concentrated on the organised white labour movement for the 
furthering ofthis objective. Judging from Van Rensburg's 1944-
report to the Grootraad, the Arbeidslaer, in this context, was 
a self-appointed guardian (made up of all Afrikaners, 
irrespective of class-affiliation) whose primary task it was to 
guard over Afrikaner-interests in the trade union movement. 
Support for the OB's social policies - which Van Rensburg 
referred to as ” 	 ideologiese kultivering ..." - and 
membership of the Arbeidslaer (and by definition the CE) would 
be a natural spin-off resulting from this guardianship 
role.117)  In a May Day-speech at Crosby in 1944 Van Rensburg 
compared the role of the Arbeidslaer in this regard to that of 
Die 0.B., 28.7.1943. 
Van Rensburg, in his 1944 report to the Grootraad, 
referred to this aspect in the following terms: "Ons 
eventuele beloning 18 in die feit, dat as die werker 
eenmaal landswye 0.8.-steun in sy stryd geniet het, dan 
word dit In vanselfsprekendheid by hom om ook verder 
daarop te hoop en om op die O.B. in sy berekeninge te bou. 
Onvermydelik moet dit dan In geval wees van "een hand was 
die ander". Die werker sal die O.B. sterk maak om self 
sterk te wees. En daardeur word die O.B. se seggingskap 
groter en sy beleid in steeds wyer kringe aanneemlik" 
(italics in the original). See "Ossewa-Brandwag. Verslag 
van Kommandant-Generaal aan die Groot Raad. September 
1944" (OB archives, KG 11/8/56). 
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a waterfall: 
"A waterfall, tumbling ceaselessly over the rocks, 
may be utilized by the enterprising and intelligent 
man to provide power. He harnesses the dynamic force 
to a turbine or to a waterwheel and with this force 
he runs a mill and grinds his corn and wins his bread 
and feeds and clothes his family. And in due course 
around the mill, at the foot of the waterfall, a 
community arises, with houses and schools and places 
of worship and recreation. All this because of the 
waterfall, the force of which has been utilized. But 
the waterfall itself asks nothing in return. It is 
indifferent to the fact whether men have harnessed 
its power or failed to do so. Because, wheel or no 
wheel, the cascade falls of its own [a]ccord, that is 
the law of its being. 
And whether shortsighted or suspicious Trade Union 
officials fail to harness the social potential of the 
Ossewa-Brandwag to the worker's struggle or not, that 
can affect•  the OB as little as the waterwheel does 
the waterfall. It is the essence of the OB, the law 
of its being _1,118) (italics mine). 
Undoubtedly, the cause of the OB in general and more 
specifically that of the Arbeidslaer may have indeed been 
promoted by the unilateral support for certain groupings within 
the organised (white) labour movement.119) Conversely, however, 
the OB employed the same divide-and-rule tactics communists 
were accused of. This was done through the appointment of OB 
'operatives' who had to infiltrate the different labour 
organisations without revealing their true political 
identities)-20) Although no empirical evidence exists by which 
See OB-archives, KG 11/7/53. 
This may have been particularly the case following the 
suspension of two of its members by the Garment Workers' 
Union in February/March 1944. Van Rensburg, in his 1944 
report to the Grootraad, noted that the Arbeidslaer played 
a significant role in this regard. Apart from the GWU, the 
Building Workers'Industrial Union (BW1U) was also named as 
a 'recipient' of OB aid. (See "OB Kommandant-Generaal se 
Jaarlikse Verslag, September 1944", OB-archives, KG 
11/8/56.) 
See undated document (in Meyer's handwriting) entitled 
"Werksmetode van die O.B. Arbeidslaer" (OB-archives, GR 
I/3/30).. Apart from the BWIU, the GWU and MWU, this 
document indicate that OB operatives were also active in 
the leather-, steel- and transport industries. 
158 
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the success of these endeavours can be measured, Moodie 
speculates that the NRT, following initial successes, may have 
been moribund until interfused with the OB-Arbeidslaer.121)  
Volkssocialism and Communism were irreconcilable on the 
following major points: 
a) Ethnicity and Racialism: 	 Ethnocentrism, as was the case 
with the G/HNP, NO and Greyshirt-movement, played a 
decisive role in the formulation of OB-policy. The term 
yolk had to embody and direct the principle of (white) 
ethnic exclusively within the OB. Volk, a term initially 
employed to denote inter-ethnic cultural diversity, in 
time came to be regarded as a political concept which, 
rather than exclusively denoting cultural differences 
between Afrikaans- and English-speaking whites, emphasized 
the .uniqueness and irreconcilability of white and black 
and the striving of the former towards continued self-
determination (read also domination) and national 
autonomy. The term yolk thus came to take on a similar 
meaning as that of nation.122)  
T.D. Moodie: The Rise of Afrikanerdom. Power_, Apartheid  
and the Afrikaner Civil Religion, pp.232-233. 
Volk, in the context of this chapter, is used as referring 
to both a cultural and national identity. Meyer's 
exposition of the social- and economic ordering of 
Afrikanerdom (see P.J. Meyer: Arbeidsordening in die  
Volksbeweging en Volkstaat) utilised the concept 'Volk' in 
its more conventional context as referring to a cultural 
community (see for example Meyer's definition of the Volk 
as a family-unity). Official OB policy, however, referred 
to this concept in its twin context (see for example Van 
Rensburg's speech on the OB's policy towards the English-
speaking 'Afrikaner' at Potchefstroom during January 1941 
- cited in Some facts about the Ossewa-Brandwaq, pp.53-
58). At other times the term volk was deliberately 
replaced by that of nation. The Ten Point Policy 
Declaration, in its Afrikaans-original, set out the 
conditions for absorption into the yolk and State: 
"4. Net Volksgenoot kan Burger word 
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Although it was acknowledged that the Union's population 
were made up of all individuals dwelling inside the 
geographic borders of this country, the South African 
nation (read also yolk) consisted of white 'nationally 
minded' Europeans. As members of a superior civilization, 
the (white) South African yolk had to follow a policy of 
trusteeship towards the non-white population with the 
eventual aim of realizing complete racial and territorial 
segregation and differentation. This policy, which by 
January 1945 was referred to as apartheid123), had to be 
reflected in the economic ordering of South Africa. A 
policy, document which circulated amongst members of the 
Grootraad, formulated this objective in no uncertain 
terms: "Ons moet dus In 100% blanke ekonomie, met In 
parallelle nie-blanke ekonomie, territoriaal afgeskei, as 
langtermyn doelstelling voorop stel."124) Integration 
Slegs volksgenote of potensidle volksgenote - dws 
slegs blankes wat assimileerbaar blyk, kan burgers 
word. Dus, benewens Afrikaans- en Engelssprekende 
burgers van vandag, ook ander van Europese afkoms. 
Maar burgerskap is afhanklik van onverdeelde trou 
teenoor Suid-Afrika. Ander blanke persone geniet wel 
gasreg, dog g'n burgerreg nie" (italics in the 
original). (lets oor die Ossewa-Brandwaq, p.12.) 
The English equivalent reads as follows: 
"4. Only Members of the Nation can become National  
Citizens. 
Only Afrikaners or potential Afrikaners can become 
nationals. In other words, only assimilable white 
elements. That is to say, over and above the 
AFrikaans and English-speaking nationals of today we 
include other people of European descent. But 
nationality is founded on undivided loyalty to our 
Fatherland. Other Europeans only enjoy national 
hospitality - not national citizenship." (Some Facts  
about the Ossewa-Brandwaq, pp.97-98.) 
Die 0.B., 17.1.1945. 
"Die Arbeidsbeleid in die Nuwe Staat" (undated document). 
OB-archives, GR 1/3/30. 
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could under no circumstances be allowed: 
"Ten einde die bloedsuiwerheid van ons yolk 
te handhaaf, is dit noodsaaklik dat daar 
ook in die arbeid geen gelykstelling en 
geen vermenging tussen blank en nie-blanke 
mag wees nie ... Tot tyd en wyl algehele 
segregasie 	 deurgevoer 	 is, 	 moet 
arbeidssegregasie van blanke en nie-blanke 
werkers as In vereiste in alle bedrywe 
gestel word."125) 
Communism, for which • • • Isocietas' nie die yolk [is] 
nie, maar wel In internasionale proletariaat van werkers, 
van alle kleure en geure",126) thus undermined the very 
foundations of the OB's ethnically defined and racially 
constructed ideology. As a result of its negation of the 
colour bar, communism not only endangered white 
civilization, but also, and even more menacing, the 
continued existence of the South African yolk as a nation. 
Hence it was repeatedly stressed that Bolshevism implied 
Ikaffirisation' in Africa)-27) Relative to labour 
organisation, the yolk, as an organic work-unity and as a 
matter of course, was also going to be affected by 
communism's striving towards racial equality. Indeed, with 
the possible exception of volksunity, communism's negation 
of the colour-bar was the strategy most often employed by 
the OB in its social campaign against the perceived menace 
of communism. 
Relative to the perceived involvement of communists in 
non-white labour organisation, OB-speakers stressed that 
these individuals were motivated not by concern for the 
interests of the non-white worker, but by directives 
issued from Moscow.128)  On the more general theme of 
Die 0.B., 22.3.1944. 
Ibid., 23.2.1944. 
See Die 0.B., 1.3.1944. 
Ibid., 22.3.1944. 
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alleged non-white susceptability to communism, the OB, as 
opposed to the repeated references by HNP speakers, made 
little mention of Africans allegedly providing fertile 
soil for Marxist philosophies. Meyer was the exception to 
the rule. However, while it was acknowledged that 
communism may have had some effect on the non-white 
proletariat in the past, Meyer stressed that the non-white 
trade union movement, in time, developed a character which 
differed fundamentally from that of communism)-29) Meyer 
described this separate consciousness as `native-
socialism'. 
b) Volksunity: 	 Volksunity, as indicated, was of central 
importance to the ideological construction of the OB's 
anti-communism. Relative to the yolk as an organic work-
entity, communism and capitalism were perceived to be 
equally menacing. Capitalism, with its emphasis on 
individual economic exploitation, had initiated a process 
whereby the organic volksunity were schismatically divided 
into two opposing sides, each with its own sectional 
interests. Communism supposedly utilised the class 
struggle between workers and `bosses' for the promotion of 
its doctrine of proletarian internationalism; thereby 
strengthening existing divisions between members of the 
yolk. Hence the interdependence of communism and 
capitalism. 
The OB had as objective the destruction of this fictitious 
and man-made division between volksmembers. Die O.B.  
identified the OB's basic plan of action in this regard: 
"Die redding van die blanke werker 16 nie 
in die wegbreek van sy volk en die 
aanskakeling by die workers of the world 
nie; dit 16 in die ierugkeer tot en opname 
in die vo1k!"130) (italics in the 
original). 
P.J. Meyer: Die Stryd van die Afrikanerwerker, pp.64-65. 
Die 0.B., 8.12.1944. 
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Meyer, as architect-in-chief of the OB's social policy, 
drew up an elaborate and complex plan which had to provide 
for the restoration of the natural organic unity of the 
yolk. In terms of `labour' organisation, Meyer proposed a 
functional structure which, in both its horizontal and 
vertical construction, would reflect the organic 
composition of the yolk. The work-circle, according to 
Meyer, was composed of four natural spheres of activity, 
viz "... die staatkundige en regsbedryf, die geestelik-
intellektuele en opvoedkundige bedryf, die maatskaplike 
bedryf en die ekonomiese bedryf.n131) The yolk, as an 
organic work-unity, were collectively organized along the 
lines of these four fields of activity. Horizontally, all 
of the spheres were equippolent and complimentary. Given 
the belief that the Afrikaner yolk was assentially a 
labouring yolk, it is important to note that volksarbeid 
[literally labour for the people] were composed of not 
only economic activities, but included all activities 
which served the interests of the organic whole. In terms 
of vertical construction, each sphere was inclusive of all 
individuals - and on an equal footing - who were active in 
a given field. All members of the volk, irrespective of 
their position or function within the work-circle, were 
thus equal contributors to the creation of wealth. Wealth, 
however, was not defined in terms of capital, but rather 
in the context of service to the yolk. 
Within the context of volksunity, the OB's labour policy 
was described in the following terms: "Die [Ossewa- 
Brandwag] ... se 	 arbeidsorganisasie 
	 is 	 daarom 	 geen 
arbeidersorganisasie nie, maar die organisasie van alle 
mense wat deelneem aan die skeppings-, vormings- en 
produksieproses van die volk 	 nieteenstaande of die 
131. P.J. Meyer: Arbeidsordening in die Volksbeweging en  
Volkstaat, p.11. In a further document, these "natural" 
fields of activity were reduced by one (See "Arbeidsadel - 
Arbeidsorganisasie van die Ossewa-Brandwag" [undated 
document], OB-archives, P.J. Meyer 1/3). 
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persoon In werkgewer of In werknemer is nie."132) Meyer 
described the terms worker and employer as 'class-
concepts' which did not reflect the organic composition of 
Afrikanerdom. As such it was replaced by the term "labour-
doer" [arbeidsverrigter]: 
"In Predikant, In onderwyser, In padwerker, 
In mynbestuurder - almal is arbeids 
verrigters binne In bepaalde en natuurlike 
arbeidsverband."133)  
c) Individual vs Class vs Volk: Each of these principles, in 
terms of the OB's credo, were respectively the guiding 
principles of liberalism-capitalism, 
Volkssocialism. In terms of socia 
organisation, capitalism had led 
exploitation of the majority by the 
under this system, had become 
communism and 
1 and economic 
to large-scale 
minority. Labour, 
••• 	 In 	 blote 
gebruiksartikel, die prys waarvan bepaal word deur die 
skommeling van vraag en aanbod in die arbeidsmark."134)  
Van Rensburg, while acknowledging that communism was in a 
limited sense an improvement on capita1ism135), stressed 
that by forcing the worker to choose between communism and 
capitalism was 
Baal. Dit is dieselfde ding. u136) On the one hand, in as 
far as the prominence of the working class in the 
ideological construction of communism was concerned, 
communism, in its logical conclusion, would lead to State 
capitalism where the interests of the proletariat - as was 
the case with capitalism - would be determined by a small 
Die 0.B., 12.1.1944. 
"Arbeidsorganisasie" [undated document] (OB-archives, GR 
I/1/11). 
P.J. Meyer: Arbeidsordening in die Volksbeweaing en 
Volkstaat, p.9. 
135. Die 0.B., 31.3.1943. 
See Van Rensburg's presidential speech at the ANS Workers 
Congress in 1944 as reported in Die O.B. of 15.11.1944. 
It 
• • 
soos om te kies tussen die duiwel en 
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group of individuals. Conversely, on those occasions where 
it was acknowledged that communism represented some form 
of socialism, it was noted that this ideology, through its 
materialism (which corresponded with capitalism), had 
sosialisme verneder tot In leer van die loon en die 
maag.n137) Apart from similarities, communism and 
capitalism were thus the antithesis of one another and, in 
the final analysis, sectional. 
Volkssocialism, on the other hand, provided equally for 
both sections of the community. The interests of the volk, 
and not that of the individual, the proletariat or the 
State, would predominate in the OB-constructed labour- 
community. 
137. Ibid., 8.12.1943 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE NEW ORDER, THE GREYSHIRT-MOVEMENT AND COMMUNISM 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The New Order (NO) was established in September 1940 under the 
ideological guidance and functional leadership of Oswald Pirow.1) 
Initially an organised pressure grouping within the HNP, the NO, 
in broad terms, had as objective the establishment of a Christian, 
white, National-Socialist republic, separated from the British 
Crown and based on the principles of state authority [literally 
Staatsgesag] and national discipline. As a 'party-within-a-party', 
the NO's most immediate aim was the transformation of the HNP into 
an all-inclusive volksmovement which would eventually reflect NO-
principles and -goals.2) 
Similar to the OB, the initial development of the NO depended more 
on outside developments than a particular set of ideological 
principles. Commentators, in this regard, agree that the NO was a 
product of World War II in general and more specifically German 
military successes during 1940.3) 
Apart from German war successes, the cause of the NO was also 
promoted by the near-unanimity amongst Afrikaner nationalist 
Prior to its withdrawal from conventional party politics in 
July 1943, the NO referred to itself under a number of 
different titles. Initially known as the Christian Republican 
South African National-Socialist Study Circle, this was 
changed to The New Order Study Circle by July 1941. (M. 
Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip: The South African Opposition 
1939-1945, p.80) In time the NO became known as simply The 
New Order. This last title, for the sake of expediency, will 
be used throughout this analysis. 
See Pirow's speech at Brits as reported in Die Transvaler of 
14.6.1941. 
F.J. Van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.153; D. Prinsloo: Die 
Johannesburg-Periode in Dr. H.F. Verwoerd se Loopbaan, 
pp. 258-259. 
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political leaders that, universally, there was an irrevocable 
movement away from the proverbial ancien regime towards a 'new 
order'. Within the HNP, this belief was expounded by individuals 
such as Malan and Louw and the Free State organ of the Party, Die 
Volksblad. 4) Pirow provided this term with a definite ideological 
content - which Malan, Louw and other Party functionaries largely 
failed to do - thereby annexing the concept of a 'new order' as 
the near-exclusive property of the NO. Pirow's success in this 
endeavour is illustrated by the fact that the NO's Programme of 
Principles, first published' in December 1940, went through no less 
than seven editions between this date and May 1941. 
Although the principles contained in the NO'S Programme of 
Principles were in many ways a continuation of beliefs expounded 
by Pirow since 1934, it also reflected influences from sources 
within specifically the HNP. Of particular importance in this 
regard is a pamphlet entitled "Die Nuwe Suid Afrika - Die 
Rewolusie van die Twintigste Eeu" [The New South Africa - The 
Revolution of the Twentieth Century] and published by J.H.O. 
(Otto) du Plessis, then editor of Die Oosterlict. Van Heerden 
indicates that the contents of this pamphlet were known to the 
leadership-core of the HNP prior to its publication date of 
September 1940.5) The NO'S Programme of Principles, as indicated, 
was only published in December 1940. Pirow's and Du Plessis' 
publications, when compared, does reveal a number of striking 
similarities. 
The presence of the NO as a separate grouping within the HNP was 
initially endured by the Party. Malan, in adopting a conciliatory 
approach, declared in March 1941 that "... omtrent 80 tot 85 
persent van die `Nuwe Orde' [se beginsels] ... is vervat in die 
program van die Party 	 The relationship between the HNP and 
See Van Heerden: Op.cit., pp.156-159. The Ossewa-Brandwag 
referred to the concept of a new order as the 'Revolution of 
the Twentieth Century'. 
F.J. Van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Politiek, 1939-1948, p.159. 
Die Burger, 15.3.1941. 
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NO, at first, proved to be mutually advantageous. Apart from 
continuing with the internal restructuring of the Party, HNP 
platforms and Party controlled media (particularly in the OFS) 
provided the NO with a further opportunity to propagate its 
philosophies to a wider audience. Conversely, given the schism 
which had developed between Hertzog and the HNP and the fact that 
the NO were largely composed of former Hertzog-supporters,7)  the 
HNP was not only ensured of stronger electoral standing in 
Parliament but also the prospect of luring politically undecided 
Afrikaners to the Party. 
These advantages, however, were short-term - particularly for the 
HNP. The continued presence of differently-minded persons and the 
public espousal of principles differing from that of the official 
Party line could only divide the HNP-membership, blur the 
definition of its policy, and drive supporters of the Party into 
other channels of political expression. Gradually, the advantages 
of a political party with a monolithic character came to 
overshadow the benefits to be gained from a party bearing the 
identity of an ideological 'fruit-cake'. On the sixteenth of 
August 1941 Pirow and seventeen other parliamentarians 
disassociated themselves from the HNP whereupon the New Order was 
formally constituted as a parliamentary-based opposition grouping 
independent from the HNP.8) Important to note, however, is that 
the NO refused to describe itself as a political party. An 
identification with or support for conventional and parliamentary-
based politics would be irreconcilable with the NO's declared 
objective of an organic volksstate free from political parties. 
F.J. Van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.153; T.D. Moodie: The Rise  
of Afrikanerdom, pp.209-210. 
For a discussion of the development of the conflict between 
the NO and HNP prior to 16.8.1941 see M. Roberts and A.E.G. 
Trollip: The South African Opposition 1939-1945, pp.79-86 
et.seq. and Prinsloo: op.cit., pp.258-265. For the names of 
those parliamentarians who broke away from the HNP under the 
NO-banner see B.M. Schoeman: Parlementere Verkiesings in  
Suid-Afrika sedert 1910, pp.244-245. 
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The NO, as a force in Afrikaner politics, was of no great or 
particular significance. This movement failed to maintain the 
initial interest shown in its activities and, as indicated by Van 
Jaarsveld, had a following that is of academic importance.9)  The 
resignation of Pirow and his compatriots from the HNP marked in 
many ways the advent of the NO's demise. Furthermore, although 
this organisation had established its own journal entitled "Die 
Anti-Kommunis" [The Anti-Communist] prior to the resignation of 
its leadership from the HNP, the NO, apart from Die Anti-Kommunis, 
could theoretically rely on Parliament as a forum for the 
presentation and propagation of NO points-of-view. However, 
towards the end of March 1943 the New Order-caucus released a 
statement in which it declared itself opposed to any future 
participation in the system of parliamentary democracy. Indirectly 
this particular decision further contributed to the sinking into 
obscurity of the NO. After July 1943, this movement, for all 
intents and purposes, had disappeared from the political scene. 
4.2. THE NEW ORDER AND ANTI-COMMUNISM 
Overt anti-communism, as indicated by the title of the NO-organ, 
played an important part in this movement. Opposition to 
communism, however, was not only motivated by the conception of a 
communist menace, but ideological motivations vis a vis the New 
Order's own socio-political agenda also had a prominent role in 
this regard. Although the NO, within the cadre of Afrikaner 
nationalist politics, was essentially a splinter-grouping, its 
involvement in the anti-communist debate is important for a number 
of reasons: 
(i) During its formative period, the NO, as indicated, adjudged 
its most immediate task to be the evolutionary remodelling of 
the HNP into a volksmovement which would eventually reflect 
and embody NO principles. While this was expected to be a 
one-sided process, in practice it turned out to be a 
bilateral conversion. This was particularly the case relative 
9. 	 F.A. van Jaarsveld: Van Van Riebeeck tot Verwoerd, p.249. 
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to the conception of a communist menace. In this regard many 
of those elements described as characteristic or indicative 
of communism by NO personalities were simultaneously stressed 
by HNP members. Although it is not the aim of this analysis 
to trace the origin of a particular statement, it must be 
noted that a process of cross-pollination was and had been 
taking place between ideologically diverse groupings within 
the cadre of Afrikaner nationalism. 
(ii) Whereas the HNP and OB respectively proposed mainly 
repression and the adoption of another ideology to 
combat/oppose 'communism', the NO propagated both repression 
and ideological counter-balancing. 10) This strategy provided 
the NO with the required scope to either support the campaign 
against communism, as defined by the HNP, or to develop an 
own campaign independent from that of the G/HNP. In time the 
second of these strategies progressively came to be adopted 
by the NO. However, during its period of parliamentary 
participation, the NO, while favouring the adoption of a 
separate ideology, never rejected repressionist tactics per 
se. Indeed, as will be indicated, even active participation 
in HNP campaigns occurred. 
(iii)Relative to the strategy of ideological counter-balancing, 
both the OB and NO continually stressed the desirability of 
such a step. Although similarly constructed, the NO's and 
OB's proposed blueprints for the creation of a new socio-
political order differed fundamentally in certain respects. 
In discussing anti-communism within the NO, attention will 
primarily be focussed on this movement's conception of communism 
and the NO's proposed scheme for ideological counter-balancing. 
Related aspects such as the course of the debate on communism 
within the NO during its period of involvement in conventional 
party politics and the applicability of this debate to particular 
social/ethnic/racial groupings will also be referred to. From the 
outset, however, it must be noted that the campaign against 
10. Die Anti-Kommunis, no.1, 12.8.1941. 
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communism by the NO, as was the case with all other movements and 
institutions under discussion, was a continuous process of 
redefinement, reassesment and redeployment. By May 1945 none of 
these processes in any of the movements/institutions involved in 
the anti-communist debate had been fully completed. 
4.2.1. 	 The NO'S Campaign Against Communism 
The inclusion of the Soviet Union in the Allied alliance and 
Smuts' overt support for the Soviet war effort, as indicated in a 
earlier chapter, unleashed a frenzy within the HNP. The NO, by 
July 1941 still an active participant in the affairs of the HNP, 
was not only influenced by this near-hysteria, but also came to 
utilise it for the promotion of its own socio-political agenda. 
Against this background the entitlement of the NO's journal (Die 
Anti-Kommunis) is significant. Initially a weekly publication, Die 
Anti-Kommunis, from its inception, paid particular attention to 
the perceived menace of communism. Following the decision by the 
NO executive to embark on an extra-parliamentary course, anti-
communism and Die Anti-Kommunis came to fulfill a pivotal position 
in the the promotion of the NO'S Afrikaner National-Socialism. 
The NO launched its first public campaign against communism by way 
of a motion introduced into Parliament by Oswald Pirow during the 
second week of February 1942. Pirow's motion called for the 
appointment of a Select Committee "... om ondersoek in te stel na 
en verslag te doen oor kommunistiese bedrywighede in die 
Unie —"II) Six months earlier Pirow had already motivated the 
perceived necessity of a campaign against communism. On this 
occasion (July 1941) Pirow connected his warning on communism to 
the Riotous Assemblies (Amendment) Act of 1930 which supposedly 
had to provide for the eradication of communism from society.12)  
As a result of changed circumstances, communism, according to 
Hansard, 10.2.1942, co1.1766. 
It is important to note that Pirow, as Minister of Justice, 
was responsible for the steering of this Bill through 
Parliament in 1930 and the subsequent administration of this 
Act. See Chapter One. 
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Pirow, which in 1930 was "... niks meer as In hinderlike oorlas 
vir die polisie [nie]...",13)  had become a menace for the Union. 
Pirow identified three 'sets of circumstances' which had allegedly 
contributed to the escalation of the communist menace in South 
Africa: 
The `Soviet - South African' war alliance: Because of this 
alliance, according to Pirow, Jan Smuts did not dare venture 
any steps to combat or oppose communism. In introducing his 
1942 motion on communism in Parliament, Pirow utilised this 
same assertion - albeit in a different form - to portray 
Smuts as a lackey of both British imperialism and the Soviet 
Union. This was done by stating that because of his 
subservience to the interests of the Empire, Smuts was doing 
everything possible to ensure a stable and amiable 
relationship between London and Moscow. Hence the absence of 
preventative measures against communism. The connection with 
the USSR was made in stressing the perceived aggressive and 
imperialistic nature of communism and, by implication, that 
of Moscow)-4) Although care was taken not to accuse Smuts of 
being a communist himself, he was nevertheless contributing 
to the spreading of communism in South Africa. Ultimately 
Smuts thus proved to be the archetype of the proverbial 
"useful idiot" •15) 
The prevalence and prominence of `communist' organisations in 
South Africa: Whereas the propagators of communism in 1930 
Die Anti-Kommunis, no.1, 12.9.1941. 
Hansard, 10.2.1942, co1.1773. 
Speaking in support of Pirow's motion, S.W. Naude (NO MP for 
Potgietersrust) did identify 'communists' within the House of 
Assembly. These 'communists' were D.B. Molteno (Native 
Representative), D.B. Burnside, W.B. Madeley and S. Miles-
Cadman (all Labour Party MP's). See Ibid., co1.2059. 
Important to note is that in spite of the fact that Walter 
Madeley held the portfolio of Labour in Smuts' cabinet, no UP 
members were included on Naude's short-list of 'communist 
parliamentarians'. 
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were "... hoof saaklik blanke mislukkinge •• 	 the 
propagation of this ideology had become better structured, 
organised and more composite. Apart from the CPSA, Pirow 
initially identified only one other organisation supposedly 
involved in the spreading of `communist' propaganda, namely 
the Left Book Club. During his parliamentary tirade of 1942 
the FSU, Christian Book Circle, International Red Cross and 
an unspecified number of predominantly white trade unions 
were added to this list.17) 
(iii) The vulnerability of certain sections of the population to 
communism: Pirow distinguished between white and non-white 
susceptability to communism. All non-whites, irrespective of 
ethnic affiliation, were potential victims of this 
ideology)-8)  This contention may well have been a remnant of 
the NO'S HNP past. Pirow contended that whites suffering from 
moral indignation and material degradation were vulnerable to 
communist propaganda.19) Significantly, the origin of these 
"social maladjustments" were traced back to the liberal 
systems of capitalism and democracy. 20)  S.W. Naude (NO MP for 
Potgietersrust) subsequently declared that 	 [k]ommunisme 
... is soos koue water vir In dorstige en vermoeide siel."21) 
An important element of the NO's campaign against communism 
revolved around the strategy best suited to oppose this ideology. 
The NO, as indicated, favoured both the adoption of another 
ideology and repression as counter-measures to combat communism. 
Pirow perceived both measures to be initially applied in tandem. 
Ultimately, however, ideological counter-balancing would prove to 
be the most effective mechanism in combating communism. Pirow 
Die Anti-Kommunis, no.1, 12.9.1941. 
Hansard, 10.2.1942, co1.1780-1783. 
Ibid., co1.1777. 
Die Anti-Kommunis, no.1, 12.9.1941. 
0. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid Afrika, p.7. 
Hansard, 13.2.1942, co1.2061. 
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motivated this by stating that because communism was more than 
merely a mechanism for economic and political ordering, but an 
all-encompassing philosophy of life, it could only be opposed 
effectively through a diametrically opposing philosophy. 22)  The 
NO'S brand of National-Socialism, needless to say, were supposedly 
ideally suited for such an endeavour. G.P. Brits (NO MP for 
Brits), in seconding Pirow's 1942-motion, referred to this aspect 
in the following terms: 
"Kommunisme kan ons nie aanvaar nie en die enigste 
alternatief 	 is 	 Nasionaal-Sosialisme. 	 Nasionaal- 
Sosialisme gee nie aan ons die euwels van kommunisme 
nie, maar gee aan ons meer as wat demokrasie aan ons 
gegee het, en daarom se ons dat die enigste toekoms in 
Suid-Afrika, saam met die orige deel van die wereld, is 
geled in Nasionaal-Sosialisme. Nasionaal-Sosialisme sal 
aan ons godsdiensvryheid gee. Nasionaal-Sosialisme erken 
rasselyne, en Nasionaal-Sosialisme sal op ekonomiese 
lyne die volk help. Ek besluit met te se dat Nasionaal-
Sosialisme is die enigste bolwek teen die euwels wat ons 
volk bedreig. Dit is die enigste wat in die plek van 
demokrasie kan kom en bolsjewisme bestry ..."23) 
Simultaneously, however, the NO continued to stress the perceived 
potential effectiveness of repression as strategy to curb the 
growth of communism. NO MP's not only voted in support of Louw's 
motion on communism in 1943, but Pirow even proceeded to put 
forward a further resolution to be added to Louw's original 
motion. This resolution proposed that the "... Regering [moet] 
onmiddellik onttrek van die (onheilige) bondgenootskap, en/of 
enige ander vorm van samewerking met Sowjet-Rusland."24) The 
announcement on the NO's withdrawal from Parliament seemingly 
provided for a continuation of support for repressionist tactics 
or, alternatively, the HNP's campaign against communism: "... [In] 
the forthcoming elections (July 1943), the New Order will exert 
Die Anti-Kommunis, no.1, 12.9.1941. This remark corresponded 
with Malan's total strategy approach of 1937/8. 
Hansard, 10.2.1942, co1.1787. See also Die Anti-Kommunis, 
no.59, 29.2.1944. 
Ibid., 26.2.1943, co1.2958 and 2960. The section between 
brackets was withdrawn from Pirow's original motion following 
a ruling to that effect by the Speaker of the House. 
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all its strength unconditionally against General Smuts and 
Communism. t,25) 
An explanation for the apparent at random usage of repression and 
ideological counter-balancing is possibly to be found in both 
ideological and tactical considerations. The emphasis on 
ideological opposition to communism ipso facto provided the NO 
with the opportunity to promote its own ideological agenda. 
Alternatively, for public exposure or in an attempt to ensure 
inclusion in the mainstream movement against perceived communism, 
the NO may have considered it necessary to put forward, or to be 
associated with, repressionist tactics. 
4.2.2. 	 Communism According to the New Order 
Within the context of the NO's thesis on the irreversible rotation 
of the world towards a 'new order', it was stated that both 
communism and Afrikaner National-socialism were products of this 
essentially evolutionary process. Afrikaner National-socialism, in 
turn, was diametrically opposed to communism. In spite of the 
supposition that both communism and Afrikaner National-socialism 
were incarnations of the 'new order' and thus the opposite of 'old 
order'-systems, it was emphasized that in the case of communism, 
the 'old order' - meaning capitalism and democracy - actively 
contributed (in a negative sense) to the development of this 
ideology. 26) G.P. Brits declared that "... [d]ie groot rede waarom 
kommunisme uitbrei is omdat demokrasie uitgedien is en onpopuler 
geword het."27) Communism, according to Die Anti-Kommunis, 
accepted the old order not only as a given historical reality, but 
it also formed the basis for the proposed state communists aimed 
Cited in N.M. Stultz: Afrikaner Politics in South Africa, 
p.84. 
For a discussion of the perceived contribution of the 'old 
order' and specifically capitalism to the development of 
communism see Die Anti-Kommunis, no's 47-48, 11.9.1942-
2.10.1942. 
Hansard, 10.2.1942, co1.1787. 
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at establishing. 28) Apart from the irreversibility of the 'new 
order', no 'connection - either negative or positive - were made 
between the NO'S brand of National-socialism and the 'old order'. 
Pirow and the New Order, in addressing themselves to communism, 
stressed three aspects: 
The origins of and development of communism; 
The characteristics of communism as an ideology; and 
(iii)The modus operandi of communism. 
Of importance for the aims of this analysis is the second of these 
categories. 
In analysing communism as an ideology, the NO employed a complex 
and integrated strategy whereby selected aspects of its own 
ideological agenda were not only juxtaposed against those elements 
described as fundamental to communism, but also served as basic 
ordering principles. Mainly two aspects were accentuated in this 
regard, viz, nationalism and Christianity. Furthermore, in 
assessing the contemplated moral, social and political 
implications of communism, the NO, apart from creating its own 
theoretical constructs, preferred to focus on the Soviet Union 
rather than South Africa in illustrating and vindicating its 
contentions. The expected implications specifically for South 
Africa were either implied, referred to in passing or not referred 
to at all. Exceptions on the rule, however, did occur. 
Relative to Christianity, communism - according to the NO - was 
not only opposed to religion, but proved to be both anti- and un-
Christian. As ordering principle, this statement was sufficiently 
defined so as to encompass a whole series of features described as 
characteristic of communism. 
As a collective characteristic, communism's aversion of religion 
and its negation of Christian principles were ascribed to the 
materialistic philosophy underlying the Marxist dogma. Die Anti.-
Kommunis referred to this aspect as follows: "Die 
28. See Die Anti-Kommunis, no.48, 2.10.1942. 
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grondleerstelling van die Marxistiese materialisme is die geloof 
dat 	 ekonomiese begrippe 	 oppermag voer, nie slegs in die 
maatskaplike aktiwiteite van die mensdom nie, maar ook in sy 
godsdiens, sy filosofie en in sy kunsskeppinge.u29  Particularly ) 
religion, according to the NO, was regarded as a fraudulent 
phenomenon. Die Anti-Kommunis, in this regard, declared that for 
the communist 	 bestaan daar g'n God nie, g'n geestelike 
wereld, g'n hiernamaals nie. Jou hemel en jou hel is uitsluitend 
hier op aarde, en die mens se geluk hang uitsluitend daarvan af 
hoeveel hy van die stof like 
geniet."30)  
dinge van hierdie wereld kan 
Communism's aversion towards religion was repeatedly referred to 
as a fundamental characteristic of this ideology. This was done by 
portraying atheism as either a characteristic-in-isolation or 
placing it within the context of this ideology's materialistic 
striving. Relating to the ideological irreconcilability of 
communism and religion, ample use were made of quotations 
attributed to, amongst others, Marx, Bukharin and Yaros1avsky.31)  
Measures allegedly adopted to eradicate religion from Soviet 
society served to illustrate the practical implications of this 
ideology for South Africa. Allegations regarding the assertion 
that the USSR's constitution provided for freedom of worship was 
described as an attempt "... om die buitewereld te mislei ..."32)  
Apart from illustrating its opposition to communism, the emphasis 
on particularly religion had a further advantage in so far as it 
provided the New Order with the opportunity to promote its image 
as a 'Christian' movement. Given the Afrikaner's strong self-
conception as being part of a Christian yolk and the prominence of 
religious leaders in Afrikaner society, a statement by the 
Transvaal Synod of the Gereformeerde Kerk [Reformed Church] in 
Ibid., no.6, 19.9.1941. 
Ibid., no.2, 19.8.1941. 
Ibid.  
32. Ibid., no.3, 26.8.1941. See also Pirow's speech in Parliament 
on 10.2.1942 (Hansard, 10.2.1942, co1.1772). 
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January 1941 in which the NO was categorised as un-Christian on 
the basis of its "... vergoddeliking van die Staat en die 
ophemeling van die nasie per se"33) (italics in the original) 
undoubtedly seriously jeopardised the continued relevancy of this 
movement for mainstream Afrikaner nationalist politics. Following 
this declaration by the Transvaal Synod of the Gereformeerde Kerk, 
the NO actively attempted to prove the opposite.34)  The campaign 
against communism and particularly the parliamentary phase of it 
provided an ideal opportunity for such an exercise. 
As indicated, communism - according to the NO - was not only aimed 
at the annihilation of religion, but also envisaged the 
destruction of all Christian principles and civilized norms in 
society. Communism, therefore, was both anti-Christian and un-
Christian. In juxtaposing its own 'Christian' principles of 
"... liefde, selfverlodning ... 	 [en] vrywillige sosialisme" 
against communism's ". . haat, vernietiging en moord ...",35)  the 
NO also portrayed other aspects of this ideology as anti- and un-
christian. Apart from the materialistic striving of communism, 
most prominent in this regard was the class struggle propagated by 
Marxism-Leninism and the implications of this ideology for family- 
life. 
Relative to family-life, it was asserted that communism had as 
objective the eventual destruction of the family.36) This 
destruction, according to the NO, did not only imply a physical 
diaspora, but communism envisaged a complete moral and ethical 
restructuring of the conventional conception of family-life. 
According to Die Anti-Kommunis, matrimony, in communist society, 
was not regarded as a sacred institution, but every man had the 
F.J. Van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.174. 
For a description of some of these attempts and an analysis 
of the place of religion in NO-ideology, see Ibid., pp.174- 
178. 
Die Anti-Kommunis, no.2, 19.8.1941. 
Ibid., no.6, 19.9.1941. 
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'right' to every other man's wife.37) The solemnising and 
dissolvement of marriages were quick, easy and ultimately depended 
on the State. In the event of divorce, the custodianship over 
children born from wedlock were determined by "... politieke 
oorwegings ..."38) In communist schools children were allegedly 
encouraged to undermine parental authority and to promote "... die 
bolsjewistiese gees in die gesinslewe ..."39) The Soviet Union, as 
before, served as model to illustrate these and other contentions. 
Communism, with its dogmatic fractionisation of the community into 
two opposing and irreconcilable arch-rivals, was not only un-
christian in basing these divisions on strict materialistic 
notions, but also proved to be anti-Christian by emphasizing 
'hate' (as opposed the NO'S perceived Christian principle of love) 
in promoting class struggle. In so doing, according to the NO, 
communism failed to recognise that every nation was a creation of 
God where an injustice to or impairment of a certain group, 
section or class endangered the whole nation.") Within the 
communist system man was merely "... In ingewikkelde masjien met 
In sekere hoeveelheid arbeidskrag 	 wat net soos ander • • • 
masjiene brandstof gebruik, werk verrig en vers1yt."41) 
Similar to the stressing of Christianity, communism, by being 
international, proved to be both anti-national and un-national. 
Internationalism, in this context, not only referred to 
internationalist proletarian solidarity or the perceived 
imperialistic objectives of this ideology, but also included 
remarks on communism's striving towards racial equality. The last 
of these elements, as was the case with atheism, were either 
presented as a characteristic-in-isolation or in the broader 
context of communism as an ideology-in-totality. 
37. Ibid. 
Ibid.  
Die Anti-Kommunis, no.1, 12.8.1941. 
See 0. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, p.3. 
Die Anti-Kommunis, no.48, 2.10.1942. 
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Naude summarised the internationalist objectives of communism in 
the following manner: 
"Kommunisme staan vir die algehele en algemene 
broederskap van die mensdom 	 [Kommunisme] staan vir 
gelykstelling, vir broederskap, en ons vind daardie 
idees ook terug in die Franse Rewolusie: Vryheid, 
gelykheid en broederskap.11142) 
The striving towards equality, and particularly racial equality, 
was described by Pirow as "... een van [die] fundamentele 
beginsels van Kommunisme ..."43) For South Africa the implications 
of such a step was adjudged to be especially menacing. Not only 
did it run counter to the Afrikaner's hele 
lewensbeskouing u44) and thus proved to be unnational, but it was 
also irreconcilable with the NO'S understanding of the concept 
yolk (nation). Although it was generally agreed that the advent of 
communism would result in the destruction of the South African 
nation (as a national and racial entity), no clear-cut explanation 
was provided of the manner in which this was expected to be 
achieved. Die Anti-Kommunis declared that the "... [p]roletariaat 
moet regeer en by ons is dit die Naturel !"45) This would 
seemingly indicate that the division of classes in South Africa 
corresponded with and were based on racial lines. Pirow, however, 
forwarded two other explanations: First, given the numerical 
supremacy of blacks, the establishment of a black Soviet Republic 
in South Africa would be the result of 'swamping-by-numbers'. 
Alternatively, the CPSA's slavish subservience to the CI and the 
1929-thesis on South Africa, ensured the establishment of a black 
Republic in the Union. In other words, the establishment of a 
communist state in South Africa was going to be the result of the 
CPSA's ideological complacency. 
Hansard, 13.2.1942, co1.2059. 
Ibid., co1.1770. 
Die Anti-Kommunis, no.1, 12.8.1941. 
See Hansard, 10.2.1942, co1.1770. 
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Relative to communism's perceived imperialistic objectives Pirow 
stated that ... die hele rede vir die bestaan van die 
kommunistiese stelsel ... [is] die gedagte ... van In wreld- 
rewolusie 	 ”)In promoting this world-revolution, communism - 
according to Die Anti-Kommunis - hoped to establish In Wereld 
federasie van Sowjet Sosialistiese Republieke."47) The Soviet 
Union, as the personification of communist philosophies, was to be 
an active participant in this process. Under titles such as "Die 
Moord van die Tsaar en die Keiserlike Famine" and "Stalin: Hoe Hy 
Slag en Suiwer", Die Anti-Kommunis subsequently proceeded to 
indicate the alleged vanguard role of the USSR in promoting a 
'World Federation of Soviet Socialist Republics' .48) While it was 
acknowledged that the 1941 Anglo-Soviet alliance had resulted in 
an adaptation of Soviet foreign policy, this adjustment - within 
the context of communism's declared objective of a world-
revolution - took the form of a change in tactics rather than 
principle •49) 
One alleged characteristic of this ideology which did not fit into 
the NO's explanatory model related to communism's perceived 
opposition to and negation of private ownership. Although it may 
well have been argued that the socialisation of private property 
was both lun-Christian' and 'anti-national' as far as it was 
contrary to existing South African traditions, the NO would have 
found this difficult to explain given its own policy of selective 
nationalisation. This may well have been the primary motivation 
for the presentation of communism's alleged opposition to private 
property as a separate yet interconnected characteristic of this 
ideology. In communist society, according to Die Anti-Kommunis, 
 
Ibid., 	 co1.1776. 
 
Die Anti-Kommunis, no.4, 	 5.9.1941. 
 
See 	 Ibid., 	 no.15, 21.11.1941 	 and 	 no's 21-26, 	 16.1.1942- 
20.2.1942. 
 
See for example Pirow's speech on occasion of his 1942-motion 
on 	 communism 	 in 	 Parliament (Hansard, 	 10.2.1942, co1.1776- 
1783) and Die Anti-Kommunis, no. 4, 5.9.1941. 
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the State would nationalise the assets of both the large 
capitalist and small landowner.50)  
4.2.1. 	 Afrikaner National-Socialism: The Ideological Counter- 
Balance to Communism 
Underlying the NO's proposed Christian, Nationalist-Socialist 
republic was the following propositions: 
"(a) Elke nasie [is] In gedagte van God ...; 
dit die Godsbestemming van elke volk is om die 
hoogste en beste in sy eie kultuur te verwesenlik en te 
bestendig; 
die nasie In organiese eenheid vorm en dat 
verontregting of beskadiging van In deel (klas of groep) 
lei tot die ondergang van die geheel; 
dit iedere individu se reg, nee, sy plig is om na 
die aard van sy aanleg of vermod sy deel by te dra tot 
die verwesenliking van die Godgegewe bestemming van die 
nasie as geheel; 
selfbewuste en gelukkige nasies, wat vry is om 
binne hulle eie historiese lewensruimte In eie 
bestemming te dien, die enigste waarborg is vir 
wereldvrede."51)  
Through the propagation of these principles and their 
actualisation by way of practical and attainable goals, communism 
and the liberal system(s) of capitalism-democracy - the alleged 
facilitator(s) of communism - would be eradicated from society. As 
was the case with the OB's Volkssocialism, this discussion will 
concentrate on those elements of NO-ideology which directly 
related to its conception of communism. 
The NO's emphasis on spiritual values and Christianity, as opposed 
to communism's alleged atheism and materialism, speaks for itself. 
The nation (read also yolk), in terms of NO-ideology, was adjudged 
to be a supra-individual and God-determined organic entity. The 
future republic, as the geo-political embodiment of this divine 
unity, had to reflect the Vox Dei-principle in its constitutional 
and political structure. Pirow referred to this aspect in the 
Ibid., no. 1, 12.8.1941. 
0. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, pp.3-4. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
following terms: 
"[Dit] 	 volg in die eerste plek dat die Nuwe Orde in 
Suid- Afrika christelik sal wees - christelik in die 
sin dat die etiese waardes van die christelike dogma die 
deurslaggewende faktor in alle aspekte van die yolk se 
lewe sal wees."52) 
Understandably, given the criticism levelled at it by Afrikaans 
Churches, the NO paid special attention to the place and role of 
religion in general and the Christian religion in particular in 
the proposed state. Sufficient for the aims of this analysis is to 
note that, apart from the emphasis on religious freedom (within 
the realms of the Christian dogma), the NO stressed the Christian 
foundations of its ideology and proposed state.53) Of special 
significance for the topic of anti-communism is a remark by Oswald 
Pirow that "... anti-christelike en ... onchristelike elemente 
geen se in die Staat sal he [nie]."54) Although never stated 
explicitly, this implied that all communists - by definition of 
their perceived sacrilegious tendencies - were to be 
excommunicated from political life in a future society. 
183 
Ibid., p.11. 
See Die Anti-Kommunis, no.17, 5.12.1941 and no.20, 9.1.1942. 
Pirow: op.cit., p.11. 
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The NO'S conception of nation (yolk)55) did not provide for a 
multi-racial or international structure as was supposedly the case 
with communism. The South African nation, in terms of the NO-
perspective, were composed of 'national' minded white inhabitants 
of the Union. While acknowledging the near-universal applicability 
of the 'new order' and even pointing to different manifestations 
of this new order, the NO repeatedly stressed the unique character 
and nature of each of these manifestations. Die Anti-Kommunis  
explained this uniqueness and universality in the following 
55. Judging from Pirow's exposition of the NO'S principles in 
December 1940, the concept "yolk", while on the one hand 
referring to a cultural entity, was at times also regarded as 
synonomous with the meaning attached to "nation" as a geo-
political entity. Pirow's first explication of the principles 
underlying the NO-ideology (see 0. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-
Afrika, p.5) would seem to indicate the more conventional 
utilisation of these concepts. In explaining the application 
of NO propositions in a future society, Pirow, in a sense, 
continued with this initial distinction. This was done by 
stressing the lingo-cultural equality of the two main 
component parts [volksdele] of the South African nation. 
(Ibid., p.34) However, to this was added an important 
precondition, namely the eersgeborenereg van 
Afrikanerdom." (Ibid.) In other words, in the event of a 
conflict between the two volksdele, the cultural and 
linguistic rights of the Afrikaner would receive priority 
over that of English-speakers. Undoubtedly, this precondition 
affected the inter-ethnical construction of the nation as a 
political entity. Concurrently, however, the concepts "yolk" 
and "nation" were utilised as interchangable terms to give 
effect to the inner structure of this political entity. An 
example of the indiscriminate usage of these terms is 
provided by the emphasis on the "[d]issiplinering en 
Opleiding van die hele Volk tot nasiediens ..." (italics 
mine) (Ibid., p.31). 
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manner: 
"Kommunisme het die demokratiese lande van Europa 
maklike prooi gevind totdat In nuwe idee, of hewer In 
verjongde en ware herlewing van In ou gedagte In einde 
gebring het aan sy momentum ... Teen die 
internasionalisme van ... [kommunisme], het individuele 
state van Europa In nuwe nasionalisme gestel wat, 
volgens die aard en karakter van die besondere volk, 
homself gemanifesteer het as Nasionaal-sosialisme 
(Duitsland), Fascisme (Italie), Falangisme (Spanje) en 
Christelik Nasionaal-sosialistiese republikanisme (Suid-
Afrika); teen die beoogde uniforme Sowjet-wereldstaat 
staan vandag die nuwe nasionale state van Europa, almal 
gegrondves op dieselfde bred grondplan, maar elkeen In 
interessante 	 nasionale 	 variasie 	 van 	 daardie 
wereldorde."56)  
The South African nation, while allowing for selective and limited 
inter- and intra-ethnic absorption, did not provide for any form 
of racial affiliation other than by whites. Africans, for all 
intents and purposes, were regarded as non-nation elements. While 
the future state had to remain 'white' "... in die sin dat die 
behoud van die blanke beskawing en die gesag van die Blanke 
onder alle omstandighede beskerm moet word ...,57) non-whites, by 
definition of their physical presence inside the Union, would 
nevertheless have to be accomodated in the planned republic. 
Although the NO failed to provide an indication of the manner in 
which this would be achieved, Pirow identified the basic 
parameters of NO-policy in this regard: "Wit Christelike 
Trusteeskap oor alle nie-blankes gebaseer op die beginsels van 
totale segregasie en ontwikkeling langs eie lyne onder 
regeringssupervisie."58)  
Significantly, prior to the formal publication of the NO's 
Programme of Principles in December 1940, Pirow, in explaining NO-
objectives in an edition of Die Vaderland during November 1940, 
omitted the section "... onder regeringssupervisie" in favour of 
Die Anti-Kommunis, no.4, 5.9.1941. See also no.48, 10.8.1942. 
0. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, p.12. 
Ibid., p.21. 
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ooreenkomstig Nasionaal-Sosialistiese beginsels."59) This may 
have indicated that, apart from the South African nation as an 
exclusively defined racial organity, the future republic would 
consist of at least one other `nation'. Although inferior in 
status, this second `nation' would seemingly be constructed along 
similar lines as that of the dominant nation. 
The nation, as an organic entity, was not a mechanical corpus  
composed of a single class or mutually antagonistic classes, but 
represented 	 een groot familie waarin die verskillende groepe 
en lede elk hulle plek het, en elk geleer moet word om uit liefde 
vir hulle hele volk, die belange van die geheel bokant die belange 
van die enkeling te stel."") These principles of shared interests 
and collective responsibility had to be reflected in all spheres 
of community life. Of significance for the topic of anti-communism 
is the application of these principles to the economic sphere. 
As opposed to the perceived strict materialism of communism and 
capitalism, the NO emphasized the "... HERSTEL VAN ETIESE WAARDES 
EN MORELE OORWEGINGS IN DIE VERHOUDING VAN BURGER TOT BURGER EN 
VAN DIE VOLK TOT DIE STAAT"61) (italics in the original). Relative 
to the economic sphere, this implied that all labour had a 
national and ethical value rather than being a purely commercial 
commodity. In NO terms: 
"Vir die nasionaal-sosialis is arbeid veel meer as 
broodwinning, dis vir hom In behoefte tot sy groeiende 
wesendheid, dit is vir horn [.ln] middel tot 
selfuitdrukking en self-ontplooiing. 11,02) 
Labour was thus also an important determinant of national 
identity. Die Anti-Kommunis went as far as stating that the future 
national-socialist state had to be a labour state [literally 
Reprinted in pamphlet-form under the title "Nuwe Orde vir 
Suid-Afrika" by Die Handhawersbond. 
Die Anti-Kommunis, no.2, 19.8.1941. 
Pirow: op.cit., pp.19-20. 
Die Anti-Kommunis, no.55, 1.8.1943. 
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arbeidsstaat].63)  Within the context of the NO's theorem on the 
nation as an organically constructed entity, this furthermore 
implied that all labour, if not equal in value, were at least 
equally important. Antagonism between the different forces 
comprising the national labour-unity would therefore contribute to 
not only the destruction of this organic entity, but also - and 
even more importantly - endanger national identity. 
The NO's Programme of Principles made special provision for the 
elimination of class struggle from society. Pirow proposed two 
strategies in this regard: First, in what was to be the most 
favoured strategy, Pirow suggested negotiations between the 
competing factions with mediation by the state. Alternatively, 
failing success or in the event of heightened tensions, "... sal 
deur Staatsdekreet In regverdige en onpartydige oplossing geskep 
moet word ..."64) 
Relative to socio-political accomodation in the future state, the 
NO adopted a dualistic and seemingly contradictory approach vis 
vis its emphasis on Christian- and national principles as opposed 
to values allegedly embraced by communism and 'old order'-systems. 
The NO's conception of the social structure of the organic 
community were based on economic concepts. In this regard a 
distinction was made between three classes, viz, those who were 
... so arm dat hulle voorsien moes word van gratis. mediese en 
ander hulp van die Staat ...", those who were "... so ryk dat 
hulle die bekommernisse van die lewe sonder vrees in die gesig kon 
kyk .. 	 were ."65) and those who 	 ...nog brandarm nag skatryk 
1,66) This last grouping, the largest of the three, was also 
000 
referred to as the middle-class(es). This distinction, made on the 
basis of economic welfare and status, was already a negation of 
the NO's declared aversion towards materialistic notions. In the 
future republic, the middle class would not only be another 
63. Ibid. 
See 0. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, p.37. 
Ibid., pp.14-15. 
See Die Anti-Kommunis, no.57, 14.10.1943. 
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interest-grouping, but ultimately the only one. Pirow explained 
this in the following manner: "[Die middelklas] ... is die 
ruggraat van elke yolk. Hulle standaard van beskawing is die van 
die nasie. Op hierdie mense sal die Nuwe Staat gebou moet 
word ..."67) As opposed to official NO policy whereby precedence 
supposedly would be afforded to the interests of the whole nation, 
this approach was obviously sectional, as opposed to national. 
Furthermore, by emphasizing the necessity of a form of vocational 
representation (over and above that of normal parliamentary 
representation)68), the NO ensured the continued hegemony of the 
middle-class. The elevated importance of a section of the South 
African nation corresponded in principle with communism's 
perceived preference for the working class. Pirow, at the time 
when the NO'S Programme of Principles were first published, voiced 
his opposition to this particular principle: "In teenstelling met 
kommunisme, wat gebaseerd is op klassestryd en die uiteindelike 
dominering van een klas oor alle andere, streef Nasionaal-
sosialisme daarna om nasionale belange bo alle groeps- of 
individuele belange te verhef"69) (italics mine). 
Conversely, in what was a continuation of the organic tradition of 
shared national interests and collective responsibility, the NO 
seemingly made no special provision for the working class Der se. 
Such was the case in both the NO's ideological programme and in 
terms of the future socio-political order. Relative to the social 
order, workers were 	 doodgewoon 	 [d]eel van die 
Pirow: op.cit., p.5. 
Provision for parliamentary representation in the future 
state once again contradicted the NO'S exclaimed opposition 
towards 'old order'-systems like democracy. Vocational 
representation would take the form of a guild-system in terms 
of which workers in the same industry or trade was believed 
to have common interests which could best be promoted in a 
communal context. The guild-system was a continuation of the 
organic tradition of the nation being one large family. See 
F.J. Van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, pp.178-180. 
0. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, p.4. 
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middestand ..."7°) The inclusion of the white proletariat in the 
middle class corresponded with the NO-principle of giving 
precedence to national- instead of sectional- or class interests. 
In NO-ideology, however, the middle class was the social and 
political elite. By being a composite part of the privileged 
elite, the working class automatically had to have an elevated 
importance in the future society. Once again, this contradicted 
official NO-policy of not giving preference to the interests of 
any section, group or class. 
Two other elements of NO ideology which were irreconcilable with 
this organisation's conception of communism pertained to private 
ownership and the importance of family-life. The family, according 
to the NO, was not only a microcosm of the future state, but a 
fundamental precondition for the realization of the national-
socialist republic.71)  As the smallest entity in community life, a 
contended and happy family - according to the NO - would guarantee 
the happiness of larger organic unities in the state and 
community. In terms of its status as the microcosm of the planned 
national-socialist state, Die Anti-Kommunis declared that the 
family was the 	 belangrikste kweekplek 	 waarbinne die 
arbeidskrag, die skeppingskrag, die denkkrag en die daadkrag van 
die nasie tot hoogste ontwikkeling gebring moet word."72)  
Closely related to the importance of family-life was the emphasis 
on the necessity of private ownership in the future state. Private 
ownership was described as "... een van die belangrikste karakter-
bouende faktore in die lewe van In nasie ..."73) The yolk, in NO-
terms, therefore had to be a propertied yolk. Private ownership 
Die Anti-Kommunis, no.57, 14.10.1943. In spite of the 
relative insignificance of the white proletariat in NO-
ideology, Die Anti-Kommunis did come to pay particular 
attention to the European working class. See Ibid., no.47, 
11.9.1942; no.55, 1.8.1943 and no.63, October 1944. 
Pirow: op.cit., p.5. 
Die Anti-Kommunis, no.24, 6.2.1942. See also no's. 22-23, 
23.1.1942-30.1.1942. 
Ibid., no.26, 20.2.1942. 
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served as guarantee for social security, a contended family-life 
and economic and political stability. In practice, however, the 
application of the principle of private ownership would be limited 
by what can best be described as 'national interests'. The NO, in 
this regard, proposed state ownership and -control of certain 
industries and institutions.74)  This selective nationalisation, 
judging from the NO's Programme of Principles, were to be 
implemented so as to avoid further exploitation of the yolk by 
capitalists •75) 
4.3. LOUIS WEICHARDT AND THE GREYSHIRT-MOVEMENT 
The Greyshirt-movement, founded in October 1933, was the first 
local manifestation resulting from the advent of National-
socialist philosophies in Europe in general and specifically the 
coming to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany.76)  In terms of long-
term objectives, this movement proposed the founding of a 
... Jew-free organic Volksstate, a national-socialist republic in 
74. The NO identified four categories of industries/institutions 
which would be nationalised in the future state: 
The gold-mining industry; 
All other key-industries; 
The banking- and financial sectors; 
All large property holdings used for speculatory 
purposes. See 0. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, pp.20-21. 
75. See Pirow: op.cit., p.20. 
76. Between October 1933 and its final dissolution in May 1950, 
this movement existed in a number of forms and under a 
variety of titles. Initially known as the Suid-Afrikaanse 
Christelike Nasionaal-Sosialistiese Beweging [South African 
Christian National-Socialist Movement], it was transformed 
into a political party, the Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Party 
[South African National Party] in April/May 1937. Following 
another name-change and organisational transformation in 
March 1939 (the Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionaal-Sosialistiese Bond 
[South African National-Socialist League]), this movement, 
from March 1947 onwards, was known as as the Blanke 
Werkersparty [White Workers' Party]. In the lingua franca, 
however, this movement became known and remained known as the 
Greyshirts. The term Greyshirts', within the context of this 
organisation, was in actual fact the name for the uniformed 
activist spearhead of this movement. This entitling, for the 
aims of this analysis, will be used when referring to this 
organisation in all and any of its forms. See F.J. Van 
Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.365. 
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content and form; based on responsible leadership and established 
on a corporative foundation."77)  Save the overt emphasis on the 
Jewish element, this movement and the NO, in broad terms, shared 
corresponding objectives. However, whereas the NO were marginally 
successful in gaining converts on the basis of a collective 
ideological agenda, the Greyshirt-movement gained notoriety for 
its anti-Semitic utterances and activist behaviour in this regard. 
As indicated by its own general secretary, I.J. (Isak) la Grange, 
the Greyshirts' came to be associated with "... Jode-haters en - 
slaners ..."78) Anti-Semitism, or rather the emphasis on the 
perceived unassimilative, anti-Christian, anti-social and 
parasitical character of the Jewish 'race' per se, was, in theory, 
merely a section of the Greyshirts' total socio-political 
programme. 
The cause of the Greyshirt-movement, similarly to that of the NO 
and OB, were initially promoted by developments not related to a 
particular set of ideological principles. Relative to the 
Greyshirt-movement, most prominent in this regard was the rising 
tide of animosity towards Jews within South Africa.78) Weichardt 
and his Greyshirts utilised this animosity, provided it with a 
deeper ideological content and steered the 'enriched' apprehension 
in a new and complimentary direction. To put it differently: The 
Greyshirt-movement acted as catalisator whereby antagonism towards 
Jews, up to then seemingly predominantly of economic nature, were 
provided with a definite and explicit racial content. With the 
advent of the Greyshirts, economic antagonism towards Jews thus 
gradually evolved into virile and racist anti-Semitism. This 
G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, 
p.112. 
INCH. PV 29: L.T. Weichardt-collection. File 122: [I.J. la 
Grange]: "Wie en Wat is Weichardt?" (undated pamphlet). 
Important to note is that this animosity was not only limited 
to Afrikaners, but included a significant portion of English-
speaking whites. Relative to the Greyshirt-movement, Van 
Heerden indicates that the publication of this organisation's 
mouthpiece, Die Waarheid-The Truth, was made possible through 
capital supplied by both Afrikaans- and English-speakers. 
(Van 'Heerden: op.cit., p.146) The first edition of Die 
Waarheid-The Truth was published on 16.12.1933. 
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explanation, needless to say, is an oversimplification of a much 
more complex and multi-facetted process. 
Shimoni claims that the Greyshirt-movement, made considerable 
inroads amongst Afrikaners.") An evaluation of this statement is 
crucial in determining the place and role of this movement in 
Afrikaner nationalist politics. 
The international context, together with the state of flux in 
Afrikaner politics, undoubtedly proved beneficial in paving the 
way for Greyshirt-propaganda. The benefits to be reaped from these 
factors, however, were limited. The relative absence of a mass-
circulated organ to propagate Greyshirt-points of view and the 
success of the GNP with its own brand of ethnic mobilisation, to 
mention but two factors, resulted in the Greyshirts' developing 
into even more of a peripheral movement than the NO.81) Shimoni's 
claim, in as far as it refers to the stature of the Greyshirt-
movement as an organised grouping within Afrikaner nationalist 
politics, thus deserves a re-examination. This organisation, at 
most, was merely one of a number of inconsequential movements who 
identified themselves with the political and constitutional 
objectives of Afrikaner nationalists. 
On another level, however, Shimoni's statement is possibly a fair 
reflection of the influence of sentiments which came to be 
regarded as atypical of Greyshirt beliefs on Afrikaner nationalist 
conceptions of the place and role of Jewry in society. The 
Greyshirt-movement, in this regard, did indeed exert an influence 
which corresponded with neither its numerical strength nor stature 
within the organised sphere of Afrikaner nationalism. This was 
particularly apparent in the case of the G/HNP. F.C. Erasmus, Cape 
Provincial Secretary of the GNP, for example, declared in November 
1937: 
Shimoni: op.cit., pp.110-111. 
For a discussion of other factors which limited the success 
of Greyshirt-endeavours see F.J. Van Heerden: Nasionaal-
Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-
1948, pp.83-85. 
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"Before concluding our correspondence, my party is glad 
to give expression to its sincere appreciation of the 
useful work done by the Greyshirts' in one important 
respect, viz, that they have pertinently drawn the 
attention of the yolk to the Jewish problem, which 
indeed has assumed very threatening dimensions. Although 
this fact has not figured prominently in this 
correspondence, we consider that a service has been done 
to the yolk which deserve recognition and 
perpetuation. ,82) 
Malan echoed this sentiment during the electoral campaign leading 
up to the general election of April 1938.83) Shimoni goes as far 
as stating that by 1937 the differences between the GNP's and 
Greyshirts' conception of the Jewish Question had become 
neglible.84) Although this may well be somewhat of an 
overstatement, it is important to note that assertions of a 
similar nature were not uncommon during the latter half of the 
1930s. In Morris Alexander's biography, for example, mention is 
made of a November 1937-editorial in the Cape Argus in which it 
was stated that "... the [Purified] Nationalist Party [had] gone 
over, lock, stock and barrel, to anti-semitism  
4.3.1. 	 The Greyshirt-movement and Anti-communism 
Intimately connected to Greyshirt-remarks on the Jewish Question 
were references to the perceived menace of communism. On many an 
occasion the twin elements of anti-communism and anti-Semitism 
functioned in close proximity - the one being an important 
prerequisite for the other. Within the GNP, as indicated in a 
previous chapter, antagonism towards Jews and anti-communism were 
also presented at times as interrelated elements. In this analysis 
G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, 
pp.120-121. See also Die Transvaler, 4.11.1937. 
See Malan's speech at Porterville on 26.1.1938 as reported in 
Die Burger, 27.1.1938. 
G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience.  
D.122.  
E. Alexander: Morris Alexander. A Biographv_, p.165. 
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attention will exclusively be focussed on the Greyshirts' 
conception of the alleged connection between Jewry and communism. 
However, even then, this analysis will primarily relate to the 
period prior to the outbreak of World War II. The motivation 
underlying this chronological limitation is three fold: 
(i) Whereas the NO, at different times, could either rely on 
G/HNP-platforms, symphathetic media, Parliament or Die Anti-
Kommunis for the promotion of its cause, the Greyshirts' had 
a severely restricted number of options available to them. 
Although the Greyshirt-movement contested parliamentary seats 
during the 1938-general election and even nominated 
candidates in earlier by-elections, no success was 
forthcoming from these endeavours. Parliament, as a forum for 
the presentation and promotion of Greyshirt-points of view, 
thus remained a non-realizable option. In spite of incidences 
of cooperation between supporters of this movement and those 
of the GNP in the 1938-general election, Party platforms and 
media controlled by the G/HNP remained inaccesible for the 
Greyshirt-movement. As was the case with the NO and OB, Die  
Burger and Die Transvaler only reported on Greyshirt-
activities on occasion where the G/HNP stood to benefit from 
such reportage.")  For all intents and purposes the 
Greyshirt-organ, Die Waarheid-The Truth, remained the only 
medium for the dissemination of Greyshirt-policies. Die 
Waarheid-The Truth, however, ceased publication in July 1938. 
This analysis, for a large part, will be based on reportage 
emanating from the Greyshirt-organ. 
86. An excellent example of this is provided by the attention 
afforded to a court case involving Weichardt following a 
brawl between Greyshirts and Jews at a Greyshirt-meeting in 
Cape Town during June 1939 (See Die Transvaler and Die 
Burger, 23.6.1939-29.6.1939). Apart from perhaps reflecting 
negatively on the person of Louis Weichardt, this court case 
also provided the Party with the opportunity to bring into 
focus its own policy towards Jews and, subsequently, under 
public attention. 
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(ii) Closely connected to this first aspect was the rapidly 
decreasing number of opportunities for continued and 
fundamental intra-G/HNP influencing by the Greyshirt-
movement. Prior to November 1937 this movement was 
theoretically in a' position to openly propagate its 
philosophies within the Party without being seriously 
hindered by the G/HNP-leadership. During the course of this 
last month, however, protracted negotiations aimed at the 
establishment of a common electoral front with a view of 
contesting the 1938 general elections were unilaterally 
broken off by the GNP. In spite of the official rejection of 
Greyshirt-overtures by the Party, active cooperation, as 
indicated by Shimoni, did indeed occur between supporters of 
the GNP and Greyshirts during the aforementioned election.87) 
Cooperation, however, were limited to isolated constituencies 
and did not occur on a national or even provincial leve1.88) 
Furthermore, it may well be argued that cooperation were 
initially brought about by a common objective - keeping the 
United Party out - rather than being indicative of 
ideological accord. At the Cradock Provincial Congress of the 
GNP in October 1940 Malan sharply criticised group-forming 
within the Party.89) The Greyshirt-movement interpreted this 
as proscription and Weichardt subsequently declared that 
answering Malan's call for a return to the Party would be 
equal to treason.90) Van Heerden has indicated that the 
Cradock Congress effectively eliminated the Greyshirt- 
Shimoni: op.cit., pp.125-126. 
In the Natal constituency of Vryheid, for example, candidates 
of the Greyshirt-movement and GNP opposed one another during 
the 1938 election. 
F.J. Van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.136. 
INCH. PV 29: L.T. Weichardt-collection. File 123: [L.T. 
Weichardt]: "Was die Gryshempbeweging ooit dood?". See also 
File 133: "Geskiedkundige Oorsig van die Nasionaal-
Sosialistiese Volksbeweging (Die Gryshemde)". 
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movement as a potential force .in Afrikaner nationalist 
politics 91) 
(iii)Although the conception of a connection between Jews and 
communism did come to attain a momentum largely independent 
from organisational control and/or -manipulation, the 1940 
Cradock Congress, together with the pivotal role of Louw in 
in the Party's campaign against communism and immigration 
provided the G/HNP with the necessary leverage to at least 
minimise Greyshirt-input in this regard. Even though Louw's 
remarks regarding the alleged connection between Jews and 
communism corresponded in many ways with traditional 
Greyshirt-sentiments, his physical absence from the Union 
prior to August 1937 largely precludes this movement as a 
possible source of influence. The chances of Louw being 
influenced by essentially a peripheral movement following his 
return to South Africa seems unlikely. 
4.3.2. 	 Anti-Communism and Anti-Semitism: The Greyshirt 
Perspective 
Central to the Greyshirts' conception of the alleged connection 
between communism and semitism was the belief that Jews were 
organised internationally in an insidious world-conspiracy aimed 
at the destruction of all Gentile states. In a series of 
[q]uestions to be answered by South African Politicians" Die 
Waarheid-The Truth provided an explication of this belief and its 
relevancy for South Africa: 
"1. Are you aware that the Jews in South Africa are not 
a religious community as they falsely pretend, but that 
they form a political organism or State of a secret 
nature, totally distinct from the South African State 
and with an independent Constitution, Government and 
Laws ? 
91. Van Heerden: op.cit., p.273. 
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Are you aware that the South African Jewish Board of 
Deputies, which has its headquarters in Johannesburg, is 
the Central Governing Body of this secret Jewish state; 
that both in structure, function and authority it bears 
all the characteristics of a State Government; that, 
like other State Governments, it is divided into 
Departments, e.g. a Department for Political Affairs, a 
Department of Legal Affairs ...? 
Are you aware that the authorities of this secret 
Jewish state are the actual rulers of South Africa, and 
that the South African Government seldom, if ever, dares 
to take any step of which these authorities disapprove ? 
Are you aware that that similar secret Jewish states 
exist in almost every country [of the world] ? 
Are you aware that, over and above the secret Jewish 
states established in the different states, there exists 
a secret International Jewish State, of which every Jew 
throughout the world is a member ? 
Are you aware that the laws of this secret 
International Jewish State forbid its subjects to 
recognise any non-Jewish authority, and require them to 
work unceasingly, though with foresight and cunning, for 
the undermining and destruction of all non-Jewish 
states ? 
Are you aware that the act of any Jew in becoming 
naturalised as a citizen of a non-Jewish state is merely 
a fraudulent device to enable him to promote more 
effectually the interests of World-Jewry ? 
Are you aware that Jews, so naturalised in the 
different non-Jewish states, always play in one 
another's hands, and that they constantly provoke 
animosities and wars between these non-Jewish states, 
according as Jewish interests dictate ? 
Are you aware that it is through their international 
organisation that the Jews have succeeded, by every foul 
and corrupt means, in seizing the reins of power in 
almost every part of the world ? 
Are you aware that the salvation of South Africa and 
of every other country, together with the maintenance of 
international peace and good-will depends primarlicy on 
the destruction of ... Jewish power everywhere ?"92)  
Communism and capitalism, within the context of this international 
Jewish conspiracy, were the twin elements of a perceived 
integrated strategy aimed at the subjugation of non-Jewish states. 
Communism, according to the Greyshirt-perspective, was a Jewish 
product both by nature and in terms of origin. In explaining this 
assertion, the Greyshirt-movement made use of a complex and all-
embracive strategy whereby communism was connected to and 
integrated with (Jewish) capitalism, Jewish internationalism and, 
92. Die Waarheid-The Truth, 19:6.1936. 
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collectively, the perceived hidden agenda for Jewish world-
domination. The Soviet Union, in turn, served as point of . 
departure in illustrating these and other allegations. 
In explaining the perceived Jewish origins of communism, the 
Greyshirt-movement employed three interconnected strategies: 
First, the ideology of communism was formulated by Karl Marx - 
originally a Jew by the name of Mordechai. Through the association 
with Marx, communism had thus become "... essentially Jewish."93) 
The conception of Jewish involvement with communism by way of the 
perceived Jewish background of this ideology, however, was not 
only limited to Greyshirt-circles, but included individuals in the 
more influential quarters of Afrikaner nationalism. An excellent 
example of this is provided by Nico Diederichs. Diederichs, 
prominent in Afrikaner intellectual and cultural circles, 
rublished in 1938 one of the first monographs on the subject of 
communism in the Afrikaans language. In Die Kommunisme - Sy Teorie 
en Praktyk, Diederichs paid specific attention to the Jewish 
background of Marx - the 	 vader en grondlegger ..." of 
communism.94)  
The second strategy related to the alleged hidden agenda for 
Jewish world-domination. Johannes von Strauss von Moltke, then 
leader of the South African Gentile Socialists95), alleged, in a 
series of public meetings during March/April 1934, that he was in 
possession of incontrovertible proof which indicated the existence 
of a secret plot by world-Jewry to destroy Christianity and 
civilization. Von Moltke's proof consisted of a `secret' document 
allegedly stolen from a synagogue in Port Elizabeth by H.V. 
(Harry) Inch, Eastern Cape leader of the Greyshirts. With regard 
Ibid., 12.11.1937. 
See N. Diederichs: Kommunisme - Sy Teorie en Praktyk, pp.11-
14. 
95. A splinter-movement identifying strongly with German 
national-socialism. 
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to communism, this document declared: 
"We [Jews] stand for world communism, for dictatorship 
of the proletariat. Our Imperialism of Pax Judaeica is 
one for the downfall of western civilization and its 
replacement by the eastern or Japanese system. We have 
seen the progress of the U.S.S.R. since 1917 when our 
agents, Lenin, Stalin, etc., murdered the Tzar ... As we 
have got control over Russia, so we will also control 
the Union ... Such is the mission of Judah."96)  
Shimoni indicates that this document was an adaptation of the 
notorious Protocols of Zion.97) Following the institution of legal 
proceedings against Inch, Von Moltke and a third defendant, the 
Supreme Court in Grahamstown awarded the Rev. A. Levy the sum of 
1 775 pounds for defamation. 
In spite of a ruling by the Supreme Court that Inch "... had 
either concocted the document or connived at its 
concoction ...",98) Die Waarheid-The Truth, less than four years 
later, once more returned to the infamous Protocols in explaining 
the Jewish origins of communism. Communism, according to the 
Greyshirt-organ, were based on the Protocols and "... `n 
wetenskaplike verwerking daarvan deur die Jood Karl Marx."99) 
Significantly, on this occasion the concepts Socialism and 
Communism were described as interchangable terms for the same set 
of ideological belief-systems. No explanation was provided for the 
manner in which this related to the Greyshirt-endorsement of a 
variation of Socialism. 
The third strategy pertained to the perceived role of Jews in 
Soviet society. In this regard two aspects were referred to, 
namely the role of Jews and Jewish capital in the Russian 
Cited in The South African Law Reports [1934] Eastern 
Districts Local Division, p.299. 
G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, 
p.112. 
South African Law Reports [1934] Eastern Districts Local  
Division, p.296. 
Die Waarheid-The Truth, 18.3.1938. 
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revolution of October 1917 and the alleged dominance of 
contemporary USSR by Jews. Regarding the first of these aspects, 
it was continually stressed that the 1917-revolution were both 
financed and undertaken by Jews. Die Waarheid-The Truth, in 
February 1936, stated that the "... Bolsjewistiese rewolusie in 
Rusland was die werk van 387 persone, waarvan 371 Jade was.") 
Assertions were also based on quotations attributed to Jews and 
other sources of information. An example of the latter is a 
reference to an alleged investigation undertaken by a United 
States Government agency in which it was "... established beyond a 
possibility of doubt that the Bolshevik Revolution [had been] 
financed by Jewish bankers and banking houses in Europe and 
America."101)  Indicative of quotations attributed to Jews was the 
reference to a statement by a certain J. Hermalin in which he was 
alleged to have said - during 1917 - that "[t]he Russian 
Revolution was made by Jews. We Jews have created secret 
societies, have planned the reign of terror. The Revolution 
succeeded by our convincing propaganda and our mass assasinations, 
in order to form a government truly ours.' -02) 
The perceived predominance attained by Jews in the immediate post-
1917 period, according to the Greyshirt-movement, continued to 
exist in the then present day Soviet Union. Die Waarheid-The Truth  
alleged that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU), the dominant force in Soviet society, were 
made up of 56 Jews and three (non-Jewish) Russians.103)  Members 
of this latter group (Stalin, Lobov and Ossinsky), however, were 
allegedly also married to Jews. These marriages, so it would seem 
Ibid., 7.2.1936. 
Ibid., 12.11.1937. A number of Jewish capitalists who had 
allegedly been involved in financing the 1917-revolution were 
identified. These included Rothschild, Israel Lazarevich 
Helphand [whose pseudonym was Parvus] (12.11.1937), Schiff, 
Kuhn and Loeb (7.2.1936). 
Die Waarheid-The Truth, 3.12.1937. 
Ibid., 24.4.1936. 
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in terms of the Greyshirt-perspective, only served to ensure the 
continued dominance of Soviet society by Jews. 
Another allegation which appeared with an almost monotonous 
regularity in Greyshirt-publications related to the position of 
M.M. (Maxim) Litvinov.104) Litvinov, according to the Greyshirt-
perspective, was the personification of Jewish involvement with 
and domination of communism. In a pamphlet issued during September 
1938, Litvinov was referred to as "... Litvinoff-Finkelstein-
Wallach ..."105) The name-change decided on by Litvinov and other 
Jews, according to the Greyshirt-organ, was in accordance with the 
Jewish strategy of 'camouflage' and served to disguise the 
ultimate objective of world-Jewry, viz. world-domination.106)  
In explaining the perceived Jewish nature of communism, the 
Greyshirt movement once again returned to the alleged hidden 
agenda for Jewish world-domination. Although no detailed or 
complete exposition was provided at any one time, sufficient 
evidence exist for a broad reconstruction of this argument. 
Central to this contention was the allegation that communism was 
not "... a Movement of the People, but a Conspiracy of Jewish 
International Capitalism against Humanity.11107) On another 
occasion this ideology was described as 	 ... die triomf van die 
[Joodse] Kapitalisme."1")  The emphasis on communism as being 
a form of Jewish capitalism corresponded with the Greyshirt-
conception of world-domination being the ultimate objective of the 
Litvinov, originally a Jew by the name of Meyer Wallach, rose 
to prominence under the Stalin-regime and became Soviet 
representative at the League of Nations between 1934 and 
1938. See The McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of World Biography, 
VI, pp.519-522; Great Soviet Encyclopedia, XIV, p.606. 
INCH. PV 29: L.T. Weichardt-collection. File 122: [L.T. 
Weichardt]:"Manifes". 
Die 	 Waarheid-The 	 Truth, 	 23.7.1937. 	 See 	 also 	 Ibid., 
12.11.1937. 
Ibid., 12.11.1937. 
Ibid., 18.3.1938. 
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Jewish 'race'. Although differing perspectives were identifiable 
with regard to the perceived role of international Jewish economic 
hegemony in the striving towards world-domination,109)  it is 
important for the aims of this analysis to note that both 
communism and capitalism were perceived as integrated and 
causally-connected elements in the striving towards world-
domination. 
Van Heerden indicate that capitalism, according to the Greyshirt-
perspective, was a Jewish product by origin.110) In pursuance of 
its objective of world-domination, international Jewry allegedly 
utilised capitalism as a mechanism to spread animosity between 
nations and sow discord between groups and individuals within a 
given nation. This prevented international concurrence and the 
establishment of a united front in opposing the perceived 
intentions of world-Jewry. Furthermore, because of the 
degenerative influence of liberalism, the character of democracy 
had been changed, which, in turn, provided capitalism with the 
opportunity to continue with its destruction.111) Die Waarheid-The  
Truth subsequently described the Union's political system as "... 
In Joodse stelsel, wat deur middel van die volk te verdeel, Jode-
Kapitaal in staat stel om In ekonomiese despotisme oor die nasie 
Without going into any detail, these different perspectives 
may be summarised as follow: Firstly, economic hegemony 
equalled political domination and, secondly, economic 
hegemony was a prerequisite for political domination. 
Although the differences between these perspectives relate 
more to the manner in which Jews would allegedly attempt to 
control the political process (manipulation vs direct 
control), the inclusion of both perspectives in the 
Greyshirt-strategy allowed for an extension in and 
intensification of propaganda in this regard. 
F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.57. 
Given the assertion that capitalism was a Jewish product and 
the belief that Jewish capitalists attempted to dominate in 
all countries of the world, this may have implied that 
British imperialism, if not controlled, were at least 
inspired by Jews. This lends support to Shimoni's assertion 
that, in terms of Greyshirt-propaganda, "... the Jew made the 
Boer War[s], and it is he who incited the 1Kaffirs' against 
White civilization." See G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The 
South African Experience, p.113. 
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te voer. 11112)  Indicative of the alleged international influence of 
Jews, according to this movement, was the whipping up of emotions 
against Hitler and national-socialist Germany. This was done 
because Hitler had uncovered and foiled a plot by Jew-communists 
to bolshevise Germany and Europe. 
Communism, ostensibly the antithesis of capitalism, was in effect 
a continuation of the "... Joodse politiek van Iverdeel en 
in113) heers' 	 This was also the final step towards Jewish world- 
domination. Whereas Jew-capitalists, through the accumulation of 
capital and control over powerful trusts and cartels, attempted to 
subjugate and pauperise the small independent businessman and 
entrepeneur - "... die ruggraat van die nasionale besigheidswereld 
II 114) Jew-communists envisaged the extention of Jewish control ,
over and possession of respectively competing (non-Jewish) cartels 
and non-Jewish possessions. A socialisation of the means of 
production under the communist system thus implied a transfer and 
even more intensive monopolisation of wealth by the Jewish 'race'. 
Die Waarheid-The Truth, in juxtaposing the Greyshirt-ideology to 
that of communism, referred to this aspect in the following terms: 
"National-Socialism upholds Private Property, but 
subjects the same to control so that it may be utilised 
for the common good. Marxian-Socialism upholds State 
ownership of all things, and so concentrates the entire 
wealth of the community in the hands of the state-rulers 
who, doubtless, will be Jews."115) 
The strongest argument in favour of this contention, and indeed so 
acknowledged by the Greyshirt-movement, was the perceived 
predominance of Jews in the Central Committee of the CPSU. 
Although never stated explicitly, this furthermore implied that 
the Soviet Union, within the international arena, was a microcosm 
Die Waarheid-The Truth, 10.9.1937. 
Ibid., 8.7.1938. 
ICH. PV 29: L.T. Weichardt-collection. File 146: "Die Suid-
Afrikaanse Nasionale Party (Gryshemde)" (undated pamphlet). 
Die Waarheid-The Truth, 17.1.1936. 
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of the Jewish supra-national and super-state referred to in Die 
Waarheid-The Truth of June 1936.116) 
Within the context of the Union, according to the Greyshirt-organ, 
communism was ... the chief-weapon by which the International 
Jewish Money-Power is seeking to destroy the white Christian South 
African Nation and State and to set up a black Atheistic Republic 
under Jewish control."117)  The operative words in the above 
quotation are ... under Jewish control." As indicated by the 
Inch-document of 1934, the slogan 'South Africa and Africa for the 
black man' was merely an element of the camouflage strategy aimed 
at obscuring the actual objective of world-Jewry. Whereas Jewish 
domination of (white) Gentiles was in accordance with the alleged 
prophecies of the Protocols of Zion, (atheistic) Africans and the 
slogan of a Black Republic merely facilitated eventual world-
domination by Jews. Inch's document referred to these aspects in 
the following manner: 
"The Nordics in our eyes are in no wise (sic!) different 
to the Chinese Dogs or Turks. They are all our 
destroyers, our enemies. The Christian religion is 
wrong. Christ, in the Jewish sense, was a false prophet 
born of the womb of a foul bitch whose husband was in 
our eyes never married to Joseph [sic!]. In our Talmud 
Torah and other holy books it does say that the Gentiles 
will be made to drink the piss and eat the dung of the 
Jews. 
It is our plan to give South Africa to the natives ... 
However, we have the prospect in view that if South 
Africa is given to the Sons of Ham, we shall not be in 
any way molested ... The natives are of no account. They 
are as brainless as their Teutonic. cousins - rapers 
(sic!), blackguards, thieves and spies."118)  
In the campaign leading up to the 1936 parliamentary by-election 
in the constituency of Port Elizabeth-North, Weichardt went to 
See "Ten Questions to be answered by South African 
Politicians." Die Waarheid-The Truth, 19.6.1936. 
Die Waarheid-The Truth, 12.11.1937. 
Cited in The South African Law Reports [1934] Eastern 
Districts Local Division, pp.300-301. 
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considerable lengths in attempting to explain the 'true' meaning 
of the Black Republic-slogan to the non-white electorate.119)  
Within South Africa, according to • the Greyshirt-movement, 
significant progress had been made in attempts to convert the 
Union into a Jewish-communistic state. The continued immigration 
of Jews to South Africa served to bolster the ranks of communistic 
organisations already active in South Africa. Weichardt declared 
that an intimate and fraternal relationship existed between newly-
arrived immigrants and the Jewish-Bolshevistic government of the 
Soviet Union.4) Under the direct supervision of the Comintern-
centre in Johannesburg, met takke in Kaapstad en Durban 
n 121) these immigrants were under orders to reap havoc in the , 
Union. Examples of this havoc allegedly included the death of the 
two policemen in the Vereeniging-townships during 1937. 
Examples of the divide and rule-tactics employed by Jewry in 
furthering their objective of world-domination were allegedly also 
prevalent within South Africa. This applied to both the inter- and 
intra-ethnical level. In welcoming the formation of the 
Afrikanerbond van Mynwerkers, Die Waarheid-The Truth declared: 
"Die [Joodse] kapitalistiese-kommunistiese stelsel maak 
van ons mense In werkersklas. Ons is geen klas nie, maar 
volwaardige mense. Ons moet vergeet dat daar klasse is. 
Die ... vakverbonde 	 moet afgebreek word en in die 
plek daarvan moet kom een groot volksoranisasie wat op 
Christelike-nasionale grondslag staan."1z2) 
Reacting to rumours of attempts by the CPSA/CI to establish non-
racial structures in South Africa, the Greyshirt-organ declared 
See for example Die Waarheid-The Truth, 19.2.1936. 
Ibid., 21.8.1936. 
Ibid., 11.9.1936. In the same edition, Die Waarheid-The Truth 
identified thirteen sets of instructions newly-arrived 
Jewish-communist immigrants allegedly had to adhere to. These 
instructions included blackmail, spying, etc. etc. 
Die Waarheid-The Truth, 26.3.1937. 
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this to be a ploy aimed at the obstruction of the continued 
development of the nascent Afrikaner-nationalism.123)  
Another element frequently touched upon by Die Waarheid-The Truth  
and Greyshirt-speakers related to the perceived dominant role of 
Jews in the South African economic sphere. The emphasis on the 
Jewish 'race' as constituting an economic force inherently hostile 
to the welfare and progress of the yolk argueably provided the 
ideal vantage point from which to mobilise support for Greyshirt-
objectives. Furthermore, capital accumulation by world-Jewry, in 
terms of the Greyshirt-perspective, was the first stage of the 
Jewish striving towards world-domination. This, in turn, was a 
starting point for the linking of Jews and communism. Even before 
the formation of this movement, Weichardt, in a speech at Cape 
Town, stressed the alleged imbalance between Jews and Gentiles in 
the organised professions and the former's predominance in certain 
sections of trade and industry. This assertion was also utilised 
at times to rationalise and even underplay the Greyshirts' anti-
semitism. Die Waarheid-The Truth, for example, declared in an 
editorial in February 1935: 
"We attack the Jew because and only because he is the 
world's arch-exploiter and oppressor ... we are well 
aware of the fact ... that many of the biggest and most 
successful rogues in South Africa have been, and are not 
Jews at all. But this we do say: The Jews are the 
organized exploiters and oppressors par excellence, and 
moreover their organization is international"124)  
(italics mine). 
Potentially the most far-reaching of all Greyshirt-allegations was 
the assertion that Jewish capitalists-communists, through the 
monopolisation of wealth, had succeeded in influencing Government-
policy. Smuts, in 1937 Minister of Justice in the Hertzog-cabinet, 
was branded a 'friend' of the Jews, who, in refusing to adopt 
preventative measures against communism, ignored the 	 • • • 
See Ibid., 23.7.1937. 
Cited F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, pp.39-40. 
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uitdruklike wense van die volk ..."125) Following the outbreak of 
World War II, this supposition was made applicable to the whole of 
the Smuts-administration. Allegations of this sort, apart from 
contributing to the conception of a 'link' between Jewry and 
Communism, also served to further demonise Smuts and his 
administration in the eyes of Afrikaner nationalists. By allegedly 
giving precedence to the interests of the Empire, Smuts was 
promoting not only British imperialism, but ultimately Jewish 
imperialism. Smuts' perceived refusal/inability to act against 
Jewish communism, in terms of the Greyshirt-argument, may thus 
have stemmed from his enslavement to Jewish interests. Although 
primarily of a propagandistic value, variations of this argument 
were also used in the course of the 1940s by the HNP to explain 
Smuts' perceived unwillingness to adopt repressive measures in 
opposing communism.126)  
Die Waarheid-The Truth, 11.6.1937. See also Ibid., 9.4.1936. 
See Chapter Two. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
208 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE COMPONENT PARTS OF ANTI-COMMUNISM: THE COLOUR 
QUESTION 
Chapters five and six will present a more detailed analysis of 
the main component parts of the campaign against what was 
adjudged to be communism, viz. the Colour Question, Jewish 
Immigration and developments related to (predominantly white) 
labour organisation. This analysis will take the form of an 
examination of the first two issues; thereby focussing 
attention on their evolution up to May 1945, structural 
adaptations and changes and the degree of pollination between 
the various movements/organisations under discussion. These 
analyses will also serve as background to the final chapter of 
this dissertation in which the utilisation of overt anti-
communism as respectively a principle and strategy will be 
investigated. The third element of the campaign against 
perceived communism, namely the struggle for the "soul" of the 
Afrikaner worker, will evolve around the functional role of 
anti-communism in the evolution of the concept of an organic 
volksidentity. 
5.1. THE COLOUR QUESTION 
Race and colour in South Africa, as vindicated by the ever-
increasing body of literature, have received much more than 
mere casual attention in scholarly analyses. The same 
observation, however, cannot be made for impact of the 
perceived menace of communism on the colour question and vice 
versa. While it has come to be accepted that the 'red menace' 
(i.e. communism) were progressively interfused with the 'black 
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peril' (i.e. the colour question) under apartheid ideology,l) 
little attention has been afforded to the origins and nature of 
this interfusement. 
Where remarks have been made on the linking of the 'red menace' 
and 'black peril', these comments relate to isolated incidents 
and, as a rule, appear in the framework of an analysis dealing 
with a different issue. Furthermore, such remarks are generally 
made applicable to the post-1948 era - i.e. the period after 
Malan's Herenigde Nasionale Party had come to power. A case in 
point is the Suppression of Communism Act (Act 44/1950). 
Promulgated in 1950, this Act ostensibly had as objective the 
curbing of communist propaganda and the eventual elimination of 
the perceived communist menace. This was to be done by way of a 
series of repressive measures.2) Mokgethi Mothlabi, in dealing 
with the evolution of black opposition to apartheid, views the 
Suppression of Communism Act as merely the first in a series of 
measures aimed at the villification and persecution of anti-
apartheid activists.3) Gail Gerhart, on the same theme, 
concludes that this law and other measures enacted afterwards 
promoted an "... instinctive solidarity" between some of the 
more prominent actors in anti-apartheid politics.4) 
See G.M. Gerhart: Black Power in South Africa - The  
Evolution of an Ideology, pp.91-92; M. Mothlabi: The  
Theory and Practice of Black Opposition to Apartheid, 
pp.29-32 et seq and N.M. Stultz: Afrikaner politics in 
South Africa, 1934-1948, pp.121-123. 
For a more detailed account of the different provisions 
and implications of the Suppression of Communism Act, see 
W.N. Botes: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Beleidsformuleerders se  
Persepsie van die Kommunistiese Bedreiging teen Suid-
Afrika, pp.42-46; B. Bunting: The Rise of the South 
African Reich, pp.163-169; T.G. Karis: South African 
Liberation: The Communist Factor (Foreign Affairs, 
vol.65(2), 1986), pp.274-276 and H.A. Wessels: Die Stryd 
van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika teen "Kommunistiese"  
Imperialisme - 'n Staatsfilosofiese Studie, pp.82-124. 
M. Mothlabi: Op.cit., pp.28-29. 
G.M. Gerhart: op.cit., pp.91-92. Gerhart possibly refers 
here to the alliance strategy in anti-apartheid politics. 
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The majority of studies dealing with South African politics 
during the war years regard the colour question as having 
played a relatively insignificant role both in government 
policy and Afrikaner nationalist politics.5) Questions of race 
and colour in government policy, according to this argument, 
were overshadowed by the prerogatives of the South African war 
effort.6)  Groups identifying with Afrikaner nationalism, on the 
other hand, were involved in a battle on two fronts, viz, the 
campaign against South African participation in World War II 
and the struggle for ideological hegemony and homogeneity in 
their own ranks.7) 
While both interpretations are valid in the sense that the 
colour question were indeed overshadowed by more immediate and 
pressing issues, this, however, is not to say that the colour 
question altogether disappeared from view for the duration of 
the war. Some of the basic tenets of apartheid philosophy, 
enthusiastically pursued by successive administrations after 
1948, can, within the G/HNP, be traced back to period prior to 
the outbreak of World War II. Relative to the integration of 
the colour question and the perceived menace of communism, the 
years between 1939 and 1945 saw this issue coming to the fore 
in a manner more agressive than ever before. 
One author who does make mention of integration between the 
colour question and the alleged communist menace before May 
1948 is Newell M. Stultz. This observation is based on a 
pamphlet written by Eric Louw which, according to Stultz, was 
See, for example, the limited attention paid to this issue 
in works by D.W. Krtiger: The Making of a Nation, 1910-
1961, pp.199-225; M. Wilson and L.M. Thompson (eds.): The 
Oxford History of South Africa, 1870-1966, pp.402-405 and 
G.D. Scholtz: Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van 
die Afrikaner, VIII, 1939-1948. 
One author who does attempt to come to terms with UP race 
policy during the war years is Rodney Davenport. See 
T.R.H. Davenport: Racial Policies of the Smuts Government, 
1939-1948 (unpublished paper). 
See G.D. Scholtz:  p.cit., pp.363-364. 
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published by the HNP "[e]arly in 1948 ..."8) While, as will be 
argued, Stultz' contention is a fair observation, it should be 
noted that the pamphlet in question, entitled Die Kommunistiese  
Gevaar/The Communist Danger, had in actuality already been 
published in 1943. Furthermore, this pamphlet was a revamped 
and updated version of Louw's speech on communism presented to 
Parliament earlier in the same year. Based on this pamphlet and 
the argument of previous chapters, it may well be stated that 
the enmeshment of the `red menace' and `black peril' were 
already well underway by 1943. 
This chapter, in dealing with the colour question as a 
component part of the campaign against the perceived menace of 
communism, will be divided into three sections. The first 
section will present an overview of race policy in South Africa 
under Hertzog and Smuts and, after 1935, the standpoint of the 
G/HNP as proposed alternative. This first section will serve as 
background to and form the context for the remainder of the 
chapter. The second section will relate to Afrikaner 
nationalism and the colour question after 1937, concentrating 
on indications of continuity in policy between the G/HNP, NO, 
OB and Greyshirt-movement. The integration of the `red menace' 
and `black peril' and the evolution thereof will be discussed 
in the final section. 
5.2. RACE AND COLOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1924-1945 
Before discussing particular aspects of policy vis a vis the 
colour question, four remarks of a more general nature needs to 
be made: 
Firstly, while various administrations, from 1910 onwards, 
laid claim to different principles in the formulation and 
actualisation of colour policy, one element consistently 
present in all of these initiatives was the protection and 
preservation of white interests. The safeguarding of white 
8. N.M. Stultz: Afrikaner Politics in South Africa, 1934-
1948, p.122. 
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interests thus determined the basic parameters of native 
policy. 
Secondly, ethnicity, as a central component of what T.D. 
Moodie has described as the Afrikaner's "Civil 
Religion",9)  was not only based on ethnocentric prejudice, 
but also contained, amongst other things, elements of a 
religious-theological nature and norms by which 
civilization was judged. The perceived difference between 
Christian and heathen in South Africa largely corresponded 
with racial differences between people. Similarly, 
perceived differences in civilization also found 
stratification in racial terms. Hence, the concept 
`Western civilization' also became an interchangeable term 
for `white man's civilization''. 
Thirdly, the philosophy of segregation-trusteeship, as 
defined by different administrations, did not entail a 
radically different approach towards the colour question. 
As indicated previously, it was rather the continuation - 
albeit more systematic - of a policy whose origins were 
firmly embedded in an earlier century. 
Finally, whereas phenomena such as urbanization and 
industrialisation and, generally speaking, the dynamics of 
economic development systematically undermined the 
declared status quo vis a vis racial policy, 10) Afrikaner 
nationalist oppositional groupings, by exploiting white 
fears and prejudice, proceeded to introduce a greater 
element of dogma into colour policy. Such was the case in 
both the `black peril' election of 1929 (won by Hertzog) 
and the defeat of Smuts and the UP in 1948. Concurrently, 
the greater emphasis on dogma contributed towards the 
See T.D. Moodie: The Rise of Afrikanerdom. Power,  
Apartheid and the Afrikaner "Civil Religion". 
Smuts, for example, declared with regard to colour policy 
in January 1942: "... I am afraid that segregation has 
fallen on evil days." (Cited in P. Walshe: The Rise of  
African Nationalism in South Africa, p.269). 
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demonisation and subsequent alienation of more liberal 
schools of thought on the colour question from the South 
African polity. The dwindling fortunes of Hofmeyr-style 
liberalism may well serve as example in this regard.11) 
The principles of segregation and trusteeship - particularly as 
it evolved under Hertzog - have been sufficiently dealt with in 
an earlier chapter. Ignored thus far, however, is the relative 
positioning of Coloureds vis a vis these concepts. 
In terms of Hertzog's understanding, Coloureds and whites, by 
sharing a common historical heritage, language and set of 
customs, could not simply be classed apart)-2) In spite of 
social inequalities and the tradition of a segregated community 
life, Coloureds and whites, politically and economically, were 
thus full equals. Translated into practical political 
objectives, this implied that qualified participation in the 
central decision-making process, traditionally enjoyed by 
Coloureds in the Cape Colony, had to be applied on a nation-
wide scale. Both in philosophy and in terms of practical 
objectives, Hertzog and successors of the Cape liberal 
tradition, in this regard, shared a common conviction. -3)  
Hertzog, following the coming to power of his National Party in 
1924, started applying his theories to practice. The perceived 
fundamental differences between black and white - an integral 
part of his philosophy - found near immediate application in 
See P. Lewsen: "Liberals in Politics and Administration, 
1936-1948" in J. Butler, R. Elphick and D. Welsh (eds.): 
Democratic Liberalism in South Africa, pp.98-115 and P.B. 
Rich: Liberalism and Ethnicity in South African Politics, 
1921-1948, (African Studies, vol. 35(3-4), 1976), pp.229-
251. 
See G. Lewis: Between the Wire and the Wall - A History of  
South African 'Coloured' Politics, pp.39-42. 
D.W. Kruger: The Making of a Nation, pp.149-150. 
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the policy of "civilized labour" .14) This principle was also to 
be found in the Immorality Act of 1927 - aimed at the 
prohibition of miscegenation across the colour bar. Relative to 
the colour question itself, Hertzog, in July 1926, introduced 
four Bills into Parliament which, according to Hepple, had as 
underlying motive the clear establishment of the "... principle 
that the government of the country must be in white hands and 
strongly safe guarded against any encroachment or weakening by 
non-whites."15)  These proposed Acts were the Representation of 
Natives Bill, 16)  the Native Council Bil1,17) the Native Land 
Bill18) and the Coloured Persons' Rights Bill.19 ) 
Differing opinions on the colour question within his own party 
and the politicised nature of this issue prevented Hertzog from 
For a discussion of this policy, its embodiment in various 
legislative and other measures and the impact thereof on 
the broader socio-political arena, see R.H. Davies: 
Capital, State and White Labour In South Africa. 1900-
1960, pp.179-245 and D. Yudelman: The Emergence of Modern 
South Africa, pp.221-224. 
A Hepple: A History of South Africa, p.108. 
The Representation of Natives Bill proposed the removal of 
blacks from the common voters roll in the Cape Province; 
thereby bringing the Cape in line with the status quo in 
the three northern provinces. As compensation, blacks, 
through their traditional structures, would have the right 
to elect seven white representatives in the House of 
Assembly and four in the Senate. See T.R.H. Davenport: 
South Africa - A Modern History, pp. 248-249 and D.W. 
KrUger: The Making of a Nation, pp.150-151. 
This Bill had as objective the creation of a Native 
Council composed of 50 blacks; 35 of whom were to be 
elected along lines similar to those proposed in the 
Representation of Natives Bill and the remainder nominated 
by the State. Although this body would have legislative 
power, only Ordinances could be passed by it and these 
would be binding only on Africans. See T.R.H. Davenport: 
op.cit., p.206. 
The Native Land Bill sought to consolidate trust land to 
be identified in terms of the Land Act of 1913. 
This fourth Bill proposed the extention of Coloured voting 
rights in the Cape to the three other provinces; thereby 
placing Coloureds and whites on an equal political 
footing. See Kruger: op.cit., p.151. 
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introducing the proposed legislation into Parliament. While the 
outcome of the 1929 election strenghtened Hertzog's position in 
both Houses, the extra voting power still proved insufficient 
for the two-thirds majority constitutionally required to carry 
his policy into effect.20) The only major piece of legislation 
enacted during this period which related to the colour question 
was the Native Administration Act of 1927. This Act, and 
particularly the controversial Section 29, have already been 
dealt with in an earlier chapter.21) 
While the colour question may not have been the most important 
contributory factor in promoting coalition between Hertzog and 
Smuts,22)  it was a definite stumbling block on the road to 
Fusion. The seven points agreed on by Smuts and Hertzog during 
March 1933, which formed the basis for Coalition, referred to 
the colour question in vague terms: 
"The Bantu question would be solved in such a way as 
to safeguard white civilization. The Bantu would 
however not be deprived of the right to develop. The 
political clvelopment of white and black would be 
separate."23) 
Fusion and the establishment of the UP, while bringing greater 
clarity on the new administration's policy towards the colour 
question, also retained the potential of a continued division 
in the party on this issue.24) 
See T.R.H. Davenport: South Africa - A Modern History, 
p.207. 
See Chapter One. 
See Le Roux and Coetzer's discussion of the reasons for 
Coalition. J.H. le Roux and P.W. Coetzer: Die Nasionale  
Party, III, pp.289-299. 
Cited in D.W. Kruger: The Making of a Nation, p.165. 
The Programme of Principles of the UP, as adopted by its 
inaugural congress in December 1934, declared with regard 
to native policy: 
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Hertzog's Bills of 1926, after serving for several sessions 
before a parliamentary Select Committee, came to the fore again 
during May 1935 in the form of a report by this committee. This 
report proposed the retention of two of the original three 
Bills, and, on the question of Coloured political rights, 
suggested this issue to be dealt with separately.25)  
The Native Representation Bill and the Land and Trust Bill, 
following a willingness by Hertzog to compromise, were finally 
enacted during the 1936-parliamentary session. The Native 
Representation Act, while not suspending the black franchise in 
the Cape altogether, did result in black voters in the Cape 
being placed on a separate electoral roll. Furthermore, black 
voters in the Cape were now divided into three constituencies, 
each one electing one white member to the House of Assembly. 
Provision was also made for the election, through traditional 
structures, of four white senators (one for the Transvaal and 
"(a) An earnest endeavour will be made to arrive at a 
satisfactory solution of the Native question along 
lines which, without depriving the Native of his 
right of development, will recognise as paramount the, 
essentials of European civilisation. 
It is recognised that a solution of the 
political aspect of this question on the basis of 
separate representation of Europeans and Natives, or 
otherwise, being fundamental in character and not 
having hithertho been a matter of party division, 
should as far as possible be sought through agreement 
and should be left to the free exercise of the 
discretion of the individual members representing the 
party in Parliament. 
The recognition of the Natives as a permanent 
part of the population of South Africa under the 
Christian trusteeship of the European race is 
accepted as a fundamental principle of Native policy, 
together with a definite avoidance of race 
intermixture, and the promotion of a spirit of 
goodwill and mutual confidence between the two races 
as being in the best interests of South Africa." 
(Cited in D.W. Kruger: South African Parties and 
Policies, 1900-1960, p.87). 
25. D.W. Kruger: The Making of a Nation, p.175. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
217 
OFS, one for Natal and two for the Cape Province) to represent 
black interests in Parliament. Finally, this Act also brought 
about the creation of the Native Representative Council - a 
body largely made up of blacks and which had a purely advisory 
and consultative function.26)  
The position regarding Coloured political rights remained 
unaltered. While the Commission set up to investigate this 
issue recommended an extension of the Coloured franchise to all 
provinces on a basis equal to that of whites, anti-Coloured 
feeling amongst whites and the lack of solidarity on this issue 
within the UP resulted in the Coloured Persons' Rights Bill 
being "... quietly dropped"27)  by Hertzog. 
Officially, Government policy on the colour question remained 
unchanged during the war period. While Smuts, on the one hand, 
was committed to segregation, little attempt was made to 
systematically develop on it. In many ways, as noted by 
Davenport, the policy of segregation was allowed It... to run 
down ..."28) Remarks by Smuts and others29)  and the appointment 
of several committees to investigate post-war reform may have 
even indicated a contemplated reversal in this regard. 
The Programme of Principles of the Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party, 
as adopted in 1936, declared with regard to the "Colour 
For a more detailed discussion of the different provisions 
of this Act and black and liberal white opposition to it, 
see T.R.H. Davenport: South Africa - A Modern History, 
pp.218-222; D.W. Kruger: The Making of a Nation, pp.176-
180 and E. Roux: Time Longer than Rope, pp.286-298. 
Kruger: op.cit., p.180. 
T.R.H. Davenport: South Africa - A Modern History, p.239. 
See footnote 10. 
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"14. Die Party erken die Christelike voogdy van die 
Europese ras oar die naturelle en kleurling-bevolking 
en verklaar horn beslis teen die menging van die 
blanke en nie-blanke rasse. Hy wil aan die nie-blanke 
rasse die geleentheid verskaf om hulself op eie 
terrein te ontwikkel ooreenkomstig hul natuurlike 
aanleg en vatbaarheid. 
Hy verklaar horn ten gunste van die territoriale en 
politieke segregasie van die naturel en van die 
aparte politieke verteenwoordiging van die kleurling. 
Op industriele gebied verklaar hy horn ten gunste van 
segregasie tussen blankes en nie-blankes.30)  
The GNP's approach to the colour question was in one sense a 
continuation of traditional Hertzog principles. Differences in 
policy with the UP evolved not so much around the goal of 
territorial segregation or the principle of white trusteeship, 
but related rather to the proposed extent of segregation and 
the manner in which this objective would be realized. Whereas 
Hertzog, as indicated, perceived segregation as comprising a 
political separation of black and white, the GNP, while 
agreeing with this, also wanted political separateness to be 
extended to Coloureds.31)  
Furthermore, within the context of ethnocentrism as motivation 
for segregation, Hertzog, at times, displayed a certain 
pragmatism in the realization of this goal. Hence, for example, 
he was willing to accept a compromise-solution in the enactment 
of the Native Representation Bill. Conversely, Malan and the 
GNP adopted an exclusive 'white perspective' in promoting its 
Cited in P.W. Coetzer and J.H. le Roux: Die Nasionale  
Party, III, p.639. 
In the parliamentary discussion of Hertzog's Native 
Representation Bill, for example, Malan proposed an 
amendment to remove both Coloureds and blacks from the 
common voters roll. See P.W. Coetzer and J.H. le 
Roux(eds.): Die Nasionale Party, IV, pp.48-51. 
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brand of segregation.32)  This perspective also prevented the 
GNP from lending its unequivocal support to the Land and Trust 
Bill.33) 
The G/HNP, from 1938 onwards, enthusiastically pursued the 
propagation of its colour policy. At times, as was the case 
during the general election of May 1938, the GNP made the 
colour question one of the pillars of its election campaign.34)  
While the course of events in Afrikaner nationalist politics 
during the war years and the war in itself brought a decreased 
importance to the colour question, the G/HNPIs approach towards 
this issue never lost its dogmatic ideological content. Smuts 
and the UP's lacklustre approach towards the colour question in 
Speaking in support of Malan's amendment to Hertzog's 
Native Representation Bill, N.J. van der Merwe declared 
with regard to segregation: "Daarop wil ek met nadruk se 
dat die rede waarom ons hierdie soort wetgewing wat In 
kleurlyn beoog, indien, tog uit gronde daarvan is dat die 
vrees in ons land toeneem dat, as ons hierdie vraagstuk 
nie langs hierdie lyn oplos nie, dit die voortbestaan van 
die Blanke ras as sodanig in Suid-Afrika in gevaar sal 
stel. Dit is In stryd om die sefbehoud van die Blanke ras 
in Suid-Afrika. Dit is nie In stryd on die naturel te 
verdruk nie of om die kleurling die voet op die nek te sit 
nie, maar dit is In stryd om die bestaan van die Blanke 
ras in Suid-Afrika te handhaaf. Daar word gevoel dat as 
daar eenmaal politieke gelykstelling is, dit nie daar sal 
bly nie. Dit sal verder gaan en deurwerk op ekonomiese 
gebied en sosiale gebied ... [so] kry jy later vermenging 
van bloed en die ondergang van die Blanke ras." (Hansard, 
13.2.1936, co1.60-61). 
While stressing that the GNP was not opposed to the 
consolidation of land for use by blacks, Strijdom, for 
example, also noted that whites were in greater need of 
land than non-whites. See Hansard, 15.4.1936, co1.2881. 
For a discussion of the place and role in the colour 
question in this election, see P.W. Coetzer and J.H. le 
Roux (eds.): Die Nasionale Party, IV, pp.149-158 and J.H. 
le Roux: Die "Gesuiwerde" Nasionale Party, 1935-1940, 
pp.387-394. The GNP's election programme, with regard to 
the colour question, included the following objectives: 
Separate living areas, labour organisation and, where 
possible, segregated places of work for whites and non-
whites; separate representation in legislative bodies for 
enfranchised Coloureds in the Cape ; and the extension of 
the 1927 Immorality Act to all non-whites and the 
prohibition of mixed marriages. See Die Transvaler, 
5.4.1938. 
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many ways prepared the way for the electoral triumph of the HNP 
in 1948. 
5.3. THE COLOUR QUESTION IN AFRIKANER NATIONALIST POLITICS 
The colour question, particularly during the war years, did not 
fulfill a prominent role on the overall agenda of each of the 
Ossewa-Brandwag, New Order or Greyshirt-movement. The OB's 
first manifesto, as issued by the Grootraad in April 1942, did 
not even make mention of the colour question.35)  While Van 
Rensburg did refer to the colour question in several of his 
speeches, it was only in November 1943 that specific mention 
was made of this issue in an OB policy document. The "Ten Point 
Policy Declaration", referred to earlier, declared in this 
regard: 
Only members of the nation can become national 
citizens - Only Afrikaners or potential Afrikaners 
can become nationals. In other words, only 
assimilable white elements ... 
We aim at a White South Africa - Non-Europeans 
are to be gradually segregated out of European 
territory to promote racial purity and the unhindered 
spontaneous national development of each element. 
Economic requirements to receive due consideration 
• • 
(6) Christian Nationalism instead of Liberalism - 
The national development of our people and also of 
the Coloured and native people on the basis of 
Christian Nationalism ... by [the] eradication of 
anti-Christian and anti-national propaganda, whether 
of miscegenation or of racial antagonism  
(italics in the original). 
Oswald Pirow described the goal of the NO'S colour policy as 
being the It • • onverbiddelike handhawing van die Blanke 
beskawing in die Unie en sover dit deur onderhandeling en 
See Die Ossewa-Brandwag - Vanwaar en Waarheen, pp.3-6. 
Some Facts about the Ossewa-Brandwaq, pp.97-99. 
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beinvloeding moontlik is, ook elders in Afrika.1t37)  In the 
realization of this declared aim, a policy of "Blanke 
Christelike voogdyskap oor alle nie-blankes gegrondves op die 
beginsel van algehele segregasie en die ontwikkeling langs eie 
lyne onder staatstoesig"38)  was proposed. In terms of practical 
and attainable goals, however, little serious attention was 
afforded to the colour question. Similar to the NO's policy on 
Jewish Immigration, Pirow only proceeded to elaborate on this 
issue after May 1945. 
While the Greyshirt-movement, as was the case with the NO, only 
attempted to come to terms with the colour question after 
1945,39)  during the war years this movement's approach formed 
part of its broader nationality policy. Already in 1936 Die 
Waarheid-The Truth had described the South African nation as 
being composed of ... all persons of pure European and Aryan 
descent who look upon South Africa as their only home and who 
make 'South Africa First' the guiding rule of all their social, 
economic and political activities."4°)  While Jews did not form 
part of the NO-constructed nation as a result of their non-
Aryan background, Africans, on the basis of their non-white 
ancestry, were also disqualified from holding citizenship in 
the proposed state. No indication, however, was provided of 
whether non-whites would be dealt with in a similar manner as 
provided for Jews.41) 
Had it not been for other differences in ideology and strategy, 
colour policy may well have served as a provisional basis for 
cooperation between the G/HNP, New Order, Ossewa-Brandwag and 
Greyshirt-movement. All of these organisations, be it openly or 
by implication, agreed on the untenability of racial 
0. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, p.20. 
Ibid., p.21. 
Ibid., pp.70-71. 
Die Waarheid-The Truth, 23.7.1936. 
See Chapter Three. 
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integration and foresaw an elevated and dominant position for 
whites in society. Pirow, who had once been a supporter of 
Hertzog's ideal of Coloured enfranchisement, stressed the need 
to segregate "... alle nie-blankes ... 42) (emphasis in the 
original). As indicated previously, both the HNP and the 
Ossewa-Brandwag, towards the end of World War II, referred to 
their respective race policies by using the term apartheid. 
Prospects of cooperation with the HNP may well have been an 
important contributory factor for the inclusion of articles 
relating to specifically the colour question in the the OB's 
"Ten Point Policy Declaration" of November 1943. This must also 
be seen against the backdrop of Van Rensburg's and the 
Grootraad's campaign, launched in 1944, to establish a 
yolks front. 
In practice, however, the possibility of concurrence on the 
colour question and, resulting from that, cooperation, were 
overshadowed by other differences. By being the largest and 
having the greater visibility, to mention but two factors, the 
G/HNP, on occasion where it did refer to the colour question, 
had an almost complete monopoly in influencing and guiding 
Afrikaner nationalist popular opinion. Hence, the greater part 
of this chapter will be devoted to the Gesuiwerde/Herenigde 
Nasionale Party. 
5.4. THE INTEGRATION OF THE 'RED MENACE'AND 'BLACK PERIL' 
The causal linking of issues/phenomena in South African 
politics did not start with Afrikaner nationalism's campaign 
against perceived communism. Decades of racial animosity and 
antagonism, together with differing perceptions of the place 
and role of respectively black and white in society, provided 
an ideal breeding ground for the future linking of the colour 
question with some other phenomenon. Unification, in so far as 
it brought together different strands of thinking on the colour 
question, dramatically increased this potential. 
42. 0. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, p.30. 
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The question may well be posed whether Smuts had not laid the 
tactical groundwork for the later connection between the colour 
question and perceived communism. In vindicating the use of 
force against striking mineworkers, Smuts, as indicated, 
alleged that the Rand Revolt had broken out as a result of 
(white) workers being misled by a small number of foreign 
communist agitators.43)  Although Smuts' analysis of the 
situation was a factual misrepresentation, the point in focus 
is the supposed ability of a small number of foreign agitors to 
manipulate the behaviour of a larger body of people to the 
detriment of the state. 
The first actual linking of the colour question and 
..• certain doctrines ..." took place in 1927 under Hertzog's 
administration. While communism was not explicitly identified 
as 'unhealthy' doctrine, little doubt existed about the 
eligibility of communists for prosecution under Section 29 of 
the Native Administration Act.44) Pirow, in 1930, specifically 
identified 'communism' as a major contributor to the perceived 
state of fermentation in race relations. 
Apart from the historical significance of Section 29 of the 
Native Administration Act and the Rioutous Assemblies 
(Amendment) Act in the linking of communism and the colour 
question, these measures also have had a functional 
significance vis a vis the integration of the 'red menace' and 
'black peril'. Section 29, in retrospect, was the 
institutionalisation of the primary tradition of anti-communism 
in South africa, viz, the belief that blacks would be perverted 
by a perceived unhealthy doctrine which was primarily directed 
against white hegemony in society. 'Unhealthy doctrine', by 
1930, was explicitly identified as 'communism'. Hertzog's 
administration in many ways paved the way, ideologically 
speaking, for the integration of perceived communism and the 
See Chapter One. 
Ibid.  
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colour question in Afrikaner nationalist thinking. This, issue 
will be returned to later. 
Pirow, in 1930, also paid particular attention to the alleged 
machinations of the Comintern and activities of foreign 
(communist) agitators as factors allegedly contributing to the 
perceived state of fermentation in race relations. The emphasis 
on foreign involvement corresponded, in principle, with Smuts' 
allegations, five years before, that the Rand Revolt was a 
product of foreign (communist) agitation. Furthermore, on both 
occasions, it was adjudged to be detrimental to the interests 
of the state. 
Afrikaner nationalist portrayals of the perceived communist 
menace, from 1937 onwards, also relied heavily on the perceived 
communiality in objectives between communists internationally 
and the vanguard role of Moscow and the CI in this regard. 
Important is to note, once again, the principle of foreign 
involvement and the perceived ability of mass misleading by an 
in effect miniscule grouping. 
5.4.1. 	 The Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party, Communism and the 
Colour Question : The Pre-War Period 
The linking of the colour question and communism, within the 
GNP, only started following a social function in Cape Town 
during May 1937. While the above occasion, given communism's 
perceived aim to obliterate the colour bar and the GNP's 
insistence on a rigid separation of black and white, proved an 
ideal vantage point for the linking of the 'red menace' and 
'black peril', it was only the first in a series of 
developments and events over the next two and a half years 
which could be exploited to focus attention on either the 
colour question or the alleged impact of Marxist dogma on non-
whites. Furthermore, the overall prominence of colour policy in 
South African politics in general and specifically on the GNP's 
political agenda over this period provided added incentive for 
the linking of the perceived menace of communism and the colour 
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question and, even more importantly, contributed towards the 
integration thereof. 
Finally, together with the GNP's emphasis on racial equality as 
a distinguishing feature of communism, the linking of the 'red 
menace' and 'black peril', as it evolved between 1927 and 1930, 
cannot be discounted as contributory factor in this regard. 
This aspect will be returned to later. 
As indicated in an earlier paragraph, a series of events and 
developments between 1937 and 1939 provided the GNP with the 
opportunity to promote its colour policy and, in the context of 
this study, the perceived connection between communism and the 
colour question. These events, their utilisation by the GNP to 
promote its colour policy and the alleged connection with 
communism were: 
(1) Racially mixed functions and meetings: Functions and 
meetings attended by people of different races, 
irrespective of whether it was organised by the CPSA or 
not, were more often than not described as either the 
result of communist propaganda or initiated by communists. 
While Malan, in commenting on the earlier referred to 
social function of May 1937, was primarily concerned with 
the actual mixing of races, he also stressed that this had 
come about as a result of ... die geweldige ommekeer wat 
daar onder kommunistiese 	 invloed half ongemerk in die 
laaste tyd plaasgevind het."45) Reporting on a similar 
function held in Cape Town two years later, Die  
Transvaler, while cautious not to describe it as a 
communist-organised event, nevertheless noted that "[d]ie 
blankes wat met die nie-blankes gedans het, was meestal 
did wat groot bedrywigheid op kommunistiese vergaderings 
aan die dag le."46) The obvious antedate, for the GNP, 
Die Burger, 7.5.1937. 
Die Transvaler, 26.5.1939. See also reports on similar 
occasions as reported by Die Burger, 24.9.1937 and 
2.5.1939 and Die Transvaler, 6.5.1939. 
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was, firstly, a separation of black and white as proposed 
in its Programme of Principles and, secondly, the strict 
application thereof. Malan, in 1937, compared the GNP's 
policy of segregation with the perceived 'communist' 
policy of integration: 
"Die 	 ou 	 Voortrekker-idee 	 van 
rassesuiwerheid en van die witman se 
voogdyskap as die draer en die waarborg van 
die Christelike beskawing word oor boord 
gegooi en in plaas daarvan word die 
uitwissing van alle kleurgrense openlik 
bepleit."47)  
(ii) The killing of two white policemen in Vereeniging,during 
September 1937: For the GNP there was little doubt that 
these killings had been the result of communist 
agitation.48)  The impact of this perceived communist 
agitation on race relations was indicated by N.J. van der 
Merwe: "In die verlede, ondanks al die wanvoorstellings 
van die negrofiliste en kommuniste, het die Afrikaner goed 
met die naturel klaargekom en was daar tevredenheid by die 
kaffernasie."49)  
(iii)The Coloured protest march to Parliament, 25.3.1939: Not 
only did this march allegedly vindicate the often referred 
to GNP contention 	 dat die Kleurlinge nie [teen 
kommunisme] immuun is nie",50) but also, and even more 
importantly, that Coloureds were thus also in need of 
protection and trusteeship by 'right-minded' whites. In 
terms of colour policy, this implied, as propagated by the 
Die Burger, 7.5.1937. 
Die Burger, in this regard, declared that "... die bloed 
van daardie vermoorde konstabels [is] op die hoofde 
van die kommunistiese agitators wat die onbeskaafde 
naturelle ophits." See Die Burger, 11.10.1937: "Allow 
Things to Develop" [editorial]. 
See Van der Merwe's speech at a GNP protest meeting in 
Bloemfontein as reported by Die Burger on 11.10.1937. 
See Die Burger, 13.7.1938: "Parade-opstokery" [editorial]. 
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GNP, that segregation - especially political - also had to 
be extended to include Coloureds. Malan, in this regard, 
stressed that the protes van die Kleurlinge gemunt 
(sic!) is teen die segregasie-beleid van die Regering en 
ook die van die [Gesuiwerde] Nasionale Party."51)  
The general election of May 1938: The colour question, 
next to neutrality, was the most prominent issue on the 
GNP's election manifesto. On numerous occasions during the 
course of this election campaign, GNP speakers referred to 
the perceived menace inherent to communism for the 
continued survival of South Africa as a 'white man's 
land'. D.F. Malan, for example, stressed the existence of 
a kommunistiese aksie ... met die uitgesproke 
doel 	 om rasse- en kleur-gelykstelling in alle opsigte 
te verkry ..."52) 
The extraordinary congress of the GNP, November 1938: This 
extraordinary congress, held in Bloemfontein, was 
exclusively devoted to the colour question. The role of 
the GNP in solving the colour question and the manner in 
which it had to be done was indicated in no uncertain 
terms: "Die [Gesuiwerde] Nasionale Party is die enigste 
party vandag wat die kleurskeidslyn wil trek. Die 
[Gesuiwerde] Nasionale Party wil die naturel se stem 
heeltemal wegneem en die stem van die kleurling ook 
wegneem van die van die blankes."53)  
Communism was identified as a complicating factor which 
prevented the solving of the colour question. Malan 
referred to this exacerbating effect in the following 
Die Transvaler, 27.3.1939. 
See Malan's speech at Porterville as reported by Die  
Burger and Die Transvaler, 5.4.1938. 
Die Transvaler, 9.11.1938. 
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"Daar is magte waarmee ons te kampe het, 
nl. die van kommunisme ... Die kommunisme 
verkondig die leer van gelykstelling. Daar 
moet geen kleurskeidslyne op alle gebiede 
wees nie ... As kommunisme in ander landeln 
gevaar is wat bestry moet word, dan is dit 
hier dubbel In gevaar, want dit sny diep in 
die bestaan van ons blanke bevolking."54)  
Important to note is that communism's rejection of the colour 
bar, in GNP circles, was adjudged to be a distinguishing 
feature of the Marxist ideology. Die Transvaler, for example, 
declared that 	 . die onvoorwaardelike uitwissing van die 
kleurslagboom 	 [e]en van die wesenselemente van die 
kommunisme [is] 	 ."55)(italics mine). Malan, prior to the 
outbreak of war, regularly stressed this distinctiveness.56)  
The conception of racial equality as being a distinctive 
feature of communism is important for a number of reasons. On 
one level, as indicated, it proved the ideological correctness 
of Hertzog's and Pirow's approach during the latter half of the 
1920s and early 1930s in explaining the then existing state of 
affairs in race relations on the basis of it being affected, in 
1927, by 	 unhealty doctrine ..." and, during 1930, by 
specifically "... communism ..." The GNP, as the "true" and 
54. Ibid.  
Die Transvaler, 13.5.1938. 
See, for example, Malan's speeches at the opening of the 
Cape Provincial Congress of the Party in Uitenhage during 
August 1937 (Die Burger, 19.8.1937); at Oudtshoorn less 
than three months later (Die Burger, 30.10.1937); in 
Bloemfontein during the GNP's national congress in 
November 1938; and, during 1939, at public meetings in 
Citrusdal (Die Burger, 27.6.1939) and Krugersdorp (Die  
Transvaler, 23.8.1939). 
228 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
229 
legitimate inheritor of the ideals of Afrikaner nationa1ism,57)  
was the party best suited and had the innate responsibility to 
continue with the tradition of warning the yolk against the 
perceived apocalyptic effect of what was adjudged to be 
communism. Needless to say, this perception, on its own, was a 
powerful motivation for the integration of the `red menace' and 
`black peril'. 
On a second level, and in more actual terms, racial equality, 
as a perceived distinguishing feature of Marxist ideology, 
formed the basis for the connection to be . made between the 
colour question and perceived communism. This also contributed 
towards the integration thereof. Finally, in propagating racial 
separation on the basis of white trusteeship, as opposed to the 
`communist policy' of racial integration, the GNP was not only 
providing a solution for the colour question, but also, and 
even more importantly, proved itself to be in the forefront of 
the struggle against perceived communism. 
The emotional atmosphere resulting from and created by those 
events and episodes referred to earlier, against the backdrop 
of the colour question as a prominent issue in South African 
politics, promoted and solidified the integration of the `red 
menace' and the `black peril' in GNP thinking. Two examples 
will serve to illustrate this: Colour policy, as indicated, 
figured prominently in the GNP's 1938 election campaign. In 
57. An important element in the G/HNP's overall strategy to 
legitimise its existence evolved around the ideals of 
Afrikaner nationalism. These ideals, for the G/HNP, had 
initially found expression in Hertzog's original National 
Party. Smuts' SAP, on the other hand, was depicted as the 
embodiment of the British imperial tradition and therefore 
inherently opposed to the ideals of Afrikaner nationalism. 
Fusion, in the words of Malan, was thus "... die 
vereniging van onverenigbare elemente ..." (Cited in J.H. 
le Roux and P.W. Coetzer: Die Nasionale Party, III, p.616) 
The establishment of the Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party, on 
the other hand, did not imply the formation of a new 
party, but was a continuation of the old National Party. 
The Party was `new' insofar as it had been purified from 
so-called anti-national and imperialistic elements. Not 
the GNP, but rather the UP, in terms of this argument, was 
thus a splinter grouping. 
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focussing attention on this issue and in particular the 
perceived menaces inherent to mixed-race marriages, the Party 
made use of an election poster depicting a neglected white 
woman and her black husband in front of a dilapidated house 
with a black child and white child playing in the 
foreground.58)  The inscription on this poster read: "Die hoop 
van Suid-Afrika spreek tot u en se: Stem vir die [Gesuiwerde] 
Nasionale Party en beskerm my volk en my nageslag teen Gemengde 
Huwelike wat die Verenigde party nie wil belet deur wetgewing 
nie."59)  In 'exposing' the alleged communist menace, Die 
Transvaler, shortly before election day, related communism to 
this election poster: 
"Dieselfde gevaar wat deur die [Gesuiwerde] Nasionale 
Party op sy verkiesingsplakkaat voorgestel word en 
wat die roekelose propagandastormloop van die Rant 
van die Verenigde Party-pers tot gevolg het, bekruip 
die yolk van Suid-Afrika ook langs In ander weg - die 
weg van die kommunisme."")  
The 1939 Coloured march to Parliament, while directed against 
political segregation,61)  was portrayed by the GNP as 
communist-sponsored agitation. In portraying the march in this 
fashion, Malan, for example, alleged that it had taken place 
onder leiding van erkende kommunistiese blankes."62)  At a 
public meeting in the Transvaal some months later, J.J. Hayward 
(GNP MP for Bloemfontein District) identified the leaders of 
this march as allegedly having been three communist Jews.63)  
58. This poster created -a furore in white politics at the 
time. For a discussion, see P.W. Coetzer and J.H. le Roux: 
Die Nasionale Party, IV, pp.150-153. 
Cited in Ibid., p.151. 
See Die Transvaler, 13.5.1938. 
P.W. Coetzer and J.H. le Roux (eds.): Die Nasionale Party, 
IV, p.70. 
Die Burger, 29.3.1939. 
See Die Transvaler, 8.8.1939. 
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A third series of factors which contributed towards the 
integration of the colour question and the perceived communist 
menace related to cited examples of communist involvement in 
non-white affairs. These factors can be divided into two 
categories, viz, perceived subjective conditions within the 
non-white community which promoted susceptability to perceived 
communist influencing and perceived actual examples of 
communist involvement with non-whites. 
Relative to the first category, this mainly evolved around the 
concept of white trusteeship. Communism, in terms of this 
concept, was adjudged to be equally menacing for both white and 
black. In the case of whites, this ideology endangered the 
survival of the yolk, particularly in so far as it threatened 
the hegemonic position of the white man vis a vis race / 
relations. For people of colour, as members of a perceived/ 
child-race, this ideology held the potential of causing havoc. 
Alleged non-white susceptability to communism were subsequently 
stressed. Words used in this regard included "... onbeskaafde 
and 
Transvaler even proceeded to state that communism "... het, IV/ 
n66) 
While it was accepted, with near uniformity, that blacks were 
in need of white protection/guidance, differences in opinion, 
as indicated, existed on the perceived applicability of this 
paternalism to the Coloured population. The GNP, as opposed to 
the UP, stressed that Coloureds could not be dealt with as a 
unique entity, separate from other non-whites. Relative to 
alleged Coloured susceptability to communism, the GNP went to 
considerable lengths to illustrate this conviction. :The 
Coloured protest march to Parliament in 1939, as indicated, 
Die Burger, 11.10.1937: "Allow Things to Develop" 
[editorial]. 
Die Burger, 23.9.1937: "Kommunistiese Bedrywigheid" 
[editorial]. 
Die Transvaler, 18.7.1938: "In Les uit die Spaanse 
Burgeroorlog" [editorial]. 
naturelle 	 ...n64) swart heidendom ..."65) Die 
besonder geil bodem in die naturellegemoed gevind 
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was portrayed as having taken place under the influence and 
leadership of communists. Support for this contention came from 
an unexpected quarter in the form of a comment by Morris 
Kentridge, UP candidate for the constituency of Cape Town 
Castle during the 1938-election, who, in having a public 
meeting of his in District Six broken up by rowdy elements, 
attributed this to communist agitation.67)  Commenting on 
Kentridge's contention, Die Burger subsequently declared: 
"Volkome waar, maar nie nuut nie. Die [Gesuiwerde] 
Nasionale Party en die Nasionale koerante het al by 
herhaling op daardie gevaar gewys, maar adv. 
Kentridge se leiers het die waarskuwings voorgestel 
as sommer In gogga van die Nasionaliste."68)  
Malan, in the course of the period under discussion, also 
referred to one 
feature' peculiar 
more susceptible 
other alleged characteristic or `innate 
to blacks which supposedly made them even 
to communist propaganda. Speaking at the 
opening of the Uitenhage Congress of the Cape GNP in 1937, 
Malan declared that the African provided fertile soil for the 
spreading of communism "... omdat [hy] 	 uit die aard van sy 
tradisie In voorstander van stambesit van grond is ... u69)  
Communalism, in this case the common ownership of land, for 
Malan, thus represented a form of primitive or proto-communism. 
Important, however, is to note that Malan did not repeat this 
contention, nor did he find any support for it amongst Congress 
delegates. 
The second category of factors related to perceived actual 
examples of communist involvement with non-white affairs. While 
Die Transvaler declared that this involvement was the result of 
ideological considerations (the racial stratification of class 
See report on this meeting and interview with Kentridge as 
published in Die Transvaler, 22.4.1938. 
See Die Burger, 25.4.1938: "Opsweping van Kleurlinge" 
[editorial]. 
Die Burger, 19.8.1937. 
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in South Africa),70)  this remark represented the exception 
rather than the rule. 
Judging from the available material, perceived communist 
involvement with non-whites, if not based on actual 
observation,71)  was accepted a priori as a given reality. At 
first, remarks on the alleged involvement of communists with 
non-white affairs pertained to the organised labour movement. 
While this may well have been a remnant of the GNP's initial 
interest in the issue of communism, equally important is to 
note that several GNP speakers and newspaper articles connected 
this to the emphasis by Marxist ideology on the proletariat. 
Die Transvaler, for example, declared that "... hierdie 
klasseverdeling vorm die fundamentele uitgangspunt van die 
kommunisme."72)  Possibly as a result of this, Die Burger may 
have been led to note that 600 die stedelike 
naturellewerkers 	 In vrugbare veld vir kommunistiese 
bedrywigheid uitmaak 	 11 In terms of actual examples of 
communist involvement in black trade unionism, J.H. Conradie 
(GNP candidate for the constituency of Gordonia during the 1938 
general election), in a speech to a public meeting at Maitland, 
See Die Transvaler's `exposé' of communist activities as 
it appeared in the edition of 13.5.1938. See also an 
editorial in Die Burger on 23.9.1937: "Kommunistiese 
Bedrywigheid". 
Two examples of alleged factual observations need to be 
mentioned in this regard: Eric Louw, in a speech at a 
public meeting in Springs during August 1939 stated that 
he was in possession of documentary evidence which 
indicated "... kommuniste in Suid-Afrika se strewe om 
naturelle van die land teen die bestaande orde te 
organiseer ..." (Die Transvaler, 9.8.1939) Two years 
earlier, at the Uitenhage Congress of the Cape GNP, Malan 
had also made an assertion of a similar nature. The 
`factual' basis of Malan's contention, on this occasion, 
however, was based on an alleged instruction which had 
emanated from the Communist International. See Die Burger, 
19.8.1937. 
Die Transvaler, 13.5.1938. See also Louw's interview with 
Die Burger on 2.8.1937 on his return to South Africa and 
Malan's speech at the lUitenhage Congress. (Die Burger, 
19.8.1937) 
Die Burger, 21.10.1937: "Onbelangrik?" [editorial]. 
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stated that out of the seven trade unions formed in Cape Town 
during the preceding months, four were headed by known 
communists.74)  Relating this activity to the Witwatersrand, Die 
Transvaler declared: 
"Daar bestaan aan die Rand vandag nie minder as 20 
kommunisties georienteerde naturellevakvereniginqs 
nie, en die propaganda-veldtog duur steeds voort."75) 
Die Tranvaler, in its earlier referred to `exposé' of communist 
activities, made mention of two further spheres of perceived 
communist activity amongst non-whites. The first sphere, which 
seemingly had as objective the transformation of non-whites 
from passive onlookers to active proponents of communism, was 
the regular holding of `educational classes' in the 
Johannesburg head office of the CPSA. Membership of the 
Communist Party depended on the passing of a test: "Die toets 
neem die vorm aan van In kommunistiese toespraak op In soort 
van massavergadering."76)  
The secppd sphere related to the propagation of perceived 
communism amongst blacks in country districts. This, according 
to Die Transvaler, took place under the guise of religion for 
which particularly the Independent Black Churches proved to be 
well suited for.77) 
Intertwined with all of these allegations was the contention 
that non-whites merely served as pawns in the communist grand 
strategy. These `helpful idiots' would be discarded after they 
had served their function. Die Transvaler, in an editorial 
during September 1937, referred to this aspect in the following 
terms: 
See Die Burger, 12.11.1937. 
Die Transvaler, 13.5.1938. 
Ibid. See also Die Transvaler, 28.4.1938. 
Ibid., 13.5.1938. 
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"Die naturelle-arbeiders moet georganiseer word. Is 
hulle eenmaal goed georganiseer, Ran hulle gebruik 
word om `n toestand te skep wat op die bolsjewisering 
van die land moet uitloop ... Weer is dit nie die 
belange van die naturel wat beoog word nie, wel om 
die naturel as In middel te gebruik vir die eintlike 
einddoel, In bolsjewistiese Suid-Afrika."78)  
In similar vein, as indicated earlier, the Coloured protest 
march of 1939 was depicted as having taken place under the 
leadership of white, Jewish communists. Apart from contributing 
to the integration of the `red menace' and `black peril', this 
allegation also had the function of vindicating the perceived 
correctness of the GNP's colour policy. 
While it would be wrong to assume that that the concepts `red 
menace' and `black peril' had become interchangable terms by 
1939, the period between 1937 and the outbreak of war were 
characterised by several developments which contributed towards 
the interfusement of the colour question and the perceived 
communist menace. Ideas and patterns of thought which came to 
the fore during this period were either consolidated or further 
refined during the war years. In the next section these 
processes of consolidation and development will be analysed and 
discussed. 
5.4.2. 	 Communism and the Colour Question during the war 
years:Integration, Consolidation and Development 
Between 1939 and 1945, three series of events in particular 
triggered a new wave of protestations over perceived communism 
from the G/HNP. In chronological order these events were the 
decision to involve South Africa in World War II, the 
participation of the Soviet Union on the side of the Allied 
Forces in the war and the arming of non-white members of the 
Union Defence Force. To this can be added a further factor, 
viz, the dilution of orthodox native policy under Smuts' 
administration. 
78. Die Burger, 23.9.1937. 
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These events and developments, according to the G/HNP, 
contributed towards the propagation of communism, particularly 
amongst non-whites, in the following manner: 	 • 
Firstly, World War II and South African involvement 
therewith subjectively promoted the cause of communism. On 
the one hand, participation in the war gave rise to and 
would continue to promote, as termed by Die Burger, 
valse verwagtings ..."79) Applied to non-whites in South 
Africa and translated into practical objectives, this 
implied, according to the G/HNP, a striving towards full 
racial equality. The cause of communism, the proponents of 
which were in the forefront of this striving, would, as a 
matter of course, be promoted by this. Conversely, the 
general socio-economic imbalance resulting from and 
created by an extended war would also favour the cause of 
communism.")  Important is to note that this last 
deduction was initially made applicable exclusively to 
non-whites. 
Secondly, the inclusion of the USSR in the Allied Alliance 
supposedly placed Smuts under moral obligation to allow 
communists a proverbial free hand in the propagation of 
their ideology. There was little doubt that the non-white 
population would be a preferential target and that this 
Die Burger, 8.1.1943: "Die Nuwe Opstokery" [editorial]. 
Die Burger, in this regard, declared in August 1942: "In 
Lang oorlog beteken onder meer dat ontsaglike ekonomiese 
moeilikhede vir ons land, die ideale toestand vir die 
verspreiding van kommunisme. Laat daarom die kommunistiese 
agitators voortgaan soos hulle nou doen, en dit is te 
voorsien dat hul agitasie nog tydens die oorlog tot nie-
blanke onrus en ontevredenheid van die allergevaarlikste 
aard gaan lei." (Die Burger, 19.8.1942: "Selfbedrog" 
[editorial]) See also Louw's reference to this issue in 
his 1943 motion on communism (Hansard, 12.2.1943, 
co1.1495). 
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agitation would largely comprise propaganda in favour of 
racial equality.81)  
Finally, the arming of non-white members of the Union 
Defence Force proved doubly beneficial for the propagation 
of communist doctrine. The participation of people of 
colour in an alleged white man's war82) placed non-whites 
on par with whites and, in certain instances, even 
elevated above whites. The impact this supposedly had on 
non-whites was indicated by Die Burger: "Bloot deur hom in 
dieselfde uniform met dieselfde kentekens as die blanke 
soldaat te steek, is al genoeg om In kleurling [of 
naturel], veral van die swakste klas, sy balans te laat 
verloor."83)  
Regarding perceived non-white susceptability to communism, 
J.G. St4)dom, in a speech at Nylstroom during May 1943, 
declared: "Dit (bewapening) maak hulle vatbaar vir die 
kommunistiese leerstelling van gelykwaardigheid •n84) 
Apart from contributing to perceived non-white 
susceptability to communism, the arming of non-white 
Commenting on perceived communist propaganda in South 
Africa and the alleged role of Smuts as facilitator in 
this regard, Die Burger (5.7.1943) declared: "Die akker 
van ontevredenheid ... word tans ywerig deur die 
kommuniste bewerk met die medewete en verlof, so nie met 
die aktiewe medewerking en goedkeuring van hierdie 
oorlogsbewind wat Suid-Afrika se toekoms as witmansland 
daardeur aan die verskriklikste gevare blootstel. Om hul 
strewe draai die kommuniste geen doekies nie. Hulle eis 
gelykstelling tussen blank en gekleurd op elke gebied ..." 
Malan and others, on a number of occasions, described 
World War II as a struggle between white and white. See, 
for example, Malan's speech at Zeerust in May 1943 
(reported in Die Transvaler on 28.5.1943) and an editorial 
entitled "Smutsvrugte" in Die Burger on 30.12.1943. 
Interesting is to note that even with the participation of 
Japanese forces - according to the HNP members of an 
Asiatic race - in World War II, the Party made little 
attempt to revise its characterisation of the war. 
Die Burger, 25.3.1943: "Net die Simptoom"[editorial]. 
See Die Transvaler, 3.5.1943. 
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soldiers allegedly also aided the cause of communism in so 
far as those individuals, according to the HNP, could be 
used as perceived shock troops for the planned communist 
revolution in South Africa. Malan, as indicated in an 
earlier chapter, on occasion referred to the arming of 
non-white soldiers in this context. 
While the above events provided the outer framework for the 
linking of communism and the colour question, the integration 
thereof continued to be determined by premises and assertions 
which had already appeared earlier. The basic premise for the 
linking and subsequent integration of communism and the colour 
question continued to be this ideology's perceived striving 
towards racial equality. A dualistic approach evolved in this 
regard. On the one hand, as before, the negation of the colour 
bar was typified as unique to communism. A.J. Stals (HNP MP for 
Hopetown), for example, referred to this as ... die derde 
hoeksteen van Kommunisme ..."85) while Die Burger noted that 
"... die uitwissing van kleurgrense is In grondbeginsel van die 
kommunisme."86)  
Conversely, while still referring to the striving toward racial 
equality as distinctive from other perceived characteristics of 
Marxist ideology, HNP speakers indicated that this striving was 
not unique to communism. Strijdom, in particular, took the lead 
here.87)  The striving towards racial equality, in this regard, 
was also made applicable to the ruling United Party. Racial 
equality, however, was depicted in such a manner so as to 
create the impression that opposition to the colour bar 
remained a trait indicative of the perceived communist 
Hansard, 25.1.1944, col. 113. 
Die Burger, 11.7.1944: "Valse Front" [editorial]. 
See, for example, Strydom's speech in Parliament on 
13.2.1943 (Hansard, 13.2.1943, co1.2071-2072) and his 
address to a public meeting in Cape Town less than a 
fortnight later (Die Transvaler, 27.2.1942). 
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approach. In Parliament, for example, Strijdom declared: 
11 	 wat die kleurvraagstuk betref is daar tussen die 
leerstellings van Kommunisme en die leerstellings van 
die Eerste Minister absoluut geen verskil nie. 
Kommunisme se leerstelling is gelykstelling tussen 
wit en swart en dit is die sielsoortuiging van die 
huidige Eerste Minister."88)  
The alleged focussing of communist propaganda on specifically 
the non-white population, as before, was accepted as a given 
reality.89)  At other times, however, the G/HNP attempted to 
explain this on the basis of a perceived historical tradition 
or by way of an indiscriminate usage of conventional 
Marxist/Socialist rhetoric. Relative to the first aspect, 
Strijdom, for example, traced perceived communist propaganda 
amongst non-whites back to the period before 1930.90)  Louw also 
attributed a historical character to communist involvement with 
non-whites in referring to an unspecified Comintern 
directive 91) 
At other times, when explaining this perceived preference 
against the backdrop of Marxist terminology, it was done in 
such a manner that no other deduction was seemingly possible. 
Louw, in presenting his 1943 motion on communism to Parliament, 
identified several reasons which allegedly explained why 
communists paid special attention to non-whites in the 
dissemination of their propaganda. One of those reasons cited 
by Louw referred to the concept "masses" as allegedly used in 
Hansard, 13.2.1943, co1.2071. 
See Eric Louw's letter as published in Die Transvaler on 
27.6.1941 and editorials in Die Burger on 7.8.1941 
("Bondgenote") and 5.5.1944 ("Hulle Verleen gulp"). 
Hansard, 13.3.1942, co1.2067 and 2069. 
See Ibid., 12.2.1943, co1.1480. 
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communist ideology. According to Louw: 
"Die ... naturelle is by uitstek in Suid-Afrika [die] 
"massas". Dwarsdeur die kommunistiese leerstellings 
kry ons die idee van die massas. Die 6 000 000 
naturelle in Suid-Afrika is die massas en daarom word 
die propaganda veral aan hulle gerig. 1192) 
At other times HNP members analysed the concepts "bourgeoise" 
and "proletariat" in almost exclusive racial terms. Class 
struggle, in the South African context, thus implied a race war 
between white and black - according to the HNP. Stals referred 
to this contention in the following terms: 
"[Kommunisme will 	 sy doel 	 bereik deur die 
beginsel van klassestryd. Waar in Suid-Afrika die 
blanke man, altans die grootste deel van die blankes 
as bourgeois kan beskou word en al die ander in die 
oog van die Kommuniste beskou word as proletariaat en 
waar hulle die stryd wil voer tussen die bourgeoisie 
en die proletariaat, dan is daar geen vooruitsig vir 
die bestaan van die blanke man as daardie 
grondbeginsel eenmaal posgevat het nie."93)  
Irrespective of the motivation presented to validate claims of 
a similar nature than the above, the G/HNP was primarily 
interested in 'exposing' the alleged extent of perceived 
communist propaganda amongst the non-white population. This, in 
turn, could serve as basis for the promotion of the Party's 
Christian-Nationalist cause. 
Regarding perceived non-white susceptability to communism, the 
years between 1939 and 1945 were characterised by both 
continuity and caDge. In terms of continuity, the alleged 
normative differences between black and white and, 
consequently, the receptiveness of the former grouping for 
communist influencing were further solidified in G/HNP 
Ibid., co1.1484. 
Ibid., 25.1.1944, co1.113. Malan also referred to this 
belief in a public speech at Paarl during June 1943. Malan 
stated: "Hier beoog die Kommuniste In swart proletariaat - 
dit beteken die einde van In blank Suid-Afrika." (Die 
Burger, 19.6.1943) 
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thinking. Commenting on the decision to arm non-white soldiers, 
Die Transvaler summarised those "primitive" traits: 
"Die feit dat die nie-blanke nog maar In 
halfbeskaafde wese is, dat dit horn aan In juiste 
oordeel oor sake ontbreek, dat hy horn in In groot 
mate deur sy drifte laat lei ... is dinge wat deur 
die Regering in sy huidige beleid volkome oor die 
hoof gesien word."94)  
Words used at other times included "onbeskaafde naturelle" and 
"onkundige naturelle".95)  
Primitiveness and the African's `inborn' ignorance, according 
to the HNP, thus served as basis for the propagation of 
communism amongst non-whites. Furthermore, it virtually 
guaranteed the success thereof.96)  
Communalism in traditional communities, as a form of proto-
communism, also appeared with greater regularity in Party 
Die Transvaler, 14.12.1942: "Die Groot Gevaar"[editorial]. 
See editorials in Die Burger (20.10.1942: "Ontwaak Suid-
Afrika!") and Die Transvaler (29.1.1945: "Steun die 
Besluit") and a report in Die Transvaler (13.3.1944) on 
the Natal Provincial Congress of the HNP in 1944. 
This issue particularly came to the fore again following a 
series of strikes on the Witwatersrand during 1942/3 and, 
coupled to that, the announcement in May 1942 that Smuts' 
administration was considering a de jure recognition of 
the black labour movement. The former was ascribed to 
perceived communist machinations while Die Burger declared 
that non-white trade unions would evolve into instruments 
for the propagation of communism. (Die Burger, 22.1.1943: 
"Hulle Speel met Vuur" [editorial]) On both counts the HNP 
made use of the alleged inherent primitiveness of the non-
white to explain its contention/policy. Strikes by trade 
unions were ascribed to workers being misled by 
communists. Die Burger proceeded to explain the modus  
operandi employed by perceived communists to 'infiltrate' 
black labour organisations. (See Die Burger, 21.12.1942: 
"Die Kommunis Lag" [editorial]) The Party's policy on non-
white labour organisations was explained by Die 
Transvaler: "Die standpunt van die Afrikaner teenoor 
hierdie gedagte is dat die naturel nog geensins daardie 
trap van ontwikkeling bereik het dat hy horn nou al in 
vakbonde kan verenig nie" (italics in the original). (Die 
Transvaler, 24.1.1944: "Naturelle-Vakbonde" [editorial]). 
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circles. Eric Louw described traditional communalism as one of 
the main reasons why communists were focussing their propaganda 
on specifically the non-white population.97)  Malan proposed the 
introduction of a system of private property; thereby 
suspending communalism and, indirectly, curbing susceptability 
to communism: 
"Hulle moet geleentheid tot private besit in hul 
gebied he. Nou is daar net stambesit. Die kaffers sal 
dan In meer gevestigde bevolking wees, meer tvrede 
en minder vatbaar vir kommunistiese inv1oede."98)  
In spite of the wide-spread appearance of this contention, it 
did not find approval within all sectors of the Party. While 
agreeing that tribal communalism did represent a form of 
primitive communism, particularly P.0.(Paul) Sauer (HNP MP for 
Humansdorp) stressed that tribal communalism differed 
fundamentally from Marxian Socialism. According to Sauer: "Ons 
moet dit nie uit die oog verloor nie dat die soort 
Kommunisme wat in die land verkondig word, is nie dieselfde 
soort natuurlike Kommunisme wat ons in die naturellelewe vind 
nie. Maar dit kom in botsing daarmee. Dit is jets nuut vir 
hulle."99)  Furthermore, the retention of traditional tribal 
structures inhibited the spreading and growth of perceived 
communist propaganda. Thus, according to Sauer, susceptability 
to communism was particularly applicable to detribalised 
natives and, secondly, traditional structures represented the 
proverbial first line of defence against communism and thus had 
to be protected. Sauer referred to these two aspects in the 
Hansard, 12.2.1943, co1.1485. See also Louw's remarks on 
this issue during the previous parliamentary session 
(Ibid., 13.2.1942, co1.2050). 
See Malan's speech at the Paarl as reported by Die  
Transvaler on 25.5.1943. 
Hansard, 17.3.1942, co1.3949-3950. 
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Ek dink dat almal sal aanneem dat die naturelle 
waarskynlik in die hele wereld, en sekerlik in Suid-
Afrika die vrugbaarste teelaarde is vir kommunistiese 
propaganda, veral en feitlik uitsluitlik in die geval 
van ontstamde naturelle, die kaffers in die groot 
stede. Dit is kaffers wat weggebreek het van hul 
stamgewoontes en hul stamtradisies 	 Waar dit die 
posisie is en wanneer enige persoon wat hierdie saak 
kalm en bedaard wil beskou, moet erken dat as die 
kaffer sterk kommunisties word in Suid-Afrika, dit In 
baie groot gevaar kan wees, sal hy ook moet saamstem 
dat een van die beste maniere om kommunistiese 
propaganda onder ons naturelle teen te gaan, is om 
niks te doen om die stamtradisie van ons naturelle af 
te breek en te verswak nie. u100) 
Important is to note that Sauer found strong support for this 
contention from the influential Cape mouthpiece of the Party, 
Die Burger.101)  
The war years, however, were also important for the appearance 
of allegations which were founded and based upon arguments 
relating to alleged non-white susceptability to communism. The 
first of these pertained to the perceived role of the Smuts 
government as facilitator of communism. Allegations, in this 
regard, not only related to Smuts' seemingly lackadaisical 
attitude towards communist propaganda, but encompassed a broad 
series of issues. 
As indicated earlier, particularly the arming of non-white 
soldiers, which, according to the HNP, ran counter to accepted 
norms vis a vis the position of non-whites in South African 
society, was portrayed as promoting the cause of communism.102)  
Ibid., co1.3950-3951. 
See editorials in Die Burger on 3.1.1942 and 6.4.1945 
entitled, respectively, "Gevaartekens" and "Die Naturel se 
Probleem". 
At a mass meeting in Melville, organised to protest 
against the arming of non-white soldiers of the Union 
Defence Force, one of the HNP speakers described this 
decision as a communist policy. See Die Transvaler, 
23.3.1942. 
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Perceived communist agitation in favour of racial equality was 
also described as having found its origins in the decision to 
arm non-white soldiers. Die Burger declared in this regard: 
"Deur sy bewapening van kleurlinge en naturelle, deur hulle in 
dieselfde uniforms as die blanke soldate te steek en hulle 
selfs as gewapende wagte oor blanke krygsgevangenes te stel, 
het die Regering die grondslag vir hul eis om gelykstelling 
gele. En op daardie grondslag bou die kommuniste ywerig 
voort."1°3)  Important is to note that Smuts' policies, for the 
HNP, were based on invalid assumptions and a negation of the 
native's `true' nature, which, in turn, had `exposed' non-
whites to communist machinations. 
Participation in the war, according to the HNP, also increased 
non-white susceptability to communism. Smuts and the UP-
government, once again, were to blame: Firstly, Smuts, by 
involving South Africa in the war, had and were placing a heavy 
burden on the Union's resources so as to promote his war 
policy. This allegedly evoked discontent amongst a broad 
section of the South African population. Within the non-white 
community, this discontent, together with the non-white's 
perceived inner gullibility, were mobilised by communists to 
promote their cause. Secondly, participation in the war by non-
whites gave and would give rise to unrealistic expectations. 
These expectations, coupled with the `shortsightedness' of 
natives in grasping the `true' intentions of communism (as 
opposed to the `positive' qualities inherent to trusteeship), 
made non-whites and communists natural allies in the striving 
towards racial equality. Finally, as indicated in an earlier 
chapter, HNP propaganda intermittently portrayed Smuts as a 
hand-maiden of both Whitehall and the Kremlin in explaining his 
unwillingness to institute perceived preventative measures 
against alleged communism. In terms of this portrayal Smuts and 
his government were thus once again contributing to the 
spreading of communist dogma. 
103. Die Burger, 1.7.1943: "In Onheilige Verbond" [editorial]. 
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The UP's approach towards the colour question was also 
portrayed as having contributed to non-white susceptability to 
communism. Die Burger, in an editorial early in January 1942, 
identified two elements in this approach which allegedly 
promoted the cause of communism, viz, the absence of a clearly 
formulated policy on the colour question and the presence of 
elements within the UP who propagated a 	 sieklike 
sentimentele 	 liberalisme ..."104) 	 Liberalism, 	 within the 
context of race policy, implied, for the HNP, an unqualified 
striving towards full equality between white and black. Against 
this background, the presence of liberal strands of thinking on 
the issue of race policy within the UP, implied a convergence 
in aims between communists and the ruling party. Particularly 
Strijdom, as indicated earlier, attempted to portray liberalism 
- in so far as it related to the colour question - within the 
United Party as being the result of communist influencing. 105) 
Collectively, the HNP's campaign against communism also came to 
include the UP. On the eve of the 1943 general election, Die 
Burger, with unusual candour, declared: 
"Die stryd teen die kommunisme, die stryd om die 
voortbestaan van Suid-Afrika as witmansland word 
derhalwe ook In stryd teen die kommuniste se 
bondgenoot, die Smuts-party ... En in hierdie stryd 
om selfbehoud is daar geen neutraliteit nie. Geen 
Afrikaner kan opsy staan en meen dat die dreigende en 
vernietigende magte by hom en sy nageslag verby sal 
gaan nie. En geen Afrikaner, as hy die kant van sy 
volk wil kies, durf vir In oorlogskandidaat stem of 
van die stembus wegbly nie. Daardeur stel hy huidige 
en toekomstige geslagte aan die gevaar van In tweede 
Bloedrivier bloot."1°-6)  
See Ibid., 8.1.1943: "Die Nuwe Opstokery" [editorial]. 
Die Burger, towards the end of 1942, also declared in this 
regard: "Die kommuniste in Suid-Afrika is, verder, die 
ywerigste propageerders van die uitwissing van die 
kleurskeidslyn. Hulle wil blank en swart op gelyke voet 
stel en geen onderskeid maak nie. Ook van hierdie 
kommunistiese "aspirasie" is die Verenigde Party ... ook 
geen vyand nie!" See Die Burger, 9.11.1942: "Ook 
Binnelands Geswore Vyande" [editorial]. 
Die Burger, 5.7.1943: "Na die Stembus" [editorial]. 
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The significance of the above commentary for the utilisation of 
overt anti-communism as a strategy for political mobilisation 
speaks for itself. 
A second maA9r alleaation, based on alleged non-white 
susceptability to communism, related to the perceived ability 
of communists to mobilise existing grievances for the creation 
of new or complimentary patterns of discontent; thereby 
promoting the cause of their ideology. Particularly important 
for the HNP, in this regard, was the portrayal of white 
trusteeship as repressive by 'communists' .107) 
In commenting on this portrayal and the proposed alternative 
(full equality between races), the Party adopted a dualistic 
approach. On the one hand, reaction, as had to be expected, 
evolved around downright denial. S.M. Loubser (HNP MP for 
Malmesbury), for example, declared in Parliament: "Ek mag 
verder aan die Mipister se dat hierdie propaganda ... In baie 
nadelige uitwerking het. Dat dit In gevoel van ontevredenheid 
skep, sonder dat daar rede is. Daar is geen rede vir 
ontevredenheid nie 	 /1108) Interconnected with this were 
allegations relating to the utilisation of unorthodox methods 
by perceived communists in the spreading of their ideology. 
Louw, in his 1942 motion on communism, made specific mention of 
[k]ommunistiese agente onder die dekmantel van 
kaffeiredikante."109)  Die Transvaler, towards the end of 
January 1945, devoted a whole article to the alleged cunning 
methods used by perceived communists to gain control over 
native advisory committees on the Witwat ersrand.110)  
Die Burger, during January 1942, noted in this regard: 
"Die tradisionele Afrikaanse beleid van voogdyskap oor die 
naturelle en van geleidelike opvoeding en opheffing met 
behoud van soveel moontlik van die stamverband en wat mooi 
is in die eie naturelle-gewoontes, stel hulle (i.e. 
communists) voor as In beleid van onderdrukking." (Die 
Burger, 3.1.1942: "Gevaartekens" [editorial]) 
Hansard, 16.4.1942, co1.6324. 
See Ibid., 13.2.1942, co1.2049. 
Die Transvaler, 24.1.1945. 
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Relative to non-white conceptions of trusteeship, this may have 
implied that white paternalism were willy-nilly accepted. 
Communists, so as to promote their cause, therefore, together 
with native's inner gullibility, had to rely on unconventional 
strategies and methods to promote their cause. 
A second reaction, significantly, was the acknowledgement that 
racial equality, as alternative to white trusteeship, was 
indeed attractive) )  Racial equality, as propagated by 
perceived communists, however, had to be seen in its supposedly 
`proper' context. The Herenigde Nasionale Party, accordingly, 
set out to warn against the `actual' intentions of communist 
propagandists and, coupled to that, the `virtues' of 
paternalism. Die Burger declared in this regard: 
"Die wesentlike gevaar van die kommunisme vir die 
Unie is egter in sy gelykstellingsbeleid wat blank en 
nie-blank betref. Dit kan maklik as aantreklik 
voorgehou word aan die nie-blankes wat die 
voogdyskapbeginsel van die Voortrekkerbeleid nie 
verstaan nie. Hy wat nie besef hoe onder laasgenoemde 
daar behoorlike sorg vir ras- en familie-genote sal 
wees nie hunker maklik na In gelykstelling met die 
blanke sonder om te besef dat dit eintlik In dwaallig 
is wat horn eintlik in In moeras sal laat beland. Die 
nie-blanke word immers nie veel kans gegee om te 
besef dat sowel die imperialis as die kommunis horn 
wil gebruik vir hul eie oogmerke en horn daarna 
gevoelloos links sal laat le nie. Sodra hul 
self sugtige oogmerke bereik is sal hy nie enige sorg 
ervaar nie, soos onder die voogdyskap-beginsel 
outomaties beoog word."112) 
Finally, as opposed to the opportunism and invalid assumptions 
which found expression in the UP's colour policy and communist 
exploitation of black `primitiveness', the HNP, as the 
legitimate inheritor of the historically-valid Voortrekker 
point of view and thereby the true interpreter of the native's 
culture, was ideologically best equipped to deal with the 
See a speech by Bremer in Cape Town as reported by Die 
Transvaler on 30.5.1945. 
Ibid., 14.6.1941: "Die Kerke Waarsku" [editorial]. See 
also Die Transvaler, 13.3.1945: "Die Geknakte Riet" 
[editorial]. 
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colour question. In terms of practical differences, these 
different approaches found application in diametrically opposed 
policies. Malan, in April 1944, categorised these differing 
policies: 
"Daar is twee standpunte. Die een is: maak die nie-
blanke los van sy eie gemeenskap, sy taal, sedes en 
gewoontes. Maak van hom In Europeaan! Hoe eerder hy 
die blanke se beskawing aanvaar, hoe beter. En gee 
hom dan oral volkome gelykstelling met die blanke. 
Wis die kleurgrens uit. Dit is die een beleid. 
Die ander is die van segregasie, van apartheid 
waardeur die naturel en blanke apart gehou word, 
elkeen op sy eie terrein. Laat die naturel op sy eie 
gebied ontwikkel. Laat daar geen vermenging wees nie. 
Hou die ras suiwer. Handhaaf die kleurgrens, en laat 
die naturel en die blanke apart na hul aard 
ontwikkel. Dit is die ander beleid - die beleid van 
die Voortrekkers"113)(italics in the oiiginal). 
Furthermore, as opposed to the integrationist-perspective, 
which, for the HNP, was either communist-inspired or served to 
promote communism, the Party's policy of segregation was also 
the only effective means by which to 'curb' non-white 
susceptability to communism and thus combat the spreading of 
communism. Particularly from 1944 onwards, as indicated in an 
earlier chapter, a policy called apartheid came to be advanced 
as the only effective and comprehensive antedote against 
perceived communism. Die Burger, towards the end of 1944, 
related apartheid to the perceived spreading of communism in 
the Coloured community: 
"Want in die geval van die kleurling veral kan alleen 
apartheid en die geleenthede wat dit vir die 
kleurling sal skep om sy mense te dien in werk en 
betrekkings tans buite sy bereik, vir hom red van die 
vretende gevoel van frustrasie wat hom vandag In 
gewillige en geesdriftige slagoffer van die 
kommunisme maak."114)  
Die Burger, 17.4.1944. 
See Ibid., 13.10.1944: "Hulle Keer Verniet" [editorial]. 
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While a diverse number of specific examples could be cited to 
illustrate the integration of the `red menace' and `black 
peril' during the war years, more functional - in terms of 
illustrating some of those arguments and allegations referred 
to above - is the focussing of attention on Die Burger's  
analysis of Coloured voting patterns during the 1943 general 
election and the 'perceived relationship between `African 
restlessness' (strikes, civil protests, etc.) and perceived 
communist influencing. 
In the case of the former, Die Burger, in a series of 
editorials, came to the conclusion "... dat die kommunisme die 
Skiereilandse kleurlinge vir meer as 50 persent verower het 
8115) Two fundamental premises, as identified earlier, 
underpinned this allegation: Firstly, communists, in the 
propagation of their ideology, primarily had in mind the non-
white population and, secondly, non-whites were particularly 
susceptible to the Marxist dogma. This second allegation was 
referred to in the following terms: "Dit ly weinig twyfel dat 
die groot meerderheid van die Kommuniste se ondersteuners [in 
die verkiesing] uit kleurlinge bestaan het." --6) 
Next, in identifying the culprits, both the ruling UP and 
`communists' were to blame. On this occasion, however, Die  
Burger proceeded to attribute more blame to the UP. The UP had 
not only contributed to the creation of conditions which aided 
the spreading of communism (e.g. the arming of ,non-white 
soldiers), but Smuts' perceived lackadaisical attitude towards 
communist propaganda and the absence of a clearly defined 
colour policy actively promoted the cause of communism. 
Finally, and in particular with regard to integration, Die 
Burger, in proposing `remedial action', identified two sets of 
prospective solutions. The most immediate `solution', as may be 
expected, was the unseating of Smuts and his government: 
Die Burger, 10.12.1941: "Nie Veel Invloed". See also 
Ibid., 1.7.1943: "In Onheilige Verbond" and 3.8.1943: "Die 
Kleurling-kiesers." 
Die Burger, 3.8.1943: "Die Kleurling-kiesers" [editorial]. 
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"En die Afrikaner, aan watter party hy ook al behoort 
dan of hy aan geen party behoort nie? Wil hy die 
kommunisme vir nog vyf jaar laat voortwoeker? Wil hy 
die gif vir nog vyf jaar onbelemmerd deur die nie-
blanke massas laat trek en sodoende ons 
kleurvraagstukke so goed as onoplosbaar laat word? 
Die oorlog sal verbygaan en veldm. Smuts sal die weg 
van alle vlees opgaan. Maar Suid-Afrika sal die 
bittere oes moet insamel van die saad wat die Smuts-
regering die kommuniste toelaat om te saai."117) 
The 'final' solution, however, judging from Die Burger, would 
have to be the rearrangement of colour policy and, relative to 
political rights for Coloureds, their removal from the common 
voters ro11.118)  Significantly, in terms of integration, is to 
note that a series of editorials which initially ostensibly had 
in mind the explanation of Coloured voting patterns on the 
basis of perceived communist influencing evolved into a 
propaganda onslaught which centered around the solving of the 
colour question. Furthermore, according to Die Burger, 
communists were not so much to blame for this perceived state 
of affairs, but rather Smuts and his government. This, once 
again, brings to the fore the function of overt anti-communism 
as a strategy for socio-political mobilisation. 
A diverse range of strikes, discontent and even crimes, as 
indicated previously, were also attributed to communist 
influencing of the non-white population. Once again, in terms 
of integration, and particularly so after the general election 
of 1943, proposed solutions came to be defined far less in 
terms of direct measures vis a vis alleged communist 
propaganda, but rather evolved around the colour question. Die 
Transvaler, for example, in attributing a crime wave on the 
Witwatersrand to communist influencing, proposed the following 
Die Burger, 1.7.1943: "'n Onheilige Verbond" [editorial]. 
See 	 Die 	 Burger, 	 3.8.1943: 	 "Die 	 Kleurling-kiesers" 
[editorial]. 
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solution(s): 
"Beter arbeidsbeheer, gesonder ekonomies-maatskaplike 
toestande, en verstandiger behuisingsmaatreels, plus 
In sterk genoeg polisiediens en In toepassing van die 
gesonde voogdyskapbeginsels, met verwerping van 
liberalistiese en kommunistiese inmenging, sal alles 
nodig wees voor die naturelle-werker in die stad 
gelukkig en maatskaplik aangepas kan word. Dan eers 
sal did misdaadvlae verminder. Dan eers sal diegene 
wat deur hul oorlogsbeleid en valse liberalistiese 
naturellebeleid regstreeks verantwoordelik is vir die 
wantoestande, nie meer daaroor hoef te murmureer 
nie."119)  
The linking of communism and the colour question, specifically 
after 1943, was also in accordance with the HNP's broader 
strategy of adopting a more active approach (as opposed to the 
reactiveness of earlier) in its campaign against perceived 
communism. This approach, together with the posing of apartheid 
as alternative to (communism's) racial equality ipso facto 
provided for the further integration of these two elements. 
Integration of the `red menace' and `black peril', especially 
after 1948, attained a momentum all of its own and continued 
unabatedly for many years. 
Whereas the G/HNP, for reasons discussed earlier, took the 
proverbial lead in the linking of perceived communism and the 
colour question, other organisations referred to in this study 
did not lag behind. Judging from the available literature, 
particularly within the Ossewa Brandwag a similar process of 
integration was in progress. As indicated earlier, communism, 
for the OB, found stratification in racial terms. This belief 
had already appeared on occasion of Van Rensburg's policy 
251 
119. Die 	 Transvaler, 	 18.3.1942: 	 "Naturelle-misdaad" 
[editorial]. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
252 
speech on communism at Crosby during March 1943.120) 
Furthermore, against the backdrop of the broader strategy of 
ideological counter-balancing, the interlinking of the 'red 
menace' and 'black peril' was to be expected. Indicative of 
this is the 'solution' proposed by Die O.B. for the curbing of 
perceived communist agitation amongst African workers: 
"Om blanke heerskappy in hierdie land te handhaaf en 
om bestaansveiligheid vir elke witman te waarborg, 
sowel as om sosiale regverdigheid aan die naturelle 
te laat toekom, moet In beleid van territoriale 
segregasie aanvaar en uitgevoer word. In sy eie 
gebiede, afgeskei en onder voogdyskap van die blanke 
kan die naturel nie alleen sy nasionale org,anisasie 
uitbou nie, maar ook sy arbeidsorganisasie."11)  
Finally, in portraying communism as a menace for the 
yolk/state, an important adaptation was in the process of 
taking place. Whereas, between 1927 and 1930, the perceived 
dangers inherent to communism - in so far as it pertained to 
race relations - were presented as more menacing for state 
order than for any particular section of the white electorate, 
the G/HNP, frop___1.927 	 _onwards, while still stressing the 
perceived dangers of communism for the state ,122) gradually 
proceeded to lay greater emphasis on the destructive nature of 
communism for specifically the yolk. While this was obviously 
the result of tactical considerations (the G/HNP as opposition 
party vs. Hertzog's National Party and the later United Party 
as governing parties), it nevertheless held important 
implications for the utilisation of overt anti-communism as 
At Crosby Van Rensburg declared: "Where Communism says "No 
God, no Nation and no Fatherland" the Ossewa-Brandwag says 
in its motto "My God, my Nation, my Fatherland, South 
Africa" ... Where Communism knows a class and no 
distinction of race, there we know a race and no 
distinction of class - the white race which acknowledges 
South Africa as its one and only home - Afrikanerdom". 
(Cited in Some Facts about the Ossewa-Brandwaq, pp.89-90) 
See Die 0.B., 22.3.1944: "Aan die Kommunistiese Front" 
[editorial]. 
See, for example, Malan's remarks on the Coloured protest 
march to Parliament in September 1939 as reported by Die 
Transvaler on 27.3.1939. 
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mobilising factor in the broader context of Afrikaner 
nationalist politics. This issue will be returned to in the 
final chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE COMPONENT PARTS OF ANTI-COMMUNISM: IMMIGRATION, THE 
JEWISH QUESTION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE "SOUL" OF THE 
AFRIKANER WORKER 
6.1. IMMIGRATION AND THE JEWISH QUESTION 
Although the Jewish Question falls for a large part outside the 
framework of this study, it nevertheless had, as indicated, points 
of contact with the issue of 'communism'. The presentation of some 
introductory remarks will thus be in order. Particularly important 
is the motivation underlying the opposition of certain groupings 
and individuals to continued Jewish immigration to South Africa 
and the connection between this opposition and the perceived 
menace of communism. 
Commentators, in addressing themselves to the aforementioned 
issues, generally adopt one of two points of view: The first 
grouping, which may well be described as the "ideologists", 
to Jewish immigration on 
of anti-semitism. This 
so it is alleged, had an 
The second grouping, the "economic pragmatists", acknowledge the 
existence of organisational manifestations of anti-semitism within 
the cadre of Afrikaner nationalist politics. However, to this is 
added an important provision, namely that anti-semitism had a 
1. 	 See G.C. Cuthbertson: Jewish Immigration as an Issue in South 
African Politics, 1937-1939 (Historia, vol. 26(2), 1981), 
p.119; M. Cohen: Anti-Jewish Manifestations in the Union of  
South Africa during the 1930's, pp.8-10; L. Rubin: South 
African Jewry and Apartheid (Africa Report, February 1970); 
pp.22-23; E.S. Sachs: Rebel's Daughters, pp.130-131; G. 
Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, 
pp.109-112 and N.M. Stultz: Afrikaner Politics in South 
Africa, pp.44-45. 
explain Afrikaner nationalist opposition 
the basis of a nativistic version 
Afrikanerised version of anti-semitism, 
all-permeating impact.1) 
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limited impact on Afrikaner politics.2)  Most often referred to in 
this last instance is the G/HNP. In this regard it is stated that 
the Party's continued opposition to Jewish immigration have to be 
explained against the backdrop of the Afrikaner's righteous 
struggle for a place in South African economic life. The G/HNP's 
opposition to Jewish immigration, according to this perspective, 
was thus motivated not by racial anti-semitism, but - as typified 
by Leslie Rubin - a form of "... economic anti-Semitism ..."3) Van 
Heerden goes as far as explaining the racial qualities of anti-
semitism within the G/HNP on the basis of this 'economic' anti- 
semitism: 
Hierdie [evolusie] ... van die veldtog teen die 
Jode vanaf In ekonomiese stryd [na In rassestryd] was 
In 	 natuurlike ontwikkeling, want in Suid Afrika het 
die rassestryd nog altyd gewentel om ekonomiese [sake]. 
Hierdie ver-Afrikaniseerde weergawe van rassehaat 
teenoor die Jood, nietemin, moet onderskei word van die 
Duitse weergawe. In Suid Afrika is die Jood, as ras, 
gehaat omdat hy geassosieer was met die ekonomiese sowel 
as politieke verslawing van die Afrikanervolk ... In 
Duitsland, aan die ander kant, het die veldtog teen die 
Jood as ekonomiese mag verander na In veldtog teen die 
Jood as In biologiese qevaar vir die voortbestaan van 
die suiwer Ariese ras."4) 
The same divergence in view regarding the connection between the 
Jewish Question and the alleged menace of communism, exist between 
the ideologists and economic pragmatists. The ideologists, as may 
be expected, explain this connection on the basis of a rigid anti-
semitism and manipulation of the masses by the proverbial 
See F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die  
Suid Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, pp.376-378; G.D. 
Scholtz: Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die  
Afrikaner, VIII, pp.482-485; P.F. van der Schyff: Eric H.  
Louw in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek tot 1948, pp.480-483; 
P.W. Coetzer and J.H. le Roux:(eds.): Die Nasionale Party,  
IV, pp.77-79 and J.H. le Roux: Die Nasionale Party tot 1938, 
pp.340-343. 
L. Rubin: Afrikaner Nationalism and the Jews (Africa South, 
vol. 1(3), 1957), p.28. 
F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.53. 
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"heavyweights" in Afrikaner nationalist politics. E.S. Sachs 
declare in this regard: 
"The earlier nationalism of the Afrikaners was in large 
measure replaced by a new and narrow Nationalism that 
[had] much in common with Nazi doctrines. Yet many of 
its supporters were probably unaware of the character 
and source of the changes which were brought about, for 
at heart the Afrikaners are individuals and dislike 
dictatorship and excessive discipline intensely."5)  
This issue is particularly problematic for the economic 
pragmatists. Coetzer and Le Roux only refers to it in passing and 
thus effectively ignore it.6) Van Heerden treats the G/HNP's 
opposition to Jewish immigration and the emphasis on the alleged 
communist menace as two separate issues.7) Van der Schyff, in 
commenting on the Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration Bill of 
1939, acknowledges that Louw's remarks on the perceived menace of 
communism cannot be divorced from the context of the Jewish 
Question. Once again, however, Van der Schyff also favours 
'economic' anti-semitism in explaining the connection made between 
Jewish immigration and communism.8)  
6.2. AFRIKANER NATIONALISM AND `JEWISH COMMUNISM' 
6.2.1. 	 The Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party and `Jewish 
Communism' 
Eric Louw's 1939 Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration Bill, as 
indicated, marked the climax of the G/HNP's campaign against 
E.S. Sachs: Rebel's Daughters, p.131. 
See P.W. Coetzer and J.H. le Roux (eds.): Die Nasionale  
Party, IV, pp.77-86 
Van Heerden: Op.cit., p.380. 
P.F. van der Schyff: Eric H. Louw in die Suid-Afrikaanse  
Politiek tot 1948, p.481. 
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Jewish immigration and perceived Jewish com1nunism.9)  Without going 
into any great detail, two observations need to be made on the 
general issue of opposition to Jewish immigration within the GNP 
at the time: 
Firstly, in motivating its opposition to Jewish immigration, 
two schools of thought were discernable within the GNP. The 
one school, which included Malan and the Transvaal leader of 
the Party, J.G. Strijdom, concentrated almost exclusively on 
the alleged predominance of Jews in South African economic 
life. In other words, economic protectionism, together with 
self-preservation, according to this school, explained the 
Party's call for a moratorium on Jewish immigration.10)  This 
approach was seemingly in accordance with the proscribed 
Party line.) 
Indicative of the importance of the Jewish Question on the 
GNP's overall agenda is the publication of Louw's speech, in 
introducing the Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration Bill in 
Parliament, by the Party in pamphlet form under the title 
"Die Jodevraagstuk in Suid-Afrika/The Jewish Problem in South  
Africa" 
One example will serve to illustrate this: The August 1937 
Uitenhage Congress of the Cape GNP adopted, unanimously, the 
following resolution on the Jewish Question: "Ten einde ons 
volk, asook die Unie as geheel te beskerm op sowel ekonomiese 
as finansiele gebied, eis hierdie kongres dat alle Joodse 
immigrasie stopgesit moet word. Wat die huidige Joodse 
bevolking betref, is die kongres van mening dat handels- en 
ander lisensies op proporsionele basis aan Jode toegeken moet 
word en dat besighede bedryf moet word onder die geboortenaam 
van die eienaar." (Die Burger, 19.8.1937) 
The roots of economic anti-semitism, both internationally and 
in South Africa, are to be traced back to the Great 
Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s. The 
distinguishing features of the G/HNP's `economic' anti-
semitism may be summarised into four points: 
Jews constitute an economic power inherently inimical 
to the interests of the yolk; 
The Jewish community, in the above sense, form a state-
within-a-state (imperium im imperio); 
Jewry control commerce and industry, dominate the 
organised professions and, as a result of this, influence 
Government; and 
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The second school, including, amongst others, Eric Louw, P.J. 
van Nierop (GNP MP for Mossel Bay) and A.L. Werth (GNP MP for 
Kroonstad), on the one hand, as was the case with the 
supporters of Malan, stressed the actual/potential domination 
of South African economic life by Jews. On the other hand, 
emphasis was placed on the perceived covert and even overt 
political objectives of international Jewry. Although the 
structure and general content of this second allegation did 
not differ fundamentally from some of those arguments 
forwarded by other Party members during the previous two 
years, its importance lies, firstly, in the division in 
opinion on this issue within the GNP and, secondly, the 
integration with the Malan-associated argument of 'economic' 
anti-semitism. 
The second observation relate to the integration of the 
aforementioned arguments. 
While Malan and his supporters concentrated almost 
exclusively on the perceived dangers inherent to the Jewish 
'race' for the economic survival of the volk12) and made, ;or 
all intents and purposes, no mention of the perceived 
political aims of world-Jewry, Louw and his supporters 
utilised both sets of arguments as either being the primary 
or secondary motivation underlying the GNP's policy on the 
Jewish Question. Hence, for example, Van Nierop attempted to 
illustrate, on this basis, his conviction that Jews were 
directly responsible for the outbreak of the Second Anglo- 
Boer War: Economically, because they attempted 	 om met 
(iv) Jews, as a separate economic entity, did not favour 
manual labour [handearbeid], but aimed at filling the 
managerial positions in commerce and industry. (See P.W. 
Coetzer and J.H. le Roux (eds.): Die Nasionale Party, IV, 
pp.77-79 and G.D. Scholtz: Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke  
Denke van die Afrikaner, VIII, pp.482-485) 
12. Malan did make mention of Jewry as being "... In politieke 
mag ..." during the parliamentary session of 1939. (See 
Hansard, 17.3.1939, co1.1997) This, however, was an isolated 
remark and did not fall into the pattern of Malan's general 
argument. No special significance can therefore be attributed 
to this comment. 
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geld ... die ou [Transvaalse] Volksraad om te koop" and 
politically because they rebelled a... teen die ou 
republikeinse staat, verwek opstootjies en ... [werk] selfs 
geweld in die hand ..."13) 
The alleged connection between communism and Jewry provide an 
excellent example in illustrating the division in opinion 
within the Party on the Jewish Question and the integration 
of this issue with arguments relating to 'economic' anti-
semitism. Louw, in introducing the Aliens (Amendment) and 
Immigration Bill to Parliament, placed particular emphasis on 
alleged Jewish compassion for communism. Speaking in support 
of Louw's Bill and on the Jewish Question in general, neither 
Malan nor Strijdom made any mention of Jewish support for or 
affinity towards communism.14)  Newspapers supportive of the 
GNP continued with this second approach. Die Burger, in 
announcing the publication of the Aliens (Amendment) Bill, 
presented this Bill as being illustrative of Party policy on 
two separate issues, viz. Jewish immigration and 
communism.15)  Following the introduction of this Bill into 
Parliament, neither Die Burger nor Die Transvaler, in its 
editorial columns, initially referred to communism or the 
perceived connection between this ideology and Jewry.16)  Die  
Burger continued with this approach; its remarks on the 
alleged connection between Jews and communism limited to a 
factual reportage of parliamentary debates and speeches by 
Louw.17) 
See Hansard, 14.4.1939, co1.2954-2957. 
See Ibid., 17.3.1939, co1.1996-2003; 16.5.1939, co1.4899-
4902. 
Die Burger, 7.1.1939. 
See Die Burger, 27.2.1939: "Die Jode-debat" and Die 
Transvaler, 27.2.1939: "Debatteer Saaklik". 
See, for example, Die Burger's (25.3.1939) report on the 
debate in Parliament on this Bill and • reports on Louw's 
speeches in Johannesburg (8.8.1939) and at De Aar (12.8.1939) 
during August 1939. 
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Die Transvaler, as opposed to Die Burger, adopted a far less 
consistent approach in relation to 'Jewish communism'. 
Towards the end of April 1939 this newspaper published an 
article in which it was declared: 
"Die siel van [die] kommunisme in die Unie is 
In paar Jode wat self nooit op die voorgrond 
tree nie, dog In aantal Afrikaners en Engelse 
gebruik om die massa te bereik, gewoonlik teen 
In betreklik gesproke hod salaris. Hul 
organisasies vul mekaar aan. Daar is omtrent 
tien 	 sulke 	 verenigings 	 aan 	 die 
[Witwatersrand], maar hul lede is almal 
onderling met mekaar verbind en die 
organisasies word weer deur In federale raad 
saamgevoeg, sodat die werksaamhede nie oor 
mekaar gaan nie."18)  
Following the siding of the Soviet Union with the Allied 
Forces, Die Transvaler, in its editorial columns, continued 
to deal with the Jewish Question. Relative to the percei*ed 
connection between Jewry and communism, this was either 
explicitly referred to19)  or not mentioned at al1.20)  
Indicative of attempts to integrate arguments regarding Jews 
as respectively an economic and political entity is a remark 
by Louw relating to Jewry as allegedly being supportive of 
both capitalism and communism: 
Die Transvaler, 28.4.1939. 
Die Transvaler, 18.2.1942: "Dit keer al teen hulself"; Die 
Transvaler, 16.2.1943: "Kommuniste Beoog Kafferrepubliek" and 
Die Transvaler, 21.3.1945: "Blanke Selfmoord". 
See Die Transvaler, 4.2.1943: "Waarsku Betyds!". 
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"Maar dan word gevra hoekom daar aan die een 
kant gese word dat die Jode kommuniste is, en 
aan die ander kant dat die Jode kapitaliste 
is. Ek weet, dit skyn In paradoks te wees, 
maar een van die vernaamste doeleindes van die 
kommunisme is die kontrole van die produksie 
en van die distribusie. Die kommuniste bedoel 
daarmee die kontrole van distribusie en 
produksie deur amptenare en die amptenare is 
gewoonlik weer Jode wat vir hulle eie sakke 
sorg. 1121) 
Relative to the parliamentary debate on the Aliens 
(Amendment) and Immigration Bill, this remark by Louw was 
more the exception than the rule. The general strategy 
employed by the Louw-faction during this debate was of a less 
obvious nature, concentrating more on the perceived 
connection between communism as an all-embracive ideology 
with obvious implications for the existing status quo and the 
alleged radical transformation of society-in-totality as 
sought by Jews. The impression of interconnectedness created 
by the accentuation of shared objectives was unobtrusive and 
seemingly a natural deduction. 
6.2.2. 	 Eric Louw, Jewry and Communism 
Although the introduction of Louw's Aliens (Amendment) and 
Immigration Bill marked the first occasion where the alleged 
connection between Jewry and communism was presented in an 
organised and coherent manner from a GNP-platform, this did not 
mark the advent of the campaign against `Jewish communism' 
either within the Party or by Louw. 
Louw, following his return to South Africa from Europe in 1937, 
had already made mention of alleged Jewish involvement with 
communism. 	 The motion on communism adopted by the Uitenhage 
Congress of the Cape GNP in 1937 explicitly provided for a 
21. Hansard, 14.4.1939, co1.2998. 
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connection to be made between Jewry and communism.22)  The section 
on "Immigration and the Jewish Question" in the GNP's manifesto 
for the 1938 election was once again sufficiently widely 
formulated so as to allow for a connection to be made between Jews 
and communism.23)  However, in spite of this and in spite of 
remarks by Malan along similar vein in the course of 1938,24) no 
attempt was made by Louw to .repeat or expand on his 1937- 
contentions. 
Within the GNP, remarks on the alleged menace of `Jewish 
communism' can also be traced back to 1937. This topic, as 
indicated in an earlier, chapter, figured prominently in the period 
immediately preceding and following the introduction of the 
"closed shop"-principle in the mining industry. Although closely 
related to Louw's remarks of the post-1938 period, it will be 
argued that the motivation underlying these comments may well have 
differed fundamentally from those of 1939. 
The cause of Louw's campaign against perceived Jewish communism 
was aided by the increasing topicality of the Jewish Question. A 
diverse range of factors contributed towards this actuality and 
The first article of this resolution proposed the adoption of 
"[s]trenger immigrasiewette ..." as a measure to combat 
communism. Louw was responsible for the introduction of this 
motion. See Chapter 2. 
This section reads as follow: "While the party in general 
welcomes the immigration of suitable assimilable Europeans, 
it will, with an eye to South Africa's specific problems, 
take steps to put an end to further immigration of Jews, to 
oppose the changing of names, to exercise stricter control 
over naturalization and to bring into existence an occupation 
permit system for unnaturalized foreigners such as that which 
exists in England, France and other counties." (Cited in G. 
Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, 
p.125. See also Die Burger and Die Transvaler, 5.4.1938). 
Malan, on occasion of the November 1938 unitary congress of 
the Party at Bloemfontein, was reported as having said: "Daar 
is nog In mag, en dit is die verenigde mag van die Jodedom. 
In alle lande is hulle in die minderheid, maar hulle verstaan 
die kuns om meer te kry uit die yolk as wat hul getalle 
regverdig. Hulle gebruik nie alleen hul ekonomiese mag nie, 
maar verkondig in alle lande die kommunistiese en 
imperialistiese leer, omdat dit staan vir gelykstelling" (Die 
Transvaler, 9.11.1938). 
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ensured an initial positive response to the Aliens (Amendment) and 
Immigration Bill - even from quarters not normally associated with 
the G/HNP. these factors, without going into much detail, can be 
divided into three broad categories: 
(i) The European context: The upsurge of different variations of 
National-Socialism on the European continent undoubtedly had 
its ramifications within South Africa. Shimoni declares in 
this regard: 
"It so happened that Afrikaner nationalists 
provided fertile soil for the seeds of 
National-Socialist ideas. Their acute race 
consciousness, their seething anti-British 
sentiments, the economic frustrations of their 
urbanisation, the political frustrations they 
experienced in a parliamentary system whose 
rules had been prescribed by the British 
tradition, a vague sense of affinity with 
Germany by Afrikaners of German stock - all 
these attributes rendered a considerable 
segment of the Afrikaners amenable to 
influence by German National-Socialism ..."25) 
(ii) The South African context: Within South Africa, a number 
of individuals and organisations also contributed to the 
creation of an atmosphere of animosity towards Jews; thereby 
ensuring, at least initially, a positive response to Louw's 
Bill. In terms of organised groupings, most prominent was the 
Greyshirt-movement. Negotiations between representatives of 
this organisation and the GNP with the aim of establishing a 
common electoral front for the 1938-elections has been noted. 
The presence of Greyshirt-elements in the structures of the 
GNP, in spite of occasional misgivings and criticism from 
different quarters of the Party, remained a real possibility 
up to the latter half of 1940. Prominent amongst individuals 
connected to then existing political movements were Eric Louw 
and Louis Weichardt. 
25. G. Shimoni:Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, 
p.108. 
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(iii) A third category of factors, although not to be discussed 
comprehensively within the framework of this dissertation, 
which also made an important contribution in paving the way 
for Louw's Bill, relate to the diverse number of cultural, 
religious and social organisations/institutions, individual 
intellectuals and other prominent personalities who were also 
identified with the aspirations of Afrikaner nationalism. The 
absence of a meaningful discussion, however, should not be 
interpreted as meaning that these individuals, organisations 
and institutions were of lesser importance compared to those 
organisations and individuals already mentioned. 
In many ways these organisations/institutions acted as 
"watchdogs" of the collective Afrikaner conscience, thereby 
providing an added credibility to the campaign against Jewry. 
The example of Nico Diederichs has been cited. To this can be 
added, amongst others, the names of Manie Maritz 26) and even 
prominent literary figures such as N.P. Van Wyk Louw.27) 
Relative to the Afrikaans Protestant Churches, the Transvaal 
See M. Maritz: My Lewe en Strewe. Prior to 1939 Maritz had 
already acquired a semi-martyr status in the eyes of many an 
Afrikaner as a result of activities in the Second Anglo-Boer 
War and his maverick escapades at the time of the First World 
War. Following a decision to invade the then German territory 
of South West Africa, Maritz, an officer in the Union Defence 
Force, and a number of militia crossed into this territory to 
join the German para-military force stationed there. This, 
together with the Rebellion of 1914, were expressions of an 
increasing animosity which had systematically been building 
up in the ranks of Afrikaner nationalists since 1902. (For a 
detailed account of Maritz' escapades and the Rebellion of 
1914, see T. Cameron (ed.): New History of South Africa, 
pp.236-238 and D.W. Kruger: The Making of a Nation, pp.85-
98). Although the rebellion was suppressed and Maritz finally 
brought to trial at the beginning of 1924 - only to be 
released from goal a number of months later by Hertzog - the 
point in focus is the elevated stature achieved by Maritz 
through the course of events as a martyr for Afrikaner 
nationalism. Through his "struggle" against British 
imperialism, Maritz, in a sense, achieved a moral and 
historical authority to speak on a diverse spectrum of 
events. The alleged connection between Jewry and communism 
was one of those issues addressed by Maritz. 
See a most interesting article by Gerrit Olivier: NP Van Wyk 
Louw en die Afrikaner-Nasionalisme (Die Suid-Afrikaan, no.25, 
February 1990). 
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Synod of the Nederduits Hervormde Kerk (NHK), in a resolution 
on the Jewish Question, declared, inter alia, in April 1937: 
vervolging van enige seksie van die 
gemeenskap dra nie goedkeuring [van die 
Sinode] weg nie. Waar anti-Joodse bewegings 
georganiseer word vir ekonomiese en ander 
oorwegings, laat die Sinode dit oor aan die 
Christelike gewete van sy lidmate om te 
besluit in welke mate die bestaan van sodanige 
bewegings geregverdigd is, met inagneming van 
die belange van die volk."28) 
A pamphlet, issued under authority of the general synod of 
the NHK, explicitly referred to the presence of 'communistic 
Jews' in the South African labour movement.29)  In this sense 
mention must also be made of the NRT and in particular its 
campaign against Solly Sachs and the GWU. In a letter to 
Sachs in October 1938, D.B.H. Grobbelaar, then NRT organiser 
for garment workers, stated: 
"Met kommunisme wil ons volk niks te doene he 
nie en met Jode - die Priesters daarvan - nog 
minder. Die dag wanneer ons Afrikaners begin 
afreken met julle Jode sal jy vind dat 
Duitsland 'n Joodse paradys is in vergelyking 
met wat Suid-Afrika sal wees!"30) 
Louw's allegations regarding alleged Jewish affinity for communism 
hinged on three sets of arguments, viz, the person of Karl Marx, 
the role of Jewry in perceived communist organisations and what 
was termed "Jewish internationalism". 
See Die Burger, 27.4.1939. This resolution, needless to say, 
could be interpreted as both supportive and critical of the 
campaign against Jews. 
H.P. Wolmarans: Kommunisme en die Suid-Afrikaanse Vakunies, 
pp.25-29. Interesting to note is that a nephew of this self-
same H.P. Wolmarans, J.L.P. Wolmarans, was one of the first 
Afrikaner labour leaders to visit the Soviet Union in an 
official capacity. This visit took place in the early 1930s. 
Records of the GWU. Bcc 1.10: Letter Grobbelaar-Sachs, 
27.10.1938. 
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The argument relating to the alleged Jewish nature of communism as 
a result of the connection between this ideology and the person of 
Karl Marx, as indicated, was an oft repeated contention in various 
quarters. Louw formulated his version of this argument in the 
following terms: "Maar ek se tog dat die Jode die mense is wat die 
begrip van kommunisme bedink het ... Kommunisme het sy oorsprong 
gevind in die leer van Karl Marx wat In Jood was."31) Important, 
however, is to note that this contention was not a kingpin in 
Louw's overall repertoire of arguments regarding alleged Jewish 
compassion for communism. Reacting to allegations that Marx was a 
converted Jew, Louw, for example, pleaded ignorance and 
acknowledged "... dit is besmoontlik [so] .1132) 
A second argument forwarded by Louw evolved around the actual 
involvement of Jews in organisations adjudged to be communistic. 
In the international context this was related to the Bolshevik 
Revolution of 191733) and Louw's own experiences in Europe.34). 
Within South Africa, the "... twee leiers van kommunisme ... [is] 
mnre. Solly Sachs en [Eli] Weinberg."35)  Speaking in support of 
Louw's Bill, Werth stated that "... die Jood [is] by uitstek die 
Kommunistiese Propagandis in Suid-Afrika."36)  
The stressing of perceived examples of Jewish involvement with 
communism were in many ways the closest to reality of Louw's three 
sets of arguments. Prior to 1940 Jews had indeed figured 
Hansard, 24.2.1939, co1.843. 
Ibid., 14.4.1939, co1.2997. 
Louw identified the following Jews as allegedly having played 
In groot en leidende rol ..." in the revolution of 1917 
(Jewish name in brackets): Trotsky (Bernstein), Zinoviev 
(Appelbaum), Kamenev (Rosenfield), Kaganowitz, Bogandor 
(Silberstein), Verdlov, Marlov, Radek, Litvinov, Glagonsov, 
Steklov, Gonev, Meskousky and Garin (Hansard, 14.4.1939, 
co1.2997). 
Referring to an unspecified meeting of the League of Nations, 
Louw stated that the Soviet delegation present consisted of 
"... sewe Jode en een Rus." (Hansard, 24.2.1939, co1.2994). 
Hansard, 24.2.1939, co1.843. 
See Ibid., co1.879. 
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prominently in left-wing politics, progressive trade unions and 
radical organisations. The Labour Party (LP), which initially 
constituted the majority segment of the political Left, continued 
to attract Jewish support even in the years of decline after 1929. 
GNP-speakers and -newspapers, on a number of occasions during the 
run-up to the general election of 1938, referred to the LP as 
being either wholly communistic or near-communistic.37)  
Jews also constituted a sizeable percentage of the CPSA's active 
white cadres and played an important role in the CPSA's 
ideological development and -deployment. This is most vividly 
illustrated by the series of purges within the Communist Party 
during the 1930's.38) H.M. Basner, another Jew alleged to be a 
communist by Louw, did indeed contest a parliamentary seat under 
the banner of the CPSA during the general election of 1938.39) 
Sachs, as indicated, had been expelled from the CPSA during the 
early part of the 1930's. Neither the official history of the 
CPSA/SACP nor other sources identifies Eli Weinberg as either ever 
In a speech before an audience in the Pretoria City Hall, 
D.F. Malan, relative to the LP, stated: "Die Arbeidersparty 
het ver weggedryf van sy fondament[e]. Hy het geblyk die 
werktuig te wees van die georganiseerde jodedom en was in 
noue voeling met die kommuniste" (Die Transvaler, 28.4.1938). 
See also Die Burger, 16.11.1937: "Arbeidersparty se Rol in 
die Verkiesing" [editorial] and Die Transvaler, 3.1.1938: 
"Die Koers van die Arbeidersparty" [editorial]. 
The trio of Bolshevik dogmatists responsible for the 
expulsion of 'right-wing deviationists' from the CPSA were 
Douglas and Molly Wolton and Lazar Bach. Douglas, a gentile 
of Yorkshire, was married to Molly, originally a Jewess from 
Lithuania. Lazar Bach was also a Jew originally from Latvia. 
(H.J. and R.E. Simons: Class and Colour in South Africa,  
1850-1950, pp.446-448 and J.Cope: Comrade Bill, pp.319-322.) 
The Woltons and Bach were supported by another Jew, Louis 
Joffe. Victims of these purges included S.P. Bunting and his 
Jewish wife Rebecca and two other Jews: Ben Weinbren and 
Fanny Glass (nee Knelerman). 
See Hansard, 24.2.1939, co1.845 and G. Shimoni: Jews and 
Zionism - The South African Experience, p.157. For the sake 
of completion it must be noted that Basnerls candidature was 
defeated by the liberal, J.D. Rheinalt-Jones. 
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having been a member of the Communist Party or having participated 
in its activities.") 
Apart from its obvious propagandistic value, the stressing of 
actual examples of alleged Jewish involvement with communism were 
also important for two further reasons: Firstly, Louw's contention 
corresponded in principle with remarks made by other GNP members 
during 1937 on the perceived presence of "Jewish communists" in 
the labour movement.41)  This served to indicate a continuity in 
Party policy between 1937 and 1939 and, even more important, acted 
as an extra legitimising device in ensuring the acceptance of and 
support for Louw's argumentation on this issue within the Party. 
Secondly, whereas, in 1937, emphasis was placed on the perceived 
prevalence of (Jewish) communist propaganda amongst certain social 
classes (the Afrikaner proletariat) within the framework of South 
Africa, Louw and his supporters, by 1939, stressed the prominence 
of alleged Jewish communists in all social strata the world-
over.42) In this manner Louw and his compatriots may have 
attempted to elevate, both in terms of stature and scope, their 
warnings on the alleged connection between Jewry and communism. 
Ultimately this served to further internationalise the Jewish 
Question in the minds of Afrikaner nationalists. 
The single most important explanation cited by Louw for the 
perceived connection between Jewry and communism related to 
"Jewish internationalism". What exactly was meant by this concept, 
however, is not clear. At first Louw explained this concept and 
the connection thereof with communism as "... heeltemal 
verstaanbaar, want die kommunis is internasionaal en die Jood is 
40. See A. Lerumo [B. Bunting]: Forty Fighting Years; H.J. and 
R.E. Simons: op.cit. and P. Walshe: The Rise of African 
Nationalism in South Africa. 
See Chapter 2. 
Louw, in Parliament, noted the 'existence of "... 
kommunistiese verenigings, organisasies wat onder die 
dekmantel van liberalisme probeer om hulle met liberale 
oortuigings in die kommunistiese sfeer in te trek" (Hansard, 
24.2.1939, co1.844). 
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internasionaal in sy uitkyk."43)  This, then, would seem to 
indicate that as a result of shared internationalist 
goals/characteristics communism and Jewry shared corresponding 
aims and an inner unity-in-purpose. However, whereas, with regard 
to Jewry, this internationalism was related to a broad and general 
construct (Jews as supra-national entity), in the case of 
communism it was based on specific characteristics and goals. 
Stressed in this regard were communism's aim of a world 
revolution, internationalist proletarian solidarity and, on an 
organised level, the CPSA's affiliation to the Third 
International 44) 
To this internationalist unity-in-purpose came to be added a 
further dimension, namely the anti- and unnational nature of both 
communism and Jewry. Relative to communism, Louw stated: 
"[K]ommunisme is absoluut die teenstelling van nasionalisme in sy 
wydste sin."45)  Although this was a logical and to be expected 
deduction, it is important to note that while, in the case of 
Jewry, these anti- and unnational attributes were only implied, in 
the case of communism it was openly and directly stated.46)  
6.2.3. 	 The Jewish Question and Communism: Unilateral, Bilateral 
and Multilateral Influencing 
In explaining the actuality of the Jewish Question, two general 
spheres or streams of influence can be identified which initially 
played a facilitatory role in this regard. In chronological order 
these streams of influence were animosity towards Jews which 
largely had a local origin and content and dogmas more readily 
connected to a European source. Although the latter and 
Ibid., co1.843. 
See Ibid.  
Ibid., co1.843. Indicative of the perceived anti-systemic 
qualities of communism, according to Louw, was its opposition 
to "... instellings van die Westerse beskawing, 
godsdiens, die gesin en privaat-eiendom." 
See Hansard, 24.2.1939, co1.844-845. 
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particularly the German form receive more attention in the 
literature for obvious reasons, care must be taken not to 
overemphasize the significance/importance of German Nazism in 
explaining anti-Jewishness in Afrikaner nationalist politics. 
Furthermore, neither an Afrikanerised form of antagonism towards 
Jewry nor an overseas version of anti-semitism can be interpreted 
as complete and mutually exclusive explanations. Different 
organisations depended on either existing prejudices or the 
example of another country to promote their own policies. Within 
this context, influencing - irrespective of whether it be 
unilateral, reciprocal or multilateral - was a real possibility 
which cannot be discounted. The same must be said for the alleged 
connection between Jewry and communism. 
In this section attention will be focussed on the position of the 
different movements vis a vis the perceived connection between 
Jews and communism relative to influencing. 
Some of the earliest attempts to establish a linkage between 
communism and Jewry emanated from the Greyshirt-movement. The 
manner in which this was done has been sufficiently dealt with in 
an earlier chapter. Important for the aims of this section is the 
Greyshirt-movement policy towards Jews as a subdivision of a 
broader ideological identity and the relative positioning of this 
organisation with regard to the increasing topicality of perceived 
Jewish communism in Afrikaner nationalist politics. 
The Greyshirt-movement, as indicated, gained notoriety for its 
policy towards and activist behaviour regarding Jews. The 
Greyshirt standpoint on and resultant policy towards Jewry was 
contained in this movement's Programme of Principles, issued 
shortly after its founding in 1933: 
"Ten opsigte van die Jode is die [Gryshemp-beweging] 	 se 
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standpunt:- 
Dat die Jode, van Oosters-Semitiese oorsprong, In 
aparte, afsydige, onassimileerbare, nie-christelike 
rassegroep is, wat op internasionale grondslag 
georganiseerd is en sy tradisionele godsdienstige en 
rasse-identiteit orals handhaaf. 
Dat hulle daarom as groep nie deur die 
Volksgemeenskap geassimileer Ran word nie en dus 'n 
onnasionale, anti-nasionale en vreemde element in die 
volksliggaam sal bly. 
(iii)Dat hulle belange in Suid-Afrika dus alleen 
individualisties, materialisties of groepbeskermend is, 
en nie volksgemeenskaplik nie, en hulle daardeur In 
toestand skep wat die ewewig van die volkslewe op byna 
elke terrein, ekonomies, maatskaplik, sowel as 
kultureel, versteur. 
Dat die Jode weens hulle wereldverspreidheid en die 
kapitalistiese mag waaroor hulle in elke land beskik, 
inderdaad In internasionale volk is wat deur middel van 
die Joods-kapitalistiese pers, die vernaamste 
propagandiste (vir hulle eie voordeel en veiligheid) van 
die 	 sogenaamde 	 liberalisme, 	 kosmopolitanisme, 
kapitalisme en denasionaliserende internasionalisme 
(kommunisme) is. 
Dat die Jode uit 'n staatkundige oogpunt dus nie In 
selfonderhoudende groep is nie, maar lewe en teer op die 
arbeid, 	 produksievermod, 	 -lewensgeleenthede 	 en 
bestaansregte van ander - m.a.w. parasities floreer op 
die Volksgemeenskap - en as sulks 'n nadelige gewas in 
die volksliggaam is. 
DAAROM aanvaar die [Gryshemp-beweging] ... en verbind hy hom tot 
die uitvoering van In beleid van:- 
Strenge wetgewing om voortaan alle Joodse 
immigrasie tot die volkstaat te belet. 
Algehele vernietiging van die huidige Joodse 
dominasie en beperking van Joodse invloede op elke 
terrein. 
271 
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Wetgewing waardeur die posisie van sodanige Jode 
aan wie vergunning gegee word om binne die gebied van 
die Staat te bly woon, sosiaal, ekonomies en staatkundig 
bepaal sal word as vreemdelinge wat alleen geduld sal 
word solank as hulle die sedes van die yolk eerbiedig, 
die landswette gehoorsaam en aan die eise van die 
volksgemeenskap voldoen. 
Bestraffing en deportasie sover moontlik van alle 
Jode wat hulle aan rasseskending skuldig maak, of 
skuldig gemaak het."47) 
The radical reversal of Jewish emancipation, as proposed in this 
policy document, was in accordance with Greyshirt nationality 
policy. The proposed organic Volkstaat [literally State of the 
people] were to be made up of two categories of people, viz, those 
who were of "... suiwer Europese en Ariese afkoms ..." and those 
who did not qualify for citizenship under the above definition or 
were Aryans who owed their loyalty to another state. Whereas the 
first group would enjoy the full privileges of citizenship, 
members of the second grouping were to be debarred from holding 
citizenship. The latter grouping's continued presence in the state 
depended on their subservience to certain authoritarian measures. 
Apart from those dissipated Aryans who owed their loyalty to 
another state, this second grouping would also encompass 
descendants of non-Aryan peoples - in practice non-whites and 
Jews. Greyshirt-ideology, as indicated, held that Jews were 
members of an "Oosters-Semitiese ras". Furthermore, whereas non-
whites, as members of 'child-race', were easily manageable, Jews, 
for a multiplicity of reasons, positively constituted a menace. 
Harsh measures, as identified earlier, was therefore a requisite 
necessity in dealing with this situation. Communism, also 
described as "denasionaliserende internasionalisme", was 
identified as one of those measures employed by Jewry to subjugate 
Gentile-states and perpetuate existing patterns of domination. 
In dealing with the perceived interconnectedness of Jewry and 
communism, the Greyshirt-movement could count on the presence of 
47. Cited in F.J van Heerden: Nasionaal Sosialisme as Faktor in  
die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, pp.77-78. 
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three sets of variables which either automatically favoured its 
cause or could be manipulated to such effect: 
Within the cadre of then existing national-socialist 
organisations, the Greyshirt-movement held the advantage of 
being one of the first organisational embodiments of this 
ideology in South Africa. Although the number of national-
socialist movements active in the Union mushroomed after 
1933,48) the Greyshirt-movement retained the dubious honour 
of being one of the earliest. On a different level, the 
Greyshirt-movement was also the first organisation, in the 
broader context of Afrikaner nationalist politics, to connect 
the `communist menace' to the `Jewish peril'. 
Closely related to this historical advantage were the 
benefits to be gained from an already-in-existence propaganda 
structure, a comprehensive and fully completed Programme of 
Principles and functioning regional and national 
organisational structures. A single example will serve to 
illustrate this point: Although all of those pre-1939 
national-socialist movements supposedly had their own 
separate mouthpieces, in the majority •of cases the 
publication of these organs were seemingly irregular and the 
circulation thereof limited to listed members. This, needless 
to say, placed a damper on activities and severely curtailed 
recruitment. The Greyshirt-movement, being the exception 
rather than the rule, could, at least up to October 1938, 
count on the nationally circulated and regular editions of 
Die Waarheid-The. Truth. This, in turn, ensured the 
propagation of Greyshirt-philosophies to a much wider 
audience. 
(iii)Of special importance, however, was the ability of the 
Greyshirt-movement to mobilise existing prejudices towards 
48. These included: The South African National Democratic Party 
which emerged in August 1934, Die S.A. Nasionale 
Volksbeweging (The S.A. National People's Movement - more 
commonly known as the Blackshirts), The People's Movement and 
the South African Gentile Socialists. 
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Jewry for political gain - especially in relation to the 
subject of `Jewish communism'. The manner in which this was 
done, importantly, should not be seen as a development 
whereby Greyshirt-beliefs were unilaterally superimposed atop 
existing animosities. Such an explanation views Afrikaner 
nationalism as an ideologically homogenous construct. 
Ultimately this turned to be a process, characterised by 
continuous integration where the actual content of existing 
prejudices were of fundamental importance in the creation of 
new and complimentary forms of antagonism. 
Through the presence of the above three factors, the Greyshirt-
movement, in many ways, achieved an early monopoly on both the 
Jewish Question and perceived Jewish communism. This applied to 
different levels. On the one hand, as indicated previously, the 
Greyshirt-movement was the first of several national-socialist 
organisations active in the Union as well as within the narrower 
framework of Afrikaner nationalist politics vis a vis the Jewish 
question. Conversely, remarks on the Jewish question related to 
not only Jewish immigration, but encompassed a whole series of 
related contentions. The same deduction can be made relative to 
the perceived interconnectedness of Jewry and communism. In 
various ways this placed the Greyshirt-movement in a particularly 
strong and favourable position regarding future influencing on 
both issues. 
The possibility and even probability of the G/HNP being influenced 
by the Greyshirt-movement on the Jewish Question have been noted. 
Sufficient for the aims of this analysis is to note that with the 
outbreak of war in September 1939, three different interest 
groupings - relative to the Jewish Question - could be identified 
within the Party, viz. Malan's grouping, Louw and his supporters 
and those whose primary ideological allegiance lay with Greyshirt-
philosophies. The presence in GNP structures of the latter 
`grouping' was partly the result of Weichardt's successful 
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membership-application in January 1939.49) Even if the influence 
of the Greyshirt-grouping, relative to the other two sections, was 
limited to a non-ideological level, it nevertheless had an 
important part to play. F.C. Erasmus, as indicated, acknowledged 
the facilitory role of this movement in bringing the Jewish 
question to the attention of the Party.50) 
Regating to points of view associated with Louw, the Greyshirt-
movement may well have fulfilled an important function in paving 
the way for a positive reception of the Aliens (Amendment) and 
Immigration Bill. 
The origins and ideological orientation of both the New Order and VI 
Ossewa-Brandwag also allowed for influencing from other sources on 
the perceived connection between Jewry and communism. The OB and 
G/HNP, as indicated, were at first closely related. The initial 
absence of a separate politico-ideological identity, the 
ostensibly cultural objectives of the OB and the phenomenon of 
dual membership provided for unlimited influencing from G/HNP 
circles on the Jewish Question. The same may well be said for 
Oswald Pirow and his New Order. Conversely, the presence of 
differently-minded elements in the G/HNP and the ensuing campaign 
against those `alien' elements strenghtened the position of the 
Malan-grouping in the struggle for supremacy on the issue of 
`Jewish communism' within the Party. This aspect will be returned 
to in the following section. 
49. In announcing his decision to join the GNP, Weichardt also 
called on his supporters to follow the example set by him. 
See Die Transvaler, 20.1.1939. Although little information is 
available on the extent of Greyshirt reaction to Weichardt's 
call, it must invariably be accepted that such a grouping - 
even if unorganised and miniscule - may indeed have existed 
within the Party. While Weichardt did not remain a member of 
the G/HNP for very long, the point to be made relates to the 
existence - albeit in theory - of a fundamentally different- 
minded grouping within the Party. The existence of such a 
body of people within the Party may have continued until 
October 1940. 
50. See Chapter Two. 
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Although the OB's political philosophy was couched in somewhat 
diabolical terms, resulting in what Shimoni has described as "... 
deliberate ideological vagueness ..."51), this organisation's 
conception of `nation' - particularly after 1942 - bore 
unmistakable marks of national-socialist influencing. While, even 
during its initial phase as cultural movement, the OB permitted/  
only white members, "Omsendbrief 1/41", issued in July 1941, 
provided the first indication of citizenship in the OB's future 
republic to be limited to particular sections of the white 
population.52) 
A manifesto issued by the Grootraad in June 1942 qualified this 
issue even further by identifying "assimilability" as the basis 
for citizenship.53)  Jews were openly identified as being 
unassimilable. Although the concept of assimilability was not 
explained on this occasion, Van Rensburg and other OB-ideologues, 
at different times, in referring to the future republic and 
nation, made use of terminology such as bloedsuiwerheid [blood-
purity], die bande van bloed [the bonds of blood] and bloed en 
bodem [blood and soil].54) 
G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, 
p.128. 
Omsendbrief 1/41 was a copy of the draft-constitution for the 
future South African republic as decided on by the 
Afrikanereenheidskomitee 	 [literally 	 Afrikaner 	 Unity 
Committee] (AEK). The AEK was an amorphous body composed of, 
inter alia, leaders of the HNP, OB, FAK and Reddingsdaadbond 
(an affiliate of the FAK dealing with economic matters) and 
set up to coordinate Afrikaner nationalist activities over a 
broad front. See M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip: The South 
African Opposition, 1939-1945, pp. 85-90. The publication of 
the draft constitution by the OB marked the beginning of a 
definite parting of ways between the OB and HNP. In terms of 
citizenship, this circular declared that nationality, besides 
being reserved exclusively for whites, would only be accorded 
to "... subjects of whom it can be expected that they will 
act as up-builders of the nation." See Shimoni: op.cit., 
p.129). 
See Die Ossewa-Brandwag - Vanwaar en Waarheen, p.5. 
See Ibid.; Die Ossewa-Brandwag - Konstitusie and J.F.J. van 
Rensburg: Lewensbeskrywing en Drie Toesprake. 
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An even more explicit indication of racist anti-semitic patterns 
of thought within the OB is provided by a document on racial 
policy issued by one of the OB Studielaers [literally Study-
laagers - policy-study committees].55)  This document identified 
five racial groupings in the Union, viz. whites (composed of 
English- and Afrikaans-speaking whites), Jews, Africans, Coloureds 
and Indians. Referring to specifically the Jewish 'race', this 
document, inter alia, declared: 
"In die rassebeleid ten aansien van die Jode moet 
uitgegaan word van die standpunt dat dit 'n nie-Europese 
(Semitiese), nie-assimileerbare en volksvreemde ras is 
wat in hierdie land as uitheemse minderheidsgroep 
behandel en onder beheer gestel moet word ... Die gronde 
[hiervoor] is die volgende: 
1. Die Jood het in sy are die bloed van In voor-
Asiatiese ras en nie die bloed van die Europese ras soos 
die Afrikaners en Engelse dit in hulle are dra nie. 
Omdat hy die draer van vreemde bloed is, moet hy ook nie 
deur die Europese ras van hierdie land geassimileer word 
nie ..."56) 
Against this background, as illustrated, the OB also proceeded to 
connect the presence of Jews in South Africa to the perceived 
menace of communism.57)  
Nevertheless, two important observations need to be made with 
regard to the alleged connection between Jewry and communism made 
by the OB. Firstly, although references to perceived Jewish 
communism may well be afforded a character independent of remarks 
on any other issue, it must be noted that more often than not this 
aspect was integrated with remarks on "Jewish capitalism”. 
Indicative of this is an editorial comment by Die 0.B. on the 
OB-Archives. GR I/1/1: "Rassevraagstuk: Algemene 
Uitgangspunt" (undated document). 
See Ibid. 
See Chapter Three. 
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leaders of the perceived communist movement: 
"En wie is hierdie leiers van die kommunisme? Is dit 
werkers? 'n Engelse skrywer beweer dat die 49 kopstukke 
van die Kommunistiese Party in Rusland In paar jaar 
gelede op drie na almal Jode was. Van die ander drie was 
twee - onder wie Stalin self - met Jodinne getroud. Ons 
weet uit eie ervaring dat die Jood oor die algemeen nie 
deurgaan as 'n hande-arbeider nie. Hulle word getel 
onder die kapitaliste. Dat Jode die regeerders in 
Rusland is, is juis 'n bewys dat ons hier met die mees 
absolute vorm van kapitalisme te doen het."58) 
To this can also be added Van Rensburg's comment of 1944 that 
communism and capitalism was "... the same thing."59) 
Secondly, remarks on the alleged connection between Jewry and 
communism did not figure prominently in the OB's overall 
propaganda strategy and, compared to the emphasis placed on 
alleged Jewish attempts to monopolise private capital (the so-
called Joodse Geldmag)60)these remarks were of relative 
insignificance. 
The NO, on the other hand, while also never attempting to deny its 
national-socialist orientation, paid only scant attention to the 
Jewish Question. The NO's Programme of Principles referred only 
indirectly to the Jewish Question and, even more importantly, this 
took place within the framework of a general statement on the 
status of members of the future National-Socialist Republic.61)  
Although a more detailed elucidation of NO-policy towards Jewry 
Die 0.B., 19.7.1944: "Kolossale Bedrog". 
See Van Rensburg's speech at Crosby on May Day 1944 (OB-
Archives, KG 11/7/53) 
See, for example, Die Ossewa-Brandwag: Vanwaar en Waarheen, 
pp.35-39 and Die 0.B., 5.1.1944: "Die 0.B.-Arbeidslaer" 
[editorial]. 
Point P of the New Order Programme of Principles declared: 
"Hersiening, gesien uit die oogpunt van Nasionale belang, van 
die status van alle persone, genaturaliseer of nie, wat die 
land binnegekom het sedert 4 Augustus 1914 en die restourasie 
van alle naamveranderinge [na sy oorspronklike vorm] wat 
plaasgevind het sedert hierdie tyd." (O. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir 
Suid-Afrika, p.34) 
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evolved after World War II, this falls outside the ambit of this 
particular study. Significantly, nevertheless, is to note that 
even then NO-policy was not atypical of conventional National-
Socialist belief systems.62)  
6.2.4. 	 The Rise and Fall o "Jewish Communism" 
Although the loss in stature of the perceived connection between 
Jewry and communism was closely related to the reduced prominence 
of the Jewish Question in general, within Afrikaner nationalist 
ranks this development was also affected by the struggle for 
political/ideological leadership within certain movements and 
between organisations of different ideological hue. In this 
section attention will be focussed on the struggle for hegemony on 
the Jewish Question within the G/HNP and, following that, the 
general decline of the perceived connection between Jews and 
communism. 
Initially, following the unsuccesfull promulgation of the Aliens 
(Amendment) and Immigration Bill, remarks on `Jewish communism' 
continued almost unabatedly in certain quarters of the GNP.63) 
Simultaneously, however, *indications were that this issue was 
starting to lose its popularity and prominence in the upper 
echelons of the Party. Prior to the outbreak of World War II, for 
example, GNP-speakers, in Parliament, continued to stress the 
necessity of an immediate moratorium on Jewish immigration. On all 
of these occasions, without exception, no reference was made to 
alleged Jewish affinity for communism.")  Even Louw, on the 
solitary occasion where he also contributed to the on-going 
For a discussion of NO-policy towards Jewry in the post-1945 
period, see F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor 
in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, pp.168-169. 
See speeches by Louw in Johannesburg (Die Burger, 8.8.1939) 
and De Aar (Die Burger, 12.8.1939); P.O. (Paul) Sauer (GNP MP 
for Humansdorp) at Messina (Die Transvaler, 7.8.1939) and 
J.J. Hayward (GNP MP for Bloemfontein District) in Pretoria 
(Die Transvaler, 8.8.1939). 
See, for example, J.G. Strijdom's speech in Parliament on 
16.5.1939 (Hansard, co1.4899-4922). 
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debate, did not make mention of the perceived connection between 
Jewry and communism.65)  
The period following the outbreak of the World War II was 
characterised by a marked decrease in remarks on the Jewish 
Question. The same can be said for the alleged connection between 
Jewry and communism. Although a wide range of specific factors 
contributed towards the decreased importance of these issues, all 
were in some way related to the striving towards volkseenheid and, 
following the failure thereof, the state of proliferation in 
Afrikaner nationalist politics. Relative to the struggle for 
ideological hegemony on the perceived connection between Jewry and 
communism within the G/HNP, particularly two series of events 
fundamentally affected this issue after September 1939: 
(i) The campaign for ideological homogeneity within the G/HNP: 
The presence of differently-minded groupings and individuals 
within the G/HNP increasingly resulted in criticism from and 
tension within Party structures. Following an initial period 
of grace and attempts to win these individuals over to 
actively support all aspects of Party policy, 66) the G/HNP, 
from 1940 onwards, launched various campaigns against 
volksvreemde elemente [literally elements alien to the 
people] in the Party. Of special importance for the positions 
of respectively the Malan-grouping and Eric Louw and his 
supporters vis a vis perceived Jewish communism were the 
campaigns against elements of the Greyshirt-movement and, to 
a lesser extent, the NO and OB. 
Malan, at the Cradock Congress of the Party in October 1940, 
as indicated, criticised the presence of groupings in the GNP 
who subscribed to agendas differing from that of the declared 
Hansard, 16.5.1939, co1.4877-4892. 
Relative to the NO, for example, Malan, in spite of continued 
criticism from personalities such as J.G. Strijdom, initially 
underplayed the structural differences between the ideology 
of this organisation and the HNP in order to promote 
volkseenheid. See Chapter Four. 
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and accepted Party-line.67)  This resulted in the withdrawal 
from the Party of Greyshirt-members.68)  The alienation of the 
G/HNP and Greyshirts' resulted in a serious restriction of 
opportunities for the propagation of beliefs/philosophies in 
the Party which were perceived to be directly or indirectly 
related to the Greyshirt-movement. Relative to the alleged 
connection between Jewry and communism, this, in turn, 
arguably restricted the continued propagation thereof in 
Party circles and, even more important, immeasureably 
strenghtened the position of the Malan-grouping vis a vis 
Louw and his supporters on this issue. 
While Louw and his compatriots, in a hypothetical sense, may 
have continued to stress alleged Jewish affinity for 
communism from HNP platforms, the withdrawal of Greyshirt-
elements from the Party, as indicated, seriously affected the 
acceptability of this form of propaganda in so far as it may 
have been perceived to be closely related to orthodox 
Greyshirt-beliefs. Although Louw may well have been 
influenced in his thinking on this issue by sources 
unconnected to the Greyshirt-movement, the issue of `Jewish 
communism', within the framework of the G/HNP, retained its 
aura of being a by-product of the Party's Greyshirt-legacy. A 
continued and even intensified stressing of perceived Jewish 
communism may well have resulted in an open schism developing 
within the G/HNP on this issue. The eviction of Louw and his 
supporters from the Party, on the basis of them being opposed 
to the official Party-line, would have been the next logical 
step. Malan's comment on the untenability of group-forming 
within the Party at the Cradock Congress, which was endorsed 
by all delegates present, provided the precedent which could 
have made such an eviction indeed possible. Furthermore, if 
Weichardt could indeed count on an almost unqualified loyalty 
See F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.136. 
As indicated, the Cradock Congress and the decision to 
withdraw from the Party, marked the demise of the Greyshirt-
movement as a separate and independent entity in Afrikaner 
nationalist politics. 
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from his supporters and even if he had sizeable support in 
G/HNP ranks prior to October 1940, the decision to 
disassociate himself from the Party deprived Louw of a 
valuable source of support from within the HNP. 
Although the OB paid scant attention to `Jewish communism', 
the HNP's campaign against this movement - particularly from 
1942 onwards - deprived Louw of another ideologically 
receptive source of support. The same may well be said for 
Oswald Pirow and his New Order-movement. 
(ii) The consolidation of Malan's position within the Party: As a 
result of political confusion and amid indications of a 
growing tension between the Party on the one hand and the NO 
and OB on the other, the HNP called for an extraordinary 
unitary congress to be held in Bloemfontein during June 1941. 
The Congress unanimously adopted a motion which conferred on 
Malan the title of "Volksleier" [literally leader of the 
people] and, more importantly, voted him extraordinary powers 
over the Party-machine.69)  
Without going into any detail, Malan, following the 
Bloemfontein Congress, was afforded a near-monopoly over most 
functions of the Party. This included the formulation of 
Party policy and control over membership.70)  In the exercise 
of these powers Malan was responsible to only the HNP 
executive and the sole criterion to abide by was that 
adjudged by him to be "... necessary in the interests of the 
unity and efficiency of the Party."71) Although the rationale 
behind the actual voting of these powers to Malan related 
more to the striving towards volkseenheid and the activities 
See M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip: The South African 
Opposition, 1939-1945, pp.84-86 and Van Heerden: op.cit., 
pp.216-217. 
For a more detailed elucidation of those powers afforded to 
Malan by the Bloemfontein Congress, see Die Transvaler, 
4.6.1941. 
M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip: The South African Opposition,  
1939-1945, p.85. 
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of the earlier referred to Afrikanereenheidskomitee,72)  the 
implications for the position of the Malan-grouping vis a vis 
Louw and his supporters relative to the topic of 'Jewish 
communism' were equally far-reaching. 
Even if Louw and his supporters had decided to intensify the 
propagation of perceived Jewish affinity for communism, 
Malan, under the authority extended to him by the 
Bloemfontein Congress and on the possible grounds of Louw's 
propaganda being counter-productive to the interests of the 
Party, may have decided to veto or actively oppose any such 
propaganda. Furthermore, as indicated, the near-authoritarian 
powers voted to Malan provided him with a monopoly on intra-
Party policy formulation. Any and all attempts to alter the 
existing Party policy on the Jewish Question could thus 
effectively be halted. 
Of special significance for the aims of this study is to note 
that the Bloemfontein Congress directly contributed to the 
placing of Malan and his supporters in a position far 
superior to that of the Louw-grouping in the struggle for 
hegemony on the issue of 'Jewish communism'. 
Collectively, and on their own, both these factors had an 
important part to play in the restoration of ideological 
homogeneity in thinking on the Jewish Question within the G/HNP. 
Illustrative of this restoration and the increasing domination of 
beliefs associated with Malan is the HNP's policy on "Immigration 
and the Jewish Question" as it appeared in the 1941-adopted 
"Programme of Principles, Programme of Action and Constitution": 
"a) The repatriation of all illegal and undesirable 
immigrants. 
b) The party favours in general the immigration of 
suitable assimilable white European population elements. 
72. See Footnote 17. 
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C) In view of South Africa's specific problems, the 
[P]arty recommends the immediate cessation of all 
further immigration of Jews and further of all elements 
which cannot be assimilated by the South African nation 
or which are a hindrance or dangerous to society. 
d) It further has in view: 
exercise of stronger control over 
naturalization; [and] 
introduction of a vocational permit system 
for unnaturalized foreigners as exist in many 
other countries. 
e) The Party wishes to take all possible steps to fit 
South Africa's own original White population elements 
for earning a living in every uthere and to protect them 
against unfair competition."/3)  
Although it may well be possible to argue that point a) of the 
above policy-declaration, in so far as it referred to tt • • 
undesirable [Jewish] immigrants", continued to provide for a 
connection to be made between Jewry and the perceived menace of 
communism, more important is to note that those ideas originally 
associated with Louw became increasingly isolated within the 
framework of the Party. The overwhelming majority of HNP 
parliamentarians who had earlier supported Louw's contentions 
relating to `Jewish communism', now made no mention of it.74) 
Some of the more vocal supporters of Louw's 1939 Bill, for example 
Louis Weichardt, had already left or was forced to leave the HNP. 
Louw himself, however, continued to stress alleged compassion for 
Marxist philosophies by Jews. During his 1943-parliamentary motion 
Cited in G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African  
Experience, p.134. 
A case in point is the example of Paul Sauer. Addressing a 
public meeting in Messina during August 1939, Sauer explained 
in great detail the perceived Jewish nature of communism (Die  
Transvaler, 8.8.1939). Speaking in support of Louw's 1943-
motion on communism, Sauer made no reference - either 
directly or indirectly - to `Jewish communism'. See Hansard, 
5.3.1943, co1.2936-2938. 
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on communism, for example, Louw paid detailed attention to alleged 
examples of Jewish involvement with communism.75)  Sufficient is to 
note that Louw added a number of not-before mentioned names to his 
1939-list of perceived leading South African Jewish communists.76)  
Important to note, however, is that these remarks were isolated in 
the sense that Louw found no support for his contentions from 
other quarters within the HNP. In many ways this resulted in the 
campaign against `Jewish communism', at least within the context 
of the G/HNP, being changed from a campaign with tacit sanctioning 
by the Party to a personal crusade by Louw without any formal 
support. 
Furthermore, compared to the Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration 
Bill of 1939, the structure of Louw's argumentation had also 
changed noticeably. Whereas, during 1939, Louw had employed three 
different sets of arguments to validate his claims, by 1943, no 
reference was made to the alleged communiality of objectives and 
other parallels between Jewish internationalism and the 
internationalism attributed to orthodox Marxism. This last 
argument, as indicated previously, was seemingly the most 
important of Louw's 1939 allegations. The emphasis on actual 
examples of perceived Jewish involvement with this ideology was 
less contentious than the above argument and, even more important, 
largely devoid of overt indications of belief-systems connected to 
National-Socialism. 
Invariably, the question arises that if, after 1941/42, Louw's 
emphasis on alleged Jewish involvement with communism was not 
atypical of the accepted HNP stance on the Jewish Question, why he 
was allowed to continue with the propagation thereof under the 
Party banner. Two explanations possibly provide an answer: 
Firstly, Louw's emphasis on actual examples of alleged Jewish 
involvement with communism - even if only in a strict historical 
See Hansard, 12.2.1943, col-1478-1479 and 5.3.1943, co1.2940. 
To the names of Sachs, Weinbren and Basner were added: Harry 
Snitcher, Ikey Wolfson, Issy Diamond, Eli Weinberg, [Michael] 
Harmel and [Sam] Kahn. See Hansard, 12.2.1943, co1.1478. 
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context - may still have enjoyed considerablle support in various 
quarters of the Party.77)  Disciplinary action against Louw, taking 
place against the backdrop of the Party recouping from the losses 
suffered as a direct result of its campaign against volksvreemde  
elements (read OB, NO and Greyshirt-movement), could have resulted 
in a mass exodus from the Party. Secondly, compared to the 
demagogic and other favourable qualities of Louw, the HNP may have 
adjudged the prospective inconvenience to be had from a continued 
stressing of perceived Jewish communism to be minor, temporary and 
even neglible. 
Within the broader context of Afrikaner nationalist politics, the 
Jewish Question in general and in particular the alleged 
connection between Jewry and communism had virtually disappeared 
by the end of 1943. Generally speaking, the reduced topicality of 
this issue was the result of two interconnected factors, viz, the 
aura of National-Socialism which clinged to the Jewish Question 
and the rapidly worsening position of Germany in the continuing 
war. By 1943, with the turning of the tide against Germany78)  and 
the effectiveness of propaganda in linking policies of retribution 
towards Jews with National-Socialist influencing, the price to pay 
for this 'idealistic opportunism' had become too costly. 
Regarding the connection between communism and the Jewish 
Question, the virtual disappearance thereof from the platforms of 
the HNP, Greyshirt-movement and, to a lesser extent, the Ossewa-
Brandwag, were unobtrusive and in the majority of cases 
overshadowed by other developments. Following the outbreak of 
World War II, this issue was overshadowed by the HNP's emphasis on 
the necessity of neutrality and, after the 1943-general election, 
expected developments in the post-war era. Concurrently, the 
That this may have indeed been possible is illustrated by the 
repeated references to the alleged presence of Jewish 
communists in the labour movement, even from overtly 
apolitical cultural organisations such as the NRT and FAK. In 
this regard, for example, see the highly tendencious 
publication by Louis Naude: Dr. A Hertzog, die Nasionale  
Party en die Mynwerkers, pp.14-16 et. seq.  
See G.D. Scholtz: Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke 
van die Afrikaner, VI, pp. 240-241. 
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eventuality of an Allied defeat and the possible favourable 
implications resulting from this for the republicanist striving 
was shifted from its centrist position in HNP-propaganda to a 
standing with peripheral importance. 
Important to note, however, is that in spite of the above 
situation, the Party's declared policy on the Jewish Question 
never lost its place on the HNP's Programme of Principles. 
Illustrative of this is a letter by H.F. Verwoerd, then editor of 
Die Transvaler, to Strijdom during October 1947 in which it was 
stated that "... [ons] moet eenvoudig aanvaar dat ons Joodse 
beleid bestaan en dat niks verder daaroor geskryf hoef te word 
nie."79) Furthermore, the ban imposed on Jews from becoming 
members of the Party in the OFS and Transvaal remained in place 
for a considerable period, even after the war. 
Finally, with the turning of the tide against Germany in the war 
and the triumph of the HNP in the struggle for the loyalty of the 
yolk, National-Socialism also lost its potential attractiveness as 
a socio-political and economic alternative. Proponents of this 
ideology subsequently also ceased to attract meaningful support 
from Afrikaner nationalist circles. Concurrently, the alleged 
Jewish nature of communism also lost its credibility as a slogan 
behind which to rally mass support. 
79. See F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.381. 
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6.3. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE "SOUL" OF THE AFRIKANER WORKING CLASS 
Several studies have appeared on the Christian-Nationalist assault 
of the 1930s and 1940s on the established trade union movement.")  
While none of these analyses, for a variety of reasons, provide 
satisfactory insight into the different facets of this onslaught 
(e.g. the utilisation of overt anti-communism to further the cause 
of this campaign), for the aims of this dissertation it will be 
accepted that these different studies provide sufficient 
background-information. No attention will thus be afforded to the 
course of the campaign for the establishment of Afrikaner 
nationalist trade unions. 
Important, for the aims of this chapter, is the contribution of 
• 
the perceived communist menace to the deployment of a collective, 
organic Afrikaner volksidentity. 81) 	 The striving towards 
volksunity and -identity, similar to the utilisation of overt 
anti-communism for the promotion of Afrikaner nationalist trade 
unionism, have been neglected thus far by analysts. A 
comprehensive analysis of this issue, almost needless to say, 
demands a study on its own. In the context of this dissertation, 
See L. de Kock: Die Stryd •van die Afrikaner in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Mynwerkersunie, 1936-1948; D. 0' Meara: Analysing 
Afrikaner Nationalism: The 'Christian National' Assault on 
White Trade Unionism in South Africa (Historical Abstracts, 
vol. 25(B), 1979); D. 0' Meara: Volkskapitalisme; D. 0' 
Meara: "White Trade Unionism, Political Power and Afrikaner 
Nationalism" in E. Webster (ed.): Essays in South African  
Labour History; L. Naude: Dr. A. Hertzog, die Nasionale Party 
en die Mynwerkers; R.H. Davies: Capital, State and White  
Labour in South Africa, 1900-1960; and L. Witz: Servant of  
the Workers: Solly Sachs and the Garment Workers' Union. 
From the outset it needs to be emphasized that the concept of 
an organic volksidentity was neither a product of the 1930's 
nor did it come to the fore as reaction to the perceived 
volksdivisive character of communism. While the origins of 
the conception of an organic volksidentity is debateable, the 
point to be made is that the striving towards volksidentity 
and -unity was not a causal product of overt anti-communism. 
The alleged menace of communism, in the context of the 1930s 
and 1940s, was perceived as constituting a further threat to 
the organic unity of the yolk. In this regard, in terms of 
the perception of a "menace", it was closely associated with 
capitalism. 
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some introductory remarks will be presented on the evolution of an 
organic volksidentity and the possible functional role of overt 
anti-communism in this regard. These comments could serve as basis 
for a more detailed analysis. 
6.4. ANTI-COMMUNISM AND THE EVOLUTION OF AN ORGANIC VOLKSIDENTITY 
The conception of a communist menace, at first glance and in the 
context of the 1930s, played a decisive role in the further 
evolution of the conception of an organic volksidentity. The 
G/HNP, NO and OB, in referring to this concept, repeatedly did so 
in the context of a warning on communism. The NO-mouthpiece, for 
example, declared in August 1941: 
"En so sien ook die Nasionaal-sosialisme die samelewing, 
nie as In meganies saamgestelde liggaam van noodwendig 
vyandige klasse nie, maar as een groot familie waarin 
die verskillende lede en groepe elk hulle eie plek het, 
en elk geleer word om uit liefde vir hulle hele yolk, 
die belange van die geheel bokant die belange van die 
enkeling te stel. So staan Nasionaal-sosialisme dan vir 
In rewolusie van liefde en selfverlodning teenoor die 
kommunistiese rewolusie van internasionale haat en 
self sug. 1182) 
A portrayal such as the above, however, is excruciatingly one-
sided. The functional role of overt anti-communism in the 
evolvement of the concept of an organic volksidentity, so it will 
be argued, is difficult to determine. "Internationalism",83) both 
in terms of the content attributed to it and the contextual 
utilisation of this concept, may indeed have referred to the 
Marxist dogma.84)  If so, however, this was hardly of a 
conventional nature. Furthermore, internationalism - in so far as 
Die Anti-Kommunis, 19.8.1941. 
The diametrical opposite of the organic volksunity concept. 
My understanding of the term internationalism, in the context 
of orthodox Marxism-Leninism, is based on predominantly three 
works. See, in this regard, T. Bottomore (ed.): A Dictionary 
of Marxist Thought, pp.231-233; M. Jaworskyj (ed.): Soviet  
Political Thought, pp.506-538 and L. Kolakowski: Main 
Currents of Marxism, I, pp.262-398. 
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it included remarks on a mechanistic division of the yolk - may 
equally have referred to capitalism. Finally, the concept of an 
organic volksidentity, while finding explication in the credos 
subscribed to by the various movements under discussion, these 
organisations were not the only actors involved in the ideological 
construction and elucidation of this concept. The presence of 
particularly cultural entrepeneurs of Afrikaner nationalism and, 
subsequently, the probability of multilateral cross-pollination 
further complicates this issue. 
Some of these contentions will henceforth be discussed. 
6.4.1. 	 Internationalism and the Class Struggle 
"Internationalism", as indicated in earlier chapters, was 
described as a distinctive feature of communism. This term, 
firstly, referred to the perceived ideological and functional 
manipulation of South African 'communists' by Moscow. Secondly, 
communism's declared goal of a world-revolution and, finally, this 
ideology's perceived objective of a proletariat-dominated world. 
Important, for the aims of discussion, is the internationalist 
content of this last interpretation and, connected to that, the 
meaning attributed to Marxian class struggle. 
The G/HNP, as illustrated in the second chapter, initially 
portrayed communism as an intra-racial phenomenon. While little 
mention was made of internationalism per se, given the abundance 
of remarks on organic volksunity (the diametrical opposite of 
internationalism and the class struggle), it may be stated that 
this term, for the Party, referred to a racially homogenous 
internationalist workers grouping. Die Transvaler declared in this 
regard: In verenigde werkende klas-beweging ... [is] die 
aanvalskreet van die gevaarlike kommunisme. Die oogmerk is 
klassestryd in plaas van nasionale eenheid. Grondeienaars85)  word 
85. Read also capitalists. 
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as 'n klas beveg. Selfs teen die nasionale trots van die 
Afrikanerdom word te velde getrek."86)  
From 1938 onwards, at times, a definite internationalist content 
was added to this concept. J.H.P. Serfontein (HNP MP for Boshoff) 
declared in Parliament during 1944: 
"Kommunisme staan op die grondslag van die diktatuur van 
die proletariaat. Hy se dat alle onderskeidslyne moet 
uitgewis word en alle werkers moet verenig word, 
afgesien van hul ras of kleur of nasionaliteit of wat 
ook al."87) 
The NO and OB, in similar vein, also noted the internationalist 
content of the concept of internationalism. Van Rensburg, in his 
Crosby-speech, stressed that "... all workers are really one. 
German, Zulu, Russian, Indian, Afrikaner, English - all are one 
... Racial divisions are artificial, only class hatred is 
fundamental 
kommunis bestaan die hele mensdom uit twee groepe of k1asse."89)  
Portrayals such as the above, however, were more the exception 
than the rule. Particularly the G/HNP and OB, in relating the term 
internationalism to the class struggle, did so in the framework of 
the South African racial mosaic. Two elements are of importance in 
this regard: 
Firstly, in terms of the racial stratification of classes in South 
Africa, the terms proletariat and bourgeoise did not refer to 
two non-racial socio-economic entities, but rather, a 
division based on racial differences. Van Rensburg explained 
Die Transvaler, 21.5.1937: "Aanvalskreet van die Kommunisme" 
[editorial]. 
Hansard, 13.5.1944, co1.7455. 
Cited in Some Facts about the Ossewa-Brandwaq, p.35. 
.89. Die Anti-Kommunis, 10.8.1942. 
1188) Die Anti-Kommunis noted that "[v]ir die 
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this conception in the following terms: 
"The Comintern aims at the dictatorship of the 
Proletariat. In Germany the proletariat - the 
labouring class - is German, English in 
England, Swedish in Sweden. But in our 
Fatherland the proletariat is not white but 
black, neither Briton nor Boer, but Bantu. In 
our Fatherland the class-war must logically 
and inevitably develop into race-war. If the 
labouring class must become the ruling class - 
the dictatorship of the proletariat - the 
racial implication can only be the debacle of 
the whites before the onrush of the Bantu"")  
(italics in the original). 
While the G/HNP, in theory, may have recognised the non-
racial complexion of the working class and, thereby, also the 
internationalist identity of the proletariat, whites, in the 
majority of cases, were identified as in effect belonging to 
an elite grouping. Concurrently, little mention was made of 
the traditional internationalist slogan of "Workers of the 
World, Unite!". 
Secondly, irrespective of whether the above contention does prove 
to be relevant, given the fact that the overwhelmingly 
majority of the working class in South Africa was adjudged to 
be black, class struggle, in the Union, had to imply a race 
battle between white and black. 
While it could indeed be argued that the portrayal of 
internationalism in terms such as the above, given the dire 
implications of racial equality for Afrikaner nationalism's 
declared ethnic exclusivity, was a deliberate function of 
strategy, the point in focus is the unconventional utilisation of 
this concept to promote a largely unrelated point of view. Hence, 
the term internationalism, on the basis of the content attributed 
to it by Afrikaner nationalist groupings, was hardly atonable with 
'the more orthodox meaning afforded to this concept. 
90. See Some Facts about the Ossewa-Brandwaq, p.38. 
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All being said, however, this still does not imply that 
internationalism - in so far as it referred to a mechanistic 
division of the yolk on the basis of materialistic notions - did 
not have a part to play in the evolution of the concept of an 
organic volksidentity. However, internationalism, in this context, 
as will be illustrated in the next section, may well have referred 
to both capitalism and communism. 
6.4.2. 	 Internationalism: Communism vs Capitalism 
The Ossewa-Brandwag, as indicated, subscribed to a dialectical 
model in explaining the evolution of systems of government and 
socio-economic development. In terms of this argument, communism 
was the antithesis of capitalism. The latter, in giving precedence 
to the interests of capital, alienated the working class which, in 
turn, had given rise to the class struggle. Marxist ideology, in 
giving preference to the interests of labour, utilised the 
alienation emanating from capitalism; thereby actively promoting 
the class struggle. 
While the G/HNP did not make use of a similar argument, striking 
was the fact that the Party's "Economic Plan for South Africa", 
issued in 1944, also noted the diametrically opposed aims of 
respectively capitalism and communism. Under capitalism "... word 
die swakkere ekonomiese eenhede en 	 veral die werkers 
uitgebuit", while, under communism, "... het slegs een ekonomiese 
seksie, nl. die werkersklas, reg van bestaa n. Alle ander word 
vernietig. 1,91)  
Relative to organic volksunity, communism and capitalism, by 
dividing the yolk, could thus prove to be equally menacing. Die 
0.B., in February 1944, declared in this regard: "Die kapitalisme 
en die kommunisme het ooreengekom om die volk in twee te verdeel, 
en elkeen het vir hom In deel gekies waarmee hy oorlog voer teen 
die ander. Die een het vir hom die besitters gekies en die ander 
die besitloses. Watter een van die twee dele ook al wen, die volk 
91. See Die Kruithorina, 2.8.1944. 
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as sulks moet verlore gaan."92)  Meyer, repeatedly, stressed that 
"[o]ns erken [kapitalisme en kommunisme] ... as ons gemeenskaplike 
vyande."93)  
The G/HNP, once again, while never depicting the perceived 
relationship 	 between 	 capitalism-communism 	 and 	 organic 
volksidentity in terms which equalled that of the OB, indications 
are that a similar conception may well have been present within 
the Party. 
Apart from being overly critical of capitalism,94)  principles 
supposedly adhered to by the Party were also irreconcilable with 
the perceived features of capitalism. Relative to the conception 
of an organic volksidentity, important are two elements: Firstly, 
capitalism actively contributed to the division of the yolk along 
economic lines. Under the heading "Volkseenheid en  
Verantwoordelikheid", 	 the 	 HNP's 	 "Economic 	 Plan 
Die 0.B., 23.2.1944: "Die Kontra-Rewolusie" [editorial]. 
See, for example, P.J. Meyer: Afrikanereenheid (Wapenskou, 
Vol.2(2), 1941), pp.22-23. 
Karl Bremer, for example, emphasized during December 1940 
that "... Suid-Afrika horn moet voorberei om ná die oorlog In 
nuwe stelsel te aanvaar waarin die kapitalisme geen rol sal 
speel nie." See Die Burger, 3.12.1940. Traditional Afrikaner 
nationalist anti-capitalist sentiment also came very much to 
the fore during the course of the war years. The HNP, at its 
1941 unitary congress in Bloemfontein, adopted, unanimously, 
the following proposal: "Die kongres eis die omskepping van 
Suid-Afrika in In vrye, onafhanklike republiek,_gebaseer op 
Christelik-nasionale grondslag en beliggamende in wese en 
karakter die beste wat die Boerenasie in die verlede op 
hierdie gebied te voorskyn gebring het ooreenkomstig sy eie 
volksaard en tradisies 	 Losgeruk uit die boeie van die 
kapitalistiese geldmag en parasitiese uitbuiting met sy 
nasleep van grootskaalse volksarmoede moet hy diensbaar 
gemaak word aan die geestelike, sedelike, liggaamlike en 
ekonomiese opbouing van die yolk." (See Ibid., 4.6.1941). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
295 
for South Africa" declared as alternative principle: 
"Die volk is In morele en ekonomiese eenheid. As sodanig 
besit hy die volle reg op die toegewyde diens van elkeen 
van sy lede. Maar aan die ander kant dra hy ook die 
voile verantwoordelikheid vir die versekering van In 
menswaardige bestaan aan elkeen van hulle."95) 
Secondly, the emphasis on bread-and-butter issues by capitalism 
were also in conflict with the inner organic unity of the yolk. 
Die Transvaler, in February 1943, commented on the impact 
materialism had had on sections of the yolk: "Die kapitalistiese 
instelling het In klein klompie Afrikaners in In verhewe posisie 
geplaas omdat hulle in staat gestel is om skatte vir hulself te 
vergader, dikwels buite alle verhouding tot verdienste. Onder 
dieselfde stelsel bring rykdom noodwendig voorrang mee, maar ook 
In byna onweerstaanbare versoeking om die lewe uit In 
wanperspektief te sien en om met neerbuigendheid, indien nie 
minagting nie, op te tree teenoor diegene wat moeiliker In bestaan 
vind. Juis omdat In kapitalis as sodanig geen plek het in die 
Afrikaner volkslewe nie, volg dit byna vanselfsprekend dat baie 
gegoedes onder ons hulle ook van die gewone Boer afskei. Aan 
diegene wat in die proses ... ontstam het, is daar nie meer salf 
te smeer nie."96)  Malan, in setting out the HNP's election 
manifesto for the 1943 general election, explained the proposed 
alternative: "Ons sosiaal-ekonomiese beleid berus op vier 
grondpilare ... Die tweede is die inagneming deur die staat van 
menslike waardes bokant bloot finansiele belange. Die skatkis is 
daar vir die volk en nie die volk vir die skatkis nie."97)  The 
same principle found explication in the 1944 "Economic Plan for 
South Africa": 
"Dis die plig van die Staat om by die uitoefening van al 
sy funksies menslike waardes in ag te neem bokant bloot 
finansiele belange."98)  
See Die Kruithoring, 2.8.1944. 
Die Transvaler, 19.2.1943: "Vet Passasiers" [editorial]. 
See Die Burger, 15.6.1943. 
Die Kruithoring, 2.8.1944. 
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Capitalism's impermissible qualities and the proposed 
alternatives, almost needless to say, may just as well have been 
made applicable to perceived communism. The centrifugal impact of 
this latter ideology on organic volksunity, as illustrated in the 
second chapter, played a prominent part in initial G/HNP 
protestations over communism. Party members and supportive 
newspapers, intermittently, also referred to the materialistic 
basis of the communism. Shortly before the outbreak of war in 
September 1939, Die Burger, in counterposing materialism and the 
idealism of a 'new' world-order, declared with regdrd to 
communism: 
"Na die [Eerste] Wereldoorlog het dit gelyk asof die 
Marxisme nou die beskaafde wereld sou verower. Alleen 
die ontstentenis van enige idealisme het sy triomftog 
gestuit. Beter In lewe vol teleurstelling as In lewe 
sonder ideaal. Hierdie sinspreuk het die mensheid weer 
vas gekry. Van die grofste materialisme het die mens 
teruggegaan na In bestaan vol ontberings, maar met 
idealisme. Selfs die bolsjewisme kan nie sonder 
idealisme nie. Daar is in Rusland honger, koue en 
armoede gely; alleen die ideaal dat dit alles nodig was 
om In beter, In skoner, lewe deelagtig te word, het die 
volk opgebou. Se nie dat idealisme in die grond In 
droombeeld is nie. Dit is die sout van die lewe. Stel 
die idealisme as In plig. Die idealisme sal niks 
daardeur verloor nie, en die plig sal bale daarby wen. 
Dit het die leuse van die Marxisme vervang ... Die 
mensheid weet vandag weer dat niemand die ideaal in die 
hand het nie, maar dat die mens wat die idealisme nie in 
die oog het nie, soos In skip sOnder stuur  
While it may be argued that the drawing of comparisons and 
parallels between G/HNP protestations over respectively capitalism 
and communism - in relation to the concept of an organic 
volksidentity - does not prove anything of substance, 
fundamentally important is to note that in the context of the 
1930s and 1940s, the "enemy" (in lieu of organic volksunity) was 
not only identified as being communism, but also included, inter 
alia, capitalism, liberalism and imperialism. Remarks on the 
perceived destructive nature of communism, against this backdrop 
and in the context of the near-unanimity in Afrikaner nationalist 
99. Die Burger, 24.6.1939: "Die Mens Lewe nie van Brood Alleen 
nie" [editorial]. 
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ranks on the irreversible rotation towards a new world-order, 
could thus equally have related to communism. The Ossewa-Brandwag, 
as illustrated earlier, accepted that the destruction of communism 
was intimately interlinked to a destroyal of communism. 
Volkssocialism, which encompassed the concept of an organic 
volksunity, would only be realized after such a process. 
While the G/HNP's initial comments on the perceived apocalyptic 
impact of perceived communism on the organic unity of the yolk 
could be interpreted as having played a part in the evolution of 
the concept of an organic volksunity, there is no guarantee that 
it was not intended •to reflect on capitalism as well. Rhetoric on 
communism, initially without much substance, turned into the 
proverbial avalanche following Hertzog's refusal to oppose the 
introduction of a "closed shop"-principle in the mining industry. 
Subsequent propaganda pertaining to the labour movement, apart 
from stressing the presence of perceived communists in trade 
union-structures, also referred to cooperation between the then 
existing labour organisations and organised capital. Die Burger, 
in commenting on the introduction of the "closed shop"-principle 
in the mining industry, declared in this regard: "Die mynbase tree 
as bondgenote van die Mynwerkersunie teen die Afrikaanse 
'0_00) vakverbond op. 	 Relative to the trade union movement, Naude 
stresses the following: 
100. Ibid., 10.3.1937: "Bondgenote?" [editorial]. The United 
Party, even before this incident, had already been portrayed 
as an ally and even "puppet" of capitalism. Malan, for 
example, described Fusion in the following terms: 
"Samesmelting is die bedrog wat die ou bekende groep van 
imperialistiese en kapitalistiese uitbuiters agter die skerms 
reggekry het om op die trouhartige en goedgelowige 
Afrikanerdom af te speel ..." See Die Transvaler, 5.4.1938. 
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"Maar die Afrikanermynwerker het sy vyande leer ken. Hy 
het byvoorbeeld geleer dat die Verenigde Party die party 
van die geldmag en ryk kapitalis was en daarom 
vanselfsprekend aan die kant van die Afrikanervyande 
gestaan het. Die mynwerker het geleer dat die hand van 
die Verenigde Party altyd teen die werker gelig sal 
wees. Hy was in die greep van die groot geldmag en 
daarom moes hy sy aan sy met hierdie geldmag teen die 
Afrikaner veg. Dit kon nie anders nie."101) 
The point to be made, once again, is that remarks relating to 
organic volksunity and, more specifically, the divisive impact of 
certain ideologies on the striving towards volkseenheid, could 
have been aimed at either capitalism or communism. Thus, rhetoric, 
ostensibly aimed at communism, could also be intended as a 
reflection on capitalism. 
While the concept of an organic volksidentity found application in 
the various Programmes of Principles adhered to by the different 
organisations under discussion, other entrepeneurial agencies were 
also involved in the ideological construction of this concept. 
Apart from institutions of a religious-theological nature, 
particularly important in this regard were socio-cultural 
organisations such as the Afrikaner-Broederbond, Federasie van 
Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings, Reddingsdaadbond and the Nasionale 
Raad van Trustees. Multilateral influencing vis a vis the concept 
of organic volksunity, in this context, was a real possibility 
which cannot simply be ignored. Striking was the fact that whereas 
remarks on the concept of an organic volksidentity reached a 
climax in the OB during the war years 
period, hardly referred to this theme. 
both capitalism and perceived communism. 
unrelated to political life, relative to 
greater possibility. 
the HNP, over the same 
This applies equally to 
Influencing from sources 
the HNP, was thus an even 
101. L. Naude: Dr. A. Hertzog, die Nasionale Party en die  
Mynwerkers, pp.179-180. On the eve of the 1938 general 
election, C.W.M. du Toit, in similar vein, stated: "Genl. 
Smuts, wat sy bevele kry van die Kamer van Mynwese en sy oor 
leen vir die Joodse Raad van Afgevaardigdes, kan nog alleen 
In kaartjiesvergadering toespreek aan die Rand." See Die 
Transvaler, 17.5.1938. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
299 
In lieu of all these factors, an analysis of the functional role 
of overt anti-communism in the evolution of the the concept of an 
organic volksunity will prove to be a highly complex issue. An 
attempt to do this in relation to exclusively the G/HNP, NO, OB 
and Greyshirt-movement, will prove to be a self-defeating exercise 
and, ultimately, without much academic value. 
Ultimately, the point remains that irrespective of whether the 
conception of an organic volksidentity was related to either 
capitalism or communism, two elements, in lieu of the 
aforementioned ideologies, determined Afrikaner nationalist 
behaviour on the striving towards a collective volksidentity: 
Firstly, class struggle was adjudged to be irreconcilable 
with the striving towards an organic volksidentity. The 
origins of such a mechanistic division of the yolk could have 
been attributed to either capitalism or communism. 
Secondly, internationalism, which may have related, once 
again, to either capitalism or communism, negated the 
centrality of volksidentity and volksunity in the national 
striving of the yolk. Ultimately, both were thus opposed to 
the interests of the yolk. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
OPPOSITION TO COMMUNISM: PRINCIPLE VS STRATEGY 
This concluding chapter, in drawing together the previous five 
chapters, will discuss the functional role of overt anti-
communism in Afrikaner nationalist and South African politics 
between 1937 and May 1945. In doing so, an integrated strategy 
will be employed whereby attention will be focussed, 
interrelatedly, on both tactical considerations and 
considerations of a principled nature. 
However, as stated earlier, this dissertation is mainly an 
analysis of Afrikaner nationalist conceptions of communism up 
to May 1945. With the exception of the introductory chapter, no 
attempt have been made to evaluate the correctness, 
applicability or even fairness of conceptions pertaining to the 
alleged menace of communism. Such an endeavour demands a study 
on its own. The implications of this for the aims of this 
particular chapter are two-fold: 
Given the fact that this study does not aspire to provide 
an evaluation of the factual content of conceptions vis 
vis communism, remarks made on the functional role of 
overt anti-communism in Afrikaner nationalist and South 
African politics will thus have to be of a tentative 
nature. 
Attention, in this dissertation, have been limited to 
conceptions of communism in organisations aspiring to 
provide political leadership to the yolk. Afrikaner 
nationalism and the issue of communism in particular, 
however, were not only the domain of political actors. A 
diverse range of other agencies contributed to the 
evolution of Afrikaner nationalism in general and, in 
particular, the construction of perceived anti-communism. 
The absence of a meaningful discussion on overt anti- 
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communism in organisations and institutions making up this 
latter grouping as well as an analysis dealing with 
influencing between the various embodiments of Afrikaner 
nationalism, in the context of this chapter, will affect 
any discussion aiming to come to terms with the functional 
role of perceived anti-communism in Afrikaner as well as 
South African society. 
7.1. THE PERCEIVED DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF COMMUNISM 
7.1.1. 	 Atheism vs Metaphysical Notions 
Broad consensus existed over the perceived sacreligious nature 
of communism. Communism not only scorned religion, but the 
materialistic foundations of this ideology, together with the 
emphasis on militant class struggle were irreconcilable with 
the declared Christian traditions embedded in Afrikaner 
society. This theme and variations thereof, at various times, 
were referred to by all those movements/organisations under 
discussion. 
The counterposing of atheism (communism) and religious fervour 
(Afrikaner society) while, for reasons to be discussed later, 
having obvious tactical value, an explanation for this 
counterposing must first and foremost be sought in the realm of 
principles. Important in this regard are the prominence of 
metaphysical notions and theocratic tendencies in the ideology 
of Afrikaner nationalism))  An in-depth examination of these 
tendencies does not fall within the scope of this study. 
However, in explaining opposition to communism on the basis of 
1. While no detailed and authorative examination of these 
issues have as yet been made, worth mentioning are four 
studies: W.A. de Klerk: The Puritans in Africa; A.B. du 
Toit: No Chosen People: The myth of the Calvinist origins 
of Afrikaner nationalism and racial ideology (American  
Historical Review, Vol. 88(4), 1986); I.R. Hexham: Dutch 
Calvinism and the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism 
(Collected Papers, vol.1, Centre for Southern African 
Studies, University of York, 1974) and I. Hexham: The  
Irony of Apartheid: the Struggle for National Independence 
of Afrikaner Calvinism against British Imperialism. 
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a secular volksidentitY, three sets of comments need to be 
made: 
Firstly, elements of religious fundamentalism in Afrikaner 
society can be traced back to the nineteenth century.2)  
Initially couched in vague providential language, these 
ideas, with the onset of the twentieth century, came to be 
immersed in an all-encompassing weltanschauunq. Political 
embodiments of Afrikaner nationalism reflected this 
secular volksidentity. Concurrently, given the fact that 
the family of Afrikaans Protestant Churches were 
expressions of an explicit religious volksidentity, these 
institutions attained an elevated position in Afrikaner 
nationalist society. 
The second observation relate to the propagation and 
evolution of religious qualities in those movements under 
discussion. On the one hand, as indicated earlier, the 
ideological construction and evolution of Afrikaner 
nationalism was not the exclusive domain of organisations 
aspiring to reflect the political ideals of Afrikaner 
nationalists. Several organisations and institutions 
contributed to the development of Afrikaner nationalism. 
Apart from influencing one another, all of these 
organisations and institutions (both political and overtly 
apolitical) consciously reflected a definite religious 
orientation. Consequently, apart from the general impact 
of religious-oriented thinking, specific agencies and 
individuals also manifested an influence in certain 
organisations. Notable in this regard was the influence of 
Gereformeerde Kerk [Reformed Church]-intellectuals from 
Pothefstroom on the Ossewa-Brandwag during the latter part 
of the 1930s and early 1940s. The writings of prominent 
Afrikaner intellectuals, schooled in Europe (particularly 
Germany and the Netherlands) in the Calvinistic tradition, 
2. 	 See De Klerk: Op.cit., pp.160-165 and S. Patterson: The 
Last Trek: A Study of the Boer People and the Afrikaner 
Nation, pp.34-37. 
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also had a part to play in the evolution of religious 
concepts. Names to mention here are those of Piet Meyer3) 
and Nico Diederichs.4)  
Conversely, religious qualities not only found embodiment 
in the philosophies espoused by the Gesuiwerde/Herenigde 
Nasionale Party and other movements, but individuals 
within those organisations and the organisations in 
themselves actively propounded such belief-systems. D.F. 
Malan, for example, who had left the pulpit to become 
editor of Die Burger, occasionally referred to the 
concepts of divine intervention and -predestination.5)  
Predikante-cum-politicians were also prominent in the New 
Order and OB, e.g. C.W.M. du Toit in the NO and C.R. du 
Toit in the OB. 
The third set of comments relate to the content of those 
religious qualities which found explication in the 
ideologies of the G/HNP, NO, OB and Greyshirt-movement. 
Prominent in this regard was the belief that God had 
ordained separate nations, each with a separate, unique 
and divine destiny. Malan, in his political autobiography, 
summarised this belief: "Agter ons Suid-Afrikaanse 
volksbestaan en geskiedenis sit daar In doel. Daarvan moet 
See, for example, P.J. Meyer: Die Vooraand van ons  
Vrywordinq, pp.16-20. 
Diederichs published a major study on nationalism in 1936. 
In Nasionalisme as Lewensbeskouing en sy Verhouding tot  
Internasionalisme, religiosity was described as a 
distinctive trait of 'true' nationalism. Diederichs wrote 
in this regard: "Nasionalisme is noodwendig godsdienstig 
omdat dit elke nasie beskou as maaksel van die Hoogste 
Skepper, bestemd om 'n roeping te vervul en 'n deel by te 
dra tot verwesenliking van die God-bepaalde doel van die 
heelal. Sonder hierdie ewige doel sou die nasie-bestaan 
sonder sin en betekenis gewees het. Meewerk tot die 
vervulling van die nasie-roeping is meewerk tot die 
verwesenliking van die plan van God. Diens aan my nasie is 
deel van my diene (sic!) aan God." See N. Diederichs: 
op.cit., p.63. 
See, for example, Malan's speech at Redelinghuis in 
December 1938 (Die Burger, 3.12.1938). 
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ons yolk bewus wees, en dit na die s beste van ons vermoe 
probeer uitleef."6)  The NO's Programme of Principles 
declared unequivocally that "[e]lke nasie 	 'n gedagte 
van God [is] ..."7) This belief also found application in 
the ideologies of the OB and Greyshirt-movement.8)  
The permeating influence of the conception of a divine 
volksidentity and -destiny speaks for itself. Not only did 
it lead to volksdeification in the case of the NO and 
Greyshirt-movement,8)  but also served as rationale for the 
propagation of specific elements of policy. Propaganda in 
favour of organic volksunity by the OB and NO, at most 
times, also assumed a metaphysical character. A policy 
document issued by the Grootraad in June 1942 explained 
this concept in the following terms: "Ons hoef dus nie na 
die ou filosofie van die Grieke of na die hedendaagse 
filosofie van die buiteland te gaan om daarvandaan die 
begrip oor te neem van In organiese groepseenheid nie, ons 
het die begrip reeds in ons eie Christelike leer en ons 
ken dit goed in ons eie nasionale lewe: Dit is,  'n 
Christelik-Nasionale begrip en werk1ikheid."10)  Religious 
qualities, inclusive of all those movements under 
discussion, were also present in remarks on colour policy. 
Based on the perceived anti- and un-Christian qualities 
thereof, opposition to communism, against this background, can 
hardly be afforded a mere tactical character. Opposition to the 
D.F. Malan: Afrikaner-Volkseenheid en my ervarings op die 
pad daarheen, p.240. 
0. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, p.3. See also Die 
Anti-Kommunis, 26.8.1941. 
Izak le Grange, leading ideologue of the Greyshirt- 
movement, for example, declared: "[Die Gryshemde] 	 gaan 
uit van die standpunt dat die begin en einde van alle 
dinge in God, die Almagtige is." See I. le Grange: Die 
Organiese Volksbeweging - Waarheen en Hoe, p.l. 
See Die Anti-Kommunis, 5.12.1941 and I. le Grange: 
op.cit., pp.1-5. 
See Die Ossewa-Brandwag: Vanwaar en Waarheen, p.27. 
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atheistic qualities of the Marxist ideology was of a 
fundamental and principled nature. The vociferous damnation of 
Smuts by particularly the HNP for involving South Africa in an 
alliance with the Soviet Union must also be explained, 
primarily, in the context of this Calvinistic volksidentity. 
For many South Africans, and not only Afrikaner nationalists, 
the USSR was not merely a faraway state, but the incarnation of 
evil. Relating to religiosity, the Soviet Union 
as the destroyer-in-chief of norms and principles 
be inherent to Christian society. 11) An alliance 
- albeit indirect - implied thus not a strategical and 
temporary war-time measure, but rather, as termed by Eric Louw, 
an alliance "... with the anti-Christ."12)  South Africa, given 
the imperialistic objectives of the Marxist ideology and 
supplemented by a perceived agressive and expansionistic Soviet 
foreign policy, would therefore be a victim of Smuts' 
'shortsightedness'. The Christian culture, as one of many 
qualities inherent to the Afrikaner, would be destroyed in this 
process. 
In the context of the post-1943 HNP scenario of a rampant USSR 
in a war-ravaged world, special attention, once again, was 
afforded to the implications of this for the continued survival 
of a Christian culture; both internationally and in South 
Africa.13)  
Allegations relating to religious persecution and the 
general trend of affairs regarding religion in the USSR 
fulfilled a prominent role in parliamentary motions on 
communism. Speaking in support of Pirow's 1942 motion, 
G.P. Brits alleged that a statue had been erected in 
Leningrad for Judas Iscariot (Hansard, 10.2.1942, 
co1.1786). The NO, at other times, paid special attention 
to the alleged destruction of traditional family life and 
conventional conceptions of matrimony in Soviet society. 
See Chapter Four. 
See Louw's speech at Warmbad during July 1941 as reported 
by Die Transvaler on 2.7.1941. 
See, for example, Malan's comments on the Yalta-agreement 
in Parliament during February 1945 (Hansard, 14.2.1945, 
co1.1391-1396). Similar scenarios were also advanced by 
the Ossewa-Brandwag. See Die 0.B., 20.9.1944. 
all that was 
was portrayed 
considered to 
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All being said, however, this still does not imply that all 
references to the perceived sacreligious character of communism 
have to be attributed with a normative content. Remarks on the 
anti- and un-Christian qualities of perceived communism, on 
occasion, may have been of a definite tactical nature. This is 
partly illustrated by the prominence afforded to the Afrikaans 
Protestant Churches in the campaign against 'communism' by the 
G/HNP, NO, and OB. -4) Initiatives by the Church against alleged 
communism were continuously referred to. -5) These references, 
both in terms of a general theme and regarding overt anti-
communism, served to solidify the patriarchal status of the 
Church in Afrikaner society. Commenting on the troublesome 
state of affairs in the Garment Workers' Union during 1944 and 
the involvement of the Church therewith, J.J. Serfontein (HNP 
MP for Fauresmith) categorised this patriarchal role: 
"Ons wil ten sterkste protesteer teen die aanranding 
wat plaasgevind het op die predikante van die 
Hollandse Kerk wat 	 [daar is] cm te waak oor die 
belange van In blankedom wat van Bo hier geplaas is, 
daardie predikante wat in Suid-Afrika In roeping het 
om te vervul, wat ook al die kommuniste daarvan 
se.  n16) 
This patriarchal identity and, more specifically, the inclusion 
of the Church and values espoused by it in campaigns against 
communism by Afrikaner nationalist political groupings held 
important implications for the utilisation of overt anti- 
While the G/HNP, NO and OB included references to the 
Church in its own respective campaigns against perceived 
communism, it needs to be noted that the family of 
Afrikaans Protestant Churhes were, in their own right, 
also involved in a "struggle" against perceived communism. 
From 1937 onwards, numerous publications dealing with the 
perceived menace of communism were published by or under 
authority of the Church. Memoranda and delegations were 
also sent and despatched to the State. 
Such was the case with the 1942 motions of Louw and Pirow 
as well as Louw's motion of 1943. See Hansard, 10.2.1943, 
co1.1781-1786; 13.2.1942, col. 2074-2075 and 12.2.1943, 
co1.1391-1396. The OB also noted these initiatives. See, 
for example, Die 0.B., 15.9.1943. 
Hansard, 17.3.1944, co1.3481. 
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communism in the realisation of aims of a tactical nature. 
Firstly, the identification with Christendom may have afforded 
an elevated stature to the various initiatives against what was 
adjudged to be communism. This, in turn, could have served to 
convey the impression that the campaign against perceived 
communism was not merely a party-political affair, but were 
imbued with qualities which elevated it above the arena of 
ordinary politics. Already prior to the outbreak of war in 1939 
Die Transvaler stressed that the Church's campaign against 
communism had nothing to do with politics: 
"Waar die staat besig is om sy plig in verband met 
[kommunisme] 	 te versuim, is dit goed dat die kerk 
op die gevaar wys. Niemand sal kan beweer dat die 
kerk met hierdie saak besig is om hom op die 
politieke terrein te begeef nie, want die kommunisme 
is nie net In gevaar vir die bestaande staatsorde 
nie, maar ook vir die Christelike godsdiens."17)  
Although the G/HNP never attempted to describe its own campaign 
against perceived communism in similar terms, the point in 
focus is the supra-political qualities added to it by way of 
association with religious values. 
Secondly, and on a more controversial level, the metaphysical 
character of the various campaigns against perceived communism 
may have played a part in the process of ethnic mobilisation. 
Smuts, by involving South Africa in an alliance with the USSR 
(which was criticised by the Church-8 ) and, even more 
importantly, his refusal to institute so-called preventative 
measures against 'communism' (following representations by the 
Die Transvaler, 15.8.1939: "Die Kommunistiese Gevaar" 
[editorial]. This idea was repeated in a second editorial 
less than two years later. See Ibid., 29.7.1941: 
"Afrikaanse Kerke Aangeval". 
See memoranda sent to the State on this issue as published 
by Die Kerkbode (mouthpiece of the Nederduits-
Gereformeerde Kerk) on 28.1.1942. 
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Raad der Kerke [literally Council of Churches]19)), constituted 
an act both ignorant and in contravention of a divine-
instituted authority. To put it differently: By refusing to act 
against the communist menace, Smuts was ignoring the wishes of 
the Church. A remark by Serfontein illustrates this point: 
"Die Hollandse kerke in Suid-Afrika waak vir wat 
heilig en dierbaar vir ons volk is ... en daarom het 
hulle na die Minister [van Justisie] gekom om hulle 
te help om hierdie [kommunistiese] gevaar af te 
weer ... As die Minister sy plig versuim: daar sal 
magte ontstaan wat geinspireer word deur die verlede 
van ons volk, wat die Minister sal wegvee as hy nie 
sy plig teenoor die volk wil doen nie."°)  
On the level of party politics, depictions like the above may 
have served an explicit mobilisatory function. Particularly the 
G/HNP, as the largest and most influential grouping in 
opposition politics, stood to gain from a shrinking of the 
United Party's support base. 
Finally, as noted earlier, specific elements of policy, e.g. 
colour policy, were also afforded a divine character at times. 
Such characterisations contrasted sharply with the portrayed 
anti- and un-Christian qualities of perceived communist 
policies. This element of divinity, in relation to anti-
communism, once again may have functioned as vote-catching 
strategy. 
7.1.2. 	 Segregation vs Integration 
In terms of colour policy, unqualified equality between races, 
if not distinctive to communism, was described as a 
distinguishable characteristic of Marxian Socialism. This 
ideology's striving towards racial equality was agreed on by 
A consultative body made up of representatives of the 
Nederduits-Gereformeerde Kerk, Gereformeerde Kerk and 
Hervormde Kerk and representing the interests of their 
members. 
Hansard, 12.2.1943, co1.1514. 
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all those movements under discussion. Consensus, furthermore, 
existed over the applicability of a policy of segregation or 
apartheid (as termed by the HNP and OB in the post-1943 period) 
for the regulation of race relations in South Africa. The 
counterposing of these different approaches to the colour 
question, albeit controversial, may have been indicative of 
both a principled and tactical approach vis a vis communism. 
On the normative plain, as indicated in the introductory 
chapter, white racial superiority was and had been part of 
Afrikaner political culture for many decades. Moodie states in 
this regard: "From the beginning of the eighteenth 
century ... white racism has been a constant factor in 
Afrikaner history. “21) The belief that there was to be no 
equality between white and black in any area where the 
Afrikaner had his say found clear explication in the 
philosophies propagated by various political embodiments of 
Afrikaner nationalism. The OB's 1943 "Ten Point Policy 
Declaration", under the heading "We aim at a White South 
Africa", for example, declared: "Non-Europeans are to be 
gradually segregated out of European territory to promote 
racial purity and the unhindered spontaneous development of 
each element. ,,22) 
In view of this, communism was perceived as a real and actual 
menace for the survival of Western values (read white values) 
in South Africa. The stressing of racial equality not only 
endangered white hegemony, but potentially even more hazardous, 
the total existence of the white race in the Union. 
Furthermore, equality between white and black would prevent the 
Afrikaner from fulfilling his perceived historically-determined 
and divinely-inspired role as protector of the 'lesser-breeds' 
(non-whites). Finally, communism, in so far as it propagated 
racial equality, also negated the Divine Will. For many 
Afrikaners, as noted by Moodie, the Covenant of Blood River 
T.D. Moodie: The Rise of Afrikanerdom, p.245. 
Cited in Some Facts about the Ossewa-Brandwaq, p.98. 
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was, after all, proof that God favoured the establishment of a 
white civilization in South Africa.23)  
The emphasis on racial equality as a unique/distinguishing 
feature of communism, especially in so far as it was made 
applicable to the UP's haphazard approach towards the colour 
question, may have also served a definite tactical function. 
Particularly the G/HNP and OB, as illustrated in an earlier 
chapter, portrayed official race policy as either identical or 
closely related to that of communism. In the case of the 
former, the deduction to be made was that the ruling UP and 
'communists' shared a common conviction. In the latter case, 
this served to imply that liberals were in the process of 
taking over the UP or, as a result of Smuts' perceived blind 
subservience to foreign interests (a whole range of 'menaces'), 
other forces were determining race policy in South Africa.24) 
The attempted association of the UP with communism had as 
overriding objective the mobilisation of voter support against 
the government of the day. The HNP, once again, and 
particularly so at election time, liberally made use of this 
strategy to promote its own cause. Already some time before the 
T.D. Moodie: op.cit., p.247. At Day of the Covenant-
celebrations in 1942, Malan declared: It is through the 
Will of God that the Afrikaner People exists at all. In 
[H]is wisdom [H]e determined that on the southern point of 
Africa, the dark continent, a People should be born who 
would be the bearer of Christian culture and 
civilization ... God also willed that the Afrikaans people 
should be continually threatened by other Peoples. There 
was the ferocious barbarian who resisted the intruding 
Christian civilization and caused the Afrikaner's blood to 
flow in streams. There were times when as a result of this 
the Afrikaner was deeply despairing, but God at the same 
time prevented the swamping of the young Afrikaner People 
in the sea of barbarism." Cited in Ibid., p.98. 
24. The possibility of references to parity in race policy 
between the ruling United Party and 'communists' serving a 
tactical goal must also be seen in the context of the 
G/HNP as opposition party vs the UP as ruling party. 
Attempts to align the UP with alleged communist 
organisations on the basis of race policy potentially held 
explicit tactical benefits from which the G/HNP could only 
gain. 
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general election of July 1943, Die Transvaler, for example, 
declared with regard to colour policy: 
"Nog nooit het die paaie so klaarblyklik uiteengeloop 
as tans nie. Die Afrikaanse kerke verhef steeds die 
stem teen die ontsettende gevaar van die verbreiding 
van die kommunisme onder die nie-blankes. Die 
[Herenigde] Nasionale Party-leiers toon aan dat die 
huidige kleurbeleid daarop gemunt is om van Suid-
Afrika In swartmansland te maak. Maar die Regering 
gaan goedsmoeds voort op sy ingeslane weg. Hy help 
selfs mee om die grondslae van ons blanke beskawing 
te ondergraaf en om die volk op In ramp af te stuur. 
Waar gaan dit eindig, indien blank Suid-Afrika nie 
betyds uit sy droom gewek word en indien elke 
Afrikanerkieser nie aanstaande jaar sy selfrespek 
behou deur sy stem teen hierdie roekelose Regering 
uit te bring nie?"25) 
A measure of the short-term success of this endeavour is 
provided by the the results of the general election of 1948. 
Colour issues and the role of the alleged communist menace in 
South Africa figured prominently in HNP propaganda at that 
time. As was to be expected, Smuts and the governing UP were 
portrayed as active contributors to the growth of this 
perceived menace.26)  
7.1.3. 	 Internationalism vs Organic Volksidentity 
Internationalism, occasionally described as a distinctive 
feature of communism, and the conception of an organic 
volksidentity, the diametrical opposite thereof, have been 
sufficiently dealt with in the previous chapter.27) 
Die Transvaler, 30.11.1942: "Geen Kleurslagboom" 
[editorial]. 
See W.A. Botha: Die Parlementere Verkiesing van 1948 - In  
Ontleding van die Faktore wat die Verkiesing Beinvloed 
het, pp.92-94; 147-148 and T.D. Moodie: The Rise of  
Afrikanerdom, pp.256-257. 
See Chapter Six. 
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7.2. ANTI-COMMUNISM AND THE PROMOTION OF SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF 
POLICY 
The perceived menace of communism was also connected to the 
specific elements of policy. The G/HNP, for example, attempted 
to establish a linkage between the curbing of perceived 
communism and the implementation of its colour policy and 
approach towards Jewish Immigration. Similarly, stress was 
initially also laid on the promotion of Afrikaner nationalist 
trade unionism as alternative to alleged communist labour 
organisation and, from 1944 onwards, with the publication of 
the HNP's "Economic Plan for South Africa", broad economic 
policy. The Greyshirt-movement, occasionally, also explained 
its anti-Semitic policies on the basis of the `red menace'. The 
menace of communism, in the case of the NO and OB, was 
connected to the socialist objectives of their respective 
ideological credo's. 
The linking of communism and one or more elements of policy, as 
will be argued, may have had both tactical value and served to 
illuminate a principled approach vis a vis perceived communism. 
On the level of tactics, the connection between alleged 
communism and particular elements of policy may have served a 
variety of goals. Without going into any great detail, some of 
these aims may be summarised as follow: Firstly, given the 
actuality of remarks on this topic, a linking of communism and 
some element of policy (as alternative) may have served to 
provide an added prominence to such a policy-element. Secondly, 
by attempting to focus attention on specific elements of 
policy, the particular organisation/movement may have hoped to 
attract popular support. Finally, in the context of 
parliamentary politics, the G/HNP, in propagating a more 
radical version of segregation as alternative to `communism's' 
goal of racial equality may have attempted to throw suspicion 
on the motives of the ruling United Party. 28) Almost needless 
28. See footnote 24. 
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to say, a strategy such as this held important implications for 
the process of electoral mobilisation. 
As opposed to the tactical benefits to be gained from a 
propagation of overt anti-communism and some element of policy, 
the counterposing thereof was also indicative of principled 
opposition to alleged communism. In propagating alternatives to 
'communism', all of those movements under discussion may have 
believed that they were indirectly involved in the 
curbing/combatting of communism. This observation corresponds 
with the declared strategy of ideological counter-balancing as 
propagated by the NO, OB and, occasionally, the G/HNP. 
Furthermore, the posing of alternatives to an approach 
identified to be inimical to the interests of a certain 
grouping indicate, in any case, the existence of a value-
judgement of a certain menace; in this case the ideology of 
communism. 
7.3. ANTI-COMMUNISM AND THE ATTEMPTED VILLIFICATION OF 
POLITICAL OPPONENTS 
Overt anti-communism, in expressing the distinctive features of 
what allegedly represented communist dogma, and in presenting a 
diametrically opposed alternative, represented both a 
principled and strategical approach. The utilisation of 
references to this ideology in an attempt to discredit 
political opponents served an explicit tactical function. In 
the context of this discussion, however, no attention will be 
afforded to propaganda aimed at the CPSA and other 
'communists'. The CPSA and allied organisations/individuals 
were 'natural' and to be expected targets for any propaganda 
onslaught. Rather, in this section, anti-communist propaganda 
directed against other, less conventional targets will be 
discussed. 
Colour policy, as illustrated previously, was a major element 
in particularly the G/HNP's propaganda strategy to have the 
ruling UP identified/associated with perceived communism. If 
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official colour policy did not correspond with that of 
communism (as alleged by Strijdom29)), it was either closely 
related thereto or, as a result of the influence of liberal 
strands of thinking on the United Party, in the process of 
being transformed to a perceived communist approach. It needs 
to be emphasized, however, that this last remark and commentary 
by Strijdom on parity between communists and the UP on colour 
policy must be seen in the context of the G/HNP as opposition 
party aiming to strenghten its support base. Remarks of a 
similar nature were also made by members of the NO and OB. 
Apart from being identified with communism on the basis of 
specific policy-elements, Smuts and his government, in a 
variety of ways, were also connected to the promotion of this 
ideology in South Africa and, conversely, the destruction of 
"traditional" values. The G/HNP, as the largest and most 
influential grouping in Afrikaner nationalist politics and, 
consequently, the party who stood to gain the most from such a 
strategy, took the lead in this attempted villification. While 
it would prove near-impossible to discuss the different 
elements of this strategy because of the integrated character 
thereof, a viable alternative would be the presentation of a 
single case study, namely the Allied alliance with the Soviet 
Union in 1941. 
Smuts' decision to involve South Africa in an alliance with the 
USSR, as illustrated in the second chapter, unleashed a series 
of vicious attacks from the HNP. In doing so, Smuts, as termed 
by Malan, was not only providing communism with a push like 
never before, but this alliance endangered the very foundations 
of the volk. Commenting on this last aspect, Die Kruithoring, 
29. Hansard, 13.2.1942, co1.2071-2072. 
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in August 1942, declared: 
"Solank veldm. Smuts hand on die nek sit met Satan 
Stalin, so lank sal die kanker van Kommunisme vreet 
aan die fondamente van ons volksbestaan; so lank word 
die Calvinistiese grondslag van ons volkslewe met sy 
liefde vir die Christelike godsdiens, sy sterk gevoel 
vir kleurskeiding en sy geloof in die apartheid van 
die Boerevolk bedreig."-50)  
A similar apocalyptic scenario, as indicated in the previous 
chapter, was forwarded in relation to the arming of non-white 
members of the Union Defence Force. The decision to arm non-
white soldiers was partly explained in the context of the 1941-
alliance and, for the HNP, once again vindicated Smuts' 
couldn't-care-less attitude towards communism. The status of 
Smuts as hand-maiden of British imperialism was allegedly also 
proven by the alliance with the USSR: In giving precedence to 
the interests of another entity which, in the context of World 
War II, implied the promotion of Anglo-Soviet friedship, Smuts 
not only negated South African interests but, in lieu of 
communism, actively promoted this ideology. Die Burger, in this 
regard, stated: 
"Dit word haas pateties soos veldm. Smuts se hele 
beleid op die bevordering van Engeland se belange 
gerig is. Maar daarby word hierdie beleid ook steeds 
rampspoediger vir Suid-Afrika. Die Suid-Afrikaanse 
handlangers van Moskou le hy geen steen in die weg 
nie. Hulle mag hul verderf like leerstellings van elke 
verhoog aan die swart massas verkondig, en nie omdat 
ons Britse veldmaarskalk enige toegeneentheid jeens 
die kommunistiese leer koester nie, maar omdat hy 
selfs die moontlikheid van vertroebelde Brits-
Russiese betrekkinge wil vermy. Dit is alleen 
Brittanje se belange wat by hom tel; belange wat 
blykens sy dade 	 verg dat die (ommuniste in Suid- 
Afrika vrye teuels moet geniet."31)  
Furthermore, Smuts' refusal to institute repressive measures 
against perceived communism, according to the HNP, had to be 
explained against the backdrop of the war alliance with the 
Die Kruithoring, 7.8.1942. 
Die Burger, 20.8.1942: "In Nuwe Naam Nodig" [editorial]. 
315 
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USSR and his status as lackey of British imperialism. Die 
Transvaler, in connecting the absence of repressive measures on 
communism to the 1941-alliance, declared during May 1944: 
"Met die toetrede van Rusland tot die oorlog het die 
Smutsregering al die maatreels gestaak wat die 
ondergrondse kommunisme voor die oorlog verhoed het 
[om] van Suid-Afrika se naturelle op te rui. Oop en 
bloot het kommuniste - hoewel soms onder die 
dekmantel van ander organisasies as In kommunistiese 
party - hulle sedertdien gewend tot die naturel 
Dat sowel blanke as naturel in Suid-Afrika 
hieronder gaan ly, hinder hulle min. En die Verenigde 
Party-regering was te swak of te oorlogsdronk om 
hieraan paal en perk te stel."32)  
Finally, the original decision to involve South Africa in an 
alliance with the USSR was, by implication, also included in 
the HNP-propagated post-war scenario of a rampant and 
imperialistic Soviet Union. According to the Party, this 
implied that South Africa herself could well be destroyed. 
Smuts, once more, had to be blamed for such a future 
destruction of the yolk. Reference, repeatedly, was also made 
to the possible destruction of perceived historically accepted 
bastions against communism on the European continent. Smuts and 
his government, once again, were the culprits. 
Collectively, the portrayal of Smuts and the UP in terms such 
as the above had as primary aim the mobilisation of popular 
support. The perceived menace of communism proved to be an 
ideal stepping-stone for political mobilisation. 
References to communism, at times, also appeared in relation to 
the Labour Party (LP). Prior to the general election of 1938 
the LP was repeatedly described as a communist party. In a 
speech to a public meeting in the Johannesburg City Hall during 
November 1937, J.G. Strijdom declared: "Die Arbeidersparty is 
niks anders as In tweelingbroer van die kommunisme nie en 
hoewel hul leiers dit ontken, skerm hulle tog by elke 
32. Die Transvaler, 26.5.1944: "Die Rooi Gevaar" [editorial]. 
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geleentheid vir die kommunisme."33)  A variety of opinions, 
however, were expressed on the particular ideological trait or 
element of policy which supposedly testified to the communist 
identity of the LP. Indeed, remarks on this issue can be 
divided into two periods. During the initial period, the 
alleged communist identity of the LP evolved around the concept 
of an organic volksidentity. Malan, for example, stated: "Van 
Arbeiderskant is daar vrees dat die Afrikaner voeling sal behou 
met sy volk en besiel sal wees met die gees van Suid-Afrika en 
nie met die gees van Moskou nie. Hy sal sy politieke heil 
elders as in die Arbeidersparty soek."34)  Based on this remark 
and similar comments by other GNP speakers over the same 
period,35)  it may be argued that the connotation with 
communism, in so far as it related to the LP, was provided by 
the perceived sectional working class identity of the latter 
grouping. 
From March 1937 onwards, however, no further reference was made 
to the sectional identity - as allegedly indicative of 
communism - of the Labour Party. In so far as remarks on 
communism did appear in relation to the LP, a variety of issues 
were touched upon. Most prominent was the contention that the 
LP, in allegedly propagating racial equality, provided ample 
proof of its so-called communist orientation.36)  Die Burger, by 
way of an editorial during January 1937, also referred to the 
perceived internationalism espoused by the LP. Internationalism 
was described as meaning that "[d]ie huidige Arbeidersparty 
is ... neer geinteresseer vir (sic!) die lot van werkers in 
lande soos Duitsland as wat hy is vir die belange van Suid- 
Die Transvaler, 1.11.1937. 
See Malan's speech at Stellenbosch as reported by Die 
Burger on 12.4.1937. 
See speeches by Karl Bremer at Graaff-Reinet (Die Burger, 
13.7.1937) and N.J. van der Merwe in the Paarl (Ibid., 
22.3.1937). 
See speeches by Malan at Boshof (Die Burger, 28.7.1937) 
and in Pretoria (Ibid., 28.4.1938). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
318 
Afrika."37)  Albeit a poor description of international 
proletarian solidarity, important is to note that this typical 
socialist feature was interpreted as referring to the concept 
of proletarian internationalism (in the context of orthodox 
Marxist dogma) and, subsequently, utilised to equate the LP 
with communism. Finally, the LP was also identified with 
communism on the basis of its support for labour organisations. 
As a result of this support, according to Die Burger, "... het 
die Madeley-groep meer en meer links georienteer[d] geraak"38)  
and would continue to do so until it was `wholly communist'. 
At first glance, particularly in so far as the concept of an 
organic volksidentity was posed as the diametrical opposite of 
a mechanistic class identity (perceived to be common to both 
communism and the LP), references to communism in the Labour 
Party does seem to be of a principled nature. Perspective, 
however, can only be gained when remarks on communism - in 
relation to the LP - are seen in the context of the period in 
which they were made. References to communism, based on the 
LP's perceived proletarian identity, have to be analysed, 
firstly, against the backdrop of the campaign for the 
establishment of Afrikaner nationalist trade unions and, 
secondly, in the context of the 1938 general election. 
The GNP, by supporting Afrikaner nationalist trade unionism, 
particularly stood to gain in terms of electoral standing on 
the Witwatersrand. The Labour Party prevented the realisation 
of this goal in more ways than one: Firstly, the LP had 
traditionally been the strongest political grouping in blue 
collar-constituencies. Secondly, for electoral support, the LP 
counted on the labour movement. A divided working class could 
thus end the political monopoly of the Labour Party on the 
Witwatersrand. The menace of communism, in an attempt to 
villificate the LP in the minds of the urban electorate, 
Die Burger, 13.1.1938: "Arbeiders en Smelters" 
[editorial]. 
Ibid., 16.11.1937: "Arbeidersparty se Rol in die 
Verkiesing [editorial]. 
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provided an ideal vehicle for such an endeavour. The importance 
of the working class in South African politics were repeatedly 
stressed by G/HNP speakers from 1937 onwards.39)  
The attempted identification of the Labour Party with 
communism, based on the perceived striving towards racial 
equality of the latter, must also be explained in the above 
context. Racial equality, by being portrayed as a communistic 
striving, could serve as strategy to villificate the LP in the 
minds of the urban (Afrikaner) electorate. Prior to the general 
election of 1938, both Die Burger and Die Transvaler, in giving 
prominence to the resignation of certain individuals from the 
LP, paid special attention to the "... onafrikaanse filosofie 
... van die Arbeidersparty 	 " as•  motive for those 
resignations. "Onafrikaans", in this context, included, inter 
alia, the "... toekomsdroom [van] In swart Suid-Afrikaanse 
republiek."")  
Indicative of the essentially propagandistic nature of these 
remarks are the changed content of references to the Labour 
Party during the war years. Whereas, prior to the election of 
May 1938, the LP was described as either communistic or near-
communistic, after 1939, with it becoming involved in a 
coalition with the UP, this party, according to the HNP, had 
See, for example, a speech by H.F. Verwoerd (Die Burger, 
20.2.1937) and Malan's address to a mass meeting at 
Voortrekkerhoogte during the centenary celebrations of the 
Great Trek in 1938 (Die Burger, 18.12.1938). The HNP, in 
the general election of 1943, launched a concerted effort 
to attract support in urban, working class constituencies. 
Thirty-three candidates were nominated in constituencies 
on the Witwatersrand and in Pretoria, Durban, Port 
Elizabeth and the Cape Peninsula. See Die Transvaler, 
12.6.1943. However, as indicated by David Welsh, the 
Party, by 1944, held only four seats in major urban areas. 
See D.Welsh: Urbanisation and the Solidarity of Afrikaner 
Nationalism (The Journal of Modern African Studies, 
vol.7(2), 1969), pp. 271-272. Well known is the fact that 
the swing in . voter support for the HNP in traditional 
mining constituencies on the Witwaterstrand made possible 
the victory of the HNP in the general election of May 
1948. 
Die Burger, 28.7.1937. 
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evolved into a capitalist-oriented grouping. Die Transvaler 
declared in this regard: 
"Oral in die land sien die werkers op na die 
Herenigde Nasionale Party as die enigste party met In 
ekonomiese beleid wat die werkersbelange kan beskerm 
en wat die skreiende kapitalistiese uitbuiting van 
die 	 werker in Suid-Afrika doeltref fend kan bestry. 
Die Arbeidersparty wat onder did vaandel wou veg, het 
met die kapitalistiese luislang vrede gesluit en is 
deur hom opgesluk."41)  
Furthermore, while, before 1938, the LP was adjudged to be 
communistic as a result of its working class-identity, from 
September 1939, in aligning itself with the UP, this party had, 
as termed by Malan in April 1938, "... ver weggedryf van sy 
fondament[e].H42) The HNP, as alleged by its leaders, was thus 
the only true representative and interpreter of worker-
interests •43) 
7.4. OPPOSING COMMUNISM: IDEOLOGICAL COUNTER-BALANCING VS 
REPRESSIVE MEASURES AND IDEOLOGY VS IDEOLOGY 
Anti-communism, in so far as it related to the strategy best 
suited to oppose this ideology, proved to be a divisive issue 
in Afrikaner nationalist politics. Relative to the topic under 
discussion, differences in opinion on this issue falls into a 
special category. On the one hand, as will be illustrated, the 
lack of coalescence on the method best suited to oppose 
communism had definite tactical value. This relates to both a 
general approach as well as the promotion of specific elements 
of policy. On the other hand, differences in opinion on this 
issue as well as the ideological substructure underlying a 
Die Transvaler, 31.12.1940: "Geweeg en te Lig Bevind" 
[editorial]. See also editorials in Die Burger on 
28.4.1943: "Vir die Geldmag In Bate" and Die Transvaler, 
14.6.1943: "Die Werker Ontnugter". 
See Malan's speech in the Pretoria City Hall as reported 
by Die Burger on 28.4.1938. 
See, for example, an editorial in Die Transvaler on 
1.5.1943 entitled "Stryd in Arbeiderskringe". 
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particular approach reflected basic and fundamental differences 
in ideology between the various movements under discussion. 
The G/HNP, between 1937 and 1945, in addressing itself to the 
means most effective to oppose communism, hovered between the 
strategies of ideological counter-balancing and repression. 
Malan, as indicated, noted in 1937 that one ideology 
(communism) could only be opposed through another ideology (the 
GNP's Christian-nationalism). Although never repeated in such 
explicit terms, G/HNP-members, in referrring to communism, 
proposed specific elements of policy as required counter-
measures. Malan, for example, argued in February 1945 that a 
policy of apartheid and In omvattende skema van 
bestaansbeveiliging 	 were the only guarantees against 
perceived communism.44)  While this approach served obvious 
tactical goals (e.g. the propagation of the HNP's colour 
policy), it was, as argued in an earlier chapter, the logical 
and to be expected approach given the abnormality of the war 
situation. At other times, especially when the Party launched 
parliamentary campaigns against what was adjudged to be 
communism, it revealed a distinct preference for repressive 
measures. Compare, in this regard, the measures proposed in 
Louw's 1942 and 1943 motions against 'communism' 45) 
While the NO supported the HNP's 1943 parliamentary motion 
against communism, this identification with repressive measures 
was more the exception than the rule. Generally speaking, this 
organisation favoured a strategy of ideological counter-
balancing in opposing perceived communism. Furthermore, in 
referring to the ideological content of this last strategy, the 
NO was the first organisation to contest the relevancy and 
functional applicability of approaches by movements associated 
Hansard, 14.2.1945, co1.1397-1398. 
See Chapter Two. For the sake of completion it needs to be 
noted that the HNP, following its coming to power in 1948, 
exclusively favoured repressive measures vis a vis 
communism. Indeed, draconian measures, instituted in the 
name of opposition to communism, became a trademark of 
National Party-rule in the period after 1950. 
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with conventional parliamentary politics. Oswald Pirow, in this 
regard, declared at a public meeting in Pretoria-North during 
August 1941: "Die kommunisme kan ook nie met die partyprogram 
beveg word nie, want wilde diere kan nie met programme beveg 
word nie. Die kommunisme is 'n lewensbeskouing en kan alleen 
beveg word. deur In beter lewensbeskouing, die nasionaal-
sosia1isme."46)  To this was added during 1943: 
"Maar waarmee moet die Kommunisme beveg word? "Met 
die Program van die Herenigde Nasionale Party" se die 
een. "Met In Republiek" se In ander. "Met die Gees 
van Paul Kruger" se In derde. 
Kon Italie jets uitrig teen die [k]ommunisme met In 
party program? Kon Duitsland die Bolsjewisme 
onderdruk deur In republiek. Het Spanje se groot 
verlede hom in sy stryd teen die rooi gevaar gehelp? 
Kon Portugal, Hongarye [en] Griekeland iets uitvoer 
met daardie middel. Nee, my vriende, honderdmaal nee. 
In Lewensbeskouing soos Bolsjewisme kan alleen beveg 
word deur In ander en beter lewensbeskouing. Daardie 
beter lewensbeskouing was in al die lande wat ek 
genoem het die Nasionaal-Sosialisme. En in al daardie 
lande het die Nasionaal-Sosialisme die Kommunisme 
soos kafgeloop (sic!) dat hy nooit weer sy kop sal 
optel nie. In Suid-Afrika sal ons netso te werk moet 
gaan. 
46. Die Transvaler, 6.8.1941. 
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Daar is maar een wapen waarmee Kommunisme in Suid-
Afrika doeltref fend beveg kan word, naamlik die 
Afrikaner Nasionaal-Sosialisme. Daardie feit 16 In 
dringende verpligting op ons wat Nuwe Orde-
ondersteuners is, naamlik die verpligting om die Nuwe 
Orde beskikbaar te stel vir die Afrikaner-
Volksfront47)  in die stryd teen die kommunisme. As 
die [Herenigde Nasionale] Party nie kans sien om van 
hierdie aanbod gebruik te maak nie en hewer sy eie - 
volgens ons mening minder doeltreffende - party-
politieke wapens wil gebruik sal dit ons onverdeelde 
trou en lojaliteit teenoor die Party nie in die 
minste raak nie. Maar aan die ander kant sal dit ook 
nie die verpligting van ons afneem om die Kommunisme 
deur middel van die Afrikaner Nasionaal-Sosialisme te 
beveg nie. Die Nuwe Orde beskik oor die enigste 
doeltreffende wapen wat teen die Kommunisme aangewend 
kan word en ons gaan derhalwe in die stryd teen 
daardie internasionale verpesting die voortou 
neem."48)  
The Ossewa-Brandwag, in similar vein, vehemently criticised the 
proponents of a 'tottering' system such as democracy in 
believing that it provided a riposte against perceived 
communism. Die 0.B., in an editorial during June 1944, 
declared: 
"Kommunisme of Ossewabrandwag. Dit is die keuse 
waarvoor elke blanke in Suid-Afrika vandag staan, 
want die ou orde met sy partystelsel is iets van die 
verlede 	 "Bevryde" Italie le vandag in die 
dood[s]greep van die kommunisme. Watter sterker bewys 
is dan nog nodig vir ons stelling dat dat die keuse 
vandag in ons land nie le tussen demokratiese partye 
nie, maar tussen die wereldbeweging van kommunisme en 
die volksbeweging van die Ossewabrandwag? 
A reference to the proposed and perceived end result of 
the NO's internal subversion of the HNP. 
INCH. PV 18: C.R. Swart. File 7/1/7 : [O. Pirow]: 
"Kommunisme, Nasionaal-Sosialisme en Suid-Afrika" (undated 
pamphlet). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
324 
Maar laat ons kyk hoe die demokrate in ons land die 
pad vir die kommunisme voorberei net soos die 
demokrate dit in Europa besig is om te doen. Deur die 
demokratiese politici en hul pers word reusagtige 
pogings aangewend om die Ossewabrandwag deur boikot 
of laster te vernietig ten einde die demokrasie 
waarop hulle hul magsposisies gebou het, van 
ondergang te red. So word 0.B.-lede dag na dag 
uitgenooi tot "volkseenheid" binne die geledere van 
In demokratiese party - In demokratiese party wat 
weens sy geankerdheid aan die demokrasie saam met die 
demokrasie sal verdwyn soos alle politieke partye in 
Europa reeds verdwyn het. 
Hierdie politici verkondig aan die sosialisties-
aangelegte Afrikaner dag en nag demokrasie, terwyl 
hulle die sosialisme waarna elke Afrikaner vandag hyg 
verwerp. Nou kom die kommunisme met dieselfde 
slagspreuk van demokrasie, maar hulle bied ook 
sosialisme aan. Diegene wat deur die demokratiese 
partypropaganda aan die invloed van die 
Ossewabrandwag ontruk word, aanvaar nou die 
"demokrasie" van die kommunisme omdat hulle deur die 
sosialisme daarvan aangetrek word. Elkeen wat die 
kommunistiese koerante lees, word vandag getref deur 
die ywer vir die "demokrasie" wat daarin geopenbaar 
word. The Guardian49)  praat gereeld van die 
"demokratiese magte" wat in Suid-Afrika en Europa 
vooruitgang maak. Hy praat die taal van die politici, 
om dan met sy sosialisme die werker te yang. So berei 
die politici deur hul stryd teen die volksbeweging 
vandag die veld voor vir die kommunisme in ons 
land"'°)  (italics in the original). 
In relating this contention to the HNP, L.J. du Plessis, leader 
of the OB's Social-Economic Front, postulated in March 1945: 
"Maar dr. Malan wil dan juis 
demokrasie keer! Hoe kan 
uitdryf? Nee, op daardie pad 
soos die hele wereld vandag 
koalisie gaan vanself oor in 
gooi die kommunisme horn 
demokraties genoeg is nie. 
die kommunisme met sy 
die duiwel beelsebub 
le die rooi rewolusie, 
bewys. In Demokratiese 
kommunisme, of anders 
omver omdat hy nie 
A Johannesburg-based newspaper supportive of the CPSA. 
Die 0.B., 28.6.1944: "Word Noodwendig Bondgenote" 
[editorial]. 
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Demokrasie beteken tog regering deur die massa, en 
die massa in Suid-Afrika is •swart, en kommunisme 
staan mos vir die swart republiek! 
Nee, dr. Malan en dr. Bremer, met demokrasie gaan u 
nie die kommunisme keer nie. Demokrasie loop uit in 
kommunisme, en dit is die rewolusie, en in Suid-
Afrika die swart rewolusie. Demokrasie is die 
rewolusie! En as u anti-rewolusioner is, dan moet u 
die demokrasie laat vaar, dan moet u die massa-
heerskappy en die volksverbrokkeling laat vaar en 
kies vir volkseenheid en volksregering. 
Die enigste middel teen die rewolusie wat ons van die 
Noord-Ooste bedreig, is anti-demokrasie; dit is die 
enigste doeltreffende anti-kommunisme. Dit beteken om 
in plaas van die mensgemaakte vryheid en gelykheid 
wat wanorde en rewolusie is, terug te keer tot die 
orde wat God en die natuur gestel het in die 
geskiedenis: die gebondenheid van die mens in groepe, 
die ongelykheid binne en tussen die groepe, die gesag 
wat berus op die bestemming van die verskillende 
groepen51)  (italics in the original). 
The counterposing of different strategies, together with the 
ideological content of a particular strategy, could have been a 
function of strategy. This may have been especially the case in 
so far as it affected the battle for ideological hegemony 
within Afrikaner nationalist ranks. Both the NO and OB may have 
adjudged the lack of solidarity on the strategy best suited to 
oppose perceived communism - against the backdrop of the near-
unanimity of opinion in Afrikaner nationalist ranks on the 
irreversible rotation towards a new world order - to provide an 
ideal opportunity for the promotion of their respective causes. 
Overt anti-communism, in this sense, thus served to diminish 
the ideological attraction of old order (read parliamentary- 
based) movements. 
Oswald Pirow's remarks on opposition to communism must also be 
seen in the context of the course of World War II. Between 1941 
and 1943, when these comments were made, the Axis war machine 
was in the ascendancy. Many people, inclusive of Afrikaner 
51. See Ibid., 28.3.1945. 
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nationalists, interpreted this latter development as signifying 
the proverbial beginning of the end for the Allied alliance. 
The propagation of ideological counter-balancing as measure to 
combat communism, in this context, may have been interpreted as 
a windfall by Pirow and his compatriots for the propagation of 
the NO'S cause. 
In the case of the OB, as illustrated in a previous chapter, 
the issue of communism particularly came into focus on occasion 
when mention was made of the Arbeiderslaer. Volkssocialism and 
the Arbeidslaer, as the ideological and organisational counter-
balance to a mechanistic division of the yolk, were propagated 
as elements of an all-embracive counter-strategy to oppose 
communism. Furthermore, as indicated by Roberts and Trollip, 
Volkssocialism, as the alternative to communism, may have also 
had a part to play in OB attempts to gain converts from 
particular social classes.52)  Ideological counter-balancing, as 
strategy to oppose 'communism', thus, apart from attempting to 
belittle parliamentary-based movements, also served as 
mechanism for the attempted mobilisation of working class 
allegiance. 
On another level, differences in opinion on the strategy best 
suited to oppose communism reflected fundamental differences in 
ideological orientation. Sufficient to note in this regard is 
that while the OB and NO appealed to so-called universalistic 
qualities of the National-Socialist ideology to legitimise 
their respective ideologies, the Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale 
Party stressed the exclusivity of its ideological agenda. 
Relative to the opposing of communism, the origins and content 
of ideologies, as illustrated by earlier quotations, played a 
decisive role. Particularly the HNP, in reacting to Pirow's 
remarks on opposition to communism, stressed the 'foreign' 
content and character of the NO ideology. J.G. Strijdom noted 
in this regard: "Toe Rusland in die oorlog kom het adv. Pirow 
skielik die gevaar van die kommunisme aangegryp en die 
52. See M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip: The South African 
Opposition, 1939-1945, pp.168-169. 
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nasionaal-sosialisme voorgehou as lewensbeskouing om die 
Russiese lewensbeskouing te beveg. Ons is trots op ons eie 
lewensbeskouing en wil dit vir niks ter wereld verruil nie."53) 
A more lucid exposition of this argument was to be found in the 
editorial columns of Die Transvaler.54)  For the sake of 
clarity, a lenghty quotation from one of these editorials are 
provided: 
"Na ons oordeel is adv. Pirow se stelling dat die 
kommunisme (omdat dit In lewensbeskouing is) alleen 
bestry kan word deur nasionaal-sosialisme (omdat dit 
In beter een is) heeltemal verkeerd wat die Afrikaner 
betref. Dan verval ook sy bewering dat die Nuwe Orde-
groep die enigste wapen sou besit om die kommunisme 
doeltref fend te bestry en dat die Herenigde Nasionale 
Party en sy program daartoe onmagtig is. Dit is 
trouens nie alleen In onregmatige aanval op die Party 
nie, maar sluit in hom in In diepe belediging aan die 
Afrikanervolk. 
Dit is waar dat die nasionaal-sosialisme in Duitsland 
op staatkundige en geestelike gebied In bolwerk teen 
die kommunistiese gevaar opgewerp het. Hier in Suid-
Afrika is die posisie egter heel anders. Die 
Afrikanerdom het geen ingevoerde lewensbeskouing 
nodig vir staatkundige of geestelike weerstand teen 
die kommunisme nie. Van die armste tot die rykste dra 
hy geslagte lank al in hom die geloof, die 
lewensbeskouing wat dit onmoontlik maak vir die 
kommunisme om by hom ingang te vind! 
See Strijdom's speech at Brits during January 1942 (Die 
Transvaler, 3.1.1942). 
See Ibid., 7.8.1941: "Trek Binne die Span" and 8.8.1941: 
"Verdere Redeneringsfoute". 
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Ten eerste is sy diepgewortelde godsdienstige geloof 
In geweldige wapenrusting daarteen. Daarby kom 
tweedens sy trou en innerlike gebondenheid aan die 
Voortrekkertradisies. Om een voorbeeld te noem: Sy 
algehele 	 verwerping 	 van 	 enige 
kleurgelykstellingsbeleid maak horn nie alleen 
onvatbaar vir die kommunistiese lewensbeskouing nie, 
maar bring horn geestelik en andersins in die 
kragtigste verset daarteen. Derdens is sy 
nasionalisme, sy republikanisme, nie maar net so In 
versamelinkie van opportunistiese beleid nie. Vir die 
Afrikaner is dit In alomvattende politieke geloof. 
Dit is self lewensbeskouing"55)  (italics in the 
original). 
7.6. ANTI-COMMUNISM AND THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL 
Overt anti-communism, at times, may have also served to promote 
the image of and/or extend the continued relevancy of 
particular Afrikaner nationalist political movements. This 
statement, generally speaking, holds true for all of those 
movements under discussion. In the case of the NO and OB, 
however, it had a special significance. The entitlement of the 
New Order-mouthpiece, Die Anti-Kommunis, was not simply 
coincidental. Given the actuality of the alleged communist 
menace (partly the result of Anglo-Soviet cooperation), the NO, 
in naming its journal the way it did, may have attempted to 
exploit the almost pathological fear-complex for communism in 
Afrikaner nationalist ranks; thereby promoting its own cause as 
the movement best suited to oppose the 'red menace'. The same 
observation may well be made in connection with Pirow's 1942 
parliamentary motion on communism. 
While the NO, in disengaging itself from conventional party 
politics, lost a valuable platform for the propagation of its 
philosophies, Pirow, initially and in spite of attempts aimed 
at the marginalisation of the HNP, continued to align the New 
Order with the Party's campaign against communism. In 
announcing its withdrawal from the arena of conventional party 
politics, the NO caucus, for example, declared that in the 
55. Die Transvaler, 7.8.1941: "Trek Binne die Span". 
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general election of July 1943, "... the New Order will exert 
all its strength unconditionally against Gen. Smuts and 
Communism."56)  Pirow, as indicated earlier, also supported 
Louw's 1943 motion against communism. This identification - 
either directly or by way of association - with the mainstream 
movement against communism, once again, may have served to 
bring into focus the continued relevance of the NO as actor in 
South African politics. 
The Ossewa-Brandwag, from 1943 onwards with the formation of 
the Arbeidslaer, launched a concerted effort to gain converts 
from the ranks of the white working class. Overt anti-
communism, as indicated previously, played a prominent role in 
this regard.57)  The aimed at mobilisation of white working 
class support and, for the aims of this chapter, the functional 
role of anti-communism must be seen, foremost, in the context 
of the OB possibly experiencing a serious loss of support. The 
menace of communism, against this background, may thus well 
have served as strategy to ensure the political survival of the 
OB. Furthermore, as indicated in chapter three, the OB, in the 
period under discussion, attempted to establish so-called 
volksfronte in opposing communism. While, for various reasons, 
none of these initiatives paid off, the point in focus is the 
attempted utilisation of communiality in opinion (in this case 
over the menace of communism) to retain legitimacy as relevant 
actor in Afrikaner nationalist politics. 
In conclusion, in spite of the deficiencies of this particular 
chapter, it may be stated that overt anti-communism, in all of 
those movements under discussion, served both a tactical 
function and indicated a principled approach vis a vis the 
perceived menace of communism. The utilisation of anti- 
Cited in N.M. Stultz: Afrikaner Politics in South Africa, 
p.84. 
See Chapter Three. 
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communism, for whichever strategy, depended on a range of 
factors. Finally, anti-communism not only served to indicate 
opposition to perceived points of view identified with Marxism-
Leninism, but, as strategy, were utilised to reflect on both 
the ruling United Party as well as other contenders for the 
political loyalty of the yolk. 
u 
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APPENDIX A 
RIOUTOUS ASSEMBLIES (AMENDMENT) ACT (ACT 19/1930) 
Be it enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, the Senate 
and the House of Assembly of the Union of South Africa, as 
follows :- 
(1) Section one of the Rioutous Assemblies and Criminal Law 
Amendment Act, 1914 (Act No. 27 of 1914), is hereby amplified 
by the addition thereto, at the end thereof, of the following 
provisions:- 
(4) Whenever in the opinion of the Minister there is reason to 
apprehend that feelings of hostility would be engendered 
between the European inhabitants of the Union on the one 
hand and any other section of the inhabitants of the Union 
on the other hand - 
by the assembly of any public gathering in any 
public place to which the public has access; or 
if a particular person were to attend any such 
gathering, 
the Minister may prohibit in the manner provided in sub-
section (1) any public gathering in any place to which the 
public has access within an area and during a period 
specified in the notice prohibiting such gatherings, or he 
may by notice under his hand addressed and delivered or 
tendered to that particular person, prohibit him from 
attending any public gathering in any place to which the 
public has access within an area and during a period 
specified in such notice. 
(5) The provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) shall mutatis  
mutandis apply in respect of any gathering prohibited 
under sub-section (4). 
(6) Any person who, in contravention of a notice delivered or 
tendered to him in terms of sub-section (4) attends any 
public gathering, shall be guilty of an offence and liable 
on conviction to the penalties provided in sub-section 
(2). 
Whenever the Governor-General is of opinion that the 
publication or other dissemination of any documentary 
information (as defined in sub-section (11) is calculated 
to engender feelings of hostility between the European 
inhabitants of the Union on the one hand and any other 
section of the inhabitants of the Union on the other hand, 
he may by notice in the Gazette and in any newspaper 
circulating in the area where the said documentary 
(7) 
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information is made available to the public, prohibit any 
publication or other dissemination thereof. 
Whenever the Governor-General in terms of sub-section (7), 
prohibits the publication or other dissemination of any 
documentary information contained in a periodical 
publication, the Minister shall in addition to the notice 
referred to in sub-section (7) cause to be delivered or to 
be posted in a registered letter to the editor of such 
publication, or to any other person responsible for its 
issue, a copy of such notice, bearing his signature. 
Any person affected by a prohibition under sub-section (7) 
may, within fourteen days after the first publication of 
the notice containing such prohibition, apply to the 
Provincial or Local Division of the Supreme Court having 
jurisdiction within the area referred to in sub-section 
(7) to set such prohibition aside, and if he proves to the 
satisfaction of such Division that the documentary 
information to which such prohibition applies is not of 
such a nature that the natural and probabal result of its 
publication or other dissemination will be to engender 
feelings of hostility between the European inhabitants of 
the Union on the one hand and any other section of the 
inhabitants of the Union on the other hand, such Division 
may set such prohibition aside. 
Any person who, in contravention of a notice published in 
terms of sub-section (7) publishes or otherwise 
disseminates any documentary information or publishes or 
otherwise disseminates any matter contained therein, in 
any form, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on 
conviction to the penalties provided in sub-section (2). 
In sub-sections (7), (8), (9) and (10) the expression 
"documentary information" means any book, foreign 
magazine, pamphlet, manifesto, foreign newspaper, handbill 
or poster, or any article or advertisement, cartoon, 
picture or drawing in any periodical publication or 
newspaper. 
Whenever the Minister is satisfied that any person is in 
any area promoting feelings of hostility between the 
european inhabitants of the Union on the one hand and any 
other section of the inhabitants of the Union on the other 
hand, he may by notice under his hand, addressed and 
delivered or tendered to such person prohibit him, after a 
period stated in such notice being not less than seven 
days from the date of such delivery or tender, and during 
a period likewise stated therein, from being within an 
area defined in such notice: 
Provided that the Minister may at any time withdraw 
or modify such notice or grant such person permission 
in writing to 	 temporarily any place where he is 
not permitted to be in terms of such notice. 
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If any person to whom a notice has been delivered or 
tendered under sub-section (12) requests the Minister in 
writing to furnish him with the reasons for such notice, 
and with a statement of the information which induced the 
Minister to issue such notice, the Minister shall furnish 
such person with a statement in writing setting forth his 
reasons for such notice and so much of the information 
which induced the Minister to issue such notice as can, in 
his opinion, be disclosed without detriment to public 
policy. 
Subject to the proviso to sub-section (12) any person who 
contravenes or fails to comply with any notice delivered 
or tendered to him in terms • of sub-section (12) shall be 
guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to the 
penalties provided in sub-section (2) and he may at any 
time after the expiration of the period of not less than 
seven days stated in such notice be removed by any member 
of the police force duly authorized in writing by any 
commisioned police officer from any area wherein he is 
prohibited to be in terms of sub-section (12). 
Whenever any person who has received a notice in terms of 
sub-section (12) is necessarily put to any expense in 
order to comply with such notice, the Minister may in his 
discretion cause such expense, or any part thereof, to be 
defrayed out of public funds and may, further, in his 
discretion, cause to be paid out such funds to such person 
a reasonable subsistence allowance during any .period 
whilst such notice applies to him. 
Any person convicted of any offence under the preceding 
provisions of this section who was born outside the 
territory comprising the Union and who is deemed by the 
Governor-General to be an undesirable inhabitant of the 
Union may be removed from the Union and, pending removal, 
may be detained in custody in the manner provided for the 
detention, pending removal from the Union, of persons who 
are prohibited immigrants within the meaning of the 
Immigrants Regulation Act, 1913 (Act No. 22 of 1913), or 
any amendment thereof, and thereafter such person shall, 
for the purposes of that act or any amendment thereof be 
deemed to be a prohibited immigrant. 
Section twenty-one of the Riotous Assemblies and Criminal 
Law Amendment Act, 1914 (Act No. 27 of 1914), is hereby 
amplified by the insertion therein immediately after the word 
"prohibited" of the following words: "ar any person has been 
prohibited from attending a public gathering or from being 
within any area or has been dealt with as a prohibited 
immigrant, or the publication of any documentary information 
has been prohibited". 
This Act may be cited as the Rioutous Assemblies (Amendment) 
Act, 1930. 
Source:- Statutes of the Union of South Africa, 1930.  
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